

SMERU

The SMERU Research Institute/Lembaga Penelitian SMERU

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PELAKSANAAN SUBSIDI LANGSUNG TUNAI DI INDONESIA *THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECT CASH TRANSFER IN INDONESIA*



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Dok. SMERU/SMERU Doc.

Pada tanggal 1 Oktober 2005, pemerintah menaikkan harga BBM rata-rata di atas 120%. Kebijakan ini ditempuh antara lain untuk menyelamatkan anggaran negara. Untuk mengurangi beban yang harus dipikul oleh masyarakat miskin akibat kenaikan harga bahan bakar minyak (BBM), pemerintah pada 2005 melaksanakan Subsidi Langsung Tunai (SLT) kepada rumah tangga miskin. Rumah tangga miskin yang berhak menerima bantuan diidentifikasi oleh BPS dengan menggunakan metode uji pendekatan kemampuan (*proxy-means testing*). Setiap rumah tangga menerima Rp100.000 per bulan yang diberikan tiga bulan sekali selama satu tahun. Pada pencairan tahap pertama yang direalisasikan sejak 1 Oktober 2005, pemerintah menyediakan dana sebesar Rp4,6 triliun bagi sekitar 15,5 juta rumah tangga. Penyaluran dana dilaksanakan oleh PT Pos Indonesia melalui kantor cabangnya.

On October 2005, the government raised the price of fuel (BBM) by an average of more than 120%. This policy was taken, among other reasons, in order to safeguard the national budget. To ease the burden on the poor as the result of the increased price of fuel (BBM), the government in 2005 introduced the Direct Cash Transfer (SLT) Program for poor households. Eligible households were identified by Statistics Indonesia (BPS) through the use of a proxy-means testing methodology. Every household will receive Rp100,000 per month, paid quarterly for a period of one year. During the first distribution phase which was launched on 1 October 2005, the government provided funding of Rp4.6 trillion for approximately 15.5 million households. The disbursement of funds was undertaken by PT Pos Indonesia via its network of branches.

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Pembaca yang Budiman,

Untuk mengurangi dampak kenaikan bahan bakar minyak (BBM) terhadap masyarakat miskin dan rentan, melalui Inpres No. 12 Tahun 2005 tentang Pelaksanaan Bantuan Langsung Tunai kepada Rumah Tangga Miskin, pemerintah meluncurkan Program Subsidi Langsung Tunai (SLT). Sebagaimana juga program-program bantuan sebelumnya, pelaksanaan SLT di lapangan pun tidak luput dari berbagai kendala. Bersamaan dengan itu, muncul berbagai pendapat di masyarakat mengenai keefektifan program ini dan dampak yang ditimbulkannya.

Dalam rangka evaluasi dini dan upaya perbaikan penyaluran dana tahap berikutnya, Lembaga Penelitian SMERU melakukan dua kajian cepat (*rapid appraisal*) pelaksanaan SLT, yakni di DKI Jakarta dan di lima kabupaten/kota (Cianjur, Demak, Tapanuli Tengah, Bima, dan Ternate). Gambaran singkat hasil kajian ini dapat disimak dalam rubrik “Kajian Utama” dan “Data Berkata.”

Rubrik “Dari Lapangan” menyajikan dimensi lain dari temuan kajian ini, seperti potret layanan pencairan SLT di tingkat kantor pos cabang, prakarsa lokal dalam pelaksanaan SLT, serta profil penerima dan non-penerima SLT, untuk menambah khasanah pemahaman pembaca akan realitas pelaksanaan SLT.

Uji coba pelaksanaan program dana tunai ini, seperti yang terpapar dalam rubrik “Opini,” sudah diprakarsai di beberapa negara, di antaranya yang berhasil adalah di Mexico yang dikenal dengan Program *Progresa*. Baik langkah-langkah teknis pelaksanaan program maupun desainnya yang peka terhadap disparitas gender dalam akses terhadap sumber daya dapat dijadikan pembelajaran penting dalam pelaksanaan program serupa di Indonesia.

Catatan mengenai kelemahan dan dampak program SLT yang ditulis oleh Mimin Rukmini dan Sad Dian Utomo dari PATTIRO mengakhiri edisi ini.

Selamat membaca.

Liza Hadiz
Editor



Dear Readers,

To reduce the impact of the increased price of fuel on the poor and vulnerable, the Government of Indonesia introduced the Direct Cash Transfer Program (SLT) via Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No. 12 of 2005 on the Implementation of Cash Transfer Assistance for Poor Households. In the same manner as previous funding assistance programs, several problems emerged in the implementation of the SLT program in the field. At the same time, a variety of public opinion appeared concerning the effectiveness of programs of this nature and the impact that they have.

With the aim of conducting an early evaluation and improving the second disbursement, The SMERU Research Institute conducted two rapid appraisals of the implementation of the SLT Program, namely in DKI Jakarta and five kabupaten/kota (Cianjur, Demak, Tapanuli Tengah, Bima and Ternate). The results of these rapid appraisals can be perused in the column “Focus On” as well as “And The Data Says.”

In addition, to enrich readers’ understanding of the program’s implementation, other dimensions of the research findings are presented in the “From the Field” column, namely those concerning the SLT disbursement service of the post office branches, local initiatives in the implementation of the SLT, and the profile of SLT recipients and non-recipients.

As discussed in the “Opinion” column, cash transfer programs have been initiated in several countries. Among the successful ones is Mexico where it is known as the *Progresa* Program. The steps taken by the Government of Mexico and the program’s design that is sensitive to gender disparity in accessing resources can serve as a learning process for the design and implementation of programs of this type in Indonesia.

A note from Mimin Rukmini dan Sad Dian Utomo of PATTIRO on the weaknesses and effect of the SLT Program completes this edition of the newsletter.

We hope you enjoy this edition.

SMERU adalah sebuah lembaga penelitian independen yang melakukan penelitian dan pengkajian kebijakan publik secara profesional dan proaktif, serta menyediakan informasi akurat, tepat waktu, dengan analisis yang objektif mengenai berbagai masalah sosial-ekonomi dan kemiskinan yang dianggap mendesak dan penting bagi rakyat Indonesia.

Melihat tantangan yang dihadapi masyarakat Indonesia dalam upaya penanggulangan kemiskinan, perlindungan sosial, perbaikan sektor sosial, pengembangan demokrasi, dan pelaksanaan desentralisasi dan otonomi daerah, maka kajian independen sebagaimana yang dilakukan oleh SMERU selama ini terus dibutuhkan.

SMERU is an independent institution for research and policy studies which professionally and proactively provides accurate and timely information as well as objective analysis on various socio-economic and poverty issues considered most urgent and relevant for the people of Indonesia.

With the challenges facing Indonesian society in poverty reduction, social protection, improvement in social sector, development in democratization processes, the implementation of decentralization and regional autonomy, there continues to be a pressing need for independent studies of the kind that SMERU has been providing.

Newsletter SMERU diterbitkan untuk berbagi gagasan dan mengundang diskusi mengenai isu-isu sosial, ekonomi dan kemiskinan di Indonesia dari berbagai sudut pandang. Temuan, pandangan, dan interpretasi yang dimuat dalam Newsletter SMERU sepenuhnya menjadi tanggung jawab penulis dan di luar tanggung jawab SMERU atau badan penyanggah dana SMERU. Silahkan mengirim komentar Anda. Jika Anda ingin terdaftar dalam mailing list kami, kunjungi website SMERU atau kirim e-mail Anda kepada kami.

The SMERU newsletter is published to share ideas and to invite discussions on social, economic, and poverty issues in Indonesia from a wide range of viewpoints. The findings, views, and interpretations published in the articles are those of the authors and should not be attributed to SMERU or any of the agencies providing financial support to SMERU. Comments are welcome. If you would like to be included on our mailing list, please note our address and telephone number.

The SMERU RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Jl. Pandeglang No. 30 Menteng, Jakarta 10310 Indonesia
Phone: 6221-3193 6336; Fax: 6221-3193 0850
e-mail: smeru@smeru.or.id; website: www.smeru.or.id

DEWAN REDAKSI:

Dr. Sudarno Sumarto, Dr. Asep Suryahadi, Dr. Syaikhul Usman, Sri Kusumastuti Rahayu, Nuning Akhmadi

PUBLICATION TEAM:

Editor: Liza Hadiz; Assistant Editor: R. Justin Sodo; Translator: Chris Stewart; Graphic Designer: Novita Maizir; Circulation: Mona Sintia

KAJIAN CEPAT PELAKSANAAN SUBSIDI LANGSUNG TUNAI TAHUN 2005 DI INDONESIA: STUDI KASUS DI DKI JAKARTA DAN LIMA KABUPATEN/KOTA LAINNYA*

A RAPID APPRAISAL OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2005 DIRECT CASH TRANSFER IN INDONESIA: A CASE STUDY IN DKI JAKARTA AND FIVE OTHER KABUPATEN/KOTA*



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Pengalaman di masa lalu menunjukkan bahwa pelaksanaan penyaluran dana kompensasi subsidi BBM selalu menghadapi berbagai permasalahan. Oleh karena itu, diperlukan evaluasi dini terhadap pelaksanaan program SLT guna mencari jalan keluar dari berbagai permasalahan dan kelemahan teknis di lapangan. Untuk itu Lembaga Penelitian SMERU melakukan dua penelitian cepat (*rapid appraisal*) terhadap pelaksanaan SLT. Penelitian pertama dilakukan di Provinsi DKI Jakarta pada 12-14 Oktober 2005. Penelitian kedua dilaksanakan pada 22 November-3 Desember 2005 di lima kabupaten/kota, yaitu Kabupaten Cianjur (Jawa Barat), Kabupaten Demak (Jawa Tengah), Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah (Sumatera Utara), Kabupaten Bima (NTB), dan Kota Ternate (Maluku Utara). Penelitian tersebut dimaksudkan untuk memperoleh gambaran aktual pelaksanaan SLT tahap pertama agar dapat dijadikan bahan pembelajaran bagi perbaikan penyaluran SLT tahap berikutnya.


Experience in the past shows that the disbursement of BBM compensation funds is always faced with a variety of problems. For that reason, an early evaluation of the implementation of the Direct Cash Transfer (SLT) Program was needed in order to look for a solution for the various problems and technical weaknesses in the field. Therefore, the SMERU Research Institute conducted two rapid appraisals on the implementation of the SLT Program. The initial research was conducted in DKI Jakarta from 12-14 October 2005. The second research study was undertaken from 22 November-3 December 2005 in five kabupaten/kota, namely Kabupaten Cianjur (West Java), Kabupaten Demak (Central Java), Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah (North Sumatra), Kabupaten Bima (NTB), and Kota Ternate (North Maluku). This research was intended to obtain an actual picture of the implementation of the first tranche of the SLT in order to provide lessons for the improvement of the disbursements of SLT funds in the following tranches.

*Tulisan ini dicuplik dari ringkasan eksekutif laporan penelitian 'Kajian Cepat Pelaksanaan Subsidi Langsung Tunai Tahun 2005 di Indonesia: Studi Kasus di Lima Kabupaten/Kota' oleh Hastuti et al, Lembaga Penelitian SMERU, Jakarta 2006.

*This article is an extract from the executive summary of the research report 'A Rapid Appraisal of the Implementation of the 2005 Direct Cash Transfer Program in Indonesia: A Case Study in Five Kabupaten/Kota' by Hastuti et al, The SMERU Research Institute, Jakarta 2006.

Pelaksanaan penyaluran dana kompensasi BBM menghadapi banyak permasalahan.

Disbursement of BBM compensation funds is faced with a variety of problems.



Dok. SMERU/SMERU Doc

Kedua penelitian tersebut menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif, dengan melakukan wawancara mendalam terhadap rumah tangga penerima, rumah tangga bukan penerima, dan berbagai informan kunci di berbagai tingkat pemerintahan. Khusus pada penelitian kedua, dilakukan lima diskusi terarah atau *Focus Group Discussions* (FGD) dengan peserta aparat/tokoh kabupaten/kota, 10 FGD aparat/tokoh desa/kelurahan, dan 12 FGD rumah tangga penerima. Analisis yang digunakan adalah analisis kualitatif yang dilengkapi dengan analisis kuantitatif terhadap data penargetan.

Beberapa hasil kajian cepat yang dilakukan SMERU diuraikan pada bagian berikut.

Keterbatasan Waktu dan Kesalahan Sasaran

Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa waktu yang terbatas pada saat tahap perencanaan menyebabkan program pelaksanaan SLT terkesan “dipaksakan”. Keterbatasan waktu tersebut turut memengaruhi keberhasilan pelaksanaan masing-masing tahapan dan keseluruhan program.

Dalam penargetan ditemui adanya kesalahan sasaran (*mistargeting*) meskipun dalam tingkat yang relatif rendah. Hal ini terindikasi dari adanya rumah tangga tidak miskin yang menjadi penerima SLT (*leakage*) dan adanya rumah tangga miskin yang belum menjadi penerima (*undercoverage*).

Beberapa faktor yang diperkirakan melatarbelakangi kesalahan sasaran adalah: 1) tidak meratanya kapasitas pencacah yang tidak ditunjang oleh pelatihan dan bimbingan yang memadai; 2) cukup tingginya subyektivitas pencacah dan juga ketua-ketua SLS (Satuan Lingkungan Setempat)¹ yang bertugas mendaftarkan rumah tangga miskin; 3) prosedur penyaringan rumah tangga miskin tidak dilakukan secara seksama; 4) pencacah tidak selalu mendatangi rumah tangga yang dicacah; 5) terdapat indikasi adanya penjatahan jumlah rumah tangga target sampai di tingkat rukun tetangga; 6) indikator kemiskinan yang digunakan kurang sensitif dalam menangkap kondisi sosial-ekonomi

¹ SLS adalah satuan yang digunakan sebagai basis wilayah kerja untuk pendataan rumah tangga. Di sebagian besar wilayah Indonesia, SLS terkecil adalah Rukun Tetangga (RT).

Both studies used a qualitative approach by conducting in-depth interviews with recipient households, non-recipient households and a number of key informants at various levels of government administration. In the second study, specifically, five Focus Group Discussions (FGD) were conducted with participants from kabupaten/kota authorities as well as ten FGDs with village authorities and 12 with recipient households. A qualitative analysis was used with a supplementary quantitative analysis of the targeting data.

Some of the results of the rapid appraisals conducted by SMERU are discussed in the following section.

Time Constraints and Mistargeting

The research results show that the limited time available for the program design phase made the SLT implementation seem “rushed”. The time limitation, in turn, impacted on the success of the implementation of each phase and on the whole program.

This study found mistargeting although the incidence was relatively low. This is indicated from the number of non-poor households that became SLT recipients (*leakage*) and the number of poor households that were not recipients (*undercoverage*).

Several factors that are believed to be behind the mistargeting are: 1) the different capacities of enumerators who were not supported with adequate training and guidance; 2) the rather high level of subjectivity of the enumerators and also the local area unit (SLS)¹ heads who had the task of registering poor households; 3) the screening procedure for poor households was not conducted carefully; 4) enumerators did not always visit the households that were enumerated; 5) indications of a quota for the total number of target households down to the RT level; 6) poverty indicators that were not sensitive enough to capture the whole socio-economic condition of households; 7) an incomplete choice of answers in the questionnaire; and 8) the concept of the household or family as the SLT recipient unit was not clearly determined.

¹ SLS is a unit that is used as the basis of the working area for the household data collection. In most parts of Indonesia the smallest SLS is the Rukun Tetangga (RT) or neighborhood unit.

rumah tangga secara utuh; 7) terdapat pilihan jawaban yang tidak lengkap dalam kuesioner; 8) konsep keluarga atau rumah tangga sebagai unit penerima SLT tidak ditetapkan secara tegas.

Analisis kuantitatif menunjukkan bahwa: 1) alokasi penargetan kewilayahan sampai tingkat kecamatan relatif cukup baik (berkorelasi dengan jumlah penduduk miskin 65,8%), artinya kecamatan yang jumlah penduduk miskinnya lebih banyak mendapat KKB (Kartu Kompensasi BBM) yang lebih banyak; 2) penargetan di tingkat rumah tangga menunjukkan hasil tingkat ketepatan sasaran yang bervariasi, yakni relatif rendah atau relatif tinggi; 3) pengecekan terhadap isian formulir rumah tangga responden menunjukkan tingkat kesesuaian sebesar 78,3% tetapi bervariasi antarwilayah dan antarwilayah; dan 4) simulasi terhadap hasil pendataan ulang responden menunjukkan bahwa titik potong (*cut-off point*) 0,2 yang digunakan BPS untuk menetapkan target terlalu rendah sehingga rumah tangga yang kurang layak dapat menjadi penerima; 5) terdapat indikasi bahwa pendaftaran rumah tangga susulan kurang selektif.

Distribusi KKB, Pencairan Dana, dan Penggunaannya

Setelah rumah tangga penerima SLT ditentukan, mereka diberi kartu identitas berupa KKB. Penyerahan KKB kepada rumah tangga penerima bervariasi antarwilayah. Ada yang diserahkan oleh petugas BPS, ada juga yang melalui pemerintah daerah (pemda) setempat atau pencacah. Cara penyerahannya pun berbeda-beda, ada yang dilakukan dari rumah ke rumah, ada juga yang secara kolektif dengan mengumpulkan penerima di lokasi tertentu.

Permasalahan yang muncul dalam pendistribusian KKB antara lain: 1) ketidakcocokan identitas penerima dengan data yang tercantum dalam KKB; 2) kasus penundaan pendistribusian KKB atas permintaan masyarakat; 3) kasus pungutan uang transpor oleh petugas distribusi kepada penerima; 4) beberapa KKB yang dibatalkan atau ditahan belum diserahkan kepada BPS; 5) informasi tentang KKB yang dibatalkan tidak selalu diketahui oleh kantor pos.

Sementara itu, pada tahap pencairan dana SLT ditemukan beberapa hambatan, antara lain: 1) minimnya jumlah petugas di setiap kantor pos; 2) penerima yang tinggal jauh harus mengeluarkan biaya transpor yang cukup memberatkan; 3) kecenderungan penerima untuk mengambil dana pada hari pertama pencairan menyebabkan antrean panjang; 4) di beberapa daerah, tidak jelasnya dana operasional menjadi alasan tidak dilakukannya pelayanan keliling atau penyediaan pos pelayanan tambahan.

The quantitative analysis shows that: 1) the district targeting allocation to the kecamatan level was relatively good (correlation of 65.8% with the number of poor), meaning kecamatan that have more poor people received more BBM Compensation Cards (KKB); 2) targeting at the household level shows varying level of accuracy, being relatively low or relatively high; 3) verification of the completion of household respondent forms shows a high level of consistency (78.3%) but with inter-variable and inter-district variations; 4) a simulation of the results of the data collection on respondents shows that the cut-off point of 0.2 that was used by BPS to determine the target was too low, with the result that unsuitable households could become recipients; and 5) there were indications that supplementary household registration was less selective.

The Distribution of KKB Cards, Funds Disbursement and Its Uses

After SLT recipient households were determined, they were issued with an identity card in the form of a KKB. The delivery of KKBs to recipient households varied between districts. Some were delivered by BPS officials, some also via the local government or enumerators. The means of delivery also varied, some were done door-to-door, some were also done collectively by gathering recipients at a certain location.

The problems that emerged in the distribution of KKB cards included: 1) inconsistency between the identity of the recipient with the data included on the KKB; 2) cases of delays in the distribution of KKB cards at the request of the community; 3) cases of levies for transport costs by officials distributing cards to recipients; 4) several KKB cards that were cancelled or confiscated not yet being delivered to BPS; and 5) information on cancelled KKB cards was not always reported to the post office.

Meanwhile, several impediments were found in the disbursement phase of the SLT funds, including: 1) the minimal number of officials in each post office; 2) recipients who live far away have to pay for the cost of transport which is quite a burden for them; 3) the tendency for recipients to collect the funds on the first day of distribution resulted in long queues; and 4) the lack of clarity on operational funds became the reason for not undertaking mobile services or the provision of additional service posts in several regions.



FGD dengan tokoh desa di Kabupaten Demak.

FGD with village authorities in Kabupaten Demak.

Dok. SMERU/SMERU Doc.

Penunjukan PT Pos Indonesia sebagai pelaksana pencairan dana SLT dinilai tepat oleh banyak kalangan karena berpengalaman luas dalam melayani transfer dana masyarakat, kantornya terdapat di sebagian besar kecamatan, dan dinilai relatif bersih dari penyelewengan. Di beberapa daerah yang proses pencairannya berjalan lancar, kantor pos setempat melakukan beberapa hal, yaitu: 1) menetapkan jadwal pencairan yang disosialisasikan dengan baik; 2) melakukan koordinasi dengan aparat setempat; 3) menambah pos atau loket pembayaran, atau melakukan jemput bola untuk wilayah yang relatif jauh.

Penerima SLT umumnya mengambil sendiri dana SLT-nya, kecuali yang sakit atau jompo. Sebagian besar penerima mengambil dana hanya dengan menunjukkan KKB. Terdapat juga wilayah yang mensyaratkan adanya bukti diri (KTP) yang tidak selalu dimiliki oleh penerima. Kondisi ini, dimanfaatkan oleh sebagian aparat desa/kelurahan untuk menarik biaya pembuatan bukti diri yang lebih mahal.

Penerima SLT memperoleh dana dari kantor pos dalam jumlah penuh Rp300.000. Di sejumlah lokasi ditemui adanya pungutan di tingkat masyarakat, baik sukarela maupun tidak, antara lain untuk aparat desa/kelurahan, pencacah, ketua RT, atau rumah tangga miskin lain yang tidak menerima SLT. Penerima umumnya menggunakan dana untuk keperluan konsumsi, hanya sebagian kecil yang menggunakan untuk membayar hutang, biaya berobat, keperluan anak sekolah, tambahan modal, atau disimpan.

Sosialisasi Program

Permasalahan yang muncul menyangkut penargetan dan penyaluran dana terkait dengan lemahnya sosialisasi program. Lemahnya sosialisasi terjadi di semua tahapan pelaksanaan, mulai dari proses pendataan hingga mekanisme pengaduan. Sosialisasi kepada masyarakat bisa dikatakan tidak dilakukan. Meskipun sosialisasi untuk jajaran pemda dilakukan, namun agak terlambat dan informasinya hanya tentang rencana pendataan. Hal ini diperparah dengan tidak tersedianya petunjuk pelaksanaan program yang menyeluruh di tingkat pemda. Bahkan beberapa surat yang terkait dengan pelaksanaan SLT dari pemerintah pusat yang sebenarnya dapat dijadikan dasar hukum pemda setempat, seperti Inpres, SK Menko Kesra dan SK Mendagri, terlambat datang atau bahkan tidak diterima. Di satu pihak, minimnya sosialisasi pada tahap pendataan dapat mengurangi munculnya *moral hazard* dalam penentuan target. Di pihak lain, kurangnya sosialisasi secara menyeluruh justru mendorong munculnya salah persepsi dan kecemburuan sosial.

The appointment of PT Pos Indonesia as the distribution agent for SLT funds was considered appropriate by many because they have broad experience in servicing community funds transfers, their offices are located in most kecamatan and they are considered relatively free of corruption. In several regions where the disbursement process ran smoothly, the local post office did the following: 1) determined a distribution schedule that was well publicized; 2) coordinated with local authorities; 3) added posts or payment counters, or were pro-active for districts that were relatively far away.

In general, recipients collected the SLT funds themselves, with the exception of the elderly and the sick. Most recipients collected the funds by presenting only the KKB card. Some districts also required the presentation of identification (KTP) that recipients do not always have. This condition was exploited by some village authorities by collecting payment for preparing identification cards which was fixed at a higher price.

SLT recipients obtained the full amount of Rp300,000 in funds from the post office. In several locations, levies were applied at the community level, both voluntary and not, including for village authorities, enumerators, RT heads or other poor households who were not SLT recipients. In general, recipients used the funds for consumption needs; only a small part was used to pay off debt, pay for the cost of medical treatment and school children's needs or used as additional capital or saving.

Socialization of the Program

The emergence of various problems of targeting and distribution of funds was associated with the weakness of the socialization of the program. This occurred at all stages of the implementation, starting from the data collection to the complaint mechanism. It could be said that the socialization to the communities did not take place. Although the socialization activity for a series of local government authorities was undertaken, it was rather late and the information was only on the data collection plan. This was made worse by the unavailability of comprehensive program operational guidelines at the local government level. In fact, several documents from the central government related to the SLT Program that could actually provide the legal basis for local government (such as Inpres as well as directives from the Coordinating Minister for Peoples' Welfare and Minister for Home Affairs) were late in arriving or, in fact, were not received at all. On one hand, the minimal socialization during the data collection phase could reduce the emergence of the moral hazard in the target determination phase. On the other hand, the lack of a comprehensive program socialization effort gave rise to misperceptions and social jealousy.



Dok. SMERU/SMERU Doc.

Hasil FGD menunjukkan bahwa secara umum kepuasan penerima terhadap pelaksanaan SLT adalah tinggi.

The FGD results show that, in general, there was a high level of recipient satisfaction with the implementation of the SLT Program.

Secara kelembagaan, di daerah tidak ada yang merasa bertanggung jawab untuk melakukan sosialisasi, sedangkan Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informasi (Menkominfo) sebagai penanggung jawab sosialisasi nasional hanya melakukan sosialisasi melalui media cetak dan media elektronik yang jangkauannya terbatas dan hanya dapat diakses oleh kalangan tertentu. Upaya penyebaran brosur tentang kriteria rumah tangga miskin pun, selain datangnya terlambat (21 Nopember 2005), jumlahnya terbatas, juga kurang informatif bagi masyarakat umum.

Selain itu, kelembagaan yang menangani pengaduan dan pemantauan program juga tidak berjalan di semua wilayah meskipun terdapat Surat Mendagri No. 541/2475/SJ dan Surat Menko Kesra No. B.244/Menko/Kesra/IX/2005. Posko SLT juga ditemukan di Demak dan Ternate, tetapi itupun hanya di tingkat kabupaten/kota.² Keberadaan posko dan mekanisme pengaduan yang tersedia tidak diinformasikan secara luas kepada masyarakat sehingga terjadi variasi jalur pengaduan.

Adanya kesalahan sasaran (*mistargeting*) yang diperparah dengan sosialisasi yang tidak memadai, khususnya tentang kriteria target dan tujuan program, telah memicu munculnya ketidakpuasan masyarakat. Ketidakpuasan masyarakat diungkapkan dalam berbagai bentuk, mulai dari keluhan, protes atau demonstrasi, melakukan ancaman, hingga pengrusakan. Pengaduan yang berbentuk aksi protes dan ancaman biasanya ditangani oleh kepala desa/lurah dibantu oleh aparat keamanan/kepolisian. Di beberapa daerah aparat pemda kabupaten/kota dan kecamatan serta BPS juga turun tangan. Aksi protes dan ancaman dapat diredam dengan: 1) dibukanya pendaftaran susulan bagi masyarakat yang merasa berhak; 2) adanya kesediaan penerima SLT untuk membagi sebagian dana kepada rumah tangga miskin lainnya; 3) ada pejabat yang menjanjikan bahwa pendaftar susulan akan menerima SLT pada tahap berikutnya.

Koordinasi dan Pelaksanaan

Secara umum, koordinasi dan komunikasi pelaksanaan SLT dinilai lemah. Indikasinya antara lain: 1) dokumen dari pusat tentang SLT terlambat atau bahkan tidak diterima pemda; 2) pendataan rumah tangga miskin dilakukan sebelum Inpres No. 12 Tahun 2005 tentang Pelaksanaan Bantuan Langsung Tunai kepada Rumah Tangga Miskin keluar; 3) Rakor tingkat menteri Bidang Kesra (16 September 2005) kurang tepat dalam menafsirkan Inpres tersebut, yakni tugas Departemen Dalam Negeri (Depdagri) sebagai koordinator pelaksanaan dan pengawasan berubah menjadi pengawasan dan penanganan pengaduan. Oleh karenanya, salah satu fungsi pemda sebagai kepanjangan tangan Depdagri untuk mengkoordinasikan pelaksanaan SLT tidak dilakukan dan sebagian pemda merasa tidak dilibatkan secara resmi dalam pelaksanaan SLT. Sebagian pemda juga mempertanyakan komitmen pemerintah pusat atas pelaksanaan politik desentralisasi dan otonomi daerah karena SLT bersifat sentralistik dan dilaksanakan oleh institusi yang juga sentralistik (BPS dan PT Pos Indonesia).

²Khusus di DKI Jakarta, posko tersedia hingga di tingkat kelurahan.

Institutionally, in the regions, no-one felt responsible for conducting the socialization of the program, while the Ministry for Communications and Information, as the Ministry responsible for national socialization, only conducted the socialization of this program through the print and electronic media that has a limited reach and can only be accessed by certain groups. The dissemination of brochures on the the criteria for poor households, apart from arriving late (21 November 2005) and in limited numbers, was also less than informative for the general public.

In addition, the institutions that handled complaints and program monitoring were also not operating in all regions although directives had been issued by the Minister for Home Affairs (No. 541/2475/SJ) and Coordinating Minister for Peoples' Welfare (No. B.244/Menko/Kesra/IX/2005). SLT coordinating posts were also found in Demak and Ternate, and that was only at the kabupaten/kota level.² Information on the existence of poskos and the available complaint mechanism was also not widely disseminated to the community, hence causing variations in the complaints channel.

Mistargeting that was worsened by an inadequate program socialization, especially on the target criteria and program objectives, triggered the emergence of community dissatisfaction. Community dissatisfaction was expressed in various forms, starting from complaints, protests or demonstrations, making threats to vandalism. Complaints in the form of protest actions and threats were usually handled by the village head assisted by security/police authorities. In several regions, the kabupaten/kota and kecamatan authorities as well as BPS also intervened. Protest actions and threats were stifled by: 1) the opening of supplementary registrations for those who felt they were eligible; 2) the willingness of SLT recipients to share some of the funds with other poor households; and 3) officials who promised that supplementary registrations would receive the SLT in the following tranche.

Implementation and Coordination

In general, the coordination and communication on the implementation of the SLT was considered weak. This was indicated by: 1) documents from the central government on the SLT were late or were never received by the local government; 2) data collection on poor households was conducted before Inpres No. 12 of 2005 on the Implementation of Cash Transfer Assistance for Poor Households was issued; 3) the coordinating meeting at the ministerial level within the Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare (16 September 2005) was imprecise in interpreting this Inpres, namely the duty of the Ministry of Home Affairs which was initially as the coordinator of implementation and supervision was later shifted into supervision and complaint handling. For that reason, one of the functions of the local government as the instrument of the Ministry of Home Affairs to coordinate the SLT implementation was not carried out and some local governments felt they were not officially involved in the implementation of the SLT program. Some local governments also questioned the commitment of central government to the implementation of political decentralization and regional autonomy because the SLT is centralized and implemented by centralized institutions (BPS and PT Pos Indonesia).

²Only in DKI Jakarta, coordinating posts are available up to the kelurahan level.

Sifat tertutupan proses pendataan dan penetapan penerima SLT dirasakan bertentangan dengan proses demokratisasi yang tengah dibangun. Dalam kaitan ini terdapat konflik antara larangan BPS mempublikasikan identitas responden (UU No. 16 Tahun 1997 tentang Statistik) dengan kebutuhan demokrasi untuk mengkonsultasikan calon penerima SLT dengan publik lokal. Ketika hasil pendataan rumah tangga miskin menimbulkan keresahan sosial-politik barulah pemerintah pusat secara serius meminta pemda melakukan langkah-langkah “pengamanan,” antara lain melalui instruksi pembentukan posko pengaduan. Dalam hal ini pemda terposisikan seolah-olah sebagai “pemadam kebakaran”.

Pada dasarnya, kesederhanaan birokrasi penyelenggaraan program SLT yang diserahkan kepada BPS dan PT Pos Indonesia merupakan kunci keefisienan pelaksanaan program ini. Persoalan kemudian muncul lebih karena kedua pelaksana tersebut adalah instansi yang para karyawannya biasa bekerja dengan pendekatan teknis, sementara kemiskinan merupakan persoalan yang berdimensi jamak dan memerlukan pendekatan sosial, ekonomi, dan politik secara komprehensif.

Pendapat Masyarakat tentang SLT

Hasil FGD menunjukkan bahwa secara umum tingkat kepuasan penerima terhadap pelaksanaan SLT adalah paling tinggi dibanding tingkat kepuasan aparat/tokoh desa/kelurahan atau kabupaten/kota. Meskipun demikian, penerima maupun aparat/tokoh di tingkat desa/kelurahan dan kabupaten/kota menilai sosialisasi merupakan aspek yang paling tidak memuaskan. Sedangkan cara pencairan dana dan pembagian KKB merupakan aspek yang paling memuaskan. Hasil wawancara mendalam terhadap 30 rumah tangga bukan penerima juga menunjukkan kondisi tingkat kepuasan yang tidak jauh berbeda.

Penelitian cepat SMERU menunjukkan adanya perbedaan penilaian terhadap keberadaan SLT. Sebagian aparat kurang setuju karena menganggap SLT sebagai “program yang hanya memberi ikan, bukannya kail”. Sebagian aparat lainnya setuju sepanjang pelaksanaannya tepat sasaran. Sementara itu, masyarakat penerima merasa terbantu dengan keberadaan SLT dan mereka menilai keberadaan program tidak memengaruhi etos kerja. ■ **Tim Peneliti SMERU**

The non-transparent nature of the data collection process and the determination of SLT recipients was felt to be in contradiction with the democratization process that is still underway. In this regard, there was a conflict between the law that prevents the publication of respondents’ identities (Law No. 16 of 1997 on Statistics) with the democratic need to consult with the local public on intending SLT recipients. When the results of the data collection on poor households gave rise to socio-political unrest, the central government seriously asked local governments to take “security” measures, including through the formation of complaints poskos. In this regard, local government was put in the position of being a trouble-shooter.

Basically, the simplicity of the bureaucracy in managing the SLT Program that was assigned to BPS and PT Pos Indonesia is the key to the efficiency of the administration of this program. The problem that then arose was more the result of these two program implementers being agencies whose employees normally work by applying a technical approach, while poverty is a multidimensional problem that needs a comprehensive social, economic and political approach.

Community Opinion About the SLT Program

The FGD results show that, in general, the level of recipient satisfaction with the implementation of the SLT Program was higher than the satisfaction level of village or kabupaten/kota authorities/figures. Nevertheless, both recipients as well as authorities at the village and kabupaten/kota level assess the socialization to be the least satisfying aspect. Meanwhile, the method of funding disbursement and distribution of KKB cards was the most satisfying aspect. The results of in-depth interviews of 30 non-recipient households also shows a level of satisfaction that is not very different.

*SMERU’s rapid appraisal showed differences in how the SLT Program is viewed. Some authorities were not in agreement because they considered it to be a “program that only provided a fish rather than a fishhook”. Some other authorities agree as long as there is no mistargeting in its implementation. Meanwhile, the recipient community feels assisted by the provision of the SLT and they believe the program does not impact on their work ethic. ■ **Tim Peneliti SMERU***



Dok. SMERU/SMERU Doc.

Salah satu keluarga miskin di Kabupaten Bima yang tidak terseleksi sebagai penerima SLT.

One poor family in Kabupaten Bima that was not selected as an SLT recipient.

KETEPATAN SASARAN SUBSIDI LANGSUNG TUNAI (SLT) TARGETING ACCURACY OF THE DIRECT CASH TRANSFER PROGRAM



Dok. SMERU/SMERU Doc.

Untuk melihat gambaran pengaruh kebijakan kenaikan harga BBM dan pemberian SLT kepada rumah tangga miskin terhadap tingkat kemiskinan, Lembaga Penelitian SMERU melakukan simulasi sederhana dengan menggunakan data Susenas Modul Konsumsi 2004 dari rumah tangga panel seperti ditunjukkan dalam Tabel 1. Berdasarkan tingkat kemiskinan BPS 2004 sebesar 16,66%, SMERU menghitung garis kemiskinan nasional dengan hasil Rp110.353/kapita/bulan. Selanjutnya, dengan memperhitungkan tingkat kenaikan BBM pada 1 Oktober 2005, nilai tersebut disesuaikan sehingga diperoleh garis kemiskinan baru, yakni Rp112.909/kapita/bulan. Ketika garis kemiskinan yang baru diterapkan, estimasi tingkat kemiskinan nasional meningkat hingga sekitar 22% atau sekitar 45 juta jiwa.

To examine the impact of the BBM price increase policy and the provision of the SLT for poor households on the poverty level, The SMERU Research Institute conducted a simple simulation by using data from the Susenas Consumption Module 2004 from the panel of households, as shown in Table 1. Based on the BPS 2004 poverty level of 16.66%, SMERU calculated a national poverty line of Rp110,353/capita/month. Furthermore, by taking into account the BBM price rise on 1 October 2005, this value was then adjusted in order to obtain a new poverty line, namely Rp112,909/capita/month. When the new poverty line was applied, the estimated national poverty level increased to around 22% or approximately 45 million people.

Tabel 1. Simulasi Estimasi Tingkat Kemiskinan Nasional Akibat Kenaikan Harga BBM dan Pemberian SLT kepada Rumah Tangga Miskin

Table 1. Simulation of the National Poverty Level Estimation Resulting from the Fuel (BBM) Price Increase and the SLT Provision for Poor Households

Uraian Description	Garis Kemiskinan (Rp/kapita/bulan) Poverty Line (Rp/capita/month)	Tingkat Kemiskinan (%) Poverty Rate (%)
Berdasarkan tingkat kemiskinan BPS 2004 (16,66%) Based on the BPS 2004 poverty rate (16.66%)	110.353	16,66
Disesuaikan dengan persentase kenaikan harga BBM*) Adjusted by the percentage fuel (BBM) price rise*	122.909	22,05
Pemberian SLT Rp100.000/bulan/rumah tangga Provision of SLT of Rp100,000/month/household		
• 100% sampai ke sasaran / 100% reaching the target		17,87
• 90% sampai ke sasaran / 90% reaching the target		18,23
• 80% sampai ke sasaran / 80% reaching the target		18,73
• 70% sampai ke sasaran / 70% reaching the target		19,11
• 60% sampai ke sasaran / 60% reaching the target		19,48
• 50% sampai ke sasaran / 50% reaching the target		20,05

*) Kenaikan harga BBM: bensin: 87,5%, solar: 104,8%, dan minyak tanah: 185,7%.

*) The fuel price rise: petrol: 87.5%, diesel: 104.8% and kerosene: 185.7%.

Sumber: Simulasi SMERU dengan menggunakan data Susenas Panel Modul Konsumsi 2004/Source: SMERU's simulation by using data from Susenas Consumption Module 2004.

Kebijakan pemberian SLT bagi rumah tangga miskin diharapkan dapat menekan peningkatan proporsi penduduk miskin. Namun, hasil simulasi menunjukkan bahwa meskipun ketepatan sasaran adalah 100%, tingkat kemiskinan (17,9%) masih lebih tinggi daripada keadaan sebelum kenaikan harga BBM (16,7%). Tingkat kemiskinan akan semakin tinggi jika tingkat ketepatan semakin rendah.

Hasil simulasi tersebut menunjukkan bahwa ketepatan sasaran sangat menentukan dampak SLT terhadap tingkat kemiskinan. Sementara itu, masalah ketepatan sasaran sendiri dipengaruhi oleh mekanisme penentuan/identifikasi sasaran. Mengingat sasaran program adalah rumah tangga miskin, kriteria dan mekanisme penentuan atau pengukuran kemiskinan menjadi sangat penting, walaupun konsep dan pengukuran kemiskinan itu sendiri masih diperdebatkan oleh banyak kalangan.

Pengukuran kemiskinan dapat dibedakan dalam dua tingkatan, ukuran kemiskinan makro dan mikro. Ukuran kemiskinan makro biasanya diperlukan untuk penargetan wilayah (*geographic targeting*), sedangkan ukuran kemiskinan mikro dibutuhkan untuk sasaran rumah tangga/keluarga. Pemetaan kemiskinan (*poverty mapping*), baik yang dihasilkan oleh BPS maupun SMERU untuk seluruh wilayah Indonesia menyediakan ukuran-ukuran kemiskinan untuk berbagai tingkatan wilayah dari provinsi sampai dengan desa/kelurahan,¹ yang merupakan salah satu alat yang dapat digunakan untuk menentukan penargetan kewilayahan. Sedangkan untuk pengukuran kemiskinan mikro, yaitu rumah tangga/keluarga, dibutuhkan suatu kriteria operasional yang dapat dengan mudah digunakan untuk mengidentifikasi siapa dan bagaimana orang miskin. Untuk tujuan tersebut, umumnya digunakan pendekatan karakteristik rumah tangga.

Selama ini, kriteria keluarga prasejahtera² dari Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional (BKKBN) banyak digunakan dalam penentuan sasaran penerima bantuan. Namun, untuk penentuan sasaran penerima program SLT kali ini, digunakan kriteria miskin dari Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) yang ditentukan dengan menggunakan metode uji pendekatan kemampuan (*proxy-means testing*) dan didasarkan pada kerangka kerja kontekstual, yang berarti variabel kemiskinan untuk tiap kabupaten/kota tidak selalu sama. Berdasarkan data hasil Pendataan Sosial-Ekonomi Penduduk 2005 (PSE-05) yang dilaksanakan pada pertengahan Agustus hingga pertengahan September 2005 (BPS, 2005) serta penerapan metode tersebut di atas, BPS menetapkan rumah tangga miskin yang dinilai layak untuk menerima SLT.

Beberapa cara pengukuran kemiskinan mikro lainnya juga banyak dikembangkan belakangan ini. Salah satu di antaranya adalah yang dikembangkan SMERU bersama BKKBN melalui Studi

The policy on SLT provision for poor households was expected to contain the rise in the proportion of the poor population. However, the results of this simulation show that, even if the targeting accuracy is 100%, the poverty rate (17.9%) is still higher than the condition before the BBM price rise (16.7%). The rate of poverty will become increasingly higher if the level of accuracy becomes lower.

The results of this simulation show that targeting accuracy very much determines the impact of the SLT on the poverty rate. Meanwhile, the problem of the targeting accuracy itself was influenced by the target identification/determination mechanism. Given that the target of this program is poor households, the determination mechanism and criteria or the poverty measurement becomes very important, even though the concept and measurement of poverty itself is still being debated by many people.

The poverty measurement can be differentiated into two levels, macro and micro poverty measurements. Macro poverty measurement is usually necessary for geographic targeting, while micro poverty measurement is needed for family/households targeting. Poverty mapping, both produced by BPS as well as SMERU for the whole of Indonesia provides poverty measurements for various geographic levels from the province down to the village.¹ It represents one of the tools that can be used to determine geographic targeting. For micro poverty measurement, however, namely families/households, one operational criterion is needed that can easily be used to identify the who and how of the poor. This objective generally needs a household characteristics approach.

Until now, the pre-prosperous family criteria² from the National Family Planning Coordination Board (BKKBN) has mostly been used in determining recipients of targeting programs. But for the determination of the SLT Program recipient targets this time, the BPS poverty criteria were used and were determined by using a proxy-means testing method and based on a contextual framework, where the poverty variables for each kabupaten/kota are not always the same. Based on the results of the 2005 Socio-economic Data Collection on the Population that was conducted from mid-August to mid-September 2005 (BPS, 2005), as well as the application of the methodology mentioned above, BPS determined the poor households that were assessed as eligible SLT beneficiaries.

Several other means of micro poverty measurement have also been developed recently. One of them was developed by SMERU in cooperation with BKKBN through the Community-Based Monitoring System (CBMS). The methodology used in this study was the data collection of all families in the sample village (census methodology) by using 63 variables (including demography, education, employment, health, food security, assets, security and political participation). Every variable was given a weighting with the

¹ Dari hasil verifikasi lapangan, tingkat akurasi hasil estimasi pemetaan kemiskinan dengan tingkat kesalahan (*standard error*) yang masih dapat diterima (*reasonable*) adalah sampai tingkat kecamatan (lihat Suryahadi et al, 2005).

² BKKBN mengelompokkan tingkat kesejahteraan keluarga sebagai: Keluarga Prasejahtera (KPS) yang dalam perkembangannya dibedakan menjadi KPS alasan ekonomi dan nonekonomi, Keluarga Sejahtera (KS) I yang juga dibedakan alasan ekonomi dan nonekonomi, KS1, KS2, dan KS3+. Dua kategori kesejahteraan terendah, yaitu KPS dan KS1 alasan ekonomi, sering digunakan sebagai target program penanggulangan kemiskinan, selanjutnya disebut KPS plus.

¹ From the results of the field verification, the level of accuracy of the poverty mapping estimation results with a reasonable standard error is to the kecamatan level (see Suryahadi et al, 2005).

² BKKBN classifies the level of family prosperity as: Pre-Prosperous Families (KPS) that, in their development, are differentiated into KPS economic and non-economic reasons; Prosperous Families I (KS) that are also differentiated by economic and non-economic reasons; and KS1, KS2, and KS3+. The two lowest categories of prosperity, namely KPS and KS1 (economic), are often used as poverty reduction program targets, thereafter referred to as KPS plus.

Pemantauan Kesejahteraan oleh Masyarakat/SPKM (*Community Based Monitoring System/CBMS*). Metode yang digunakan dalam studi ini adalah pendataan seluruh keluarga di desa sampel (metode sensus) dengan menggunakan 63 variabel (termasuk demografi, pendidikan, pekerjaan, kesehatan, ketahanan pangan, aset, keamanan dan partisipasi politik). Setiap variabel diberi bobot dengan metode *Principal Component Analysis* (PCA), hingga diperoleh skor untuk masing-masing keluarga. Skor yang dihasilkan kemudian diperingkatkan dan dikelompokkan ke dalam lima kategori (kuintil) yang menggambarkan tingkatan kesejahteraan, kuintil 1 (Q1) menggambarkan tingkat kesejahteraan terendah (kategori sangat miskin) dan kuintil 5 (Q5) menggambarkan kesejahteraan tertinggi (Suryadarma et al, 2005).

Guna menilai eligibilitas/tingkat ketepatan sasaran SLT, SMERU memanfaatkan hasil-hasil studi yang ada, seperti peta kemiskinan SMERU dan SPKM sebagai basis data, yang selanjutnya dikombinasikan dengan data penerima SLT. Hal ini dimungkinkan karena sebagian wilayah sampel studi SLT juga merupakan wilayah SPKM.

Untuk mengukur tingkat ketepatan sasaran kewilayahan, dilakukan analisis korelasi dan korelasi urutan Spearman (*Spearman rank correlation*) antara jumlah penduduk miskin tingkat kecamatan dari peta kemiskinan BPS 2000 (BPS, 2004) dengan jumlah rumah tangga penerima Kartu Kompensasi BBM (KKB) tahun 2005 di kelima kabupaten/kota penelitian (lihat Tabel 2).

Tabel 2 tersebut memperlihatkan koefisien korelasi antara jumlah penduduk miskin tingkat kecamatan hasil pemetaan kemiskinan BPS 2000 dengan jumlah rumah tangga penerima KKB di kelima wilayah penelitian. Tabel ini juga menunjukkan tingkat keeratan hubungan yang relatif tinggi (65,8%) dan signifikan. Di masing-masing kabupaten/kota, tingkat korelasi bervariasi dengan kisaran terendah di Cianjur (47,9%) dan tertinggi di Ternate (96,3%). Sementara itu, dengan menggunakan *Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation* (Korelasi Urutan Spearman), untuk sebagian besar wilayah studi, tingkat korelasi yang dihasilkan lebih tinggi dan signifikan, kecuali untuk Kabupaten Bima. Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa alokasi penargetan kewilayahan (*geographic targeting*) program SLT di tingkat kecamatan cukup baik, dalam arti daerah yang jumlah penduduk miskinnya lebih banyak, mendapatkan KKB yang relatif lebih banyak juga.

Namun, cukup tingginya kesesuaian sasaran di tingkat kecamatan tersebut tidak serta merta diikuti dengan tingkat ketepatan sasaran yang sama di tingkat rumah tangga. Ketepatan sasaran di tingkat rumah tangga menunjukkan hasil yang bervariasi, bahkan di dalam satu kabupaten/kota yang sama. Gambaran tingkat ketepatan sasaran di tingkat rumah tangga tersebut diperoleh dengan melakukan suatu analisis pembagian manfaat (*benefit incidence analysis*) sederhana antara tingkat kesejahteraan rumah tangga hasil pendataan SPKM yang dilakukan SMERU dengan data penerima KKB untuk Desa Jungpasir dan Kelurahan Kedondong, Demak.

Principal Component Analysis methodology, so a score was obtained for each family. The score that was produced was then ranked and classified into five categories (quintiles) that illustrate the level of prosperity. Quintile 1 (Q1) is the lowest prosperity level (the poorest category) and Quintile 5 (Q5) is the highest prosperity level (Suryadarma et al, 2005).

In order to evaluate the eligibility/level of SLT target accuracy, SMERU utilized the results of existing studies, such as SMERU's poverty map and CBMS as the database, that was then combined with data on SLT recipients. This was made possible because some sample regions of the SLT study were also CBMS regions.

To measure the level of geographic targeting accuracy, a correlation analysis and a Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation were conducted between the poor at the kecamatan level from the BPS 2000 poverty map (BPS, 2004) with the number of KKB household card recipients for the year 2005 in the five sample kabupaten/kota (see Table 2).

Table 2 presents the correlation coefficient between the number of poor at the kecamatan level resulting from the BPS 2000 poverty map with the number of KKB household card recipients in the five research sites. This table also shows a relatively high and significant degree of correlation (65.8%) in the relationship. In each kabupaten/kota, the correlation varies with the lowest range in Kabupaten Cianjur (47.9%) and highest in Kota Ternate (96.3%). In addition, by using Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation, for the majority of study areas, the level of correlation produced is higher and more significant, with the exception of Kabupaten Bima. This shows that the geographic targeting allocation of the SLT program at the kecamatan level is quite good, meaning that regions with higher numbers of poor people also received relatively more KKB cards.

However, this rather high target uniformity at the kecamatan level was not immediately followed with the same level of target accuracy at the household level. Target accuracy at the household level shows varying results, even within the same kabupaten/kota. A picture of the level of target accuracy at the household level was obtained by undertaking a simple benefit incidence analysis between the level of household prosperity resulting from the CBMS data collection undertaken by SMERU with the KKB card recipient data for Desa Jungpasir and Desa Kedondong, Demak.



Dok. SMERU/SMERU Doc.

Kebijakan pemberian SLT bagi rumah tangga miskin diharapkan dapat menekan peningkatan proporsi penduduk miskin karena kenaikan harga BBM.

The policy on SLT provision for poor households was expected to suppress the rise in the proportion of the poor population due to the fuel price increase.

Tabel 2. Korelasi Urutan Spearman dan Koefisien Korelasi Jumlah Penduduk Miskin Tingkat Kecamatan dari Peta Kemiskinan BPS 2000 dengan Jumlah Rumah Tangga Penerima KKB 2005

Table 2. Spearman Rank-Order Correlation and Correlation Coefficient of the Poor Population at the Kecamatan Level from BPS Poverty Map 2000 with the Number of KKB Recipient Households 2005

Kabupaten/Kota Kabupaten/Kota	Koefisien Korelasi Correlation Coefficient	Korelasi Urutan Spearman Spearman Rank-Order Correlation	Jumlah observasi (N) Number of Observations (N)
Tapanuli Tengah	0,9130**	0,9286**	8
Cianjur	0,4788*	0,5322**	24
Demak	0,7649**	0,7253**	13
Bima	0,6091	0,4333	9
Kota Ternate ¹⁾	0,9631	1,0000**	3
Total seluruh sampel/whole sample	0,6577**	0,7108**	57

Catatan/Note: **) Signifikan pada tingkat 1%./Significant at 1% level.

*) Signifikan pada tingkat 5%./Significant at 5% level.

¹⁾ Menggunakan angka kemiskinan dari peta kemiskinan SMERU karena tidak tersedia dalam peta kemiskinan BPS./
Using the poverty rate from SMERU poverty map because it is not available in the BPS poverty map.

Tabel 3a menunjukkan bahwa kelompok miskin dan hampir miskin (Q1 dan Q2) hanya menerima 54,7% dari seluruh KKB yang diterima Desa Jungpasir. Artinya, terdapat kesalahan sasaran (*mistargeting*) sekitar 45,3%. Di samping itu, terlihat adanya masalah kekurangcakupan (*undercoverage*) karena hanya 48,4% rumah tangga miskin (Q1) dan 42,9% hampir miskin (Q2) di wilayah tersebut yang menerima KKB.

Table 3a shows that the poor and nearly-poor groups (Q1 and Q2) only received 54.7% of all KKB cards that were received by Desa Jungpasir. This means there was a mistargeting rate of around 45.3%. In addition, there was also an undercoverage problem because only 48.4% of poor households (Q1) and 42.9% of nearly-poor (Q2) in this area received KKB cards.

Tabel 3. Analisis Pembagian Manfaat Sederhana
Table 3: Simple Benefit Incidence Analysis

a. Baseline Data CBMS dengan Penerima KKB 2005, Desa Jungpasir, Demak/
CBMS Baseline Data with KKB Recipients (2005), Desa Jungpasir, Demak

Kuintil Berdasarkan Data CBMS/ Quintile Based on CBMS Data	Jumlah Penerima KKB/ Number of KKB Recipients	Penerima KKB terhadap Total Rumah Tangga (%)/ KKB Recipients to Total Household Numbers (%)	Distribusi Penerima KKB (%)/ Distribution of KKB Recipients (%)
Q1	123	48,43	29,01
Q2	109	42,91	25,71
Q3	104	40,78	24,53
Q4	67	26,38	15,80
Q5	21	8,24	4,95
Total	424	33,33	100,00

Catatan: Total populasi = 1.272 rumah tangga; ukuran kuintil = 254-255 rumah tangga.

Note: Total population = 1,272 households; size of quintile = 254-255 households.

³ Jumlah penerima KKB yang digunakan dalam seluruh analisis kuantitatif adalah penerima KKB Tahap I yang belum diverifikasi. Selain itu, data kecamatan yang digunakan adalah kondisi tahun 2000, sehingga untuk kecamatan-kecamatan yang mengalami pemekaran wilayah dikelompokkan kembali supaya konsisten dengan basis data.

³ The number of KKB recipients that was used in the whole quantitative analysis were the Phase I KKB recipients who had not yet been verified. In addition, the kecamatan data that was used was the condition in 2000, therefore kecamatan that had undergone administrative separation were re-grouped in order to be consistent with the data basis.

Sementara itu, Tabel 3b memberikan gambaran distribusi KKB untuk Kelurahan Kedondong yang tingkat ketepatan sarasannya lebih baik daripada Desa Jungpasir. Kelompok miskin dan hampir miskin (Q1 dan Q2) di wilayah itu menerima sekitar 67,6% dari seluruh KKB untuk kelurahan tersebut, atau dengan kata lain, terdapat kesalahan sasaran sekitar 32,4%. Masalah kekurangcakupan juga masih dijumpai di kelurahan ini, meskipun persentasenya lebih rendah daripada di Desa Jungpasir, yakni hanya sekitar 25,4% rumah tangga miskin (Q1) yang tidak menerima KKB. Sementara itu, untuk kelompok masyarakat hampir miskin (Q2) kekurangcakupan masih cukup tinggi, yaitu sekitar 55%.

Meanwhile, Table 3b provides a picture of the distribution of KKB cards for Desa Kedondong whose level of target accuracy is better than Desa Jungpasir. The poor and nearly-poor groups (Q1 and Q2) in that area received around 67.6% of all KKB cards for that village or, in other words, a mistargeting rate of around 32.4%. The undercoverage problem is also still found in this village, although its percentage is lower than in Desa Jungpasir, that is around 25.4% of poor households (Q1) did not receive KKB cards. Meanwhile, for the nearly-poor community (Q2) undercoverage is still quite high at around 55%.

b. Baseline Data CBMS dengan Penerima KKB 2005, Kelurahan Kedondong, Demak/ CBMS Baseline Data with KKB Recipients (2005), Desa Kedondong, Demak.

Kuintil Berdasarkan Data CBMS/ Quintile Based on CBMS Data	Jumlah Penerima KKB/ Number of KKB Recipients	Penerima KKB terhadap Total Rumah Tangga (%)/ KKB Recipients to Total Household Numbers (%)	Distribusi Penerima KKB (%)/ Distribution of KKB Recipients (%)
Q1	205	74,55	42,01
Q2	125	44,96	25,61
Q3	78	28,26	15,98
Q4	59	21,30	12,09
Q5	21	7,58	4,30
Total	488	35,29	100,00

Catatan: Total populasi = 1.383 rumah tangga; ukuran kuintil = 275-278 rumah tangga.
Note: Total population = 1,383 households; size of quintile = 275-278 households.

Hasil analisis pembagian manfaat tersebut memperlihatkan cukup besarnya variasi tingkat ketepatan sasaran, bahkan dalam satu wilayah kabupaten/kota yang sama, sehingga sulit untuk menarik kesimpulan secara umum tentang tingkat ketepatan sasaran SLT.

The results of the benefit incidence analysis show a rather large variation in the level of targeting accuracy. In fact, within the same kabupaten/kota, it was difficult to draw a general conclusion about the level of SLT Program targeting accuracy.

Dari hasil analisis korelasi dan pembagian manfaat tersebut di atas, tingkat ketepatan sasaran SLT dapat dievaluasi, baik di tingkat kewilayahan maupun di tingkat rumah tangga. Namun demikian, perlu diperhatikan bahwa setiap ukuran yang digunakan dalam mengevaluasi ketepatan sasaran akan memberikan hasil yang berbeda. Keragaman pengukuran ketepatan sasaran dapat dijelaskan jika diketahui dengan tepat konsep dan metode pengukuran kemiskinan perbandingan yang digunakan serta unit/tingkat analisisnya.

From the results of the above benefit incidence and correlation analyses, the level of SLT target accuracy can be evaluated, both at the geographical level as well as the household level. Nevertheless, it needs to be noted that each measurement used in evaluating the target accuracy will provide different results. The variation in the measuring of targeting accuracy can be explained if the concept and method of comparative poverty measurement used as well as the unit/level of its analysis are known precisely. ■ **Wenefrida Widyanti**

■ **Wenefrida Widyanti**

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PRAKARSA LOKAL: CELAH BAGI PENYEMPURNAAN PELAKSANAAN PROGRAM SLT*

LOCAL INITIATIVES: A MEANS TO IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT OF THE SLT PROGRAM*



Dok. SMERU/SMERU Doc.

Pentingnya Prakarsa Lokal

Prakarsa lokal dalam era otonomi merupakan unsur yang tak terelakkan. Ia menandai sebuah ruang aktualisasi prinsip partisipatoris yang kini banyak dianut berbagai program. Coraknya selalu dinamis, sensitif terhadap kebutuhan langsung masyarakat dan erat berkelindan dengan aneka dimensi lokalitas seperti budaya, keadaan demografis, potensi sumber daya, tatanan struktur ekonomi masyarakat, dan lain-lain.

Peluncuran program SLT yang sentralistik dan bertujuan untuk mengurangi himpitan masalah ekonomi yang harus ditanggung oleh masyarakat miskin akibat lonjakan harga BBM tak ayal menimbulkan kendala-kendala tersendiri di tingkat lokal. Skalanya yang meluas dan strukturnya yang amat vertikal dan sentralistik (*top-down planning*) memberikan implikasi tertentu pada tingkat penerapannya. Seperti kebanyakan program berskala besar lainnya, SLT juga tidak luput dari persoalan-persoalan teknis di tingkat lokal. Mekanisme program yang dirancang tidak cukup memadai untuk mengakomodasi keanekaragaman karakteristik dan tuntutan lokal. Di tingkat inilah seringkali muncul benturan yang menjurus pada konflik sosial. Oleh karena itu, ruang bagi kehadiran prakarsa lokal dalam pelaksanaan program SLT perlu dibuka seluas mungkin.

*Ditulis berdasarkan laporan penelitian 'Kajian Cepat Pelaksanaan Subsidi Langsung Tunai Tahun 2005 di Indonesia: Studi Kasus di Lima Kabupaten/Kota' oleh Hastuti et al, Lembaga Penelitian SMERU, Jakarta 2006.

The Importance of Local Initiatives

Local initiatives are an unavoidable element of the regional autonomy era. They signify a space for the actualization of the participatory principle currently followed by various programs. Their features are always dynamic, sensitive to the immediate needs of the community and closely related to the diversity of the locality, including culture, demographic condition, resource potential, the community's economic structure, and so forth.

The launch of the SLT Program that is centralized and aimed at reducing the weight of economic problems borne by the poor as the result of the jump in fuel prices undoubtedly gave rise to obstacles at the local level. The broad scale of the program and its top-down planning structure created a certain implication at the level of their application. Like most other large-scale programs, the SLT also was not spared from technical problems at the local level. The program mechanism designed was not sufficiently adequate to accommodate the diversity in local characteristics and demands. At this level there is often an impact that leads to social conflict. For that reason, there is a need to give as broad a space as possible, for the emergence of local initiatives in the implementation of the SLT Program.

*This article is written based on the research report 'A Rapid Appraisal of the Implementation of the 2005 Direct Cash Transfer Program in Indonesia: A Case Study in Five Kabupaten/Kota' by Hastuti et al, The SMERU Research Institute, Jakarta 2006.

Prakarsa Lokal pada Tingkat Praksis

Dalam kajian cepat yang dilakukan Lembaga Penelitian SMERU baru-baru ini di lima kabupaten/kota sampel, terdapat beberapa contoh nyata prakarsa lokal yang bersumber dari masyarakat. Semuanya merupakan jawaban langsung atas munculnya berbagai kendala teknis di lapangan. Di Kabupaten Bima, pihak pemerintah daerah (pemda) setingkat kecamatan segera membentuk komite SLT di tingkat kecamatan dan di tingkat desa yang melibatkan berbagai unsur terkait. Komite ini dibentuk untuk menanggapi aksi protes masyarakat akibat dugaan salah sasaran. Komite ini bertugas melakukan pendekatan langsung dengan masyarakat, membangun upaya dialog dan secara bersama sepakat agar diadakan pendaftaran ulang mereka yang berhak menerima bantuan SLT secara lebih adil dan terbuka. Langkah ini berhasil sejenak meredam gejolak masyarakat dan komite pun langsung melakukan pendaftaran ulang secara lebih terbuka.

Di Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah (Tapteng), secara musyawarah pihak aparat bersama dengan tokoh adat dan tokoh masyarakat sepakat untuk membagi adil dana SLT kepada masyarakat miskin lain yang bukan penerima. Setiap penerima secara sukarela membagikan sebagian dana SLT-nya antara Rp25.000 hingga Rp50.000 kepada warga miskin nonpenerima. Kedua belah pihak sepakat bahwa dana yang diberikan itu merupakan pinjaman yang akan segera dikembalikan bila yang bersangkutan menjadi penerima SLT pada periode berikutnya. Kebijakan ini difasilitasi oleh tokoh adat dan tokoh masyarakat yang dibantu oleh aparat setempat. Prakarsa ini menjadi jalan tengah atas munculnya aksi protes dari warga masyarakat miskin nonpenerima lainnya.

Masih di kabupaten yang sama, prakarsa lokal lain terkait dengan mekanisme pencairan muncul melalui kebijakan pihak penyelenggara SLT di Kabupaten Tapteng untuk mencantumkan tanggal pencairan pada setiap kartu kompensasi BBM (KKB) demi memudahkan diseminasi informasi kepada masyarakat.

Di Kota Ternate dan Kabupaten Tapteng, SMERU menemukan metode pelatihan bagi pencacah rumah tangga miskin yang amat variatif. Pelatihan tidak melulu dilakukan dengan metode tanya jawab dalam ruangan, tapi juga dilakukan melalui uji coba langsung di lapangan yang melibatkan ketua RT yang ditunjuk. Tujuan pelatihan adalah untuk memberi gambaran nyata bagi pencacah sebelum terjun ke lapangan.

Prakarsa Lokal pada Tingkat Wacana

Selain di tingkat praksis, munculnya aneka prakarsa lokal dapat dengan mudah dicermati pada tingkat wacana. Dari beberapa hasil kegiatan kelompok diskusi terarah (FGD) terungkap beragam gagasan lokal dalam rangka penyempurnaan pelaksanaan SLT, umumnya menyangkut masalah kelembagaan. Di hampir setiap FGD yang diselenggarakan di tingkat kabupaten yang melibatkan berbagai unsur terkait, baik dari pemerintah seperti Bappeda, BPS, dan kantor pos maupun dari unsur nonpemerintah seperti LSM, media massa, perwakilan dari perguruan tinggi, dan tokoh masyarakat, terdapat desakan yang kuat agar program ini seyogyanya melibatkan secara formal badan-badan yang telah ada dan terkait dengan

Local Initiatives at the Practical Level

In the rapid appraisal recently undertaken by The SMERU Research Institute in five sample kabupaten/kota, there were several tangible examples of community-sourced local initiatives. All of them are a direct response to the emergence of various technical obstacles in the field. In Kabupaten Bima, the local government at the kecamatan level immediately formed an SLT committee at the kecamatan and village level that involved various stakeholders. This committee was created to respond to community protest actions resulting from suspected mistargeting. The committee had the task of undertaking a direct approach with the community, building a dialogue and cooperative agreement to conduct a re-registration that is fairer and more transparent. For a while, this move succeeded in suppressing community unrest, and the committee also immediately undertook the re-registration in a more open manner.

In Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah (Tapteng), through a community consultation, officials in cooperation with adat figures and community leaders agreed to share the SLT funds fairly with other poor non-recipients. Each recipient voluntarily shared some of their SLT funds between Rp25,000 to Rp50,000 with poor non-recipients. Both parties agreed that the funds provided were considered a loan that would be returned immediately if the non-recipients became SLT recipients in the following period. This policy was facilitated by the adat figures and community leaders who were assisted by local authorities. This initiative was a win-win solution that contained protest actions by the poor non-recipients.

Still in the same kabupaten, other local initiatives emerged concerning the disbursement mechanism when SLT implementers in Kabupaten Tapteng created a policy that the date of the disbursement must be attached to each KKB card for the purpose of making it easy to disseminate information to the community.

In Kota Ternate and Kabupaten Tapteng, SMERU found that the training methodology for poor household enumerators varied significantly. The training was not only undertaken using a question and answer method in the classroom, but was also done via direct test-piloting in the field that involved the designated RT head. The aim of the training is to provide a realistic picture for the enumerators before deployment to the field.

Local Initiatives at the Discourse Level

Apart from the practical level, the emergence of various local initiatives can be easily observed at the discourse level. From the results of several Focus Group Discussions (FGD), a number of local initiatives were expressed in the context of perfecting the implementation of the SLT Program. In general, these were associated with institutional problems. In nearly every FGD that was arranged at the kabupaten level that involved various associated elements, from government bodies like Bappeda, BPS and the post office as well as non-government bodies such as NGOs, mass media, university representatives and community leaders, there was strong pressure for this program to formally involve existing bodies associated with poverty programs. The FGD in Kabupaten Bima submitted a concrete recommendation for the central government to immediately activate the Regional Poverty Reduction Committee (KPKD). The reason for this suggestion is because the nature of its membership is cross-sectoral and

Prakarsa lokal perlu ditumbuhkan untuk membuka celah bagi penyempurnaan pelaksanaan program SLT.

Local initiatives need to be fostered in order to improve the SLT program's management.

program kemiskinan. FGD di Kabupaten Bima menyampaikan rekomendasi konkret agar pemerintah pusat segera mengfungsikan lembaga Komite Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Daerah (KPKD). Usul ini beralasan karena sifat keanggotaannya yang lintas sektoral dan melibatkan anggota nonpemerintah, serta memiliki akses dan kontribusi atas program kemiskinan. Selain itu, keikutsertaan lembaga KPKD ini menghindari inefisiensi biaya bila harus membentuk lembaga yang baru.

Selain itu, terdapat desakan kuat agar di tiap kecamatan, dan bila perlu desa, juga dibentuk semacam lembaga KPKD tingkat kecamatan. Lembaga ini harus terdiri dari unsur masyarakat dan aparat setempat dan bertugas membantu pencacah memverifikasi hasil pendataan, memusyawarahkan hasil pencacahan dan kemudian mensosialisasikan kepada masyarakat. Lembaga ini akan menjadi ujung tombak dalam upaya penyelesaian masalah di setiap tahapan pelaksanaan. Perannya menjadi amat penting karena langsung berhadapan dengan masyarakat penerima. KPKD tingkat kabupaten hanya berfungsi manakala persoalan di tingkat kecamatan atau desa tidak teratasi. Selain itu, KPKD juga berfungsi memfasilitasi tuntutan masyarakat kepada pejabat kabupaten atau pemerintah provinsi/pusat untuk hal-hal di luar kewenangan lembaga tersebut.

Gagasan pembentukan lembaga KPKD di semua jenjang wilayah tampaknya tidak berbeda dengan prakarsa lokal yang didiskusikan di FGD tingkat desa dan oleh responden penerima. Meski gagasan yang muncul tidaklah sekonkret seperti gagasan yang terungkap dalam FGD kabupaten, namun gagasan dasarnya mengandung kesamaan prinsip, yakni agar program ini melibatkan semua unsur terkait yang ada di desa, seperti kepala desa, BPD, tokoh masyarakat dan ketua RT/RW. Mereka bahkan mendesak agar proses verifikasi hasil pencacahan awal dan penentuan penerima sebaiknya melalui musyawarah desa.

Harapan ke Depan

Adalah ironis bahwa peluncuran program SLT ini telah membangkitkan berbagai aksi protes bahkan kekerasan dalam pelaksanaannya di beberapa tempat. Hal ini merupakan konsekuensi logis dari penyamaan mekanisme program yang berlaku di seluruh daerah. Maraknya berbagai prakarsa lokal, baik di tingkat praksis maupun wacana dalam berbagai tahapan program SLT memberikan indikasi kuat adanya kapasitas lokal yang dapat diberdayakan. Bagaimanapun, kehadiran prakarsa lokal membuka celah bagi penyempurnaan pelaksanaan program. Oleh karena itu, setiap prakarsa lokal yang muncul dan memberikan efek positif atas pelaksanaan program SLT seyogyanya didokumentasikan secara lengkap dan tepat. Prakarsa tersebut dapat saja menjadi semacam *benchmark* atau standar bagi program-program serupa di daerah bersangkutan dan bahkan mungkin dapat menjadi model di tingkat nasional untuk dikembangkan di daerah lain. ■ Justin Sodo



Doc. SMERU/SMERU Doc.

involves non-government members. It also has access to, and contributions for, poverty programs. In addition, inclusion of the KPKD institutions avoids cost inefficiencies if a new team has to be put together.

In addition, there is strong pressure for every kecamatan and, if also necessary, villages to form a KPKD of the type found at the kecamatan. This institution has to consist of elements from the community and local authorities and be tasked with assisting enumerators to verify the results of the data collection, hold community consultations on the results of the enumeration exercise, and subsequently socialize the results to the community. It will be the spearhead in the problem resolution effort at each phase of the implementation. Its role is very important because it directly engages with the recipient community. The KPKD at the kabupaten level only intervenes whenever problems at the kecamatan or village level can not be resolved. In addition, the KPKD also functions to communicate community demands to officials of the kabupaten, provincial and central government for issues outside their authority.

The idea for the formation of KPKDs at all regional levels is apparently no different to the local initiatives that were discussed at the village-level FGDs and by recipient respondents. Although the idea that arose is not as concrete as those that were expressed in the kabupaten FGD, the ideas basically contained similar principles, namely for this program to involve all existing associated elements in the village, such as the village head, village representative council (BPD) as well as community leaders and neighborhood (RT/RW) heads. They, in fact, urged that the verification process of the results of the preliminary enumeration and the determination on recipients should be done via a community consultative forum.

Hopes for the Future

It is ironic that the launch of the SLT Program generated a variety of violent actions in the community. This is the logical consequence of applying a uniform program mechanism in all regions. Various local initiatives, at both the practical as well as discourse levels at different phases of the program give a strong indication of the presence of local capacity that can be empowered. In any case, the presence of local initiatives opened the opportunity for the improvement of the program's management. For that reason, every local initiative that arises and provides a positive effect on the management of the program should be well-documented. These initiatives can become a type of benchmark or standard for programs of this kind in the region and, in fact, could possibly become the national model for development in other regions. ■ Justin Sodo



Dok. SMERU/SMERU Doc.

MEMOTRET LAYANAN PENCAIRAN PROGRAM SLT DI TINGKAT KANTOR POS CABANG* A SNAPSHOT OF THE SLT DISBURSEMENT BY POST OFFICE BRANCHES*

Kredibilitas yang Ditunjang oleh Komitmen Personel Kantor Pos

Penunjukan PT Pos Indonesia sebagai salah satu pelaksana program SLT tidak lepas dari kapasitas teknisnya untuk mencairkan dana bagi rumah tangga penerima. Penunjukan ini antara lain mengacu pada syarat kredibilitas dan pengalaman yang telah dimilikinya, mengingat kantor pos lazim dilibatkan dalam urusan pencairan dana program sosial. Kredibilitas lainnya juga berkaitan dengan luasnya jaringan dan etos kerja yang dinilai profesional. Kepiawaian kantor pos dalam layanan penyaluran dan pencairan dana telah terbukti melalui program-program sosial terdahulu, seperti dana JPS Pendidikan. Ditinjau dari kapasitas jaringannya, cabang kantor pos tersebar di hampir semua kecamatan yang ada dengan jumlah tak kurang dari 3.200 dan ditambah dengan 210 kantor pos tingkat kabupaten/kota (Kompas, 22 Oktober 2005).

Meski demikian, kelayakan penetapan PT Pos Indonesia sebagai pelaksana teknis pencairan dana tidak hanya terpaut dengan unsur kapasitas teknis semata, tetapi lebih dari itu. Unsur tanggung jawab dan komitmen yang tinggi, terutama di tingkat paling bawah tidak kalah penting artinya. Pernyataan ini tidaklah berlebihan mengingat sejumlah kondisi seperti keterbatasan jumlah staf di masing-masing kantor cabang, dan minimnya sarana dan fasilitas komunikasi seperti telepon, komputer dan alat bantu lainnya. Faktor keamanan dan pengamanan pendistribusian dana SLT yang jumlahnya mencapai miliaran rupiah pun tidak dapat diabaikan. Meski telah dibantu petugas keamanan, kesemuanya tentu bukanlah masalah sederhana bagi seorang pegawai atau kepala kantor pos cabang.

* Ditulis berdasarkan Laporan penelitian 'Kajian Cepat Pelaksanaan Subsidi Langsung Tunai Tahun 2005 di Indonesia: Studi Kasus di Lima Kabupaten/Kota' oleh Hastuti et al, Lembaga Penelitian SMERU, Jakarta 2006.

Credibility Supported by the Commitment of Post Office Personnel

The appointment of PT Pos Indonesia as one of the SLT Program implementing agencies is due to its technical capacity to disburse funds to recipient households. This appointment was made, on the basis of their credibility and experience, considering that the post office has always been involved in the disbursement of funding for social programs. It is also deemed credible due to the breadth of its network and work ethic which is considered to meet a professional standard. The post office's expertise in the receipt and distribution of funds has been proven via previous social programs, such as the Social Safety Net (JPS) in education funds. In its network capacity, post offices are found in almost all existing kecamatan with a total of not less than 3,200 branches in addition to 210 post offices at the kabupaten/kota level (Kompas, 22 October 2005).

Nevertheless, the suitability of PT Pos Indonesia as the technical implementer of the funds disbursement was not only associated with the element of technical capacity alone. More than that, the element of high commitment and responsibility, especially at the lowest level, is no less important. This is not an overstatement given the conditions that PT Pos Indonesia faces, for example the limited number of staff in each branch office and the minimal equipments and communication facilities such as telephones, computers and other facilities. The responsibility of the post office's officials to ensure the safety and security of the SLT funds distribution that amounted to billions of rupiah is also a factor that could not be understated. Although assisted by security officials, these tasks and responsibilities were not inconsequential matters for a post office branch official or manager.

* This article is written based on the research report 'A Rapid Appraisal of the Implementation of the 2005 Direct Cash Transfer Program in Indonesia: A Case Study in Five Kabupaten/Kota' by Hastuti et al, The SMERU Research Institute, Jakarta 2006.

Tabel 1. Jumlah Kantor Pos dan Cakupan Wilayah Pelayanan di Kabupaten/Kota Sampel
Table 1. Number of Post Offices and the Service Area in Sample Kabupaten/Kota

Kabupaten/Kota Sampel <i>Sample Kabupaten/Kota</i>	Jumlah Kantor Pos <i>Number of Post Offices</i>		Jumlah Kecamatan <i>Number of Kecamatan</i>	Jumlah Desa & Kelurahan <i>Number of Villages</i>	
	Pemeriksa <i>Main Office</i>	Cabang <i>Branch</i>		Total <i>Total</i>	Desa yang Dilayani Rata-rata per Kantor Pos <i>Serviced villages per Post Office</i>
Tapanuli Tengah	-	6	15	160	27
Cianjur	1	14	30	348	23
Demak	-	9	14	247	27
Bima	1	9	14	150	15
Ternate *)	1	3	4	63	16

*) Di Kota Ternate, kantor pos cabang tidak melayani pencairan SLT karena dipusatkan di kantor pos pemeriksa di tingkat kabupaten/*In Kota Ternate, post office branches do not disburse SLT funds because the service is centralized at the post offices at the kabupaten level.*

Suasana Layanan di Kantor Pos Cabang

Di semua wilayah penelitian, kantor pos memiliki beberapa kantor cabang. Meski demikian, seperti juga di banyak daerah lain, tidak semua kecamatan di kabupaten atau kota sampel memiliki kantor pos cabang. Jumlah desa/kelurahan dan rumah tangga penerima SLT yang harus dilayani oleh satu kantor pos rata-rata lebih dari 20 desa dengan rata-rata 4.000 orang penerima (lihat Tabel 1). Kajian SMERU tentang SLT sepintas memotret suasana layanan di kantor pos. Peneliti SMERU mewawancarai beberapa kepala kantor pos cabang di lima kabupaten/kota sampel yang dikunjungi. SMERU juga merekam berbagai informasi penting seputar layanan pencairan dana di kantor pos yang umumnya telah dimulai pada awal Oktober 2005.

Di Kabupaten Bima, di hampir semua kantor pos cabang atau tempat layanan, tiga hingga empat pegawai pos melayani sekitar 4.000 penerima. Layanan tersebut harus dilakukan dalam sehari dengan proses manual. Hal ini patut dianggap istimewa karena rata-rata waktu layanan bagi setiap penerima sekitar 25 hingga 30 detik. Efisiensi pencairan juga tidak terlepas dari persiapan pengaturan jadwal pencairan dan kebijakan "jemput bola" yang diterapkan di daerah-daerah tertentu seperti yang ditemui di Kabupaten Cianjur dan Demak. Tidak hanya kecepatan dan efisiensi pencairannya yang luar biasa, tapi juga daya tahan emosi psikologis pegawai pos di tengah suasana gaduh, hingar-bingar, dan aksi dorong-mendorong para penerima yang tidak sabar menunggu giliran. Keadaan seperti ini bukan mustahil mengganggu konsentrasi petugas sehingga dapat terjadi kekeliruan ketika memeriksa dan mencermati kupon KKB dan sekaligus menyobek kupon, serta kemudian menghitung dan menyerahkan dana kepada penerima.

Kekeliruan dapat saja terjadi misalnya ketika kupon yang telah disobek dari KKB penerima jatuh atau terselip. Ukuran kupon yang kecil menambah kesulitan bagi pegawai pos untuk memastikan bahwa semua kupon telah tersimpan dengan baik sesaat sebelum menyerahkan uang kepada penerima. Selain itu, ukurannya

The Atmosphere in Post Office Branches

In all research sites, the post office has several branches. Nevertheless, as in many other places, not all kecamatan in the sample kabupaten or kota have post office branches. The number of villages and SLT recipient households that have to be serviced by one post office averages more than 20 villages and 4,000 recipients (see Table 1). SMERU's investigation of the SLT Program provides a snapshot of the post offices' service. SMERU researchers interviewed several post office branch managers in the five sample kabupaten/kota visited. SMERU also recorded a variety of important information on the funds disbursement service at the post office that, in general, commenced early in October 2005.

In almost all post office branches or service points in Kabupaten Bima, three to four postal officials served approximately 4,000 recipients. This service had to be done manually in one day. This is quite extraordinary because the average service time for each recipient is around 25-30 seconds. The efficiency of disbursement is related to the preparation of the disbursement schedule and the policy of being pro-active that was undertaken in particular regions, such as was found in Kabupaten Cianjur and Demak. Not only is the speed and efficiency of the disbursement extraordinary, but also the psychological endurance of the postal officials who were able to work amidst a rowdy and tumultuous atmosphere where recipients pushed and shoved because they were too impatient to wait their turn. These conditions may have disturbed the concentration of officials resulting in mistakes when checking and examining the KKB coupon while, at the same time, tearing off the coupon and then counting and handing over the funds to the recipient.

Mistakes could just occur, for example when the coupon falls or slips when being removed from the recipient's KKB card. The small size of the coupon adds to the difficulty of ensuring that all coupons are properly stored before the funds are handed over to the recipient. In addition, the small size also makes it easy for the removed coupons to get lost or blown away by the wind when the postal officials move them to open boxes. Mistakes concerning the loss of detached KKB coupons or those that were forgotten to be detached were the responsibility of the relevant postal

yang kecil juga membuat sobekan kupon mudah tercecir atau terbawa angin ketika pegawai pos memindahkannya ke kotak terbuka. Kesalahan atas hilangnya kupon KKB yang telah disobek atau lupa disobek menjadi tanggung jawab pegawai pos yang bersangkutan. SMERU menemukan beberapa kasus kehilangan kupon atau kupon belum tersobek di beberapa kantor cabang di Kabupaten Bima.

Selain itu, batu ujian lainnya adalah prosedur standar teknis rumit yang harus diikuti seusai pencairan dana kepada rumah tangga penerima. Masing-masing kantor cabang diharuskan menuliskan nomor KIP (Kartu Identitas Penerima) penerima sebanyak 11 digit pada format lembaran yang tersedia. Tidak hanya itu, mereka juga harus menempelkan kupon KKB yang telah disobek dalam halaman yang telah disediakan berdasarkan namanya masing-masing dan setelah itu dicocokkan dengan duplikasi KKB-nya. Pencocokan ribuan kupon yang telah disobek dengan duplikat KKB yang ada di kantor pos bukanlah pekerjaan yang mudah karena memerlukan waktu dan ketelitian.

Apresiasi dan Kritik Masyarakat atas Layanan Kantor Pos

Di tengah himpitan beban tugas dan tanggung jawab mencairkan dana SLT kepada penerima, pihak pos mengaku puas dan tetap bersemangat menjalankan program ini. Kepuasan masyarakat juga terpancar dari apresiasi spontan dan lisan yang acapkali diterima petugas kantor pos dari penerima yang secara tidak sengaja bertemu di jalan atau tempat umum. Hal ini berbeda dengan yang dihadapi oleh mantis (mantri statistik) BPS setempat yang seringkali menjadi sasaran aksi protes masyarakat miskin nonpenerima.

Terlepas dari besarnya kepercayaan masyarakat dan tingginya profesionalisme para pegawai pos, tak jarang terdapat kritik atas kinerja pos dalam layanan pencairan SLT. Kritik itu antara lain menyangkut kesiapan dan kejelasan jadwal pencairan yang seringkali tidak dikelola dengan baik, seperti yang terjadi di Kabupaten Bima dan Kabupaten Ternate sehingga menimbulkan antrean panjang. Dalam kegiatan kelompok diskusi terarah (FGD), terungkap berbagai masukan mengenai perlunya kantor pos menerapkan metode jemput bola dalam pencairan dana, khususnya bagi desa-desa terpencil. Beberapa kepala kantor pos kabupaten menyatakan bahwa tuntutan seperti ini tentu mensyaratkan ketersediaan personel yang memadai serta sarana dan fasilitas yang menunjang. Persoalannya, kekurangan personel itu terjadi hanya ketika penyaluran dana sosial massal seperti SLT. ■ **Justin Sodo**

Kepiawaian kantor pos dalam layanan penyaluran dan pencairan dana telah terbukti melalui program-program sosial terdahulu.

The post office's expertise in the receipt and distribution of funds has been proven in previous social programs.

DAFTAR PUSTAKA

Kompas, 22 Oktober 2005.

officials. SMERU found several cases of lost coupons or coupons that were not detached in several branch offices in Kabupaten Bima.

In addition, another challenge that awaits is to proceed with the technical standards after funds disbursement to recipient households is completed. Each branch office was required to write the eleven digit recipient's KIP (recipient's identity card) number on the page format provided. In addition, they also had to attach the detached coupon according to the recipient's names to a page that had been provided and after that match them with the duplicate of their KKB. The matching of thousands of detached coupons with the KKB duplicate in the post office is not an easy task and needs time and meticulousness.

Community Appreciation and Criticism of the Post Office Service

In the crush of their workload and responsibility to disburse the SLT funds to recipients, the post office officials expressed satisfaction and are still motivated to deliver this program. The satisfaction of the community was also reflected from the verbal and spontaneous appreciation that was frequently received by postal officials from the recipients when they met casually on the street or public places. This is different to that faced by local BPS statistics officials (mantis) who were often the target of protest actions by poor non-recipients

Irrespective of the level of the community's confidence in, and degree of professionalism of postal officials, there was frequent criticism of the performance of the post office in the SLT disbursement. This criticism included that related to the clarity and readiness of the disbursement schedule that was often not well-managed, as occurred in Kabupaten Bima and Kabupaten Ternate, resulting in long queues. In the FGD activities, there were views expressed on the need for the post office to use pro-active methods in funds disbursement, especially for remote villages. Several kabupaten post office heads stated that to fulfill these demands, adequate personnel as well as supportive means and facilities are required. The problem is that there is shortage of personnel only when there is a mass disbursement of social funds like the SLT. ■ **Justin Sodo**



Dok. SMERU/SMERU Doc.

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PROFIL PENERIMA DAN NONPENERIMA PROGRAM SLT* THE PROFILE OF SLT PROGRAM RECIPIENTS AND NON-RECIPIENTS*



Dok. SMERU/SMERU Doc.

Penelusuran data individu penerima secara mendalam dan komprehensif merupakan faktor kunci dalam menilai ketepatan proses penentuan penerima bantuan. Dalam kajian ini, Tim Peneliti SMERU berhasil mewawancarai 93 penerima dan 37 non-penerima SLT di lima kabupaten/kota sampel. Selain menanyakan beberapa hal teknis terkait dengan tahapan program, wawancara ini dimaksud untuk melihat dari dekat keadaan sosial-ekonomi rumah tangga penerima dan nonpenerima, serta mengetahui lebih dalam tentang pendapat mereka terhadap program SLT.

Di Kota Ternate, peneliti SMERU menemui seorang petani, Bapak Hairun (45 tahun, bukan nama sebenarnya). Pak Hairun yang hanya tamatan sekolah dasar, bekerja sebagai petani sayuran di lahan milik orang lain dengan penghasilan berkisar antara Rp200.000 hingga Rp300.000 per bulan. Penghasilan tersebut digunakan untuk memenuhi kebutuhan sehari-hari keluarganya yang terdiri dari satu istri dan satu anak yang masih bersekolah di SMA. Karena penghasilannya sering tidak mencukupi, keluarga ini harus mengurangi kualitas konsumsi dan menunggak biaya sekolah.

Keluarga ini tinggal di rumahnya sendiri yang luasnya 30 m². Rumah ini berdinding dan beratap batang dan daun nipah, dengan lantai yang masih berupa tanah. Mereka tidak memiliki WC dan

*Ditulis berdasarkan Laporan penelitian 'Kajian Cepat Pelaksanaan Subsidi Langsung Tunai Tahun 2005 di Indonesia: Studi Kasus di Lima Kabupaten/Kota' oleh Hastuti et al, Lembaga Penelitian SMERU, Jakarta 2006.

Comprehensive, in-depth investigations of data on individual recipients is the key factor in evaluating the accuracy of the determination of recipients for assistance. In this investigation, the SMERU research team successfully interviewed 93 SLT recipients and 37 non-recipients in five sample kabupaten/kota. Apart from asking about several technical matters associated with the phases of the program, these interviews were conducted in order to have a close look at the socio-economic condition of recipient and non-recipient households, as well as gathering more in-depth knowledge on their opinions concerning the SLT program.

In Kota Ternate, SMERU's researcher met a farmer, Bapak Hairun (45 years old, not his real name). Pak Hairun who has only a primary school education, is a landless farmer who grows vegetables, with an income in the range of Rp200,000 to Rp300,000 per month. This income is used to fulfill the daily needs of his family that consists of a wife and one child who is still in senior high school. Because his income is often inadequate, the family has to reduce the quality of their consumption and are in arrears with their school fees.

The family lives in their own house that is 30 m² in area. The house has walls and a roof made of nipah leaves and branches, with a dirt floor. They don't have their own toilet or bathroom so they have to share a public toilet and bathroom. For their cooking needs, they use well water

*This article is written based on the research report 'A Rapid Appraisal of the Implementation of the 2005 Direct Cash Transfer Program in Indonesia: A Case Study in Five Kabupaten/Kota' by Hastuti et al., The SMERU Research Institute, Jakarta 2006.

kamar mandi sendiri sehingga harus menumpang di WC dan kamar mandi umum. Untuk keperluan masak, mereka menggunakan air sumur dan bahan bakar berupa kayu. Mereka hanya bisa makan dua kali sehari dan bahkan tidak seminggu sekali mampu mengonsumsi makanan berprotein.

Ketika dilakukan pendataan untuk kepentingan penargetan SLT, keluarga Pak Hairun termasuk salah satu dari sedikit keluarga yang didata, namun ternyata keluarga ini tidak termasuk penerima SLT. Keluarga ini tidak menyampaikan keluhan maupun melapor kepada pihak manapun.

Petugas pencacah setempat mengakui bahwa keluarga Pak Hairun termasuk yang didata dan sebenarnya layak menerima. Namun pencacah menilai Pak Hairun sebagai pribadi yang malas. Contohnya, Pak Hairun pernah mendapat bantuan 100 lembar seng dari departemen sosial tetapi tidak diwujudkan untuk membangun rumahnya. Seng tersebut ternyata dijual oleh Pak Hairun untuk menutupi kebutuhan hidup keluarganya.

Tampaknya nasib baik masih berpihak pada Pak Hairun. Meskipun tidak melapor, ketua RT setempat mendaftarkan keluarga Pak Hairun ketika dibuka pendaftaran ulang bagi penerima susulan. Petugas BPS yang mendata ulang pun menjanjikan mereka sebagai calon penerima susulan.

Di Kabupaten Bima, peneliti SMERU bertemu dengan seorang penerima bernama Samsudin (bukan nama sebenarnya) yang menuturkan kisah perjalanan hidupnya hingga ia kembali lagi ke Bima. Pada 1993, ketika berumur 18 tahun, Samsudin berangkat ke Jakarta untuk mencari kehidupan yang lebih baik. Setelah sempat beberapa kali pindah tempat bekerja dari satu pabrik ke pabrik yang lain sebagai buruh, pada 1995 Samsudin pindah kerja ke sebuah bengkel las di Tangerang. Di bengkel ini dia bekerja selama dua setengah tahun dengan upah mulai dari Rp7.000/hari.

Samsudin menikah pada 1996 setelah bertemu dengan seorang perempuan yang bekerja di sebuah pabrik konveksi di Tangerang, yang juga berasal dari Kabupaten Bima. Setelah menikah, ia terjun ke kegiatan jual-beli barang bekas. Pada awalnya hasil usaha ini cukup menggembirakan, penghasilannya sekitar Rp15.000/hari. Namun hasil usaha ini dari hari ke hari semakin tidak menentu. Dia menekuni usaha ini selama satu tahun, sebelum akhirnya bangkrut.

and firewood. They can only eat twice a day and are not even able to eat protein-rich food once a week.

When the data collection for the SLT targeting was being conducted, Pak Hairun's family was one of the few families who were listed but, in fact, it appears that this family was not included as SLT recipients. This family did not lodge a complaint or report it to anyone at all.

The local enumerator acknowledges that Pak Hairun's family was included in those assessed and was actually a suitable recipient. The enumerator, however, assessed Pak Hairun as having a lazy nature. For example, Pak Hairun once received 100 sheets of roofing iron from the Department of Social Affairs but it was not used to build his house. This roofing iron was sold by Pak Hairun to cover the living needs of his family.

It appears that fate still looked kindly on Pak Hairun. Although it was not reported, the local RT head registered Pak Hairun's family when the supplementary registration was opened for additional recipients. The BPS official who collected the supplementary data also promised they would be nominated as supplementary recipients.

In Kabupaten Bima, the SMERU researcher met with a recipient named Samsudin (not his real name) who shared his life story starting from when he left Bima and until he returned there once again. In 1993, when he was 18 years of age, Samsudin left for Jakarta in search of a better life. After changing jobs several times from one factory to another as a laborer, Samsudin moved to a welding shop in Tangerang. In this workshop he worked for two and a half years with wages starting at Rp7,000/day.

Samsudin married in 1996 after meeting a woman who worked in a convection factory in Tangerang, who also hailed from Kabupaten Bima. After marrying, he went into the buying and selling of second-hand goods. Initially, the results of this enterprise were quite satisfactory, his income was around Rp15,000/day. However, the day-to-day earnings of this enterprise were increasingly uncertain. He worked diligently at the business for one year before finally going bankrupt.

Salah satu peneliti lokal SMERU saat wawancara dengan responden.

One of SMERU's local researchers during an interview with a respondent.



Dok. SMERU/SMERU Doc.

Pada awal 2005, bengkel tempat Samsudin bekerja sebelumnya mendapat kontrak kerja pada sebuah proyek pembangunan gedung di Bogor. Samsudin dipekerjakan sebagai tukang las pada proyek ini. Dia menumpang di rumah sewaan teman sepekerjaannya, sementara anak dan istri Samsudin tetap tinggal di Tangerang.

Tidak sampai dua bulan bekerja di Bogor, Samsudin terlibat persoalan pribadi dengan rekannya tersebut yang memaksa dirinya pulang ke Tangerang sebelum akhirnya bersama keluarga kembali ke kampung halaman istrinya di Bima. Kini Samsudin menghidupi keluarganya dengan menjadi buruh tani dengan upah Rp20.000/hari. Ia tidak setiap hari bisa mendapat pekerjaan sehingga hidupnya sangat pas-pasan. Oleh karena itu, dia sangat senang terpilih sebagai penerima SLT. Dana yang diperoleh dari pencairan Tahap I sebesar Rp300.000 dipergunakan untuk membeli beras Rp150.000, membeli dua stel pakaian seragam sekolah anaknya Rp60.000, membayar zakat fitrah keluarga Rp30.000, dan belanja lauk pauk Rp60.000.

■ **Syaikhu Usman dan Hastuti.**

Early in 2005, the workshop where Samsudin previously worked obtained a work contract for a building construction project in Bogor. Samsudin was employed as a welder on the project. He stayed at the rented house of a work colleague, while his wife and child continued living in Tangerang.

*After less than two months working in Bogor, Samsudin was involved in a personal dispute with this colleague that forced him and his family to return to Tangerang before finally returning to his wife's home village in Bima with his family. Samsudin sustained his family by becoming a laborer for wages of Rp20,000/day. He could not find work every day so he was barely getting by. For that reason, he was very pleased to be chosen as a recipient of the SLT. The funding of Rp300,000 that was received from the Phase I funding disbursement was used to buy rice (Rp150,000), two sets of school uniforms for his child (Rp60,000), paid his family's tithe of Rp30,000, and some food (Rp60,000). ■ **Syaikhu Usman and Hastuti***

PENILAIAN KASAT MATA TIDAK SELALU MENUNJUKKAN KONDISI YANG SEBENARNYA

Pak Sulaiman (67 tahun, bukan nama sebenarnya) dan keluarga adalah pengungsi dari pulau lain yang pindah ke Ternate saat kerusuhan tahun 2001 yang lalu. Pria yang hanya berpendidikan kelas 3 SD ini mempunyai istri yang jauh lebih muda (36 tahun) yang berpendidikan SMP dan berprofesi sebagai dukun beranak terlatih. Mereka mempunyai empat orang anak yang masih bersekolah. Anak pertama kuliah di fakultas hukum universitas negeri setempat (Unkhair) sambil bekerja sebagai tenaga honorer di Pengadilan Tinggi Negeri. Ketiga anak lainnya masih sekolah di SMEA.

Sejak mengungsi, mereka menempati rumah saudara Pak Sulaiman yang masih mengungsi ke tempat lain. Rumah seluas 45 m² tersebut berdinding tembok, beratap seng, dan berlantai plester semen kasar. Rumah tersebut sudah mempunyai kamar mandi/WC sendiri meskipun sederhana. Sedangkan listrik dan air PAM yang biasa digunakan diperoleh dengan menyambung dari tetangga dan membayar Rp58.250 per bulan.

Saat baru datang, mereka hanya berbekal uang Rp80.000 yang kemudian digunakan untuk membeli tiga pasang sandal untuk anak-anaknya yang datang tanpa alas kaki. Sisa uang Rp65.000 digunakan untuk modal usaha jual-beli pisang. Tiga bulan kemudian, modalnya berkembang sehingga mereka dapat membeli kios kecil di dekat rumahnya seharga Rp1 juta yang dibangun di tanah tetangga tanpa sewa. Kios yang tadinya hanya untuk menjual pisang dan sedikit rokok tersebut sekarang sudah dapat menjual berbagai kebutuhan sehari-hari dan cukup laris.

Dari kios, Pak Sulaiman bisa memperoleh penghasilan bersih rata-rata Rp75.000 per hari. Di samping itu, istrinya yang biasa membantu orang melahirkan, biasa memperoleh pasien satu hingga lima orang per bulan. Biaya melahirkan hingga pengurusan pascamelahirkan adalah Rp750.000 per orang. Selain itu dia juga biasa diminta mengurus langganannya hampir tiap hari, sehingga dalam satu bulan istrinya berpenghasilan antara Rp1 juta lebih hingga Rp3 juta.

Dengan penghasilan sebesar itu, keluarga ini dapat memenuhi konsumsi sehari-hari yang relatif memadai, yaitu terdiri dari ikan, sayur, dan tahu atau tempe dengan biaya Rp25.000 per hari. Menjelang lebaran 2005 mereka dapat membeli tanah seluas 96 m² seharga Rp13 juta. Rencananya setelah lebaran haji 2006 ini mereka akan mulai membangun rumah secara bertahap. Keluarga ini juga mempunyai tabungan dalam bentuk uang, emas yang masih digadaikan senilai Rp2 juta lebih, dan sebuah sepeda motor gadai yang belum ditebus oleh pemiliknya. Motor gadai tersebut digunakan sebagai ojek dengan setoran Rp25.000 per hari.

Latar belakang mereka sebagai pengungsi yang belum memiliki rumah menimbulkan persepsi masyarakat sekitar bahwa mereka adalah keluarga kurang mampu. Karenanya, keluarga ini termasuk penerima beras miskin (Raskin) rutin sebanyak 20 kg per dua bulan, senilai Rp20.000. Di samping itu, mereka juga termasuk keluarga penerima SLT. Kasus keluarga Sulaiman ini menunjukkan bahwa penilaian keluarga miskin yang lebih didasarkan pada persepsi atau bias pencacah dapat mengakibatkan salah sasaran. ■ **Hastuti**

VISUAL EVALUATION DOES NOT ALWAYS SHOW THE TRUE CONDITION

Pak Sulaiman (67 years of age, not his real name) and his family are refugees from another island who fled to Ternate during the conflict of 2001. This man has only a third-grade primary school education and has a much younger wife (36 years), who has a junior high school education and a profession as a trained midwife. They have four children who are still at school. The oldest child is a student in the faculty of law at the local state university (Unkhair) while working as a casual staff member at the high court. The other three children are still at the SMEA.¹

Since fleeing, they have occupied the house of a sibling of Pak Sulaiman who is still in refuge in another place. The house has an area of 45 m², masonry walls, galvanized iron roof and walls of coarse plaster cement. The house has its own simple bathroom/WC. Electricity and drinking water are usually shared with their neighbor at a cost of Rp58,250 per month.

When they arrived they only had Rp80,000 that was used to buy three pairs of sandals for their children who had arrived without footwear, while Rp65,000 was used as seed funding for a business buying and selling bananas. Three months later, their capital had grown so they were able to buy a small kiosk near their house at a price of Rp1 million that was built on a neighbor's land and was rent-free. The kiosk that previously was only selling bananas and a few cigarettes also now sells a variety of daily needs and was quite popular.

From the kiosk, Pak Sulaiman could earn a net income averaging Rp75,000 per day. In addition, his wife who usually assisted women to give birth, normally had one to five patients per month. The cost from delivering the baby up to providing post-natal massages is Rp750,000 per person. In addition, she is also usually asked to provide massages for her clients each day, so in one month his wife has an income between more than Rp1 million up to Rp3 million.

With this level of income, the family can, quite adequately, fulfill their daily consumption that consists of fish, vegetables and tofu or tempeh at a cost of Rp25,000 per day. Shortly before Lebaran in 2005, they were able to buy a piece of land of 96 m² at a price of Rp13 million. They plan to start building a house in stages after this year's Lebaran Haji. The family also has savings in the form of money, gold that is still pawned at a value of more than Rp2 million and a pawned motor cycle that had not yet been redeemed by its owner. This motor cycle is used as an ojek at a rental fee of Rp25,000 per day.

Their background as refugees who do not yet own a house has given rise to a perception of the local community that this family is less well-off. Because of that, the family is included as a routine Raskin program recipient of 20 kg each two months at a price of Rp20,000. In addition, they are also listed as an SLT recipient family. The case of the Sulaiman family shows that the evaluation of poor families that is based more on perception or the bias of the enumerators can cause mistargeting. ■ **Hastuti**

¹ SMEA: Sekolah Menengah Ekonomi Atas: Senior Economics High School.

Dibutuhkan penilaian objektif untuk menentukan rumah tangga penerima SLT.

An objective assessment is required to determine SLT recipients.



Dok. SMERU/SMERU Doc.

BANTUAN DANA TUNAI UNTUK ORANG MISKIN: BELAJAR DARI PROGRAM PROGRESA/OPORTUNIDADES DI MEXICO

CASH TRANSFER ASSISTANCE FOR THE POOR: LEARNING FROM THE PROGRESA/OPORTUNIDADES PROGRAM IN MEXICO

Sudarno Sumarto*



www.iadb.org/images

Program pemberian dana tunai, khususnya program dana tunai bersyarat untuk mengganti subsidi berbentuk barang, telah dilaksanakan di beberapa negara sebagai salah satu alternatif upaya penanggulangan kemiskinan. Program dana tunai bersyarat mewajibkan penerima bantuan dana tunai untuk melakukan hal-hal yang dipersyaratkan, misalnya menyekolahkan anak, menggunakan fasilitas layanan kesehatan untuk kesehatan ibu dan anak, dan sebagainya. Program semacam ini berhasil dijalankan antara lain di Mexico di bawah nama Program *Progresa*, yang kemudian berganti nama menjadi *Oportunidades*.

Program Progresa

Program *Progresa* dimaksudkan untuk mengatasi kemiskinan saat ini maupun kemiskinan yang mungkin terjadi di masa depan melalui dua transmisi. Pertama, dana tunai yang diterima dapat digunakan untuk memenuhi kebutuhan mendesak seperti kelaparan, wabah penyakit, dan kebutuhan dasar mendesak lainnya. Kedua, dana

Cash transfer programs, particularly the conditional cash transfer (CCT) program to replace the subsidy in the form of commodities, was implemented in several countries as one alternative means of poverty reduction. The CCT program requires funding assistance recipients to follow stipulated requirements, for example to put children to school, use maternal and child health service facilities, and so forth. This type of program was operated effectively in Mexico (among other places) under the name *Progresa* Program and was later changed to the name *Oportunidades*.

Progresa Program

The *Progresa* Program was intended to overcome current poverty as well as prospect poverty via two means. Firstly, the cash received could be used to fulfill pressing needs such as hunger, illness, and other pressing basic needs. Secondly, the cash was expected to have a role as the tool to break the cycle of inter-generational poverty by means of enhancing investment in children from less well-off families in the areas

*Dr. Sudarno Sumarto adalah Direktur Lembaga Penelitian SMERU.

*Dr. Sudarno Sumarto is the Director of The SMERU Research Institute.

Satu aspek penting dalam *Progresa* adalah fokusnya terhadap perbaikan hidup perempuan miskin.

One important aspect of Progresa is its focus on improving the lives of poor women.

tunai diharapkan berperan sebagai sarana untuk memutus mata-rantai kemiskinan turun-temurun dengan cara meningkatkan investasi untuk anak-anak dari keluarga kurang mampu dalam bidang pendidikan, kesehatan, dan gizi. Dengan demikian, diharapkan di masa depan mereka akan mampu meningkatkan kualitas hidup dan keluar dari kemiskinan.

Atas dasar inilah maka *Progresa* disebut sebagai sebuah program kesejahteraan yang berbasis insentif (*incentive-based welfare program*). Dana tunai dipakai sebagai skema insentif agar keluarga miskin berinvestasi di bidang pendidikan, kesehatan, dan gizi. Peserta program hanya boleh mendapatkan dana tunai bila beberapa persyaratan dipenuhi, seperti tingkat kehadiran anak di sekolah, kehadiran ibu di fasilitas layanan kesehatan, dan sebagainya. Penerima dana tunai adalah para ibu. Selain para ibu, pada saat yang bersamaan pemerintah juga menyediakan bantuan untuk penyedia jasa kesehatan dan pendidikan.

Progresa dianggap sebagai salah satu program yang berhasil. Beberapa indikator keberhasilan program tersebut antara lain: menjangkau sebagian besar penduduk miskin di perdesaan dengan penduduk miskin yang tidak tercakup (*undercoverage*) hanya 7% saja, menurunkan tingkat kesenjangan kemiskinan (*poverty gap*) 30% dan tingkat keparahan kemiskinan (*severity of poverty*) 45%, meningkatkan kehadiran anak sekolah, dan menurunkan angka putus sekolah. Di bidang kesehatan, *Progresa* meningkatkan jumlah kunjungan ke fasilitas kesehatan, anak usia 0-5 tahun menjadi lebih sehat (insiden anak sakit 12% lebih rendah dari sebelum adanya program). *Progresa* juga meningkatkan kualitas nutrisi anak karena kualitas makanan yang dikonsumsi keluarga peserta mengalami peningkatan yang nyata (mengkonsumsi lebih banyak buah-buahan, sayur-mayur, daging, dan produk daging).

Selain itu, desain program ini juga dinilai sangat peka terhadap disparitas gender dalam akses terhadap sumber daya. Satu aspek penting dalam *Progresa* adalah fokusnya terhadap perbaikan hidup perempuan miskin untuk mengurangi kemiskinan secara menyeluruh melalui peningkatan pendidikan, kesehatan, dan gizi sebagai tiga komponen utama program ini. Program ini mencoba mengurangi disparitas gender dalam pendidikan dengan memberikan beasiswa yang lebih besar kepada anak perempuan dan berupaya mengubah persepsi bahwa sekolah lebih penting bagi anak laki-laki yang nantinya akan menjadi pencari nafkah utama keluarga. Di bidang kesehatan, fokus kepada layanan kesehatan bagi ibu hamil dan balita serta pelatihan mengenai kesehatan dan gizi, terutama bagi perempuan, diharapkan akan mengubah pola kebiasaan konsumsi makanan keluarga ke makanan yang lebih bergizi.

Perempuan, selain sebagai penerima dana tunai, juga merupakan aktor utama. Dengan menerima dana ini, perempuan akan mengelola dana tersebut agar kepentingan keluarganya (misalnya perbaikan



of education, health, and nutrition. In the future it is expected that they will be able to improve the quality of their lives and move out of poverty.

This is why Progresa is known as an incentive-based welfare program. The cash is used as an incentive scheme for poor families to invest in the fields of education, health, and nutrition. Program participants are only allowed to receive the cash if several conditions are fulfilled, such as child's attendance level at school, the mother's attendance at health service facilities, and so forth. Cash payments are made to mothers. In addition, at the same time the government also provides assistance for health and education service providers.

Progresa is considered to be one of the effective programs. Several indicators of the success of this program include: reaching most of the rural poor with an undercoverage rate of only 7%; reducing the poverty gap by 30% and the severity of poverty by 45%; increasing the school attendance rate and reducing the drop-out rate. In the health field, Progresa has raised the number of visits to health facilities and children aged from 0-5 years are healthier (the incidence of child illnesses is 12% lower than before the program's introduction). Progresa has also increased the quality of child nutrition because the quality of food consumed by families has experienced a real improvement (by consuming more fruit, vegetables, meat, and meat products).

In addition, the design of this program is also considered very sensitive to gender disparity in access to resources. One important aspect of Progresa is its focus on improving the lives of poor women to reduce poverty holistically via improvements in education, health, and nutrition as the three main components of this program. This program tries to reduce the gender disparity in education by providing more scholarships to girls and making an effort to change the perception that schooling is more important for boys who will later become the main bread-winner for the family. In the health area, the focus on health services for expectant women and children under the age of five years as well as training in health and nutrition, particularly for women, is expected to change the pattern of food consumption of families to one of eating more nutritious food.

Women, apart from being the cash recipients, also represent the main actor. By receiving these funds, women will manage the funds so that their families' interest (for example, health and nutrition improvements) become priority. At a glance, it indeed appears that this program is oriented towards women and gives the definite impression of affirming the

gizi dan kesehatan) menjadi prioritas. Sekilas memang nampaknya program ini berorientasi pada perempuan, dan terkesan justru menguatkan peran-peran gender tradisional dengan menonjolkan peran utama perempuan sebagai ibu semata. Namun sebenarnya, kebijakan program ini dibangun dari sebuah asumsi bahwa penguatan posisi perempuan, termasuk posisi tawarnya di dalam keluarga, adalah salah satu prakondisi bagi perubahan-perubahan sosial-ekonomi yang akan lebih menguntungkan masyarakat secara umum. Jika kesejahteraan perempuan meningkat, maka masyarakat akan memperoleh manfaat dari keadaan itu karena akan memperbaiki kualitas kesejahteraan masyarakat pada umumnya.

Bedanya lagi dengan program-program dana tunai pada umumnya, *Progresa* mempunyai investasi jangka panjang, yakni generasi mendatang yang berpendidikan dan lebih baik kualitas kesehatan dan gizinya.

Namun, banyak pertanyaan yang muncul ketika program *Progresa* hendak diluncurkan. Pertanyaan-pertanyaan tersebut, antara lain: mengapa subsidi yang diberikan berupa subsidi langsung dana tunai kepada rumah tangga, bukannya subsidi dalam bentuk barang/makanan, atau bantuan kepada penyedia jasa kesehatan dan pendidikan, misalnya? Mengapa penerima bantuan hanya mereka yang sangat miskin (*extreme poor*)? Mengapa perlu mendata lagi penduduk yang baru dan bukannya menggunakan daftar penerima program yang sudah ada? Mengapa bantuan diberikan langsung ke individu dan bukan ke masyarakat/komunitas? Mengapa program dirancang secara terpusat (sentralistik) dan tidak memberikan fleksibilitas lokal dalam penentuan sasaran serta pelaksanaannya? Mengapa penerima harus perempuan sehingga dianggap berpotensi menciptakan konflik dalam rumah tangga?

Untuk menanggapi beberapa kontroversi di atas, Pemerintah Mexico mengambil langkah-langkah berikut: melakukan uji coba, mengembangkan program secara bertahap, melakukan evaluasi program secara ketat oleh lembaga independen, pemantauan, evaluasi pelaksanaan program, serta analisis biaya-manfaat. Salah satu faktor kunci keberhasilan *Progresa* adalah desain awal yang dirancang secara seksama dan didahului dengan uji coba yang dipantau dan dievaluasi oleh lembaga independen. Uji coba dilakukan di 506 komunitas, melibatkan hampir 25.000 rumah tangga dengan cara membandingkan keluarga yang menerima program dengan yang tidak.

Program dana bantuan tunai harus bisa menjadi investasi jangka panjang bagi generasi mendatang.

Direct cash transfer programs should become a long-term investment for future generations.

traditional gender roles by giving prominence to the main role of women as mothers only. In actual fact, however, the policy for this program was developed from an assumption that strengthening the position of women, including their bargaining position in the family is one pre-condition for socio-economic changes that will be more beneficial to the community in general. If women's prosperity increases, the community will obtain a benefit from that situation because it will improve the prosperity of the community in general.

Another distinguishing feature compared to other cash transfer programs in general is that Progresa sets out for a long-term investment, namely a future educated generation with a better quality of health and nutrition.

However, many questions arose when the Progresa program was about to be launched. These questions included: why was the subsidy provided in the form of a direct cash subsidy to households and not as a subsidy in the form of commodities/food, or for example, as assistance to health and education service providers. Why assistance recipients are only the extreme-poor? Why do a new data collection on the population rather than use the existing list of program recipients? Why the assistance is provided directly to individuals and not to the community? Why the program was centrally planned and not given local flexibility in the determination of targets and its implementation? And finally, why must women be the recipients, considering that this can potentially create conflict in the household?

To address the controversies mentioned above, the Government of Mexico took the following steps: conducting a pilot program, developing the program in phases, conducting strict program evaluation by independent institutes, monitoring, program implementation evaluations as well as cost-benefit analyses. One key factor in the success of Progresa was the preliminary design that was carefully planned and preceded with pilot programs that were monitored and evaluated by independent institutes. Test pilots were undertaken in 506 communities, involving 25,000 households by comparing families that received the program with those that did not. The activity was preceded by preparing baseline data for both of these groups. One year later, the conditional cash transfer program was evaluated. In this evaluation, the issues examined included the accuracy of



Dok. SMERU/SMERU Doc.

Kegiatan didahului dengan menyiapkan *baseline* data untuk kedua kelompok tersebut. Setahun kemudian, program dana tunai bersyarat dievaluasi. Dalam kegiatan evaluasi tersebut, isu yang diteliti antara lain adalah aspek ketepatan sasaran penerima program, dampak program terhadap pendidikan, kesehatan, dan gizi. Selain itu, juga diteliti operasionalisasi program di lapangan dan persepsi dari lintas pelaku terhadap berbagai aspek pelaksanaan program, efektivitas biaya dan analisis biaya-manfaat, peranan perempuan dalam program, hubungan antarwarga, dan dampak program terhadap pemanfaatan pekerja anak serta pembagian dana tunai di dalam keluarga (*intra-household transfers*).

Langkah-langkah Pelaksanaan Program Dana Tunai

Untuk melaksanakan program pemberian dana tunai di Indonesia, langkah-langkah yang ditempuh oleh Mexico perlu diterapkan, tentu dengan beberapa modifikasi. Langkah awal yang harus dilakukan adalah kegiatan uji coba. Kegiatan uji coba dapat diawali dengan memilih beberapa kabupaten/kecamatan yang dianggap memiliki jumlah penduduk miskin tinggi (lebih dari 50%). Data jumlah penduduk miskin kabupaten/kecamatan dapat diperoleh dari hasil pemetaan kemiskinan (*poverty mapping*) BPS atau SMERU.

Kemudian di wilayah tersebut diadakan sensus rumah tangga untuk mengumpulkan data sosial-ekonomi rumah tangga, termasuk struktur demografi dan karakteristik rumah tangga. Hasil sensus tersebut selanjutnya dipergunakan sebagai informasi dasar untuk melakukan analisis diskriminan guna memisahkan penduduk miskin dengan penduduk bukan miskin. Setelah data calon penerima program tersedia, program dana tunai bersyarat dapat dimulai. Persyaratan dapat dikaitkan dengan pendidikan (misalnya tingkat kehadiran anak penerima program bantuan di sekolah) atau kesehatan (misalnya tingkat kehadiran ibu hamil di puskesmas, atau perkembangan gizi dan berat bayi dari ibu penerima program). Untuk keperluan evaluasi efektifitas program, maka diperlukan “kelompok kontrol” dengan melakukan pendataan terhadap rumah tangga nonpenerima.

Kegiatan uji coba ini sangat penting karena beberapa alasan. Pertama, dari sisi ekonomi, uji coba akan memperbaiki rancangan dan efektivitas program, serta memperkirakan dampak program. Hal ini akan memberi arahan kepada pemerintah sehingga pemerintah dapat mengalokasikan lebih banyak sumber daya kepada program yang menghasilkan manfaat terbesar. Kedua, dari segi sosial, uji coba akan meningkatkan transparansi dan akuntabilitas. Terakhir, dari sisi politik, uji coba akan meningkatkan kredibilitas program dan menghilangkan keraguan dari praktik program yang tidak berhasil di masa silam.

Catatan Akhir

Beberapa kalangan berpendapat bahwa *Progres* bukan program penanggulangan kemiskinan yang sekadar memberikan dana atau barang kepada masyarakat miskin tanpa menyelesaikan akar permasalahan kemiskinan itu sendiri. Melainkan, program ini dianggap membantu masyarakat miskin mengatasi kemiskinan dengan cara mengurangi hambatan-hambatan utama yang dihadapi orang miskin, seperti akses kepada layanan kesehatan, gizi yang baik, dan pendidikan dasar.

the program recipient targeting and the impact of the program on education, health, and nutrition. In addition, other factors were also examined, namely the operationalization of the program in the field and the perception of stakeholders on several aspects of the program implementation, the effectiveness of the cost and cost-benefit analysis, the role of women in the program, communal relationships, and the impact of the program on the exploitation of child labor as well as intra-household transfers.



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Implementation Steps in the Cash Program

To implement the cash provision program in Indonesia, the steps taken by Mexico need to be applied, but of course with several modifications. The first step that should be taken is a test pilot study. The test pilot can be initiated by selecting several kabupaten/kecamatan that are considered to have high numbers of poor (more than 50%). Data on the number of poor in kabupaten/kecamatan can be obtained from the results of the BPS or SMERU poverty mapping.

A household census was then conducted in these areas to collect the household socio-economic data, including the demographic structure and household characteristics. The results of this census were then used as the basic information for undertaking a discriminant analysis for the purpose of separating the poor from the non-poor. After the data on the program recipient nominees was available, the conditional cash transfer program begins. Conditions can be linked to education (for example, the level of school attendance of the children of program recipients) or health (for example, the level of attendance of expectant mothers at puskesmas, or the nutritional development and weight of babies whose mothers are program recipients). For the purposes of the evaluation of the program's effectiveness, a “control group” is needed by undertaking a data collection on non-recipient households.

The test pilot is very important for several reasons. Firstly, from the economic perspective, the test study will improve program effectiveness and design as well as estimate the program's impact. This will provide direction to the government so the government can allocate more resources to programs that can produce the greatest benefits. Secondly, from a social perspective, the test pilot will increase transparency and accountability. Finally, from the political perspective, a test pilot will improve the credibility of the program and remove doubts of program practices that were not successful in the past.

Concluding Remarks

Some are of the opinion that Progres is not just a poverty reduction program that provides funds or commodities to the poor whilst ignoring the root causes of poverty itself. Rather, this program is considered to assist the poor to overcome poverty by means of reducing the main impediments faced by the poor, such as access to health services, good nutrition and basic education.

Secara teoretis program dana tunai bersyarat memang berpotensi sebagai cikal-bakal program penanggulangan kemiskinan menyeluruh. Program ini dapat menjadi alat redistribusi dalam kondisi fiskal yang terbatas dan sebagai sarana investasi yang saling melengkapi di bidang pendidikan, kesehatan, dan gizi. Namun demikian, pelaksanaannya memerlukan persiapan, perencanaan serta rancangan-bangun yang tepat. Bahkan di Mexico sendiri, program yang sekarang mulai populer di Amerika Latin ini masih menyisakan beberapa pertanyaan mendasar, khususnya berkaitan dengan ketergantungan masyarakat terhadap dana transfer dari pemerintah serta persoalan strategi pengakhiran program (*exit strategy*).

Selain mempertimbangkan pertanyaan mendasar di atas, pemerintah juga perlu memperhatikan beberapa hal berkaitan dengan penerapan program pemberian dana tunai ini. Pertama, diperlukannya percontohan dengan skala kecil sebelum program ini dijalankan secara nasional. Kedua, bahwa program dana tunai hendaknya bisa memberdayakan masyarakat miskin agar mereka kelak bisa keluar dari kemiskinan. Dalam hal ini, pemberdayaan perempuan miskin merupakan salah satu faktor kunci bagi perbaikan kesejahteraan masyarakat yang juga perlu mendapat perhatian. Jika kesejahteraan perempuan meningkat, maka kondisi ini akan memperbaiki kualitas kesejahteraan masyarakat pada umumnya. Ini merupakan suatu hal yang perlu dipertimbangkan oleh Pemerintah Indonesia ketika merancang program-programnya. Tanpa adanya kesemua hal ini, maka kita semua harus siap menerima kegagalan dari upaya yang sebenarnya bisa mengubah kehidupan masyarakat miskin. ■



Dalam Program Progresa, perempuan, selain sebagai penerima dana tunai, juga merupakan aktor utama.

In the Progresa Program, women, apart from being the cash recipients, also represent the main actor.

www.progresa.gob.mx

Theoretically, the conditional cash transfer program is a potential pioneer of a holistic poverty reduction program. This program can become the redistribution tool in limited fiscal conditions and as the means of investment that is mutually complementary in the fields of education, health and nutrition. Nevertheless, its implementation needs preparation, planning and good design. In fact, in Mexico itself, the program that is now beginning to be popular in Latin America still ignores several basic questions, particularly in relation to the dependency of the community on transfers from government as well as the problem of a program exit strategy.

In addition to considering the basic questions above, the government also needs to pay attention to several issues in relation to the application of this cash transfer program. Firstly, there needs to be a small-scale trial before this program is instituted nationally. Secondly, the cash program should be able to empower the poor so they can later move out of poverty. In this regard, the empowerment of poor women is one key factor for improving the prosperity of the community that also needs to receive attention. If the prosperity of women increases, then this will improve the level of prosperity of the community in general. This is something that needs to be considered by the Government of Indonesia when planning its programs. Without the presence of all these factors, we have to be ready to accept failure in the effort that can actually change the lives of the poor. ■

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MERANCANG PROGRAM BANTUAN UNTUK KAUM MISKIN: SEBUAH CATATAN *DESIGNING AN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR THE POOR: A NOTE*

Mimin Rukmini & Sad Dian Utomo*



Dok. SMERU/SMERU Doc.

Kenaikan harga BBM per 1 Oktober 2005, termasuk minyak tanah dan solar yang harganya naik masing-masing 185,7 persen dan 104,8 persen (*Kompas*, 1 Oktober 2005) telah memicu berbagai kenaikan harga dan tarif lainnya. Keadaan ini menyebabkan rumah tangga miskin semakin sulit memenuhi kebutuhan hidupnya. Untuk mengurangi dampak kenaikan harga tersebut terhadap masyarakat miskin dan hampir miskin, pemerintah kemudian mengeluarkan Inpres Nomor 12/2005 tentang Pelaksanaan Bantuan Langsung Tunai Kepada Rumah Tangga Miskin, pada tanggal 10 September 2005.

“Program Dadakan” dan Dampaknya

Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT) atau sekarang lebih populer disebut dengan istilah Subsidi Langsung Tunai (SLT) terkesan sebagai program “dadakan” yang hanya mengejar target waktu untuk meredam gejolak sosial akibat kenaikan harga BBM. Hal ini nampak dari sempitnya waktu yang tersedia untuk memverifikasi data rumah tangga miskin. BPS hanya punya waktu sekitar sebulan untuk mempersiapkan teknis Program SLT. Mulai dari mengkoordinasikan kegiatan penyiapan data rumah

* Mimin Rukmini dan Sad Dian Utomo adalah peneliti PATTIRO (Pusat Telaah dan Informasi Regional) Banten, sebuah LSM yang bekerja untuk meningkatkan partisipasi masyarakat dalam proses pembuatan kebijakan pemerintah daerah.

The fuel price increase on 1 October 2005, including the price of kerosene and diesel which rose by 185.7 per cent and 104.8 per cent respectively (*Kompas*, 1 October 2005), has triggered a number of other price and tariff rises. This condition made it increasingly difficult for poor households to fulfill their basic needs. To reduce the impact of this price rise on the poor and near poor, the government then issued Inpres (Presidential Instruction) Number 12/2005 on the Implementation of Cash Transfer Assistance to Poor Households on 10 September 2005.

“A Half-baked Program” and Its Impact

The Cash Transfer Assistance (BLT) Program or, as it is now more popularly known, the Direct Cash Transfer (SLT) Program gives the impression that it is a “half-baked” program, running against a timeline to suppress social unrest resulting from the fuel price rise. This is apparent from the limited time available for verifying the data on poor households. BPS only had around one month to prepare the technical aspects of the SLT Program. Starting with the coordination of the data preparation activity on poor households, up to preparing and distributing the identity

* Mimin Rukmini and Sad Dian Utomo are researchers with PATTIRO (Center for Regional Information and Research) Banten, an NGO that works at enhancing community participation in the process of regional government policy formation.

tangga miskin, sampai menyiapkan dan mendistribusikan kartu tanda pengenal rumah tangga miskin, serta memberikan akses data tersebut kepada instansi pemerintah lain yang melakukan kegiatan kesejahteraan sosial (G.A. Nasser, 2005). Maka tak heran jika isu yang kemudian mencuat ke permukaan adalah masalah pendataan yang berakibat pada ketidaktepatan sasaran, di samping ketidakpuasan masyarakat atas pendistribusian Program SLT. Ketidakpuasan ini bahkan diikuti oleh berbagai ancaman dan tindak kekerasan, baik kepada petugas BPS maupun pengurus lokal, seperti RT dan kelurahan.

Selain tindak kekerasan kepada aparat pemerintah, antrean panjang untuk mengambil dana SLT, juga telah mengakibatkan korban jiwa. Peristiwa tewasnya orang miskin saat berdesakan antre sedekah sudah pernah terjadi, khususnya saat bulan Ramadhan menjelang Lebaran. Seharusnya, pemerintah sudah bisa mengantisipasi bahwa antrean yang panjang, berdesakan dan dapat menimbulkan korban itu kemungkinan besar terulang dalam antrean pengambilan dana SLT. Sudah dapat dibayangkan bahwa akan ada ratusan, bahkan ribuan orang yang akan antre di setiap kantor pos. Tak ada persiapan khusus ketika juklak (petunjuk pelaksanaan) pengambilan dana SLT disebar ke kantor-kantor pos di seluruh Indonesia. Tragedi antrean pengambilan SLT yang menimbulkan korban jiwa telah melahirkan selorohan sarkastis dalam masyarakat. Program yang juga disebut BLT atau Bantuan Langsung Tunai ini, *diplestetkan* menjadi “Bantuan Langsung Tewas”.

Penanganan Pengaduan

Pemerintah mengakui ada enam titik kritis atau kelemahan yang harus dibenahi dalam pengucuran dana SLT tahap pertama. Keenam titik kritis tersebut meliputi: (1) proses pencacahan atau pendataan rumah tangga miskin; (2) proses penetapan direktori rumah tangga miskin; (3) proses pembagian KKB; (4) proses penyaluran dana; (5) proses sosialisasi; dan (6) proses penanganan pengaduan (Riau Pos Online, 2005).

cards for poor households, as well as providing access to this data to other government bodies that conduct social welfare activities (G.A. Nasser, 2005). It is not surprising that the issue that later came to prominence is the problem of data collection which resulted in mistargeting, in addition to community dissatisfaction with the distributions of the SLT Program. This dissatisfaction was, in fact, followed by a variety of threats and violent actions, against BPS officials as well as local leaders, such as RT and village heads.

Apart from violence against government authorities, the long queues to obtain the SLT funds, also resulted in casualties. The occurrence of casualties among the poor has happened, especially during the month of Ramadhan, shortly before Lebaran, when queues crowd for sedekah (alms). The government should have been able to anticipate that long queues and crowding causing casualties would probably be repeated in the queues to collect SLT funds. It could have been imagined that there would be hundreds, if not thousands, of people queuing at every post office. There were no special preparations when the operating procedures for the SLT funds collection were distributed to post offices across Indonesia. The SLT queue tragedy that caused the death of a number of people, gave birth to sarcastic jokes in the community. The program that was also called BLT or Bantuan Langsung Tunai (Direct Cash Assistance), was jokingly changed into “Bantuan Langsung Tewas” (Direct Casualty Assistance).

Complaints Handling

The government recognized there were six critical points or weaknesses that had to be sorted out in the disbursement of the first tranche of SLT funds. These six critical points included: (1) the enumeration or data collection process on poor households; (2) the process of determining the directory of poor households; (3) the distribution of KKB cards; (4) the channeling of funds; (5) the socialization process; and (6) the complaints handling process (Riau Pos Online, 2005).



Salah satu aktivitas PATTIRO: advokasi penulisan draf Raperda di Malang.

One of PATTIRO's activities: advocating the legal drafting of the Raperda in Malang.

Dok. PATTIRO/PATTIRO Doc.

Dengan didirikannya Pusat Penanganan Pengaduan Pelayanan Publik (P5) di Semarang, banyak pengaduan masyarakat dapat ditindaklanjuti.

With the establishment of the Public Service Complaints Handling Center (P5) in Semarang, many community complaints could be followed up.



Dok. PATTIRO Semarang/PATTIRO Semarang Doc.

Penanganan pengaduan tak lagi dapat dimaknai sekadar sebagai saluran kotak saran/pengaduan tanpa kejelasan penanganannya. Proses pengaduan harus berjalan berdasarkan suatu sistem/mechanisme yang menjamin masyarakat dapat menyampaikan pengaduannya secara mudah dan murah, ada pejabat yang khusus menangani pengaduan, kejelasan waktu penyelesaiannya dan hasil akhir dari pengaduan tersebut, berupa kompensasi ganti rugi atau denda, ataupun perbaikan kebijakan dan pelaksanaan program.

Pengalaman PATTIRO dalam mengembangkan model mekanisme pengaduan terhadap pelayanan publik yang berbasis partisipasi masyarakat lokal di kota Semarang, Malang, dan Tangerang memperlihatkan bahwa mekanisme pengaduan merupakan aspek penting dalam pengelolaan pelayanan publik, seperti pendidikan, kebersihan, dan kesehatan. Di Semarang, program yang bekerja sama dengan pemerintah daerah dan tokoh-tokoh masyarakat ini menunjukkan bahwa dengan adanya mekanisme pengaduan yang diatur dalam Surat Keputusan Walikota dan didirikannya Pusat Penanganan Pengaduan Pelayanan Publik (P5), maka banyak pengaduan masyarakat yang dapat ditindaklanjuti. Namun yang membedakan program berbasis partisipasi masyarakat ini dengan program-program yang bersifat *top-down*, adalah pelibatan masyarakat dalam pengidentifikasi masalah dan perumusan kebijakan mengenai pelayanan publik dan mekanisme pengaduannya (seperti penyusunan Raperda di Malang). Selain itu, peranan elemen-elemen pemerintah lokal yang peduli terhadap masalah terkait juga diperlukan.

Berkaitan dengan Program SLT, pemerintah perlu segera mengoptimalkan fungsi infrastruktur pengaduan masyarakat di setiap tingkat pemerintahan dan daerah untuk menampung dan menyelesaikan berbagai pengaduan masyarakat menyangkut program SLT. Tentu saja, untuk hal ini pemerintah perlu melatih petugas penanganan pengaduan yang proaktif dan sensitif. Adanya mekanisme pengaduan yang jelas dapat memberikan umpan balik bagi pelaksanaan program pada tahap-tahap selanjutnya, selain menghindari munculnya berbagai aksi kekerasan dan gejolak sosial. Pengembangan mekanisme pengaduan ini juga sepatutnya membuka kesempatan bagi munculnya inisiatif lokal dalam penyelesaian masalah yang dihadapi.

Complaints handling can no longer be seen just as a complaints/suggestion box without an explanation on their handling. Complaints processes should operate based on a system/mechanism that guarantees that the community can submit their complaints easily and cheaply, that there are special officials to handle complaints, clarity on the timelines for their resolution and the final results of these complaints, the form of compensation or fines, or even the enhancement of program policy and implementation.

The experience of PATTIRO in developing a model complaints mechanism for public services that is based on local community participation in Semarang, Malang, and Tangerang shows that the complaints mechanism is an important aspect of the management of public services, such as education, sanitation, and health. In Semarang, this program which is conducted in cooperation with local governments and community figures shows that with a complaints mechanism regulated in a Mayoral Decree and with the establishment of the Public Service Complaints Handling Center (P5), many community complaints could be followed up. What differentiates this community participation-based program from top-down programs, however, is the involvement of the community in the identification of problems and the formulation of policy on public services and their complaints mechanism (like drafting the local regulation in Malang). In addition, the role of local government elements who are concerned with the associated problems is also needed.

In conjunction with the SLT Program, the government needs to immediately optimize the functioning of the community complaints infrastructure at every level of government administration and region to accommodate and resolve the various community complaints related to the SLT Program. Of course, for this to happen, the government needs to train complaints handling officials who are pro-active and sensitive. The presence of a clear complaints mechanism can provide feedback for the implementation of the program in the following phases, in addition to avoiding the emergence of various violent actions and social unrest. The development of a clear complaints mechanism also creates the opportunity for the emergence of local initiatives in the resolution of problems that they face.

Penutup

Adanya berbagai kendala di lapangan akibat sifat Program SLT yang “dadakan”, khususnya terkait dengan masalah pendataan, menunjukkan bahwa perencanaan dan desain yang baik adalah faktor penting dalam setiap upaya penanggulangan kemiskinan. Pengembangan mekanisme pengaduan yang baik dan melibatkan masyarakat lokal merupakan salah satu aspek yang perlu tercakup dalam rencana program karena dapat menjadi sarana umpan balik bagi perbaikan program selanjutnya.

Di waktu yang akan datang, “program-program dadakan” yang dirancang instan untuk mengurangi dampak dari kebijakan lainnya sepatutnya sudah tidak diimplementasikan lagi. Belajar dari kedaruratan Program SLT, maka pemerintah tidak perlu menunggu dulu persoalan menjadi genting, baru mengeksekusi “kebijakan dadakan”.

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Conclusion

The existence of various obstacles in the field as a result of the “half-baked” nature of the SLT Program, particularly those associated with the problem of data collection, show that good planning and design are important factors in every poverty reduction effort. The development of a good complaints mechanism that involves the local community is one aspect that needs to be included in the program plan because it can become the feedback tool for improvements in future programs.

In the future, “half-baked programs” that are planned spontaneously to reduce the impact of other policies should definitely not be implemented again. Learning from the emergency of the SLT Program, the government does not need to wait for the problem to become critical before then executing a “half-baked policy”.

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