

RESEARCH REPORT

**A Rapid Appraisal of the Implementation of  
the 2008 Direct Cash Transfer Program and  
Beneficiary Assessment of the 2005 Direct  
Cash Transfer Program in Indonesia**

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A significant part of the research in this publication uses interviews and focus group discussions. All relevant information is recorded and stored at the SMERU office.

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **A Rapid Appraisal of the Implementation of the 2008 Direct Cash Transfer Program (BLT) and Beneficiary Assessment of the 2005 Direct Cash Transfer Program in Indonesia**

Meuthia Rosfadhila, Nina Toyamah, Bambang Sulaksono, Silvia Devina,  
Robert Justin Sodo, and Muhammad Syukri

This report is the result of a rapid appraisal of the implementation of the 2008 Direct Cash Transfer (BLT) program and community perceptions of the stigma which emerged during the implementation of the BLT 2005 program. Early observations and assessment of the implementation of the program are essential in understanding the achievement level and problems associated with the program. This information can be used as a learning tool to improve the implementation and planning of the program in the future.

This study used qualitative methods including in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGD) as well as quantitative methods. Although there were some weaknesses, generally the results of this study show that the implementation of the 2008 Direct Cash Transfer was a great improvement from that of the 2005 Direct Cash Transfer, particularly in regard to the socialization process, distribution of cards, and disbursement of funds. Weaknesses were generally related to institutional issues, accuracy of targeting, and the handling of problems/complaints. Based on community perceptions, BLT can, in a limited way, help satisfy living needs in the short term. This study uncovers cases of BLT being deducted in some areas. Although there was mistargeting to a limited extent, BLT did not discourage participation in the work force. Conflict occurred in some cases but did not lead to anarchic behavior.

Keywords: Direct cash transfer, evaluation, program implementation

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Askeskin	: Asuransi Kesehatan Masyarakat Miskin (Health Insurance for the Poor program)
Bappeda	: Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Regional Development Planning Board)
Bawasda	: Badan Pengawasan Daerah (Regional Supervision Board)
BBM	: <i>bahan bakar minyak</i> (refined fuel oil (fuel))
BLT	: Bantuan Langsung Tunai (Direct Cash Transfer)
BOS	: Bantuan Operasional Sekolah (School Operational Assistance)
BPD	: Badan Permusyawaratan Desa (Village Consultative Body)
BPM	: Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (Community Empowerment Body)
BPMD	: Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa (Village Community Empowerment Body)
BPS	: Badan Pusat Statistik (Statistics Indonesia)
Dinsos	: Dinas Sosial ( <i>kabupaten/kota</i> or provincial social affairs agency)
FGD	: focus group discussion
Infokom	: Dinas Informasi dan Komunikasi ( <i>kabupaten/kota</i> or provincial information and communication agency)
inpres	: <i>instruksi presiden</i> (presidential instruction)
Jamkesmas	: Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat (Community Health Insurance program)
Kapermas	: Kantor Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (Community Empowerment Office)
Kaur pemerintahan	: <i>kepala urusan pemerintahan</i> (head of government affairs)
KKB	: <i>kartu kompensasi BBM</i> (fuel compensation card)
KPRK	: <i>kantor pos pemeriksa kabupaten/kota</i> ( <i>kabupaten/kota</i> inspection post office)
KTP	: <i>kartu tanda penduduk</i> (identity card)
MCK	: <i>mandi cuci kakus</i> (public bathing, washing, and toilet facilities)
<i>muspida</i>	: <i>musyawarah pimpinan daerah</i> (regional consultative council)

<i>muspika</i>	: <i>musyawarah pimpinan kecamatan</i> ( <i>kecamatan consultative council</i> )
PEPM	: Program Ekonomi Masyarakat Pesisir (Coastal Communities Economy Program)
PKH	: Program Keluarga Harapan (Family of Hope Program)
PKPS BBM	: Program Kompensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan Bakar Minyak (Fuel Subsidy Reduction Compensation Program)
PMD	: Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa (Village Community Empowerment program)
PNPM Mandiri	: Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri (National Program for Community Empowerment)
<i>posyandu</i>	: <i>pos pelayanan terpadu</i> (integrated health service post)
PPLS	: Pendataan Program Perlindungan Sosial (Social Protection Program Data Collection)
PSE05	: Pendataan Sosial-Ekonomi Penduduk 2005 (2005 Socioeconomic Data Collection on the Population)
<i>puskesmas</i>	: <i>pusat kesehatan masyarakat</i> (community health center)
Raskin	: Beras untuk Rakyat Miskin (Rice for the Poor)
RT	: <i>rukun tetangga</i> (a neighborhood unit, the smallest unit of local administration consisting of a number of households.)
RTS	: <i>rumah tangga sasaran</i> (targeted households)
RW	: <i>rukun warga</i> (a unit of local administration consisting of several RT (neighborhood units))
Satpol PP	: <i>satuan polisi pamong praja</i> (Public Order Agency)
SMS	: short message service
Sosnakertrans	: Dinas Sosial, Tenaga Kerja, dan Transmigrasi (Transmigration, Labor, and Social Affairs Agency)
Tapteng	: Tapanuli Tengah (Central Tapanuli)
UKM	: <i>usaha kecil mikro</i> (micro and small businesses)
UPP	: <i>unit pelaksana program</i> (program implementing units)
UPP BLT-RTS	: Unit Pelaksana Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai Rumah Tangga Sasaran (Program Implementing Unit for the Direct Cash Transfer Program for Targeted Households)

## GLOSSARY

<i>arisan</i>	an Indonesian social gathering in which a group of friends and relatives meet monthly for a private lottery similar to a betting pool. Each member of the group deposits a fixed amount of money into a pot, then a name is drawn and that winner takes home the cash.
<i>bupati</i>	Head of a <i>kabupaten</i>
<i>dusun</i>	hamlet/small area within a neighborhood
<i>kabupaten</i>	district
<i>kecamatan</i>	subdistrict
<i>kelurahan</i>	A village level administrative area located in an urban center
<i>kota</i>	city/municipality
<i>lorong</i>	small area within a neighborhood
<i>walikota</i>	Head of a <i>kota</i>

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## Research Background and Objectives

In 2008 the Government of Indonesia (GoI) decided to increase the domestic fuel price as it had in 2005 due to a rise in international fuel prices to above US\$120 per barrel and to address the fact that the government's fuel subsidy tended to benefit the middle and upper classes more than the lower class. In addition, the decision was made to prevent the increasing frequency of subsidized fuel being smuggled abroad. To mitigate the negative impact of the increase, the government then re-launched the Direct Cash Transfer (BLT) program. This program involved 19.02 million targeted households (RTS) being eligible to receive Rp100,000 every month for seven months—from June to December 2008. The total BLT transfer amount of Rp700,000 was distributed to eligible households in two installments—Rp300,000 and Rp400,000 respectively.

To look into the implementation process of the 2008 BLT program while taking into account the lessons learned from the implementation of the 2005 BLT program, it was deemed to be essential to conduct a rapid appraisal of the 2008 BLT program implementation and an evaluation of the 2005 BLT program beneficiaries. Funded by the World Bank, the SMERU Research Institute conducted a rapid appraisal of the implementation of the first stage of the 2008 BLT program. During this study, in addition to examining the technical aspects of the program, SMERU also carried out a beneficiary assessment—in particular regarding the community's negative perceptions of the 2005 BLT program—as well as an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of other poverty reduction programs and how these programs compare with the 2008 BLT.

## Research Methodology

The SMERU 2008 BLT study used the qualitative approach, complemented by quantitative data. Data collection was conducted through focus group discussions (FGDs), in-depth interviews with informants/respondents who were directly connected with the BLT implementation—from across the central, *kabupaten/kota* (district/city), *kecamatan* (subdistrict), village/*kelurahan*,<sup>i</sup> and household levels—and an appraisal of documents and study findings from the 2005 BLT as well as documents related to the implementation of the 2008 BLT.

Two types of FGDs were conducted in each sample *kabupaten/kota*, these being FGDs seeking recommendations and FGDs classifying the participating households' welfare status, each of which required female participation. The FGDs seeking recommendations, on the one hand, were held to collect information on the implementation of the 2008 BLT program, including the problems that arose and the recommended solutions. The FGDs at the *kabupaten/kota* level involved only the various elements or government agencies related to the BLT, while the FGDs at the village/*kelurahan* level engaged participants from among village/*kelurahan* officials, community/religious/youth leaders, and *posyandu* (integrated health service post)<sup>ii</sup> cadres. On the

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<sup>i</sup>A *kelurahan* is a village-level administrative area located in an urban center.

<sup>ii</sup>A *posyandu* or an integrated health service post is a medium for a village/*kelurahan*/RW community to provide basic health services for its own members. The main objective is to help reduce Under-Five and Maternal Mortality Rates. The services, given by local PKK cadres assisted by a medical staff member of the local community health center, include immunization, weight measuring, and general health check for children under the age of five as well as general health check for mothers and the elderly.

other hand, the FGDs classifying household welfare were aimed at obtaining information on welfare rankings to evaluate aspects of program undercoverage and leakage at the *dusun*/*RW*<sup>iii</sup> level. At the village/*kelurahan* level, these FGDs were held separately for male and female beneficiaries, involving representatives from each area within the village/*kelurahan*.

This study was conducted in the five sample *kabupaten/kota* that were used similarly by SMERU as sample *kabupaten/kota* during the 2005 BLT program evaluation study. SMERU deliberately chose the same areas so that the findings of this study can be compared with those of the 2005 BLT program implementation study. The study's research activities, report writing, and workshop were scheduled to take place over 15 weeks, from August 2008 to the end of November 2008. However, due to some technical problems and the political situation in Indonesia at that time (specifically the 2009 general election), there was a delay so that the final report in English could not be finished until the beginning of October 2009.

## General Findings

The technical aspects studied as part of the first stage of the 2008 BLT study were the institutional issues, program socialization, verification and accuracy of targeting, channeling of funds, complaints and problem solving, and the levels of satisfaction regarding the implementation of the program. Several aspects of the beneficiaries' perspectives were examined to gain an understanding of the community's true perceptions regarding some of the more common negative impressions surrounding the implementation of the 2008 BLT.

### Institutional Issues

Compared to the role of institutions in the implementation of the 2005 BLT, the role of institutions in the 2008 BLT was perceived to have improved, particularly regarding the delegation of tasks and authority from the central government level to the *kabupaten/kota* level, although some flaws were still evident. Clearly seen in the lack of coordination and consolidation among institutions and government agencies, the flaws were caused by (i) unclear division of authority among the government agencies, (ii) delayed budget realization for coordination meetings and for the implementation of the BLT-RTS from the provincial level to the *kabupaten/kota* level, (iii) complicated bureaucratic process, and (iv) confusion over the actual objectives and characteristics of the 2008 BLT program. In addition, another problem regarding institutional issues was the negative perceptions of the program from some government apparatus, NGOs, and media agencies that considered the BLT programs as playing a part in making people lazy and overly consumptive. Several stakeholders suggested that a community empowerment program replace the BLT program.

### Socialization

In general, the socialization of the 2008 BLT program, particularly that regarding funds disbursement, was done competently. However, there were still weaknesses evident in terms of the emphasis of what the BLT actually is, the background and objectives of the BLT program, and the criteria of eligible beneficiaries. Socialization of these details was essential to minimizing local conflict and increasing the community's monitoring role.

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<sup>iii</sup>A *dusun* is an administrative area within a village consisting of a number of RT (neighborhood units). An RW is a unit of local administration within a *kelurahan* consisting of several RT.

## Verification and Accuracy of Targeting

The process of verifying the eligibility of BLT beneficiaries was for the most part conducted by the village/*kelurahan* apparatus without involving other elements of the community, under the cloak of time and resource constraints and for fear of inciting local conflicts. Additionally, in almost every sample area, the verification process was only carried out to check on BLT beneficiaries who were now deceased or had moved, while, in fact, the verification process should have been used to check whether a household was still eligible to receive the BLT funds or had experienced an improvement in their welfare status. Concerns were not raised so long as the number of new/replacement RTS did not exceed the number of revoked ones.

A majority of respondents claimed that they were aware of some poor households not being able to access BLT funds while some non-poor households received the funds. The policy not to replace the RTS who had moved or died or whose welfare status had improved in order to avoid inciting local conflict, by all levels of government, from the provincial/*kabupaten/kota* to the village/RW/RT, was in fact the major reason why the inaccuracy of targeting in the 2008 BLT program worsened.

## Channeling of Funds

By and large, the process of distributing the fuel compensation cards (KKB) to the RTS went relatively smoothly, although there were still cases of misprints of beneficiaries' names and addresses. The transfer of the KKB from the *kabupaten/kota* inspection post office (KPRK) to the village heads depended largely on how long the verification process took. The location of the village was also an influencing factor on the KKB distribution process. The greater the distance between the village and the nearest KPRK, the shorter the time between the KKB distribution and the BLT funds disbursement. There was no evidence of any unauthorized levies being collected from the RTS during the KKB distribution process.

The disbursement of the 2008 BLT funds was conducted relatively better than that of the 2005 BLT funds owing to some improvements made by PT Pos, which had taken steps to increase the number of disbursement points, counters, and staff members as well as the engagement of security staff and officials. For the most part the RTS received the full amount of the BLT funds from the post office.

## Complaints and Problem Solving

The majority of complaints received were related to the RTS data, such as the unclear criteria for identifying eligible beneficiaries, target setting, and the number of beneficiaries. Unfortunately, there were no specific units for handling complaints in the study areas, so the public can only file their complaints with the related agencies from the village/*kelurahan* level to the *kabupaten/kota* level without a clear handling mechanism in place.

## Satisfaction Levels

The results of the five FGDs with the *kabupaten/kota* elite and the ten FGDs with the village/*kelurahan* elite regarding the implementation of 2008 BLT program indicates that the satisfaction level of the *kabupaten/kota* elite is higher than that of the village/*kelurahan* elite, except for the distribution of the KKB stage of the program. This situation is similar to that of the implementation of 2005 BLT. The targeting stage was the most unsatisfactory for the village elite. This is significantly different from the satisfaction level of the *kabupaten/kota* elite regarding this particular stage of the BLT implementation. The low level of satisfaction of the



village elite is due to the fact that they had to face the anger of villagers who did not receive the funds as a result of mistargeting. Furthermore, the socialization stage was the most unsatisfactory, especially for the *kabupaten/kota* elite, in both 2005 and 2008.

In regard to the RTSs' satisfaction levels with the implementation of the 2008 BLT, the results of the FGDs indicate that there is no significant difference in the levels of satisfaction between the female and male participants. However, there was a tendency for the satisfaction levels of the male participants with problem solving, program socialization, and distribution of the KKB to be higher than that of the female participants. In contrast, the female participants showed higher levels of satisfaction than the male participants in terms of the amount of money being received and the accuracy of RTS targeting.

Similar to the elites, the RTS also stated that the KKB distribution as well as the funds disbursement were the most satisfactory stages, especially for their relatively smooth implementation process. In contrast, the RTS considered the accuracy of targeting and the amount of money being received as the most unsatisfactory. During the 2005 BLT program implementation, the socialization stage was regarded as the most unsatisfactory for the beneficiaries. However, during the 2008 BLT, the RTS were quite satisfied and thought they had been given adequate information regarding schedules, requirements, and procedures of the BLT funds disbursement.

In general, the RTS participating in the FGDs could not wholly understand and identify the institutions organizing the BLT program. They did not know the roles of the institutions above the village/*kelurahan* level, except for the post office. Therefore, the RTSs' satisfaction level assessment of the institutional work performance was limited to the village/*kelurahan*-level institutions and the post office only.

### **Community Perceptions of the Negative Impressions surrounding the Implementation of the 2008 BLT**

There were negative impressions formed of the 2008 BLT program, namely (i) the BLT cannot cushion the shock of the sudden rise of the price of fuel; (ii) the targeting of the BLT is not accurate; (iii) the BLT is prone to corrupt practices; (iv) the BLT creates local conflict; and (v) the BLT creates negative incentive to labor force participation. Here are the community's perceptions of the negative impressions attached to the 2008 BLT program.

1. The RTS generally claimed that the funds that they received could assist in improving their economic circumstance. However, they thought that the amount was not adequate. This is because they compared the 2008 BLT funds with the ever-rising prices of their daily needs.
2. Most informants at the community level said that there were poor households who deserved BLT funds but did not appear on the list of BLT beneficiaries. The targeting inaccuracy was caused by (i) unclear criteria for identifying poor households; (ii) partial (due to quota requirements) and distorted (due to nepotism) data collection mechanisms; and (iii) the data collectors' as well as the listed RTSs' questionable integrity.
3. Fund distribution programs to large sections of society are often vulnerable to corrupt practices, for example, in the form of deductions—either authorized or unauthorized. In the 2008 BLT program, these deductions were made for various reasons, but mostly involved a deal being struck between community leaders and the RTS. The BLT funds



deduction was also intended to avoid personal jealousies and conflicts within the community. Another reason was that the money from the deductions could help to fund numerous social activities, such as the Indonesia's Independence Day ceremonies, as well as communal road construction projects, and religious activities.

4. The implementation of the 2008 BLT program was much more conducive than that of the 2005 BLT program because, among other reasons, people were already apathetic and powerless, the issuance of local resolutions that enabled non-RTS to receive part of the BLT funds, statements from *kecamatan* officials that the non-RTS would receive the funds during the next distribution period, reduced political tensions in the regions, and the notion that the amount of funds distributed in the 2008 BLT program was relatively smaller than that in the 2005 BLT. In most cases there was only local tensions due to some individuals becoming envious or accusing others of being nepotistic during the targeting stage.
5. The assumption of many people that the BLT program would make the beneficiaries lazy or reduce the beneficiaries' working hours was not entirely proven. Most of the informants stated that the BLT funds distribution did not make the beneficiaries lazy because the size of the fund was too small to cover their daily needs.

### **BLT Compared with Other Poverty Reduction Programs, according to BLT Beneficiaries**

Poverty reduction programs that have been implemented in Indonesia can be categorized into three groups, namely: (i) social/charitable programs—aid and social protection programs for specific groups such as the BLT, PKH (Family of Hope Program), Raskin (Rice for the Poor), Jamkesmas (Community Health Insurance), and BOS (School Operational Assistance); (ii) empowerment programs—PNPM Mandiri (National Community Empowerment Program); and (iii) programs for developing Micro-, Small- and Medium-scale Enterprises (UMKM). According to the majority of the program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, the BLT programs are the best among poverty reduction programs in Indonesia.

Overall, most of the program beneficiaries prefer the charitable programs over the empowerment and UMKM development programs. In contrast, most stakeholders stated that empowerment programs such as PNPM Mandiri, UMKM development, Farming Revitalization, and the Economic Empowerment of Coastal Communities (PEMP) were better than social/charitable programs as the empowerment programs did not only promote the welfare status of poor households but also gave them a higher level of status and dignity.

## **Conclusions and Recommendations**

Outlined here are several conclusions based on the study findings of the first stage of the 2008 BLT program.

1. The BLT program is still relevant and it can help the poor recover from the economic shock due to the sudden rise in the price of fuel.
2. There were still tensions—and even conflict—at the community level, although with a lower intensity. Social envy and the nontransparent process of verification of the beneficiaries were prominent contributing factors.

3. Deductions from the BLT funds—authorized or unauthorized—were still made systematically with an increasing figure. This condition was not anticipated and taken care of by the program implementing apparatus.
4. The BLT program does not make the RTS lazy and change the RTS' overall working hours. The limited size of the funds received makes the poor think and act rationally. They continue working at their jobs to fulfill their increasing daily needs.
5. There are still errors in the targeting process and there are poor households not listed as eligible beneficiaries due to some flaws during the verification process.

Consequently, the continuation of the program requires several improvements in terms of its implementation. Presented here are some recommendations to be implemented.

1. The RTS lists from Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik or BPS) need to be verified by the community at the village consultation meeting—involving as much as possible all community elements—and be documented in an official report. Village officials should also be required to present the list of the RTS' names on a community notice board so the village residents can provide feedback in case they have any objections to the list.
2. People need to be made more aware of the fact that BLT funds are only available to eligible poor households by
  - a) reaching out to more people during the socialization process, especially in relation to the program's purpose, objectives, mechanisms, and targeting;
  - b) giving explanations about the program, formally and informally, through various events such as village/*dusun* meetings, religious occasions, *arisan*,<sup>iv</sup> and other community's social activities;
  - c) distributing brochures and displaying posters at public places as well as disseminating information through, among other methods, public service announcements (PSA) in relevant mass media (printed and electronic).
3. In order to prevent unauthorized deductions from the BLT funds for any purpose and on any grounds, *bupati/walikota*<sup>v</sup> need to issue a directive to related apparatus and agencies from the *kabupaten* (district)/*kota* (city) level to the village/*kelurahan* level—including the RT<sup>vi</sup>/RW—that prohibits BLT fund deductions and the letter should be distributed and displayed in public places.

In addition to the three points above, there are also other factors that need to be taken into consideration.

1. The KKB must be distributed after the verification process has been completed, so that those KKB that have been revoked cannot be misused.
2. In relation to BLT funds disbursement, the following needs to be provided.
  - a) Additional disbursement points, especially in areas which are remote and difficult to access.
  - b) Additional counters and special counters for RTS who are elderly, sick, or having special needs.

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<sup>iv</sup>An *arisan* is a regular social gathering in which the members operate a rotating savings scheme.

<sup>v</sup>A *bupati* is the head of a *kabupaten* (district). A *walikota* is the head of a *kota* (city).

<sup>vi</sup>An RT, or a neighborhood unit, is the smallest unit of local administration consisting of a number of households.

- c) A queuing system (queuing numbers, designated queuing lines, security personnel, etc.).
3. Complaint-handling centers need to be established at each of the administrative levels.
- a) At the *kabupaten/kota* level, the functioning of a complaint-handling center is inherent in the tasks and functions of the BLT-RTS program implementing unit (UPP BLT-RTS).
  - b) At the *kecamatan* level, the functioning of the center is the responsibility of the head of the *kecamatan*.
  - c) At the village level, the functioning of the center is the responsibility of the head of the village/*kelurahan*, overseen by the Badan Permusyawaratan Desa (Village Consultative Body)/*kelurahan* board with the involvement from the village/*kelurahan* youth organization and the community's social workers.
4. There needs to be a directive from the head of the *kabupaten/kota* clearly describing the tasks and functions of the agencies involved in the UPP BLT-RTS, especially at *kabupaten/kota* level.

# I. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Background

In order to compensate poor households for an increase in the price of fuel, in 2008 the government again implemented a Direct Cash Transfer (BLT) program as it had in 2005. The constantly increasing price of oil in the international market to over US\$120 per barrel and the fact that the government's fuel subsidy has so far been more beneficial to the middle and upper classes rather than the poor provided the context for the decision to reduce the fuel subsidy that caused the increase in the national price of fuel. As well as this, there was concern that the large difference between the fuel price inside and outside the country could lead to an increase in smuggling fuel out of Indonesia.

The increase in the fuel price led to an increase in the price of daily goods and services, which led to a decrease in the purchasing power of the community, especially of poor households. Through the Direct Cash Transfer program for targeted households<sup>1</sup> (RTS – Rumah Tangga Sasaran)) the government gave compensation of Rp100,000 per month, distributed in two stages over seven months from June to December 2008, to the value of Rp300,000 and Rp400,000. The number of RTS was the total number of beneficiaries of BLT 2005/2006 which was 19.1 million. This total was updated in 1000 *kecamatan* (subdistricts) through the Family of Hope Program (Program Keluarga Harapan) and the total was reduced to 19.02 million RTS.

Previous experience showed that the implementation of the distribution of BLT still faced many problems, particularly with targeting and socialization. Thus, with the re-implementation of this program, monitoring and evaluation of its implementation was needed to ensure that the program could be carried out effectively. Through funding support from the World Bank, The SMERU Research Institute has conducted a rapid appraisal of the implementation of the first stage of the 2008 BLT program.

## 1.2 Research Objectives

This research aimed to evaluate the implementation of the 2008 BLT program, including institutional aspects, socialization, verification and accuracy of targeting, channeling of funds, and the handling of complaints and problems. The research also examined some aspects from the beneficiary's perspective (beneficiary assessment) particularly to gain an understanding of the community's true opinions about five negative perspectives which emerged during the implementation of the 2005 BLT program, that is: (i) BLT was not able to overcome the shock from the increased fuel price, (ii) the targeting of BLT was inaccurate, (iii) BLT created opportunities for corruption, (iv) the implementation of BLT caused conflict, and (v) BLT gives a disincentive for the beneficiaries to participate in the work force.

This research also evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of other poverty reduction programs, such as PKH, Raskin (Rice for the Poor) and Jamkesmas (Community Health Insurance), compared to the 2008 BLT based on community opinions and beneficiary experiences.

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<sup>1</sup>Before Presidential Instruction No. 3, 2008 was released the BLT program for RTS was originally called BLT Plus. BLT Plus beneficiaries were going to receive Rp100,000 in cash as well as assistance of food goods, such as cooking oil and sugar.

## 1.3 Research Methodology

### 1.3.1 Research Approach and Stages

This study uses a qualitative approach supplemented by a quantitative approach. Data was collected through focus group discussions (FGD) and in-depth interviews using interview guidelines and short questionnaires. In each *kabupaten/kota* (district/city) there were nine FGDs; one FGD at the *kabupaten/kota* level, two at the village level, and six at the community and RTS level. This research also included a literature review of documents and research results from the 2005 BLT and documents related to the implementation of the 2008 BLT which were compared with the actual implementation of the 2005 BLT. Before visiting the five sample areas, direct observation of the implementation of BLT funds distribution was conducted in Kecamatan Pasir Kuda, Cianjur.

Two types of FGDs were held in each *kabupaten/kota*: FGDs seeking recommendations and FGDs for classification of households' welfare. The FGDs seeking recommendations sought information about the implementation of the 2008 BLT program, the problems faced by RTS, and recommendations to deal with each problem. There were eight to ten participants in each discussion. The FGD to classify household welfare was conducted to gain information about the household welfare levels, which was then used to evaluate the under coverage and leakage at the *dusun* (hamlet)/RW<sup>2</sup> level. These FGDs had 10–15 people involved. Each FGD was required to have at least one female representative as a participant.

At the *kabupaten/kota* level only FGDs seeking recommendations were held. These involved Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistics or BPS), the post office, Social Affairs Agency, local government, Bappeda (Regional Development Planning Board), Information and Communication Agency (Infokom), BPM (Community Empowerment Body), tertiary institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and the local media. At the village/*kelurahan*<sup>3</sup> level both recommendation and household welfare classification FGDs were conducted. Recommendation FGDs with the village/*kelurahan* elite included participants from the village/*kelurahan* staff, the head of the *dusun/lorong*<sup>4</sup>/RW/RT<sup>5</sup>, community/religious/youth figures, and personnel from the *posyandu* (integrated health service post). At the household level, the implementation of the recommendation FGDs differentiated between women's and men's beneficiary groups. For the classification of household welfare FGD, participants were representatives from one area in a village/*kelurahan* (*lorong/dusun*, RT, RW), including community figures, head of the *dusun/lorong*, RT, RW, midwives, and teachers, who understand the community living conditions in the particular village/*kelurahan* and consist of a mixture from the various welfare levels (rich/poor).

### 1.3.2 Selecting Research Sample Areas

The study was conducted in five sample *kabupaten/kota* which were the same as those for the previous study, also carried out by SMERU, for the 2005 BLT. The sample areas are Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah (Tapteng), Kabupaten Cianjur, Kabupaten Demak, Kabupaten Bima, and Kota Ternate (see Table 1.1). The same sample regions were deliberately selected so

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<sup>2</sup>RW is a unit of local administration consisting of several RT (neighborhood units). *Dusun* is a hamlet, or settlement smaller than a village.

<sup>3</sup>A *kelurahan* is a village level administrative area located in an urban center

<sup>4</sup>A *lorong* is literally a small street, but here refers to a small area within a neighborhood.

<sup>5</sup>RT, or a neighborhood unit, is the smallest unit of local administration consisting of a number of households.

that a comparison could be made with the 2005 BLT implementation evaluation results. These five *kabupaten/kota* were selected for SMERU's 2005 BLT study as they were spread across Indonesia, they had been research areas for previous SMERU studies and so a database about poor households was available, and these areas represented conducive and not conducive areas for the first step of the 2005 BLT implementation.

In every sample *kabupaten*, except for Kota Ternate, the same two villages from the same two sample *kecamatan* as used in the 2005 BLT study were chosen. Due to the creation of new administrative regions, Kelurahan Kampung Pisang, which had previously been part of Kecamatan Ternate Selatan, was now part of Ternate Tengah. These changes caused a number of areas in Kelurahan Kampung Pisang to become part of a different *kelurahan*.

**Table 1. 2008 BLT Study Sample Areas**

Province	Kabupaten/Kota	Kecamatan	Village/ Kelurahan
North Sumatra	Kab. Tapanuli Tengah	Sibabangun Sorkam	Mombang Boru Pearaja
West Java	Kab. Cianjur	Cugenang Cibeber	Cibulakan Girimulya
Central Java	Kab. Demak	Wedung Karang Tengah	Berahan Wetan Wonoagung
West Nusa Tenggara	Kab. Bima	Monta Wera	Simpasai Nunggi
North Maluku	Kota Ternate	Ternate Tengah Ternate Selatan	Kampung Pisang Fitu

### 1.3.3 Number and Type of Respondents

The informants and respondents who took part in this research are from parties directly related to the implementation of the BLT program; from the central, *kabupaten/kota*, *kecamatan*, village/*kelurahan* and household levels (see Table 1.2). Institutional informants included those from the Ministry of Social Affairs, local government (social affairs agency, the Regional Development Planning Board, information and communications agency, the Economic Sector), Statistics Indonesia at the central and *kabupaten/kota* levels, PT Pos<sup>6</sup> (the Central Post Office in Jakarta, *kabupaten/kota* inspection post office (KPRK), *kabupaten* secondary post office, *kecamatan* post office), *camat*<sup>7</sup>, the police, and the village/*lurah*<sup>8</sup> head/secretary to the RT head.

Household respondents who were interviewed were mostly the same as those interviewed in the 2005 BLT study and were divided into the 2005 BLT beneficiary households and poor nonbeneficiary households. Respondents for the 2008 BLT study consisted of the 2005 BLT respondents as well as some new respondents who were divided into four criteria: 2005 and 2008 BLT beneficiary households, 2008 BLT beneficiary households, 2005 BLT beneficiary households, and poor nonbeneficiary households. In total there were 128 respondents, consisting of 90 RTS from the 2005 and 2008 BLT, 6 RTS 2008, 4 RTS 2005, and 28 nonbeneficiaries.

<sup>6</sup>PT Pos is the state-owned post office.

<sup>7</sup>A *camat* is the head of a *kecamatan*.

<sup>8</sup>A *lurah* is the head of a *kelurahan*.

**Table 2. Number and Type of Respondents for 2008 BLT Study**

Level	Respondent	Total
1. Center	1. Statistics Indonesia	1
	2. Post Office	1
	3. Ministry of Social Affairs	1
2. Kabupaten/kota	1. Statistics Indonesia	5
	2. Kabupaten/kota Inspection Post Office (KPRK)	5
	3. Local government (social sector, secretary to the <i>kabupaten/kota</i> head/regional assistant) and/or Bappeda	6
	4. Dinsos (social affairs agency)	5
	5. Infokom (information and communications agency)	1
	6. BPM (Community Empowerment Body)	1
	7. Police	1
	8. Local Media	5
	9. Nongovernment organizations	3
3. Kecamatan	1. Statistics Indonesia/statistics staff	6
	2. Secondary Police Office	6
	3. Camat/Camat's secretary	9
	4. PMD (village community empowerment)	1
	5. Police	2
4. Village/ Kelurahan	1. Village head/secretary/head of government affairs ( <i>kaur pemerintahan</i> )	11
	2. Partners/Assistant Partners	4
	3. RW/dusun	14
	4. RT Head	16
	5. BPD (Village Consultative Body)	3
	6. Community Social Welfare Workers	12
	7. BLT 2005 and 2008 beneficiary households	90
	8. BLT 2008 beneficiary households	6
	9. BLT 2005 beneficiary households	4
	10. Poor nonbeneficiary households	28

### 1.3.4 Research Team Members and Research Schedule

The SMERU research team included twelve people: advisor Dr. Sudarno Sumarto and eleven researchers (Meuthia Rosfadhila, Nina Toyamah, Bambang Sulaksono, Silvia Devina, R. Justin Sodo, Eduwin Pakpahan, Nur Aini, Upik Sabainingrum, Muhammad Syukri, Dedi Ali Ahmad, and Sinta Satriana). These eleven researchers were divided into five teams who were each responsible for conducting research in one *kabupaten/kota*. Each team was assisted by a local researcher. These local researchers were Basyri Nasution, Pitriati Solihah, Fathur Rohman, Syahbudin Hadid, and Salha Marasaoly. Thus one team on average consisted of two SMERU researchers and one local researcher.

The research activities took place over 15 weeks, starting from the second week of August 2008. Field research in five *kabupaten/kota* was carried out simultaneously over 14 days, from 24 August to 6 September 2008. The main findings and recommendations were completed at the end of September, followed by the writing of the draft report finishing at the end of October 2008. The final report was completed at the end of November 2008.



**Table 3. 2008 BLT Research Schedule**

Activity	August 2008				Sept 2008				Oct 2008				Nov 2008			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
1. Preparation stage and participants making observations		■	■													
2. Field research				■	■	■										
3. Data entry and analysis						■	■	■								
4. Writing up of main findings and recommendations							■	■	■	■						
5. Workshop									■	■						
6. Writing draft report									■	■	■	■				
7. Writing final report													■	■		
8. Translation of report																■


The implementation of several activities, like workshops, the writing of final reports, and the translating of reports, experienced a delay due to some technical problems. The political situation in Indonesia at that time—approaching the 2009 General Election—was also not conducive to carrying out the workshops so that it was not conducted on time. The World Bank even stipulated that they did not allow workshops to be carried out during the election. The workshops, which should have been carried out at the time of writing the new draft report, finally began to be carried out in July 2009, then continued with the writing of the final report up until August 2009. The final report in English was finished in early October 2009.



## II. EVALUATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIRECT CASH TRANSFER PROGRAM (BLT)

### 2.1 Institutional Issues

The BLT program was conducted through coordination across sectors which worked together based on each institution's function and main tasks. Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No. 3/2008, which was the legal basis for the implementation of the 2008 BLT program, stated that the Ministry of Social Affairs, together with related government agencies, was responsible for channeling BLT funds. Through the Minister for Social Affairs Decree No. 28/HUK/2008, the Minister for Social Affairs selected PT Pos Indonesia and BRI as the implementers for the channeling of 2008 BLT funds to the RTS.



**Figure 1. BLT program organizational structure**

Source: Departemen Sosial RI, 2008.

As a unit for coordinating activities, as can be seen in Figure 1, a program implementing unit (UPP) was established at each government level from the central to the *kecamatan*. These UPP had the authority to carry out development, supervision, and program monitoring. The UPP were chaired by the department/agency/social affairs agency and were made up of members from various relevant government agencies, such as the Ministry for Communications and Information Technology, PMD, Statistics Indonesia, and Bappeda/regional secretaries.

In contrast with the role of institutions in the implementation of the 2005 BLT, the involvement of institutions from the central level to the *kabupaten/kota* level in the 2008 BLT, particularly with regard to the delegation of tasks and authority, was more efficient. Various documents (Presidential Instruction No. 3, 2008 and Minister for Home Affairs Decree (SK) No. 541/1336/SJ, 2008 on the Implementation and Monitoring of BLT), had already been received before the distribution plan was carried out. Despite this, the responses in regard to the delegation of tasks/authority and the coordination from the center varied.

In Cianjur, the local government responded to the delegation of tasks and authority through its regional consultative council (*muspida*) meetings, which involved related agencies such as the army and police. These meetings were carried out systematically down to the *kecamatan* level. In Bima, Tapanuli Tengah, and Demak, the coordination control was in the hands of the social affairs agency who involved related agencies such as Bappeda, PT Pos, Statistics Indonesia, and all *camat* representatives. These agencies were invited to attend an event about the socialization of the technicalities of the program. In Kota Ternate, the coordination between levels took place down to the *lurah* level. The coordination was still limited to the program's socialization activities between regions and between elite and did not spread nor was it intensive at the village apparatus level, with community leaders or with the community. The coordination also made no serious efforts to organize follow up or anticipate for the systematic monitoring and evaluation of the program implementation. The orientation of the coordination of the institutions seemed to be more focused on fulfilling formal requirements.

While the implementation of BLT 2005 was dominated by Statistics Indonesia, PT Pos took the dominant role in the implementation of BLT 2008. In sample areas, the post office was involved in the socialization process, explanations about the verification of RTS data, distribution of fuel compensation cards (KKB) to the village/*kelurahan* level, fund disbursement and receiving community complaints. Other institutions/agencies were only involved in the socialization process, coordination between agencies and tended to wait for information from the post office.

Generally, problems with the institutional aspects of the BLT program ranged from problems with coordination and consolidation between levels and institutions to the speed and ability to understand instructions from higher level institutions to those below. The weaknesses with the institutional coordination and consolidation between institutions and levels (*kabupaten, kecamatan, and village*) were caused by a number of factors, including unclear division of authority between agencies, delayed budget realization for the coordination meetings and the implementation of the BLT-RTS from the provincial to *kabupaten* levels, the complicated bureaucracy process, and the confusion over the actual objectives and characteristics of the BLT 2008 program.

The formation of UPP BLT-RTS only occurred at the *kabupaten/kota* levels, and not at the *kecamatan* level as was instructed by the technical guidelines for the BLT 2008 program. In almost all sample regions, the formation of UPP was explained in decrees from the regional heads. However, in Bima, decrees about the formation of these units were signed by the head of the local social affairs agency. However, the decrees only included the structure of the technical

implementing unit for BLT 2008 and did not clearly detail the function and authority of the establishment, supervision, and monitoring of the program from the respective agencies involved.

Due to the delayed budget realization, the coordination meetings, which should have taken place at the start of the program implementation, had to be held after the implementation of socialization for BLT 2008. In Bima, the UPP BLT-RTS was forced to limit its supervising and monitoring activities of the program implementation because the operational funds had not been received. In accordance with the regulations, these funds can only be released if all operational activity reports and staff travel directive reports have been signed and sent to the provincial government. Based on these reports, the provincial government could then disburse the operational funds. In Tapteng, monitoring and evaluation activities did not even take place. This was because the local social affairs agency had only been formed three months prior to the research being carried out (around May 2008), and because they had not yet received operational funds.

Another problem involving institutions was the negative perceptions toward the program from some government apparatus from the *kabupaten* to the village level, NGOs, and the media. They felt that BLT made people lazy and consumptive. Thus, some stakeholders suggested that BLT should be replaced by a community empowerment program that the village needed.

## 2.2 Socialization

Socialization of the 2008 BLT program involved multiple institutions at the *kabupaten/kota* and *kecamatan* levels. Apart from Kota Ternate, socialization took place in the form of a coordination meeting involving the *muspida* and other related institutions such as the local government, Office of Social Affairs, Statistics Indonesia, PT Pos, Bappeda, BPM, and *camat*. The village heads/*lurah* and the *kecamatan* consultative council (*muspika*) were only involved in socialization at the *kecamatan* level. In Kota Ternate, the socialization for the 2008 BLT program was conducted separately before the coordination meeting and directly involved the *lurah*.

The implementation of interinstitution socialization carried out at the *kabupaten* level was generally instigated by the Office of Information and Communications, the Office of Social Affairs and the post office. This differs from the implementation of the socialization for BLT 2005 where Statistics Indonesia was the only organization that conducted socialization to the local government apparatus. As well as holding the coordination meeting, the Office of Information and Communications also conducted socialization through pamphlets, radio broadcasts, and press conferences.

Socialization for the community was not done in any formal way. The RTS communities generally only got their information about BLT 2008 from village/*kelurahan* agencies. RTS obtained information about the plan for the disbursement of funds from the village apparatus, particularly from the head of the RT/RW when they went to collect their KKB. Non-RTS communities heard information by word of mouth, and also obtained information through local media news and articles, or through community service advertisements. In Cianjur and Demak socialization to the community was included in various routine local or *kecamatan* activities. In one village in Cianjur, socialization also took place through religious activities (*pengajian*<sup>9</sup> and Friday sermons).

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<sup>9</sup>*Pengajian* is a Koran reciting group.

In almost all sample regions, except for Kota Ternate, the socialization material for the 2008 BLT program focused only on the technical implementation of the program, such as verification, distribution of the KKB, fund disbursement timetable, and the total amount of funds to be disbursed. Important explanations about what BLT actually is, the background and objectives of the program, and the criteria for BLT recipients were not given serious attention. Socialization of this kind of material is very important in order to minimize conflict and to increase the monitoring role of the community.

The implementation of socialization for the 2008 BLT program was far better than that for the 2005 BLT program, especially with regards to the disbursement of funds. For the 2005 BLT program there were weaknesses in the socialization of the technical aspects of the program at almost all stages, that is, data collection, fund disbursement, and complaint mechanisms. The increase in quality of 2008 BLT fund disbursement was influenced by the intensive socialization efforts from the media, post office, and village apparatus. Press about the date of the fund disbursement spread widely, not only through print and radio media, but also through copies of the disbursement timetable which the post office gave to the village apparatus.

## 2.3 Verification and Accuracy of Targeting

### 2.3.1 Verification Process

In contrast with the targeting for BLT 2005, which was conducted by Statistics Indonesia using the 2005 poor household data collection process—known as 2005 the Socioeconomic Data Collection on the Population (PSE05)—the basis for determining beneficiaries of BLT 2008 was through a verification process of the 2005/2006 RTS database, which had been updated in 1,000 *kecamatan* in relation to the Family of Hope Program (PKH).

From all sample areas, only Bima and Tapteng had made use of the updated data from the 2007 Health and Education Basic Services Survey to allocate the beneficiaries of BLT 2008. While other *kabupaten/kota* still used the same data as for BLT 2005–2006 (see Table 4).

**Table 4. Number of RTS in Five Sample Kabupaten/Kota**

Kabupaten/ Kota	BLT 2005/2006	Updating related to PKH (SPDKP 2007)	KKB received by RTS	BLT 2008	
				KKB cancelled/printing process	
				Total	%
Tapanuli Tengah	35,861	34,900	34,780	120	0.3
Cianjur	195,579	-	160,324	35,255	18.0
Demak	119,000	-	117,439	1,561	1.3
Bima	52,614	51,815	48,409	3,406	6.6
Ternate	3,915	-	3,877	38	1.0

Statistics Indonesia at the central level, as the owner of the database, sends data of the names and addresses of RTS to PT Pos to print KKB. The KKB were printed by PT Pos then sent along with a nominative RTS list to all post offices in Indonesia. The post office then gave this nominative list to the village/*lurah* head to be verified. In Cianjur, Bima and Ternate, the nominative list was immediately given by the KPRK to the village/*lurah* head.

In Demak and Tapteng the nominative list was given to the village/*lurah* head through the subdistrict post office branch.

According to the technical guidelines for the 2008 BLT program, post office and village staff are required to conduct verification of 2005/2006 BLT beneficiary data from Statistics Indonesia through a village consultation process involving all community elements from the village/*kelurahan*. With the exception of Tapteng and Cianjur, the verification process was more often conducted by village/*kelurahan* apparatus without involving other elements of the community such as religious and community figures, RT/RW/*dusun* heads, and others, with the excuse that there was limited time, resources, and the potential for local conflict. In Bima and Demak, verification was conducted completely by the RT head, without involving other elements of the community. In Kota Ternate, the *kelurahan* checked the data only with internal *kelurahan* staff and did not involve the RT/RW heads or community figures. In Demak and Cianjur, as well as for the purposes of verification, consultation at the RT/RW level was also conducted to make agreements about the deduction of BLT funds.

The technical guidelines for BLT 2008 assert that verification is done to check for RTS that have moved or died (without an heir) and for inclusion errors, and then to cancel or withhold these RTS's KKB. Such KKBs are then transferred to other households that have the right or are eligible to receive BLT, provided that the number of the new beneficiaries does not exceed the number of beneficiaries cancelled. Despite this, there were still various irregularities in the verification process. In almost all sample areas the verification process was only aimed at BLT 2005 beneficiaries who had died or moved. Except for Bima, verification of beneficiaries who were not actually eligible to receive BLT (inclusion error) was not carried out in order to avoid potential conflict or threats to government apparatus. In one village in Demak, RTS who had moved were not crossed off the list of beneficiaries and their money could still be obtained by the head of the RT who then divided this money evenly to non-BLT beneficiaries. This was done to avoid conflicts like those which occurred during the data collection of 2005.

In Kota Ternate there was an agreement at the *kota* level not to change the names of 2005 BLT beneficiaries. In Tapteng the same agreement was made at the provincial level. However, in practice the village staff did not always adhere to this agreement. In one village in Tapteng, the village apparatus transferred the KKB to new deserving beneficiaries by giving them certificates from the village so that the new beneficiaries could access their money from the post office.

In conducting verification of beneficiaries who are ineligible or finding replacement households who have the right to receive BLT, the village/RT/*dusun* apparatus in some sample areas said that they used the 14 criteria that were used by Statistics Indonesia in the data collection for BLT 2005. In Kota Ternate, during the socialization phase Statistics Indonesia gave instructions to the heads of *kelurahan* about the 14 criteria to determine whether a household was eligible to receive BLT or not. In Demak, Statistics Indonesia instructed the village apparatus, who had met with Statistics Indonesia to ask about this issue, to keep using these 14 predetermined criteria.

As well as using the 14 criteria, some sample areas also used local criteria to determine households that were not eligible or to find appropriate replacement households. In one village in Tapteng, replacement RTS consisted of poor widows, people with disabilities, or elderly people. In one RW in Cianjur, the criteria for supplement RTS was if they did not have a house and had two to three children. Meanwhile, in other RW the criteria used was that beneficiaries did not have their own houses, had lived in the local area for a long time, and did



not have a stable income. In one village in Demak, the RT head determined that citizens who owned land or rice fields, owned a motorcycle, or had houses with stone walls and tiled floors were not eligible to receive BLT.

The limited time for the verification process, which was on average one to two weeks, was one of the obstacles in the process at the village/*kelurahan* level. In one village in Kabupaten Bima, the Village Consultative Body (BPD) apparatus joined with the replaced RTS residents and protested in front of the *kecamatan* post office against the verification results and demanded they still receive BLT. Staff from the *kecamatan* post office were forced to comply with their demands. Based on results of the verification, in Cianjur there were 35,255 RTS which would receive a new KKB, or approximately 18% of the total number of RTS. While in Bima, approximately 6.6% of the total number of RTS failed to receive a KKB. In Tapteng, Demak, and Kota Ternate, the number of RTS who failed to receive a KKB or their KKB was still in the printing process was lower, at 0.3%, 1.31% and 1% respectively (see Table 4).

### **2.3.2 Accuracy of Targeting**

To analyze the accuracy of the targeting for the 2008 BLT program, both qualitative and quantitative approaches were used. Using a qualitative approach, based on observations by the SMERU team and answers from the majority of respondents, mistargeting still occurred during the implementation of the 2008 BLT program. The majority of respondents stated that there were poor households which did not receive BLT and conversely, some well-off households that received BLT 2008. This was also supported by the FGD with *kabupaten* and village elites who explained that one of the big problems in this program was with the targeting and there needed to be improvements in the data collection process. The use of 2005/2006 data which had not been updated and still had doubts over its validity, in addition with the verification process which was invalid and tended to be affected by the subjectivity of the RT/RW or village/*kelurahan* apparatus, caused mistargeting (inclusion and exclusion errors) with BLT 2008. Moreover, policies from the provincial/*kabupaten/kota* level instructing the village/RW/RT level not to redirect or replace RTS who had moved, passed away, or increased their welfare, in order to avoid conflict, worsened the mistargeting in the 2008 BLT program.

Using a quantitative approach, the SMERU team collected data from 2005 BLT beneficiary respondents from the previous SMERU BLT study, along with some new respondents who were also BLT beneficiaries, using the PSE05.RT questionnaire as used by Statistics Indonesia for BLT 2005. From a total of 96 respondents who were beneficiaries of BLT 2008, approximately 60% were beneficiary respondents from the BLT 2005 study, the remainder could not be found as they had moved or died, and were thus replaced by other respondents who fulfilled the same criteria.

Using the same weighting system and values as that of the 2005 BLT program, for the 14 poverty indicators gained from the PSE05.RT questionnaire, the scores of every household respondent were calculated and their level of eligibility for receiving the 2008 BLT fund was measured. The final score gained by each household ranged from 0 to 1; the higher the respondent's score, the poorer the respondent, and vice versa. Furthermore, to determine the eligibility of a BLT beneficiary household, a cut-off point of 0.2 for the household score was used. Thus, those who obtained a score of 0.2 or higher were determined to be poor households.

At the cut-off point of 0.2 (see Table 5) 98.9% of RTS were eligible to receive BLT 2008. This shows that the level of accuracy of the targeting was quite high for BLT 2008. However, as there was no verification process for BLT 2005/2006 data in some areas, this figure seems to be too high to depict the real accuracy level of targeting for BLT 2008 in sample areas.

To obtain information on the accuracy of targeting that is closer to the condition in the field, a sensitivity analysis was conducted with the cut-off point being increased to 0.4 and 0.6. The result was that the proportion of RTS who were eligible to receive BLT 2008 experienced a decrease in line with the increased cut-off point. Thus it can be seen that the determination of the cut-off point in the targeting process is very important as with a higher cut-off point, the selected households are only those which are very poor, while those which are not eligible are eliminated.

If compared with BLT 2005, the proportion of RTS eligible to receive BLT 2008 does not change at the 0.2 cut-off point. However, with a cut-off point of 0.4 and 0.6 there is a downward trend when compared to 2005. The decrease in the proportion of RTS eligible to receive BLT 2008 compared to those in 2005 at the cut-off points of 0.4 and 0.6 shows there has been an increase in welfare for some RTS in the time period of 2005–08. In other words, some of the beneficiaries who previously received BLT 2005 are no longer eligible to receive BLT. In addition, if all three cut-off points are compared, the biggest decrease in the proportion of RTS who are entitled to receive the BLT between 2005 and 2008 occurs at the cut-off point of 0.6. This shows that between 2005 and 2008, the biggest increase in welfare occurred with very poor RTS rather than with near-poor households.

Based on the results of calculations per region, Kota Ternate has the lowest proportion of RTS who are suitable for receiving BLT 2008, whereas Bima has the highest proportion. The low proportion of RTS suitable to receive BLT in Ternate has a positive correlation with the low level of poverty in this area.<sup>10</sup> Thus, as with the different weighting for each variable in each region, the cut-off point should also be different for each region.

## 2.4 Channeling of Funds

### 2.4.1 Distribution of KKB

In order to disburse BLT, RTS received a KKB with the beneficiary's identity on the card. The RTS data was prepared by the Central Statistics Indonesia who then sent the data to PT Pos Indonesia to print the KKB. The KKB printing by PT Pos Indonesia was divided into five stages for 434 *kabupaten/kota*. The period for printing the KKB was from 15 May until 16 June 2008. From the five sample *kabupaten/kota*, only Kota Ternate was included in the second stage of the KKB printing, while the other four *kabupaten/kota* were included in the fifth stage (see Table 6).

After printing, the KKB were immediately given to KPRK throughout Indonesia. For a number of *kabupaten/kota* which did not have a KPRK, the KKB were sent to a KPRK closest to that *kabupaten/kota*. For Tapteng and Demak, the KKB were sent to KPRK Sibolga and KPRK Semarang respectively. While in Cianjur, Bima, and Kota Ternate, the KKB were sent directly to the respective KPRK in each *kabupaten/kota*.

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<sup>10</sup>The poverty level in Ternate is based on Statistics Indonesia's calculations in 2007, which is 4.26%.

**Table 5. Proportion of RTS Eligible to Receive BLT**

Region	Cut-off points						N	
	0.2		0.4		0.6		2005	2008
	2005	2008	2005	2008	2005	2008		
Tapteng	100	100	94.4	88.2	83.3	47	18	17
Cianjur	100	100	95	79	95	68	20	19
Demak	100	100	94.1	42.8	64.7	14.3	17	7
Bima	100	100	100	100	88.8	80	18	25
Ternate	95	95.4	90	63.6	50	9.1	20	22
<b>Total</b>	<b>98.9</b>	<b>98.9</b>	<b>94.6</b>	<b>80.0</b>	<b>76.3</b>	<b>48.9</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>90</b>
<b>Respondent Panel</b>	<b>98.2</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>94.6</b>	<b>80.3</b>	<b>78.5</b>	<b>44.6</b>	<b>56</b>	

**Table 6. KKB Printing Schedule**

Stage	Number of Kabupaten/Kota	Total Data Received	KKB Printing Process	
			Period	Total Printed
I	10	778,790	15–21 May	778,790
II	26 <sup>a</sup>	699,092	22–26 May	699,092
III	98	3,348,166	27–31 May	3,348,166
IV	139	5,534,246	1–5 June	5,534,246
V	161 <sup>b</sup>	8,657,764	6–16 June	8,657,764
<b>Total</b>	<b>434</b>	<b>19,018,058</b>		<b>19,018,058</b>

<sup>a</sup>Kota Ternate was the only sample area included in the second stage of the KKB printing.

<sup>b</sup>Kabupaten Tapteng, Kabupaten Cianjur, Kabupaten Demak, and Kabupaten Bima were included in the fifth stage of the KKB printing.

During the printing process of the KKB there were a number of misprints (of names and addresses). This was found particularly in Tapteng and Bima. In one village in Tapteng there was a case where one name was written on three of the KKB.

In contrast with BLT 2005, the distribution of the KKB for BLT 2008 did not involve Statistics Indonesia at the *kabupaten/kota* level, but only involved KPRK and *kecamatan*/village apparatus. Generally, the channels for the distribution of the KKB to the RTS started from the direct delivery of the KKB by KPRK to village/*lurah* heads which took place in the post office or the *kecamatan* office with first signing an official report that the KKB had been received. After this, village/*lurah* heads or staff then gave the cards directly to the RTS or passed them to the RT/RW/*dusun* head, or they were collected directly by the RTS at the village/*lurah* office.

In Tapteng, after the KKB was taken from the KPRK in Sibolga by the secondary post office, the post office contacted the village heads to collect the KKB. The village heads then gave the KKB to the *kepala lorong* (*dusun* heads) to be immediately distributed to the RTS houses. In one village, which only has one functioning *kepala lorong*, the village heads advised the RTS to collect their KKB from the village head's house. Meanwhile in Demak, the Semarang KPRK sent its staff under the direction of the coordinating implementer to distribute the KKB in each *kecamatan*. The *kecamatan* then requested the village heads to collect the KKB, which were then given by the village head to the RT head to be given to each RTS.



In Cianjur, the post office gave the KKB to the village heads during a meeting at the *kecamatan*. The village heads then gave the KKB to the RT heads to be divided to RTS houses. In Bima and Kota Ternate, the KKB were given directly to the village heads by the local KPRK. In Bima, the KKB were then given to RT heads by the village heads to be given straight to RTS. Meanwhile in Kota Ternate, the KKB were given to RTS in a number of ways. Besides being distributed through the RT, some KKB were given directly to RTS by *kelurahan* staff or were collected by RTS straight from the *kelurahan*. In this case, the information that RTS must collect their KKB at the *kelurahan* was not always gained from *kelurahan* staff or the RT head. This information sometimes came from neighbors or other RTS who had already collected their KKB. To avoid social jealousy and conflict, in some areas the KKB were distributed secretly. Moreover, according to one respondent in Kota Ternate, when they collected their KKB at the *kelurahan*, the *kelurahan* staff requested that the KKB not be shown to anyone else because they were worried that those members of the community who did not receive BLT would become jealous.

The delivery of the KKB from the KPRK to the village heads was very dependent on the speed of the verification process and the location of the village. In general, the delivery stage of the KKB to village heads began with the post office giving the verified RTS list, and then the post office gave out the KKB strictly based on this data. However, in Tapteng there were KKB that had been cancelled but were still with the village head and had not been given back to the post office. The distribution of the KKB was also influenced by the geographical nature of the village. If villages were far from the KPRK, the distribution of KKB sometimes occurred close to the time of the disbursement of BLT funds. In some regions, the KKB were distributed one or two days before the BLT funds were given out. Moreover, in Kota Ternate, RTS who lived in three islands (Batang Dua, Moti, and Hiri) only received their KKB at the time of fund disbursement.

During the distribution of the KKB there was no levy/payment required from the RTS. In general, the distribution of the KKB to the RTS went smoothly. The post office declared that the KKB being received by the RTS must not be lost because the post office would not replace them. This stipulation led to one RT head in Demak to recall the KKB from RTS after the first stage of BLT disbursement so that the KKB would not be lost. However, some RTS objected to this as there was no guarantee that the RT head could replace the card if the RT head lost the card and this also created an opportunity for the deduction of BLT funds.

The KKB distribution organizer in each *kecamatan* received an incentive which was channeled through the post office. This incentive was counted at Rp2,500 per KKB distributed, with a financial break down of: Rp250 for the *camat*, Rp500 for the village head/*lurah*, Rp750 for the RW and Rp1,000 for the RT, and; a 5% deduction for PPH Article 21. However, the knowledge about the KKB and its distribution differed among regions. This was due to unclear information about the program. In Bima, the village apparatus and the heads of the RT/RW did not know anything about the existence of a stipend for the distribution of the KKB. In Kota Ternate, only the *lurah* knew about the stipend but it had not yet been collected. In Tapteng, some people knew about the stipend but had not yet collected it. In Cianjur, only the village apparatus (village head and village secretary) knew about and had received the stipend, and it was not divided to the RT/RW heads. While in Demak, the stipend was divided down to the RT/RW heads based on the number of RTS or it was divided evenly.

## 2.4.2 Disbursement of Funds

Since Kota Ternate was in the second stage of the printing schedule for the KKB, it was also the earliest sample region to receive the fund disbursement schedule in comparison with the four other sample *kabupaten*. However, 168 (4.5%) have not been disbursed. At the time the researchers were in the field, on average between 88,3% and 97,8% of the disbursement process in each sample region had been completed (see Tabel 7).

**Table 7. Schedule for BLT Disbursement and Number of KKB which Have Been/Have Not Yet Been Paid Out for BLT Funds in Each Sample Kabupaten/Kota**

Kabupaten/Kota	Schedule for Disbursement of BLT	KKB Paid <sup>a</sup>	KKB Not Yet Paid <sup>a</sup>
1. Kab. Tapanuli Tengah	11–29 July 2008	30,461	3,555
2. Kab. Cianjur	17 July–23 August 2008	156,930	3,394
3. Kab. Demak	14–24 July 2008	n.a.	n.a.
4. Kab. Bima	21–27 July 2008	46,081	2,328
5. Kota Ternate	19–25 June 2008	3,709	168

<sup>a</sup>The final amount at the time the researchers were in the field (23 August–6 September 2008).

As with BLT 2005, the disbursement of funds for BLT 2008 was conducted by the post office. The process of distributing BLT 2008 funds was relatively better than the process in 2005 because PT Pos carried out a number of improvements to guarantee the fluency of the distribution of the funds for BLT 2008, including increasing the number of points of distribution, the total number of counters available as well as the staff. As not all the *kecamatan* in the sample *kabupaten/kota* had secondary post offices, PT Pos increased the number of distribution points in distant locations. PT Pos applied a more proactive system especially for elderly and sick beneficiaries, as well as for those in remote areas.

In Cianjur, PT Pos implemented a proactive system by increasing the number of distribution points in some villages that reported the number of sick/elderly people. The post office also provided specific counters for elderly, disabled, and sick beneficiaries. In Tapteng, in order to implement this proactive mechanism, PT Pos required an application letter from the village head as well as signatures from at least half the total RTS in that village. Using this procedure, PT Pos conducted fund distribution in a number of remote villages. In Demak and Bima, PT Pos increased the number of distribution points in local *kecamatan* offices for remote locations. While in Kota Ternate, fund distribution in three islands was facilitated and funded by the local government using hired speedboats.

Although PT Pos introduced the proactive system in some regions, some community members did not know about this system before the distribution, thus although PT Pos had already increased the number of distribution points, some of the RTS felt the distribution points were still too far away. The transportation cost to collect the funds generally ranged between Rp5,000–Rp25,000 for a return trip. In Cianjur the transportation cost for elderly RTS could reach up to Rp40,000 because they have to pay for someone to accompany them as well.

During the disbursement of BLT, the post office provided large sun shelters, seats, drinks, and public-address system to ensure that the process is smooth and convenient for the people queuing to get the fund. In some regions, the post office extended their service hours during

BLT disbursement. In Cianjur and Demak the post office opened from 6am to 5pm. Post offices also conducted scheduling (day and hour) based on each village/*kelurahan* and introduced a number system for queuing or organized the flow of the beneficiaries queuing to anticipate them arriving altogether and jostling with each other on the first day. Generally, post offices were available for one week for fund disbursement. The RTS who wanted to collect their BLT funds outside of the set available times had to collect them from the KPRK or *kabupaten* secondary post office. Different from BLT 2005, the final date to receive BLT 2008 funds was set for 31 December 2008. However, information about this final date for funds disbursement was not widely known by the RTS. Generally, the RTS only knew that the fund disbursement is carried out in one day, the day which is set on village/*kelurahan* schedule.

Information about the time of fund disbursement was given to the RTS in various ways. In Tapteng, Cianjur, Demak and Bima, the village apparatus gave the information about the time of the fund distribution when handing out the KKB or when they went to the RTS's houses. In one *kecamatan* in Cianjur the time for fund disbursement was brought forward but this was only announced a few hours before the disbursement took place. This occurred because the fund disbursement process in other villages was faster than the scheduled time.

In Kota Ternate, information about the fund disbursement time was conveyed in a number of ways. In one *kelurahan* the information about the fund disbursement schedule was announced through megaphones from mosques/*musholla* (a place for Muslims to pray). Information about the disbursement schedule was also given through announcements on the radio and posted at post offices.

To guarantee safety during the disbursement, PT Pos requested the security apparatus (police, army, public order agency (Satpol PP)) to ensure security during the process. In one *kecamatan* in Cianjur, the security apparatus were involved in helping PT Pos during the disbursement process by checking the RTS's KKB before giving them to the post office staff. In Tapteng, the security apparatus' authority was abused in the name of assisting RTS who wanted to save time and jump the queue or who claimed to be too old to wait for their turn. For this "service", every RTS paid Rp10,000–Rp15,000.

Based on the technical guidelines for the distribution of BLT to the RTS, BLT disbursement requires a KKB and valid proof of identity such as a KTP (identification card), driver's license, family card, official letter from the *kelurahan*, etc. However, there were variations and deviations from this in the actual implementation. In Cianjur, to avoid delays in the first stage of disbursement, with the help of the apparatus, inheritors/new beneficiaries falsified KTPs from previous beneficiaries by replacing the photo with the photo of the inheritor/new beneficiary. There were also RTS who created a new KTP and changed the name to be the same as the name on the KKB. In Tapteng and Bima, PT Pos disbursed BLT funds to new/inheritor RTS without replacing the KKB. In Demak, the KKB of the RTS who had moved away were still being used by the RT/RW to receive funds, which were then divided equally among nonbeneficiaries. In Bima, not only the KKB from the RTS who had moved away but also from those who had died could be used by the village apparatus to gain funds which were then divided equally among poor nonbeneficiary households.

In some areas funds could be received without having to show proof of identity (KTP, family card, driver's license, official letter from the village/*lurah*). In Kota Ternate, instead of proof of identity, a 2005 KKB or guarantee from the *lurah*/RT present during the fund disbursement could be used. Generally, BLT funds were collected directly by the beneficiary whose name was written on the KKB. BLT disbursement for the RTS being represented by

someone else, due to ill health or old age, or the heir from an RTS, had to give proof of identity and the KKB, as well as an official letter from the village/*lurah* head. In actual implementation, this requirement varied between different regions.

In general, the RTS received the complete funds of Rp300,000 from the post office, with the exception of one *kecamatan* in Tapteng. The post office staff deliberately made available particular denominations of money (Rp5,000, Rp10,000, Rp20,000, Rp50,000, and Rp100,000) so that it was easier for post office staff to obtain unofficial levies of Rp5000-Rp10,000 per RTS.

## 2.5 Complaints and Solving Problems

As there was no specific BLT 2008 Complaint Handling Unit formed in each sample region there was no clear mechanism for complaints to be handled in the community. In Demak and Cianjur, respondents at the *kabupaten* level thought that complaints were dealt with by the PKPS BBM (Fuel Subsidy Reduction Compensation Program) Monitoring and Complaints Coordination which had been set up in 2005 in accordance with the Minister of Home Affairs Declaration Number 541/2338/SJ, on 13 September 2005. This team was under the Village Community Empowerment Body (Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa, BPMD) or Community Empowerment Office (Kantor Pemberdayaan Masyarakat, Kapermas). In practice, in each sample region complaints were given directly to the various institutions involved (Statistics Indonesia, PT Pos, Office of Social Affairs, Regional Supervision Board (Bawasda)). Respondents at the village/*kelurahan* level generally made complaints to the village/*kelurahan* apparatus and to the RT/RW/*dusun/lorong* heads. In Demak, the local government opened a hotline, which could receive complaints by SMS (short message service); however, up to the time this research was conducted, there were no complaints received in this way for the implementation of BLT 2008.

Generally, the complaints that were received were to do with data collection problems such as lack of clarity about the criteria for beneficiaries, targeting, and the number of beneficiaries. Responses to these complaints were generally the explanation that the RTS list still refers to the 2005/2006 data that was determined from the central government. In Demak the complaints were generally about mistargeting with people asking why they did not receive BLT, while other more well-off households did receive BLT. The complaints received were generally not dealt with and there was no follow up.

In Bima, all aspects involved in the management of the program such as social affairs agency, the post office, Statistics Indonesia, Bappeda, *kecamatan* and village/*kelurahan*, stated that they received various complaints from the community. Statistics Indonesia in fact received on average two complaints per day. There were complaints related to suspicion that village and *kelurahan* apparatus kept some KKB and there were also complaints from some households who were beneficiaries of BLT 2005 but no longer received BLT in 2008. As there was no Complaint Handling Unit, responses to each complaint tended to be unclear and confusing. Generally, answers varied, including “don’t know”, “ask at the post office”, “regulation from the center”, and so on.

In one village in Tapteng, the village head received complaints about inappropriate uses of BLT funds, which were being used to buy alcohol, gamble, and play billiards. The village head responded by going to the places involved and warning the accused RTS. In Kota Ternate, complaints received by the institutions involved were generally questions about the technical

implementation of BLT such as the requirements for fund disbursement when the beneficiary could not be represented. There were also complaints related to the targeting of BLT, such as why some people were not receiving BLT 2008 when they previously received BLT 2005. These complaints were answered by explaining that the data received came from the central government and could not be changed.<sup>11</sup>

In a number of sample regions there was an agreement between residents to deduct some of the BLT funds to be divided evenly among residents who did not receive BLT. The community considered this to be an appropriate way to ensure harmony between residents. In Cianjur, a similar agreement was made, which was considered a good way of pacifying potential conflict and reduce complaints from the community. This shows the lack of concern from the apparatus in dealing with problems, as they went along with the demands of non-BLT beneficiaries in the community.

## 2.6 Satisfaction Levels

### 2.6.1 Village/*Kabupaten* Elite Satisfaction Levels


The elite's satisfaction levels with the implementation of BLT were measured through FGDs at the *kabupaten* and village levels. In each sample *kabupaten/kota* one FGD was conducted for the *kabupaten* elite and one FGD was conducted for the village elite. Results from the five FGDs at the *kabupaten* level and the ten FGDs with the village elite show that the satisfaction level for the *kabupaten* elite is higher than that for the village elite, except for the KKB card distribution stage. This was the same case as with the implementation of BLT 2005. The negative impact was felt more by the village elite than the *kabupaten* elite in relation to each problem during the implementation of BLT—for example being the target of contempt of nonbeneficiaries—causing the satisfaction level at the village elite level to be lower than that for the elite at the *kabupaten* level (see Graphic 1). As with BLT 2005, both the village and *kabupaten* elite rated the KKB card and BLT fund distribution stages as the stages with the highest satisfaction level. The reason for this high satisfaction level was the security and fluency of the implementation process at these two stages.

There was a significant difference between the satisfaction levels of the *kabupaten* and village elites at the targeting and socialization stages. Differing from BLT 2005, in BLT 2008 the targeting was the least satisfactory level for the village elite and the socialization of the program was the least satisfactory level for the *kabupaten* elite. In BLT 2005, socialization was the least satisfactory level for both the village and *kabupaten* elite. The low level of satisfaction of the village elite at the targeting stage of BLT 2008 is due to the fact that the village elite are the people who are most impacted by mistakes with targeting, whereas the *kabupaten* elite were not satisfied with the socialization stage of the program because according to them socialization at the community level was insufficient.


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<sup>11</sup>In Ternate, one person received BLT in 2005 but did not receive BLT in 2008 because their name was not on the list received by the post office. Accompanied by *kelurahan* staff, this person reported to the post office and the post office told the person to report to Statistics Indonesia. According to Statistics Indonesia the data came from Jakarta and could not be changed.





**Graphic 1. Satisfaction levels of the village and *kabupaten/kota* elites in five sample *kabupaten/kota***



**Graphic 2. RTS Satisfaction Levels in Five Sample *Kabupaten/Kota***

## 2.6.2 Recipient Satisfaction Levels

The satisfaction levels of the RTS with the implementation of BLT were measured during RTS FGDs at the village level. In each sample *kabupaten/kota* there were four RTS FGDs carried out; two female and two male FGD groups. The results of the ten FGDs with women and men showed that there was no significant difference between the male and female satisfaction level with the implementation of BLT. However, there was a tendency that the satisfaction level of men towards some stages of BLT implementation (handling of problems, program socialization, and card distribution) was higher than that for women. On the other hand, the female group had relatively higher levels of satisfaction with the total funding

amount and the accuracy of targeting. Meanwhile, both the male and female groups had almost the same level of satisfaction toward the involvement of institutions and fund disbursement (see Graphic 2).

As at the elite levels, the distribution of KKB cards and the disbursement of funds were considered the most satisfactory stages for the RTS particularly because of the fluency of the process. This was similar to the implementation of BLT 2005. They assessed that there were no meaningful obstacles in these two stages of the implementation, and that some of the RTS received KKB directly to their houses, delivered by the village apparatus or the RT head. This was also the case with the disbursement of funds, which took place faster and safer than with the disbursement of BLT in 2005. However, the accuracy of targeting and the total amount of funds were the issues RTS considered least satisfactory. The dissatisfaction was caused by the large amount of poor households who did not receive BLT and that some well-off households did receive BLT. The low level of satisfaction with the amount of funds was due to the amount being considered insufficient, and this was worsened by the deductions of funds.

The RTS had quite high satisfaction levels with regards to the handling of problems because there were few conflicts with the implementation of BLT 2008. Compared to conflicts with BLT 2005, which included protests and threats to the village apparatus and destruction of public facilities; BLT 2008 was relatively far safer. Differing from BLT 2005, the RTS satisfaction toward the socialization of BLT 2008 was quite high. Although socialization of the program was not optimal, the RTS were quite satisfied and considered the information they received to be appropriate for what they needed to know; information related to the disbursement process such as the schedule, requirements and rules for disbursement. With the implementation of BLT 2005, socialization was the least satisfactory stage for BLT beneficiaries.

In relation to the assessment of institutional aspects, the FGD participants generally found it hard to understand or define and identify the institutions involved in implementing BLT. They also did not know about the various roles of institutions above the village/*kelurahan* level, except for the post office. Thus, the RTS satisfaction level assessment on the achievement of the institutions was limited to the implementing institutions at the village/*kelurahan* level and the post office.

### III. COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS OF THE STIGMA SURROUNDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BLT

#### 3.1 Is BLT Incapable of Dealing with the Shocks Caused by the Increase in the Fuel Price?

Generally RTS stated that the funds they received were enough to help reduce the economic burden on the household. However, they felt that the amount of funds was insufficient. This is because they only compared the BLT funds received with nominal prices for various needs, such as rice and low-octane fuel (gasoline), which indicated that the value of the 2008 BLT was lower than that of the 2005 BLT. If we refer to the objective of BLT to give compensation as a result of the fuel price rise, which is always followed by price rises for other goods, the value of BLT should be compared with the increases in price of these goods. As seen in Table 8, if compared with changes in the average price of rice and low-octane fuel between the month before and the month after the fuel price rise, the 2008 BLT funds actually increased. However, the community did not notice this. The community assessment that the value of BLT decreased was due to the increasingly large deductions that affected the RTS.

**Tabel 8. Comparison of the Value of BLT with Changes in the Price of Rice and Low-octane Fuel<sup>a</sup>**

One Month Before and One Month After the Fuel Price Increase	Nominal Price (Rp)	Price Changes between the Months	Comparison of the Value of BLT <sup>b</sup> with Changes in Prices
<b>1. Rice (Kg)</b>			
September 2005	3,460		
October 2005	3,672	212	472
May 2008	5,332		
June 2008	5,517	185	541
<b>2. Low-octane fuel (liter)</b>			
September 2005	2,400		
October 2005	4,500	2,100	48
May 2008	4,500		
June 2008	6,000	1,500	67

Source: State Logistics Board (Bulog) and Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2009.

<sup>a</sup>Changes in fuel prices which led to the 2005 BLT and 2008 BLT programs took place on 1 October 2005 and 24 May 2008.

<sup>b</sup>Value of BLT = Rp100.000/month.

The received BLT funds were generally spent straight away and used up within less than one week, although the use of the funds could last longer than a week. Generally, the RTS used BLT funds to fulfill their most urgent needs. In some regions, during the disbursement of BLT there was an appeal from the PT Pos staff concerning the use of funds given to the RTS. The PT Pos staff generally recommended that the funds be used to buy basic necessities. In Tapteng this appeal was also made by the village apparatus in drinking places where citizens often meet together, requesting they do not use the money to buy alcohol or gamble. Despite this, the RTS made the decisions completely by themselves concerning the use of the BLT funds.



Although the funds were distributed to the household head (husband), the majority of the BLT funds were managed by wives. There were no changes in consumption patterns, and even if they were, they only lasted for a few days after BLT was disbursed. In terms of funds management, the majority of the RTS used the BLT funds for consumption with an average proportion of approximately 45% (see Appendix 2). The RTS prioritized the availability of basic goods, especially rice, to fulfill daily needs over a relatively long period of time. In terms of other uses aside from food, each region had different priorities. In Tapteng, aside from being used for transportation costs, the majority of the RTS used BLT funds received to treat an illness or for household improvements. The proportion of usage for treating an illness on average reached 87%, whereas for household improvements 89.2% on average was used and this was the biggest expenditure in Tapteng.

In Cianjur and Bima there was a tendency for the RTS to be more willing to go into debt relying on the BLT funds which they were to receive. Thus the use of BLT funds to pay off debts was the biggest expenditure in Bima and the second biggest in Cianjur after consumption. Moreover, in Bima many RTS went into debt with kiosk owners charging interest of 50%–100%, depending on the length of the loan, which was usually between one and three months. Aside from paying off debts, the majority of the RTS in Cianjur used BLT funds for transportation costs at an average of 5.2% whereas in Bima funds were used for school costs and to buy clothes, with average proportions of 20.3% and 19.9% of BLT funds respectively.

In Ternate, the majority of the RTS used BLT funds for transportation costs, business capital and school costs. On average 12.8% of BLT funds were used for transportation and 46.2% for business capital. Meanwhile funds used for school costs reached 83.3% and was on average the biggest expenditure in Ternate. This also occurred in Demak, where the majority of the RTS used their BLT funds for school costs at an average expenditure of 20.8%.

Other uses of BLT funds included paying for electricity, making a KTP, and paying for *zakat* (tithes), cigarettes, mobile phone credit, and so on. Although it was relatively infrequent, there were cases of BLT funds being used for non-urgent needs, such as buying mobile phones, phone credit, DVD player, VCDs, and playing billiards, and even for activities such as gambling and buying alcohol.

If compared with the results of the BLT 2005 study (Hastuti et al., 2006), there are differences in the priorities of the use of BLT funds in 2008. The differences in priorities were related to the schedule for disbursement of BLT funds. The majority of respondents used BLT 2005 for consumption, paying off debts, buying clothes and business capital. Whereas in 2008, BLT funds, aside from being used for consumption needs and to pay off debts, a significant amount was used for transportation and school costs. Due to the first stage of disbursement for BLT 2005 occurring close to Eid al-Fitr (the celebration at the end of Ramadhan), the majority of beneficiaries used the funds to buy clothes. In contrast with BLT 2005, in some sample regions the distribution schedule for BLT 2008 stage 1 was in July–August, which was the time for the new school year, and so many RTS used the BLT funds for paying school costs.

### **3.2 Is the Targeting of BLT Inaccurate?**

The targeted households for BLT 2008 was not determined based on new census data but on the results of the verification of BLT 2005/2006 beneficiaries. However, generally the community did not know that verification of the 2005/2006 BLT data had been conducted.

This was because the community was not involved in the verification process for determining the RTS for BLT 2008. The community thought that the data for BLT 2008 respondents was exactly the same as that for 2005/2006 BLT respondents. Thus, when mistargeting and undercoverage occurred with BLT 2008, the community immediately related it to the various problems experienced with the 2005 data collection.

In relation to the data collection in 2005 and also the results of the verification in 2008, the majority of informants at the community level believed there were still many poor households which should have been receiving BLT but did not receive it. On the other hand, there were households who were relatively well-off who received BLT. Generally, the number of well-off households who were considered RTS was smaller than the number of poor households who did not receive BLT.

Based on FGD and in-depth interview results with the RTS and village elite as well as in-depth interview results with nonbeneficiary households, the causes of mistargeting included: inappropriate criteria for selecting poor households, data collection mechanisms which were not comprehensive (because there was a quota) and not in line with regulations (nepotism), and there was doubt about the integrity of the data collectors and the community from whom data was taken. According to the community, the inaccurate criteria used by the government to determine poor households that would become the RTS was one of the causes of the mistargeting of BLT. Although the community did not completely understand the criteria used by the government, they considered the criteria to be inaccurate because there were still many poor households that were not counted as RTS.

To gain further knowledge of the community's understanding of poverty and the related criteria, SMERU conducted household welfare classification FGDs. The aim of these FGDs was to understand how the community differentiates between social groups based on living standards using criteria that they formulate themselves. The results of these FGDs showed that most of the community differentiated between social groups according to four categories: "rich", "medium", "poor", "very poor". In one village in Bima there was an extra category ("very rich") in the welfare classification.

Although there are similarities in the divisions of the social groups between regions, there were differences with the criteria of each group in each sample area. The criteria for a poor family in Kota Ternate differed from the criteria for a poor family in Demak. The same occurred with criteria for the "very rich", "rich", "medium", "poor" and "very poor" groups. Moreover, within the same *kabupaten/kota* there were differences between villages (see Appendix 1). Generally the criteria used referred to the ownership of assets and valuable goods (land, rice fields, houses, furniture, livestock, gold, savings), transportation vehicle, job, education, income, and life style. For criteria which were the same between groups, such as land ownership, rich, average and poor families were differentiated based on the size of the land they own. Thus, people who owned an extensive amount of land were considered richer, and this was also the case for other criteria.

Besides the social grouping criteria, each region also had local criteria. In Cianjur and Kota Ternate, the community used various criteria to determine living standards such as whether people had already been on the haj. In Bima one criterion was about involvement in various social activities such as weddings, *syukuran* (a ceremony to express gratefulness to God), and so on. Another local criterion in Bima was the number of pillars of a house. If a house had less than six pillars the household was considered poor, whereas if there were more than six, the household was considered average or wealthy.

There are differences between the number of poor households according to Statistics Indonesia data and FGD results because the FGD results refer to the community's perceptions of poverty.<sup>12</sup> The proportion of poor households according to welfare classification FGDs is always larger than the proportion of RTS (see Table 9). The proportion of poor families based on the FGD results is between 17%–90%, while the total number of RTS compared with the total number of families in each village is between 10%–68%. In other words, there are still many families who are considered poor according to community criteria but do not receive BLT.

**Table 9. Proportion of RTS and Poor Families in Sample Villages**

<i>Kabupaten/Kota</i>	<i>Kecamatan</i>	<i>Village</i>	<b>Proportion of RTS<sup>a</sup> (%)</b>	<b>Estimated Number of Poor Families<sup>b</sup> (%)</b>
1. Tapteng	Sibabangun	Mombang Boru	48	64
	Sorkam	Pearaja	68	90
2. Cianjur	Cugenang	Cibulakan	26	63
	Cibeber	Girimulya	37	33
3. Demak	Wedung	Berahan Wetan	33	74
	Karang Tengah	Wonoagung	40	81
4. Bima	Monta	Simpasai	38	68
	Wera	Nunggi	39	78
5. Ternate	Ternate Tengah	Kampung Pisang	10	17
	Ternate Selatan	Fitu	24	62

<sup>a</sup>The number of RTS in proportion to the number of households in each sample village.

<sup>b</sup>Results of the welfare classification of households FGD.

To gain a better understanding about the community's perspective of mistargeting and undercoverage, SMERU, along with the community, carried out verification of RTS and poor families in one *dusun* or one RW based on the criteria for poverty as formulated by the community. The selection of one *dusun* or one RW, aside from being based on considerations concerning limited time and personnel, was also based on judgments about the limited capacity of FGD participants in knowing about all households in their area and their lifestyles.

According to the results of the verification, mistargeting and undercoverage for the BLT program occurred in almost all villages/*kelurahan*. This situation is possible due to the different approaches used in data collection by PSE 05 and FGD data. The PSE 05 was an objective measure of poverty, while the FGD data results are more a subjective measure of poverty. Only in one village in Tapteng was there no mistargeting, while in other areas mistargeting ranged from 3% to 80%. Undercoverage also occurred from 9% to 78% (see Table 10)

<sup>12</sup>Comparisons between the number of RTS and the proportion of poor household heads, as shown in the table mentioned, are not entirely accurate due to a number of reasons. The first reason is that the number of poor household heads according to the community is only an estimate based on their observation in the village. Secondly, the number of RTS is determined based on the household unit, while the estimate of poor families, and the data results in various villages, is based on the concept of the family, where within one household there can be more than one family.

**Table 10. Proportion of Poor Households in Sample RW/Dusun<sup>a</sup>**

<i>Kabupaten/ Kota</i>	<i>Kecamatan</i>	<i>Village</i>	<b>Proportion of Non-poor RTS in One RW/Dusun (Mistargeting) (%)</b>	<b>Proportion of Non-RTS Poor Households (%)</b>
1. Tapteng	Sibabangun	Mombang Boru	4	9
	Sorkam	Pearaja	0	n.a.
2. Cianjur	Cugenang	Cibulakan	12 <sup>b</sup>	52 <sup>b</sup>
	Cibeber	Girimulya	40	63
3. Demak	Wedung	Berahan Wetan	8	15
	Karang Tengah	Wonoagung	3	15
4. Bima	Monta	Simpasai	80	71
	Wera	Nunggi	23	57
5. Ternate	Ternate Tengah	Kampung Pisang	20	64
	Ternate Selatan	Fitu	16	78

<sup>a</sup>Processed from data results from the FGDs on welfare classification.

<sup>b</sup>RTS data is only for three RT, that is RT 2, 3, and 4.

According to the community in one village in Tapteng, there was no mistargeting of funds because they formulated a relatively high poverty criteria (see Appendix 2). In this village, households with land ownership and having electricity were included as part of the criteria for being poor. The community also determined a high standard income per month, at Rp1,000,000 per month. The high standards in the poverty criteria in this village meant that the number of poor families, according to the community's perceptions, was inflated, reaching 90% of the total households in the village. Thus, from 166 RTS, not one was considered to be non-poor.

The high rate of mistargeting and undercoverage in one village in Bima was caused by inaccurate 2005 BLT data. Incorrect data collection mechanisms and nepotism in determining RTS caused conflict which culminated in the forced closure of the village office during the implementation of BLT 2005. During BLT 2008, based on the results of the verification by SMERU and the community, there was overcoverage in two *dusun* in the same village because the number of RTS in these two *dusun* (318) was more than the total number of poor households (220). From these 318 RTS, according to the community only 63 of these households were actually poor, whereas the remaining 255 RTS were not poor families. The large number of poor families in these two *dusun*, as well as the large number of mistargeted RTS caused a high level of undercoverage in these two *dusun*. In Cianjur and Ternate, the high undercoverage levels were caused by mistargeting but also by insufficient RTS allocations for these regions.

Aside from RTS selection criteria, other causes of mistargeting in BLT 2008, according to the community, were data collecting mechanisms from BLT 2005 which were not comprehensive and not in line with regulations. Only certain poor people were included in the 2005 data collection process, based on the initial data available or on information from people considered to understand the conditions in the village. Data collectors did not always visit the house of each poor family.

Some informants also felt the data collectors lacked integrity during the 2005 data collection process. The lack of integrity among data collectors was shown when many people close to the data collector, including the data collectors themselves, became BLT beneficiaries, even though there were many poorer households. Some informants also queried the honesty of the

community who were questioned for the data collection. Not all those questioned gave accurate information about their living conditions. The results of the data collection were also never reconfirmed with the community thus they could not conduct a cross-check. According to the community not having this cross-check had an influence on the mistargeting.

### 3.3 Does BLT Create Opportunities for Corruption?

All RTS knew that they should receive Rp300,000 for three months for their 2008 BLT funds, although in reality the RTS did not always receive the total amount. From the five sample *kabupaten/kota*, with the total number of respondents between 6 and 25 RTS per region, only in Ternate did all respondents receive the complete amount of BLT funds (see Table 11).

**Table 11. Percentage of Total Deductions and RTS Respondents Receiving Reduced BLT Funds in Five Sample *Kabupaten/Kota***

Kabupaten/Kota	Total Number of Respondents	RTS Receiving Reduced BLT Funds (%)	Range of Deductions (%)	Average Deduction (%)
1. Tapteng	18	22	1–3	1.5
2. Cianjur	22	91	16–55	32.2
3. Demak	6	100	33–50	41.3
4. Bima	25	48	3–6	3.7
5. Ternate	19	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>46.67</b>	<b>1–55</b>	<b>22.4</b>

With these deductions, the size of funds actually received by the RTS differed between research areas, ranging from Rp135,000–Rp300,000. The largest BLT deductions occurred in Cianjur and Demak. On average, the RTS in Cianjur only received 67.8% of total BLT funds and those in Demak only received 58.7% of the funds.

The BLT 2008 funds were deducted at two points, at the post office and at the community level, using various methods. In Tapteng, deductions at the post office only took place in one post office, with Rp5,000–Rp10,000 being deducted. According to the community, this deduction was a way of saying thank you to post office personnel for their service and the actual amount was up to the beneficiary. However, there were other factors that influenced beneficiaries to give away a portion of their fund. Some respondents stated that post office workers deliberately provided small denominations of money—Rp100,000, Rp50,000, Rp20,000, Rp10,000, and Rp5,000 notes—so that it was easier for them to take these unofficial levies of Rp5,000–Rp10,000/RTS. For BLT 2005, some beneficiaries stated that they were used to giving money, on average Rp5,000, to the post office workers as a way of saying “thank you”. While not all beneficiaries were willing to give money, all BLT 2005 beneficiaries, however, were required to pay Rp10,000 per person to buy a lottery prize coupon, which was circulated by the post office staff, in relation to the World Cup event.

Deductions at the community level by the RT/RW/*dusun* head took place in Cianjur, Demak, and Bima with the amount deducted ranging from Rp10,000 to Rp165,000. The majority of deductions were the result of agreements at the village level with the size of the deduction being fully determined by discussions at the RT/RW/*dusun* level with community leaders and RTS. Following are a number of cases which appeared related to agreements that were made:



- a) In one *dusun* in Demak, the RTS who refused the decision made at the RT level to deduct BLT funds received some threats, including that they would not receive their KKB, that they would not get Raskin, and would be excluded from community activities. In practice, these threats were not carried out but were used as a scare tactic.
- b) In Cianjur and Demak, the agreement about the deduction of funds was confirmed in writing with a declaration letter that affirmed the willingness of every RTS to give a portion of their BLT fund. The village apparatus set out the format of the letter. This was done to avoid accusations from the authorities to the village apparatus and RT/RW/*dusun* heads.

In Cianjur and Demak, deductions from BLT funds were carried out with the reason being to avoid conflict with nonbeneficiary parts of the community who also wanted to receive BLT funds. Deductions for this reason have been taking place since the distribution of BLT 2005 and are considered an effective mechanism for dealing with conflict. As there was no deterrent/banning from the local government these deductions continued to take place and the total amount increased with BLT 2008, both in terms of the sum of deduction and the number of cases of deduction. The funds deducted are then distributed to households who did not receive BLT. There were differences between regions in the mechanism for this division of funds and the amount of funds for BLT 2008, as explained below:

- a) Funds equally divided to all households who did not receive BLT, without considering welfare level. This method was found in a number of RT/RW/*dusun* in Demak and Cianjur. In Demak the amount of funds received by nonbeneficiaries was between Rp100,000 and Rp125,000 while in Cianjur it ranged from Rp20,000 to Rp50,000.
- b) Funds divided to all households who did not receive BLT, with the size of the funds being dependent on the welfare level of a household. This method was also found in Demak and Cianjur with the amount of funds ranging from Rp20,000–Rp80,000 per nonbeneficiary household.

Another reason for BLT 2008 deductions was to help pay for various community activities, such as Independence Day celebrations in August, road infrastructure development, religious activities such as *musabaqah tilawatil Qur'an* (competition for reciting the Koran), and even as incentives for the village administration apparatus. The deductions for these reasons are on average smaller than those for the reasons outlined above. In relation to the use of the funds, some communities could not guarantee that the funds from the deductions were definitely used for these reasons, because there was a lack of transparency in the management of the funds, thus making it very vulnerable to corruption.

There were no deductions in Ternate, which was perhaps due to the fact that the community considered the amount of BLT funds to be quite small compared to the high living cost. BLT fund of Rp100,000 per month was considered insufficient and one BLT beneficiary even stated that the money would be used up within one day to shop in the market and fulfill other needs. Demands for the funds were considered unsuitable for the amount of funds received. Also, the poor communities in Ternate generally have plantation land,<sup>13</sup> or are fishers and so can still work for their daily needs. They only sell to the market if they have an excess of goods.

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<sup>13</sup>In Kota Ternate, communities in the poor category are relatively better-off compared to those that are considered poor in other regions.

### 3.4 Does BLT Cause Conflict?

The implementation of BLT 2008 ran much more smoothly than the implementation of BLT 2005. Five research target villages were selected because they experienced conflict related to BLT 2005; only one of these villages, in Bima, still had occurrences of conflict. This conflict was a consequence of the verification results submission from the village apparatus, which determined that 55 of the RTS from BLT 2005 in that village were not eligible to receive BLT 2008. The family members of these 55 RTS, led by a member of the BPD, protested in front of the post office and demanded the post office give them their KKB. Worried that the demonstration could become anarchic, the post office finally revoked the village verification results and returned the KKB of these 55 RTS.

The majority of conflict was only tension between non-RTS and RTS citizens and also with the government apparatus. This tension was usually caused by cynical comments from non-RTS to RTS and by accusations of nepotism and injustice within the village apparatus in terms of accurate targeting of BLT recipients. These cynical comments and accusations of nepotism usually came from citizens who felt they were poorer than the RTS but did not receive BLT. For example, one nonbeneficiary informant in Bima stated, “Well fine then, if there are any government programs, they [RTS] can do the work”<sup>14</sup>. For this type of underlying conflict, there were no resolution mechanisms being applied.

Aside from causing conflict at the community level, BLT also caused conflict at the family level. In Tapteng, there was a case of a fight between a husband and wife because the husband used the BLT funds on gambling and alcohol. Most family conflicts were dealt with through internal family solution mechanisms and some were dealt with by the village head.

The relatively smooth running of BLT 2008 was not due to the improved conflict solution mechanisms related to problems with BLT or because conflict triggers had been dealt with in 2005. In fact, at the time of writing the government had still not formed any mechanisms to deal with conflict. Instead, there are five factors that made the implementation of BLT 2008 relatively better than that of 2005:

- a) The poor members of the community had given up and were resigned to the fact that no matter how long they struggled with regards to BLT, they never succeeded. In their opinion, complaints or any form of protest they made had no impact whatsoever, because things were not decided by the village level officials.
- b) There were local conflict resolution mechanisms, such as dividing some BLT funds to nonbeneficiaries, as occurred in Cianjur and Demak. The division of funds to nonbeneficiaries is a response from the community apparatus and leaders in relation to accusations from nonbeneficiary parts of the community so that they too could enjoy BLT funds. Also, the village apparatus decided to fulfill the demands of the community in order to keep themselves safe as in most regions the village apparatus are always the targets of the community’s dissatisfaction. After these funds were divided, the condition in these areas improved and protests dwindled. Although this is not actually allowed, the village apparatus and community leaders did not want to be blamed. Their reason for their actions was that the local government had never offered a solution to the problem. However, for RTS these deductions caused their own problems. On the one hand, it was demanded that they share their funds, but on the other hand they very much needed those funds. Thus, this type of conflict resolution mechanism has its own problems, which can cause further issues in the future.

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<sup>14</sup>“Ya *udab*, kalau ada program pemerintah, biar mereka saja yang kerja”



- c) There were promises from the *kecamatan* apparatus that there would be a repeat of the data collection process for those who had not received BLT, as occurred in one *kecamatan* in Tapteng. With this expectation the community refrained from ongoing protests and waited for this new data collection. In September 2008, Statistics Indonesia carried out data collection on poor families, however this was not done to collect data on those who had not received BLT. Statistics Indonesia actually conducted this data collection for the purposes of developing a database of social protection programs in general (PPLS08).
- d) The fourth factor was because of the decrease in local political tension at the village/*kelurahan* level in the implementation of BLT 2008 as well as the increased community understanding and awareness about BLT. One cause of conflict with BLT in 2005 was the high political climate in regions and the low level of community understanding about BLT, which meant that BLT was vulnerable to being politicized in the interests of certain parties. Moreover, SMERU's research study on BLT 2005 (Hastuti et al., 2006) concluded that most protest action from the community was more to do with local politics than technical problems related to the implementation of BLT. During the implementation of BLT 2008, none of the research areas were having a local political event such as the election of a village/*lurah* head.

Some informants considered that the amount of BLT 2008 received for only seven months was less than that from BLT 2005 that was received for one year. Thus, demands or protests were considered unworthy of the amount of money received.

### 3.5 Is BLT a Negative Incentive for Participation in the Work Force?

The opinion of some groups that BLT would cause beneficiaries to become lazy or to reduce their working hours was not proven to be correct. In fact, all RTS respondents and nonbeneficiary respondents rejected this claim. In all sample areas, almost all informants believed that BLT did not make the RTS apathetic towards working since the value of BLT was not enough to fulfill all living needs. Generally BLT money received by the RTS for three months was spent within one week, mostly on buying basic necessities. With the limited amount of BLT received, beneficiaries were unlikely to become lazy. The working hours of the RTS were only affected when they were collecting BLT, because the RTS had to collect their BLT funds from the post office. After receiving the money on the distribution day, they went back to work as usual.

The attitude of most of the RTS to keep working is intensified because of the limited work available in their region. The availability of work is also very dependent on seasons and the demand from employers. In Cianjur, work for the RTS, who mostly work as farm laborers, is only available during the land preparation, harvest, and weeding seasons. Outside of these seasonal times, most farm laborers are unemployed and they can only farm land that is not irrigated if there is lots of rain. This is also the case with construction workers; work to build houses is very rare in this region, and their income is relatively larger than if they have to look for work outside the region, or go to Jakarta. In Tapteng, freelance laborers in rubber and palm oil plantations would lose their jobs if they are absent from work for a day, as the jobs would be taken by other laborers.

A small amount of the RTS used BLT funds for business capital. However, this did not affect the type of business they conducted. BLT money was used to increase business capital which they already owned, such as to increase the number of livestock they had, increase their business capital in making cakes, buy farming tools, fertilizer, seeds, and so on.

## IV. COMPARISON OF BLT AND OTHER POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAMS

Various poverty reduction programs have been carried out by the government to assist poor families/households. With a combination of “fish” and “teaching fishing” methods<sup>15</sup>, the government divided poverty reduction programs into the three following groups:

- a) Programs giving “fish” to the community, that is, allowance programs and social protection for targeted groups, such as BLT, Family of Hope Program (PKH), Raskin (Rice for the Poor), Community Health Insurance (Jamkesmas, previously Askeskin (Health Insurance for the Poor)) and School Operational Assistance (BOS);
- b) programs teaching the community “how to fish”, that is, community empowerment programs, such as the National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM Mandiri); and
- c) programs helping the community so that they can have their own “fishing rods and boats”, such as the Development of Micro and Small Businesses (UKM).

There were strengths and weaknesses in the implementation of each program. Using a strengths and weaknesses approach for each program, this research seeks to compare BLT 2008 with other poverty reduction programs and to rank the programs based on the appraisals of the program beneficiaries, nonbeneficiaries, and stakeholders.

### 4.1 Program Beneficiaries

In the research regions, all the program beneficiary respondents have only ever or continue to receive five types of poverty reduction programs carried out by the government, they are: BLT, Raskin, Jamkesmas/Askeskin, BOS and UKM, (see Table 12). Aside from these programs, in Tapteng there was also the Fertilizer and Seed Assistance (Bantuan Pupuk dan Bibit) program which was from nongovernmental sources.

**Table 12. Comparison of BLT 2008 and Other Programs Based on Program Beneficiary Assessments<sup>a</sup>**

Program Name	Better	The Same	Worse	Do Not Know	N <sup>a</sup>
BLT 2005	18.60%	23.26%	45.35%	12.79%	86
Raskin	18.06%	47.22%	27.78%	6.94%	72
Jamkesmas/Askeskin	50.94%	26.42%	22.64%	0	53
BOS	38.10%	45.24%	16.67%	0	42
UKM	83.33%	8.33%	8.33%	0	12
Fertilizer and Seed Assistance <sup>b</sup>	44.44%	0	55.56%	0	9

<sup>a</sup> This figure represents the number of respondents that can answer the questions concerning a certain program, not the number of respondents per research area or program.

<sup>b</sup> This program is implemented in Tapteng.

<sup>15</sup>The metaphors used here are based on the saying “Give someone a fish; feed them for a day. Teach someone to fish; feed them for a lifetime.”

Based on program beneficiary respondents' assessments, when compared to BLT 2008, 45% of BLT 2005 beneficiaries stated that BLT 2005 was worse than BLT 2008. This is because the implementation of BLT 2008 was considered to be more orderly than BLT 2005. To receive BLT 2008 funds, the RTS did not have to travel to far away post offices, queue and jostle each other out of the way and there were no conflicts as in 2005.

Nevertheless, beneficiary respondents identified a number of weaknesses of BLT 2008 as follows:

- a) There was no increase in the amount of money received compared to BLT 2005.
- b) The amount was not considered sufficient to counter balance increases in prices at the time.
- c) Compared with BLT 2005, there were larger deductions for redistribution with BLT 2008, which meant that the money received by the RTS was even smaller.
- d) The BLT 2008, which was planned to be distributed over seven months, was considered insufficient when compared with BLT 2005, which was divided over one year.
- e) Mistargeting still occurred and there were still poor households that did not receive BLT 2008.

Differing from BLT 2005, the majority of Jamkesmas/Askeskin and UKM program beneficiaries stated that Jamkesmas/Askeskin and UKM programs were better than BLT 2008. A number of 50.94% program beneficiaries stated that Jamkesmas/Askeskin were better than BLT 2008. The strength of the Jamkesmas/Askeskin programs is that the program can be used immediately when ill. Jamkesmas/Askeskin are of great assistance for patients who are in an urgent situation and cannot afford to get medical treatment from the hospital. Program beneficiaries who were sick felt that this free medical treatment was very useful. Some respondents assessed free medical treatment as being better than BLT 2008 because the cost of medical treatment is considered higher than the amount of money gained from BLT.

The weaknesses of Jamkesmas/Askeskin, according to these respondents, are that Jamkesmas/Askeskin only help sick people. Some Jamkesmas/Askeskin patients stated that they received poor service and there were differences between the services for Jamkesmas/Askeskin and non-Jamkesmas/Askeskin patients. Also, there are some medicines for certain illnesses which cannot be compensated for using Jamkesmas/Askeskin cards.

As many as 83.33% of program beneficiary respondents stated that the UKM was better than BLT 2008. Program beneficiaries stated that in the business capital given is useful for the long term and that they could be more independent. The weakness of this program is that not all poor people could receive the capital. Also, the large loan interest made it difficult to repay these loans.

If the Raskin and BOS programs are compared with BLT 2008, 47.22% of respondents stated that Raskin and BOS programs were the same as BLT 2008, neither better nor worse. The reasons for this were that they could get cheap rice that could be enjoyed by everyone and so was more evenly spread, but the quality of the rice was poor and the rice often arrived three months late. Also, another weakness was that Raskin was not free. According to program beneficiary respondents, the money gained from BLT could be used to buy anything, while the amount of Raskin was too small and in some areas was only 4–5kg/month.

For the BOS program, 45.24% of program beneficiary respondents stated that the BOS program was neither better nor worse than BLT 2008. This is because BOS was only enjoyed by those who had school-age children. Also, not all school costs were made free and BOS was not to pay for transportation to school and books. The strengths of BOS were that it helped pay for their children's education, and now school is already free in some areas.

Based on the assessments of program beneficiary respondents of the Fertilizer and Seed Assistance program in Tapteng, 55.56% of these respondents stated that this program was worse than BLT 2008. The weaknesses with the Fertilizer and Seed Assistance program, according to respondents, was that (i) it was not given routinely, (ii) the amount was insufficient, (iii) prices were still too high, and (iv) the assistance often arrived during the non-harvesting season. The strength of the program was the type of assistance given because the majority of the community members in Tapteng are farmers.

**Table 13. Ranking Poverty Reduction Programs Based on Program Beneficiary Assessments<sup>a</sup>**

Program Name	First Ranking	Second Ranking	Third Ranking
BLT <sup>b</sup>	43.08%	33.85%	13.85%
Raskin	24.62%	33.85%	18.46%
Jamkesmas/Askeskin	23.08%	12.31%	21.54%
BOS	3.08%	12.31%	13.85%
PNPM Mandiri	0	0	1.54%
UKM	1.54%	6.15%	6.15%
Others	4.62%	0.00%	1.54%

<sup>a</sup>Total number of respondents= 65.

<sup>b</sup>Referring to both BLT 2005 and BLT 2008.

From the programs that have been or are still being received, many program beneficiary respondents (43%) stated that BLT was the best program compared to other poverty reduction programs (see Table 13). The next best program was considered to be Raskin (25%) and Jamkesmas/Askeskin (23%). Overall, the majority of program beneficiaries preferred programs in the first group (the “fish” group), that is, poverty reduction programs such as BLT, Raskin and Jamkesmas/Askeskin rather than empowerment programs in the second and third groups.

## 4.2 Nonbeneficiaries of the Program

From the six poverty reduction programs nonbeneficiary respondents in the research areas knew about, only two—BLT 2005 and Raskin—could be assessed and compared with BLT 2008 by the majority of respondents. The majority of nonbeneficiary respondents could not give an assessment<sup>16</sup> of the Jamkesmas/Askeskin, BOS, PNPM Mandiri and UKM programs (see Table 14).

If comparing BLT 2005 and BLT 2008, 37.50% of nonbeneficiary respondents stated that BLT 2005 was worse, 37.50% said the two programs were the same and only 4.17% said that the 2005 BLT program was better. The strengths of BLT 2008, according to nonbeneficiaries, was that there were no disturbances as there had been in 2005, whereas the weakness of the program was that there were still many poor citizens who did not receive BLT and the number of beneficiaries was considered to be too small.

<sup>16</sup>Nonbeneficiary respondents could not provide an assessment or were not willing to answer and provide an assessment.

**Table 14. Comparison of BLT 2008 with Other Programs Based on Nonbeneficiary Assessments<sup>a</sup>**

Program Name	Better	The Same	Worse	Do Not Know	N <sup>a</sup>
BLT 2005	4.17%	37.50%	37.50%	20.83%	24
Raskin	37.50%	29.17%	12.50%	20.83%	24
Jamkesmas	9.52%	14.29%	4.76%	71.43%	21
BOS	15.00%	0	0	85.00%	20
PNPM Mandiri	5.00%	5.00%	0	90.00%	20
UMKM	0	5.26%	0	94.74%	19

<sup>a</sup>These figures show the number of respondents who could answer questions about certain programs, not the amount of respondents per study region or per program.

For the Raskin program, 37.50% of nonbeneficiaries assessed Raskin as better than BLT 2005. Their reasoning was that the Raskin program was more evenly spread and that prices were cheap. The weaknesses of Raskin were that even though the rice was cheap, the rice was often delivered late, and the quality of the rice was poor.

**Table 15. Ranking Poverty Reduction Programs Based on Nonbeneficiary Assessments<sup>a</sup>**

Program Name	First Ranking	Second Ranking	Third Ranking
BLT <sup>b</sup>	36.84%	21.05%	5.26%
Raskin	31.58%	26.32%	26.32%
Jamkesmas/Askeskin	15.79%	15.79%	26.32%
BOS	5.26%	31.58%	10.53%
UKM	0	0	10.53%
Other	10.53%	5.26%	5.26%

<sup>a</sup>Number of respondents= 19.

<sup>b</sup>Referring to both BLT 2005 and BLT 2008.

In comparing programs that nonbeneficiaries knew about, overall the majority of nonbeneficiaries rated BLT, Raskin and Jamkesmas as the best poverty reduction programs (see Table 15). From the nineteen nonbeneficiary respondents, 37% assessed BLT as the best poverty reduction program, followed by Raskin and Jamkesmas/Askeskin by 32% and 16% respectively. As with program beneficiaries, nonbeneficiaries assessed allowance programs and social protection programs for targeted groups as the best programs for poverty reduction compared to empowerment programs.

### 4.3 Stakeholders

For stakeholder respondents from the various poverty reduction programs implemented by government and nongovernment institutions, the majority of stakeholders could only assess and compare BLT 2005 and Raskin with BLT 2008 (see Table 16). The nine other programs could not be assessed and compared with BLT 2008 by the majority of stakeholder respondents in the research areas.

**Table 16. Comparison of BLT 2008 and Other Programs Based on Stakeholder Assessments<sup>a</sup>**

Program Name	Better	The Same	Worse	Do Not Know
BLT 2005	1.33%	33.33%	48.00%	17.33%
Raskin	36.00%	32.00%	16.00%	16.00%
Jamkesmas/Askeskin	26.67%	18.67%	17.33%	37.33%
BOS	25.33%	8.00%	10.67%	56.00%
PKH	9.33%	5.33%	2.67%	82.67%
PNPM Mandiri	13.33%	12.00%	2.67%	72.00%
UKM	17.33%	4.00%	10.67%	68.00%
Revitalisasi Pertanian	5.33%	4.00%	2.67%	88.00%
PEPM	9.33%	1.33%	5.33%	84.00%

<sup>a</sup>Number of respondents= 75.

From the 75 stakeholder respondents, 48% stated that BLT 2005 was worse than BLT 2008. As the implementers of the BLT program, the majority of respondents felt that BLT 2008 was better because the implementation ran better than in 2005, and experiences from BLT 2005 had been used as lessons learned for the program implementers. The BLT 2008 was assessed as being more organized and there was no conflict in most research areas. Despite this, some respondents still saw weaknesses with BLT 2008, such as coordination problems between agencies, no verification of the RTS data in some regions, and the large amount of deductions that were made from the funds. The fact that there are still a large number of poor households who have not yet received BLT caused social jealousy in the community and if there is inaccurate targeting usually the government apparatus become the target of the community's dissatisfaction. Some stakeholder respondents also viewed BLT as only spoiling the people, not encouraging them to become independent and suggested that BLT be replaced with a different program.

If compared with Raskin, a large proportion of stakeholder respondents (36%) assessed Raskin as better than BLT 2008. The benefits of Raskin for poor families were more obvious than assistance in the form of cash and Raskin did not cause conflict. The weaknesses of the Raskin program were considered to be that there are still irregularities in the distribution and that the community still has to pay to get the cheap rice. Raskin is also often late, the quality is poor, the amount received is not as much as what should be received, and the quota is small because it must be divided equally among all members of the community.

For the the other programs, Jamkesmas/Askeskin, BOS, PKH, PNPM Mandiri, UKM, Revitalisasi Pertanian (Agricultural Revitalization) and PEPM (Coastal Communities Economy Program), although the majority of stakeholder respondents could not give an assessment, many stakeholders stated that these programs were better than BLT 2008. The Jamkesmas was considered better than BLT 2008 because BLT is a momentary program, while Jamkesmas provides long-term benefit because it can support the health of the poor and thus they can keep working. The weaknesses of Jamkesmas are the intricate and complicated bureaucracy, not all health services are free, and Jamkesmas patients get less welcoming service at health centers. In one region there was corruption with the use of medicines and claims from a hospital over fictitious patients.

Stakeholder respondents considered BOS to be better than BLT 2008 because with BOS the children of poor families did not have to stop going to school and the targeting was also more



accurate. Providing free education was considered better than giving cash because the cash could be misused. The weakness of BOS, according to stakeholders, was that (i) the disbursement of funds took time so the teaching/learning process was disrupted, (ii) the BOS program in some areas also had not yet made schooling free, and (iii) many schools were not transparent in their management of BOS funds.

A majority of stakeholder respondents stated that the empowerment programs such as PKH, PNPM Mandiri, UKM, Revitalisasi Pertanian and PEPM were better than BLT, Raskin, BOS and Jamkesmas. These empowerment programs are not only useful for increasing welfare, but also for increasing poor families' feelings of worth in society and pride.

**Table 17. Ranking Poverty Reduction Programs Based on Stakeholder Assessments<sup>a</sup>**

Program Name	First Ranking	Second Ranking	Third Ranking
BLT	13.79%	20.69%	18.97%
Raskin	25.86%	24.14%	10.34%
PKH	8.62%	1.72%	1.72%
Jamkesmas/Askeskin	8.62%	13.79%	22.41%
BOS	1.72%	13.79%	12.07%
PNPM Mandiri	17.24%	3.45%	8.62%
UKM	3.45%	6.90%	5.17%
Revitalisasi Pertanian	0	1.72%	0
PEPM	1.72%	1.72%	0
Other	18.97%	10.34%	6.90%

<sup>a</sup>Number of respondents= 58.

Of these poverty reduction programs, stakeholder respondents in all research areas considered Raskin to be the best program (see Table 17). From these 58 respondents, approximately 26% stated that Raskin was the best program. The other poverty reduction programs ranked highest by stakeholders were PNPM Mandiri and BLT. These programs were selected by 17% and 14% of stakeholders respectively. In contrast with the assessments from BLT beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries, stakeholders considered empowerment programs to be one of the best programs in tackling poverty.



## V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 5.1 Conclusions

Based on the study findings it can be concluded that:

1. The BLT program is still relevant and can assist the poor community in overcoming shocks caused by the increased fuel price. Although the poor community felt BLT helped them, some implementing apparatuses stated that they objected to the program being continued and suggested it be replaced by a community empowerment program.
2. Support for the continuation of the BLT program can be seen from the comparative analysis of BLT 2008 and other poverty reduction programs. The majority of household beneficiary and nonbeneficiary respondents stated that the BLT 2008 program was the best program because the money could be used immediately to fulfill the most urgent needs and the implementation was far better than that of BLT 2005.
3. There was still some tension and conflict at the community level; however, the intensity was less than that of 2005. The conflicts were based on social jealousy and the lack of transparency in the verification process. In some regions the conflict could be reduced through local mechanisms such as dividing some of the BLT funds to nonbeneficiaries.
4. Deductions to BLT funds were made at the community level with the amount tending to get larger and conducted systematically. This was not anticipated and was not dealt with by the relevant apparatus who tended to turn a blind eye.
5. BLT did not cause laziness or changes in the working hours of the RTS. The limited amount of funds which could only fulfill basic necessities in the short term meant that the poor people had to act rationally and keep working to fulfill their increasing living needs.
6. There were still problems with targeting and undercoverage of BLT beneficiaries because the verification was not as effective as it should have been.

### 5.2. Recommendations

Thus, the continuation of this program requires some improvements in the implementation, particularly in terms of data collection, socialization, and preventing the deductions of BLT funds. The following are some recommendations for improvements which must be made.

- a) The verification of Statistics Indonesia data collection results on the RTS needs to be legitimized at the community level through a village consultation process involving all elements of the community and presented in an official report. Prior to this, the village needs to socialize the names of prospective RTS through notice board announcements so that based on this information the community can convey any objections. The objections can be discussed during the village consultation process to determine whether these RTS are indeed eligible to receive BLT.
- b) The community's understanding and awareness that BLT is only for poor families needs to be increased using the following steps:
  - (1) Socialization at the community level needs to be broadened, especially in relation to the intention, objectives, mechanisms, and targeting of the program.

- (2) Formal socialization needs to be carried out through village/*dusun* meetings and other means, and informally through religious activities, *arisan* (a community rotating savings and credit group), and other social activities.
  - (3) Brochures should be distributed and posters displayed in public areas and information should also be disseminated through public service announcements in the printed and electronic media.
- c) In preventing deductions and levies of BLT funds for any purpose or reason whatsoever, including to be equally divided to reduce conflict between residents, the *bupati/walikota*<sup>17</sup> needs to produce an official letter for circulation to the apparatus and agencies involved from the *kabupaten/kota* level to the village/*kelurahan* level, including RT/RW, which forbids deductions and levies of BLT funds. This official circulation letter must also be published in public places, such as the *kelurahan* office, places of worship, *posyandu*, food stalls, and so on.

Aside from these three points, there are a number of other issues that must be considered:

- a) The KKB must be distributed after the verification process has been completed so that the KKB from the RTS which have been revoked cannot be misused.
- b) In relation to the disbursement of BLT funds, there needs to be:
  - (1) An increase in the number of distribution points, particularly in areas which are far away or difficult to access;
  - (2) The number of counters should be increased and special counters need to be available for elderly, ill and disabled RTS; and
  - (3) A queuing system needs to be applied so that the process is orderly, such as using a number system, organizing the flow of the queues, and involving the security forces.
- c) Complaint posts need to be established at every level.
  - (1) At the *kabupaten/kota* level the post would adhere to the tasks and function of UPP BLT-RTS;
  - (2) At the *kecamatan* level the post would be the responsibility of the *camat*;
  - (3) At the village level the post would be the responsibility of the village/*lurah* head and would be overseen by the BPD or *kelurahan* board, including the village youth organization and the community social workers.

These complaint posts would function as places to receive complaints and solve emerging problems related to BLT. Problems which could not be solved would be given to the next level to deal with. However solutions to the problems cannot violate the regulations that are in place.
- d) There needs to be confirmation of basic tasks and relative functions of the agencies involved in the UPP BLT-RTS, especially at the *kabupaten/kota* level which could be presented in decrees from the *bupati/walikota*.

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<sup>17</sup>*Bupati* is the head of a *kabupaten* and the *walikota* is the head of a *kota* (similar to a mayor).

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# APPENDICES

## APPENDIX 1

**Table A1. An Example of Different Poverty Criteria in Two Villages in Tapteng**

Desa Pearaja		Desa Mombang Boru	
Very Poor (20%)	Poor (70 %)	Very Poor (20%)	Poor (70 %)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- House has a dirt floor, roof made out of sago palms, 4x5m in size, sometimes rented or lent out without the land being rented</li> <li>- Many children</li> <li>- Parents have a maximum education of primary school, children have not yet graduated</li> <li>- Receive medical treatment from the <i>dukun</i> (local medical practitioner) or village midwife</li> <li>- Mostly are migrants</li> <li>- Work as tappers, freelance laborers</li> <li>- Own no land, rice fields rented from rich people</li> <li>- Buy one clothing ensemble per year</li> <li>- Use MCK (public bathing, washing, and toilet facilities)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Semi permanent house, iron roofing, 5x6m or 4x6m in size</li> <li>- Have one bicycle</li> <li>- Have coconut trees</li> <li>- Have rice field, plantation, max 1ha in total</li> <li>- Receive medical treatment at the <i>puskesmas</i> (community health center), use Askeskin (Health Insurance for the Poor) and go to a <i>dukun</i></li> <li>- Their children are schooled to junior high school level (maximum)</li> <li>- Lighting is 450 watts</li> <li>- Work as freelance laborers on rich people's land, or <i>bejak motor</i> (motorcycle pedicab, rented from the owner) to make enough to meet daily needs</li> <li>- Education is usually primary school graduate and sometimes have not graduated from primary school</li> <li>- Water sourced from a well</li> <li>- Use MCK facilities</li> <li>- Have 5 to 15 children</li> <li>- Maximum income Rp1,000,000</li> <li>- Buy 1–2 items of clothing per year</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Very simple house, shack, roof made out of sago palms, dirt floor, bamboo walls, 3x4m in size, not all houses are self-owned</li> <li>- Have no electricity</li> <li>- Have to go to the river to get water</li> <li>- Livelihood gained as a freelance laborer on someone else's plantation</li> <li>- Have ≥ 5 children because they have a low education level</li> <li>- Receive medical treatment from the <i>dukun</i> and <i>posyandu</i></li> <li>- Their children often migrate to seek a better life</li> <li>- Often ill</li> <li>- Often receive help from others to fulfill daily needs</li> <li>- Total income ≤ Rp250,000/ month, and even this is not certain</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- House made from board, space underneath the house (dilapidated), roof of sago palms, dirt floor, size of house 6x5m, no electricity</li> <li>- Water source is a well, nonpermanent MCK facilities outside the house</li> <li>- Children educated to junior high school level but some do not graduate</li> <li>- Own 1ha of rice fields which can be farmed, but they often flood and cannot afford fertilizer</li> <li>- Receive medical treatment from the <i>dukun</i></li> <li>- Eat 2x a day, consumption is only salted fish</li> <li>- Go to the market once every 3 months</li> <li>- Freelance laborer</li> <li>- Do not own a motorcycle or bicycle</li> <li>- Income is ≤ Rp700,000/month and even this is not certain</li> </ul>

*Source:* Results from Classification FGDs in Desa Pearaja, Kecamatan Sorkam and Desa Mombang Boru, Kecamatan Sibabangun, Kabupaten Tapteng.



## APPENDIX 2

**Table A2. Uses of BLT 2008 Funds (Percentages)**

Use		Tapanuli Tengah	Cianjur	Demak	Bima	Ternate	Total
Clothes	Min	0.0	10.0	0.0	10.0	70.0	10.0
	Max	0.0	15.0	0.0	35.0	70.0	70.0
	Mean	0.0	12.5	0.0	19.9	70.0	22.4
	N	0.0	2	0.0	11	1	14
Consumption	Min	16.0	4.0	23.0	4.0	30.0	4.0
	Max	100.0	83.0	50.0	66.0	100.0	100.0
	Mean	48.6	34.7	35.6	43.8	60.6	44.9
	N	11	19	5	24	13	72
School Costs	Min	33.0	1.0	10.0	8.0	50.0	1.0
	Max	66.0	34.0	50.0	33.0	100.0	100.0
	Mean	49.5	13.2	20.8	20.3	83.3	27.9
	N	2	4	5	15	3	29
Seek Health Treatment	Min	66.0	0.0	16.0	10.0	53.0	10.0
	Max	100.0	0.0	16.0	33.0	100.0	100.0
	Mean	87.0	0.0	16.0	19.7	77.7	61.9
	N	5	0.0	1	3	3	12
Pay Off Debts	Min	66.0	3.0	8.0	16.0	0.0	3.0
	Max	100.0	100.0	8.0	83.0	0.0	100.0
	Mean	83.0	23.1	8.0	30.5	0.0	30.8
	N	2	10	1	13	0.0	26
Increase capital	Min	56.0	16.0	NA	43.0	20.0	16.0
	Max	56.0	16.0	NA	43.0	66.0	66.0
	Mean	56.0	16.0	0.0	43.0	46.2	42.8
	N	1	1	0.0	1	4	7
Village Apparatus/Post Office Deductions	Min	1.0	16.0	33.0	3.0	0.0	1.0
	Max	3.0	66.0	66.0	6.0	0.0	66.0
	Mean	1.5	33.8	45.5	3.7	0.0	23.8
	N	4	20	6	12	0.0	42
Electricity	Min	16.0	1.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	1.0
	Max	16.0	16.0	6.0	10.0	6.0	16.0
	Mean	16.0	8.0	6.0	8.7	6.0	8.6
	N	1	4	1	3	1	10
Transport Expenses	Min	1.0	1.0	0.0	2.0	1.0	1.0
	Max	10.0	13.0	0.0	3.0	40.0	40.0
	Mean	5.6	5.2	0.0	2.9	12.8	6.0
	N	7	12	0.0	15	9	43

*continued*

*continued*

<b>Use</b>		<b>Tapanuli Tengah</b>	<b>Cianjur</b>	<b>Demak</b>	<b>Bima</b>	<b>Ternate</b>	<b>Total</b>
KTP (Identity Card)	Min	0.0	5.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.0
	Max	0.0	8.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	8.0
	Mean	0.0	6.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	4.6
	N	0.0	3	0.0	1	0.0	4
Zakat (Tithe)	Min	0.0	1.0	0.0	8.0	0.0	1.0
	Max	0.0	1.0	0.0	16.0	0.0	16.0
	Mean	0.0	1.0	0.0	11.3	0.0	8.7
	N	0.0	1	0.0	3	0.0	4
House Improvements	Min	66.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.0	33.0
	Max	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0
	Mean	89.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	77.7	84.3
	N	4	0.0	0.0	0.0	3	7
Cigarettes	Min	6.0	1.0	3.0	3.0	1.0	1.0
	Max	13.0	16.0	4.0	10.0	3.0	16.0
	Mean	9.5	6.0	3.5	6.2	2.3	5.4
	N	2	3	2	4	3	14
Mobile Phone Credit	Min	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0
	Max	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0
	Mean	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0
	N	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	0.0	1
Other	Min	66.0	2.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
	Max	66.0	91.0	0.0	33.0	1.0	91.0
	Mean	66.0	25.7	0.0	10.8	1.0	16.0
	N	1	4	0.0	14	1	20
Total Respondents		18	22	6	25	19	90

## APPENDIX 3

### Instruction of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Number 3, 2008 on the Implementation of the Direct Cash Transfer Program for Targeted Households



PRESIDEN  
REPUBLIK INDONESIA

INSTRUKSI PRESIDEN REPUBLIK INDONESIA  
NOMOR 3 TAHUN 2008  
TENTANG  
PELAKSANAAN PROGRAM BANTUAN LANGSUNG TUNAI  
UNTUK RUMAH TANGGA SASARAN

PRESIDEN REPUBLIK INDONESIA,

Untuk kelancaran pelaksanaan program pemberian bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran dalam rangka kompensasi pengurangan subsidi Bahan Bakar Minyak (BBM), dengan ini menginstruksikan:

- Kepada :
1. Menteri Koordinator Bidang Politik, Hukum dan Keamanan;
  2. Menteri Koordinator Bidang Perekonomian;
  3. Menteri Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat;
  4. Menteri Keuangan;
  5. Menteri Negara Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional/Kepala Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional;
  6. Menteri Sosial;
  7. Menteri Dalam Negeri;
  8. Menteri Komunikasi dan Informatika;
  9. Menteri Negara Badan Usaha Milik Negara;
  10. Jaksa Agung Republik Indonesia;
  11. Panglima Tentara Nasional Indonesia;
  12. Kepala Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia;
  13. Kepala ...



PRESIDEN  
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13. Kepala Badan Pusat Statistik;
14. Kepala Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan Pembangunan ;
15. Para Gubernur;
16. Para Bupati/Walikota.

Untuk :

- PERTAMA : 1. Menteri Koordinator Bidang Politik, Hukum dan Keamanan segera mengkoordinasikan langkah-langkah yang diperlukan dalam menjaga keamanan dan ketertiban masyarakat untuk pelaksanaan program pemberian bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran dalam rangka kompensasi pengurangan subsidi BBM.
2. Menteri Koordinator Bidang Perekonomian segera mengkoordinasikan penyiapan kondisi perekonomian yang mendukung rencana pelaksanaan program pemberian bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran dalam rangka kompensasi pengurangan subsidi BBM, dengan melibatkan menteri-menteri terkait, para gubernur, dan Kepala Badan Pusat Statistik.
3. Menteri Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat segera mengkoordinasikan pelaksanaan program pemberian bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran dalam rangka kompensasi pengurangan subsidi BBM, dan penanganan pengaduan masyarakat ...



PRESIDEN  
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masyarakat berkaitan dengan pelaksanaannya, dengan melibatkan menteri-menteri terkait, para gubernur, dan Kepala Badan Pusat Statistik.

4. Menteri Keuangan segera melakukan:
  - a. penyediaan pendanaan setelah menerima usulan dari Menteri Sosial;
  - b. penyusunan dan pengendalian anggaran untuk pelaksanaan program pemberian bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran;dalam rangka kompensasi pengurangan subsidi BBM.
5. Menteri Negara Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional/Kepala Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional segera melaksanakan:
  - a. koordinasi pelaksanaan dalam penyusunan rencana program pemberian bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran dalam rangka kompensasi pengurangan subsidi BBM;
  - b. penyusunan organisasi pelaksanaan program pemberian bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran dalam rangka kompensasi pengurangan subsidi BBM ;
  - c. melakukan evaluasi pelaksanaan program bantuan langsung tunai terhadap pendapatan rumah tangga sasaran.

6. Menteri ...



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6. Menteri Sosial:
  - a. menjadi Kuasa Pengguna Anggaran dalam pelaksanaan pemberian bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran;
  - b. mengusulkan kebutuhan pendanaan kepada Menteri Keuangan sesuai data rumah tangga untuk program pemberian bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran yang disediakan oleh Badan Pusat Statistik;
  - c. segera menyalurkan bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran sesuai program yang telah disusun oleh Menteri Negara Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional/Kepala Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional;
  - d. menyusun pelaporan pelaksanaan penyaluran bantuan langsung tunai sebagaimana dimaksud pada huruf c;  
dalam rangka kompensasi pengurangan subsidi BBM.
7. Menteri Dalam Negeri segera mengkoordinasikan pelaksanaan dan pengendalian program pemberian bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran dalam rangka kompensasi pengurangan subsidi BBM bersama-sama Pemerintah Daerah.

8. Menteri ...



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8. Menteri Komunikasi dan Informatika bersama Menteri Dalam Negeri segera mengkoordinasikan pelaksanaan sosialisasi dan konsultasi publik mengenai program pemberian bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran dalam rangka kompensasi pengurangan subsidi BBM.
9. Menteri Negara Badan Usaha Milik Negara segera mengintegrasikan program BUMN Peduli dan mengambil langkah-langkah yang diperlukan berkaitan dengan peran Badan Usaha Milik Negara dalam rangka mendukung pelaksanaan program pemberian bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran dalam rangka kompensasi pengurangan subsidi BBM.
10. Jaksa Agung Republik Indonesia segera melakukan pengkakan hukum terhadap setiap pihak yang melakukan penyimpangan dan penyelewengan dalam pelaksanaan program pemberian bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran dalam rangka kompensasi pengurangan subsidi BBM.
11. Panglima Tentara Nasional Indonesia segera memberikan dukungan dan bantuan pengamanan pelaksanaan program pemberian bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran dalam rangka kompensasi pengurangan subsidi BBM.
12. Kepala Kepolisian Republik Indonesia segera melakukan langkah-langkah komprehensif dalam menjaga keamanan dan ketertiban

masyarakat





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masyarakat untuk pelaksanaan program pemberian bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran dalam rangka kompensasi pengurangan subsidi BBM.

13. Kepala Badan Pusat Statistik segera:
  - a. melakukan kegiatan penyediaan data rumah tangga sasaran untuk program pemberian bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran bersama Pemerintah Kabupaten/Kota;
  - b. memberikan akses data rumah tangga sasaran kepada instansi Pemerintah lain yang melakukan kegiatan kesejahteraan sosial.
14. Kepala Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan Pembangunan segera melaksanakan audit atas pelaksanaan penyaluran bantuan langsung tunai mulai kepada rumah tangga sasaran dalam rangka kompensasi pengurangan subsidi BBM.
15. Para Gubernur beserta jajarannya memberikan dukungan terhadap pelaksanaan dan pengawasan program pemberian bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran dalam rangka kompensasi pengurangan subsidi BBM di wilayah masing-masing.
16. Para Bupati/Walikota beserta jajarannya memberikan dukungan terhadap pelaksanaan dan pengawasan program pemberian bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran dalam rangka kompensasi pengurangan subsidi BBM di wilayah masing-masing.

KEDUA ...



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- KEDUA : Yang dimaksud dengan rumah tangga sasaran dalam Instruksi Presiden ini adalah rumah tangga yang masuk dalam kategori Sangat Miskin, Miskin, dan Hampir Miskin.
- KETIGA : Segala biaya yang diperlukan dalam rangka penyiapan, pelaksanaan, pengendalian, dan pengawasan program pemberian bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran dalam rangka kompensasi pengurangan subsidi BBM dibebankan kepada Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara.
- KEEMPAT : Melakukan tindakan hukum yang tegas sesuai dengan ketentuan peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku terhadap setiap orang, perusahaan atau badan hukum yang melakukan atau patut diduga melakukan penyimpangan dan penyelewengan dalam persiapan dan pelaksanaan program pemberian bantuan langsung tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran.
- KELIMA : Bantuan Langsung Tunai kepada rumah tangga sasaran sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Instruksi Presiden ini, berakhir pada tanggal 31 Desember 2008.
- KEENAM : Agar melaksanakan Instruksi Presiden ini secara terkoordinasi dan dengan penuh tanggung jawab serta melaporkan hasilnya kepada Presiden.
- KETUJUH : Dengan dikeluarkannya Instruksi Presiden ini, maka Instruksi Presiden Nomor 12 Tahun 2005 tentang Pelaksanaan Bantuan Langsung Tunai Kepada Rumah Tangga Miskin dinyatakan tidak berlaku lagi.

Instruksi ...



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Instruksi Presiden ini mulai berlaku pada tanggal dikeluarkan.

Dikeluarkan di Jakarta  
pada tanggal 14 Mei 2008  
PRESIDEN REPUBLIK INDONESIA,

ttd.

DR. H. SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO

Salinan sesuai dengan aslinya

Deputi Sekretaris Kabinet  
Bidang Hukum,



Dr. M. Iman Santoso

## APPENDIX 4

Decree of the Minister of Social Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia No. 28/HUK/2008 on Guidelines for PT Pos Indonesia and Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) as the Funds Distributors for the Direct Cash Transfer for Targeted Households



**KEPUTUSAN MENTERI SOSIAL  
REPUBLIK INDONESIA  
NOMOR : 28 / HUK / 2008**

**TENTANG**

**PENUNJUKAN PT. POS INDONESIA DAN BRI  
(PERSERO) Tbk., SEBAGAI PENYALUR DANA  
BANTUAN LANGSUNG TUNAI UNTUK  
RUMAH TANGGA SASARAN**

**MENTERI SOSIAL REPUBLIK INDONESIA,**

- Menimbang :
- a. bahwa untuk kelancaran pelaksanaan program pemberian Bantuan Langsung Tunai Untuk Rumah Tangga Sasaran dalam rangka kompensasi pengurangan subsidi bahan bakar minyak perlu ditunjuk badan/ lembaga sebagai penyalur dana bantuan dimaksud;
  - b. bahwa berdasarkan pertimbangan sebagaimana huruf a perlu menunjuk PT. Pos Indonesia dan Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk sebagai penyalur Dana Bantuan Langsung Tunai Untuk Rumah Tangga Sasaran dalam suatu Keputusan Menteri Sosial.

- Mengingat :
1. Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1974 tentang Ketentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Kesejahteraan Sosial (Lembaran Negara RI Tahun 1974 Nomor 53, tambahan Lembaran Negara RI Nomor 3039);
  2. Undang-Undang Nomor 32 Tahun 2004 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah (Lembaran Negara RI Tahun 2004 Nomor 60, tambahan Lembaran Negara 3839);
  3. Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 42 Tahun 1981 tentang Pelayanan Kesejahteraan Sosial bagi Fakir Miskin (Lembar Negara RI Tahun 1981 Nomor 59, Tambahan Lembaran Negara RI Nomor 3206);
  4. Keputusan Presiden RI Nomor 187/M Tahun 2004 tentang Pembentukan Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu, sebagaimana telah beberapa kali diubah terakhir dengan Keppres RI Nomor 171/M/2005;
  5. Keputusan Presiden RI Nomor 9 Tahun 2005 tentang Kedudukan, Tugas, Fungsi, Susunan Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Kementerian Negara RI;

6. Peraturan Presiden RI Nomor 7 Tahun 2005 tentang Rencana Pemerintah Jangka Menengah Nasional Tahun 2004-2009;
7. Peraturan Presiden RI Nomor 10 Tahun 2005 tentang Unit Organisasi dan Tugas Eselon I Kementerian Negara RI;
8. Keputusan Menteri Sosial Nomor 84/HUK/1997 tentang Pelaksanaan Pemberian Bantuan Sosial bagi Keluarga Fakir Miskin;
9. Peraturan Menteri Sosial RI Nomor 82/HUK/2005 tentang Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Departemen Sosial.

Memperhatikan: Instruksi Presiden RI Nomor 3 Tahun 2008 tentang Pelaksanaan Bantuan Langsung Tunai Untuk Rumah Tangga Sasaran.





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## MEMUTUSKAN :

Menetapkan :

- PERTAMA** : Menujuk PT. Pos Indonesia dan Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. Sebagai Penyalur Dana Bantuan Langsung Tunai Untuk Rumah Tangga Sasaran.
- KEDUA** : Jumlah Dana Bantuan Langsung Tunai Untuk Rumah Tangga Sasaran akan ditentukan besarnya dalam DIPA Sekretariat Jenderal Departemen Sosial RI Tahun 2008.
- KETIGA** : Data penerima Dana Bantuan Langsung Tunai Untuk Rumah Tangga Sasaran sebagaimana dimaksud dalam diktum KEDUA, bersumber dari Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS).
- KEEMPAT** : Mekanisme penyaluran Dana Bantuan Langsung Tunai dimaksud dimuat dalam kesepakatan kerjasama antara Departemen Sosial, dengan PT. Pos Indonesia dan PT. Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk.



- KELIMA** : Seluruh biaya dan pelaksanaan penyaluran Dana Bantuan Langsung Tunai Untuk Rumah Tangga Sasaran sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Diktum PERTAMA dibebankan pada DIPA Departemen Sosial RI Tahun 2008.
- KEENAM** : Keputusan ini berlaku pada tanggal ditetapkan dengan ketentuan apabila dikemudian hari terdapat kekeliruan akan dibetulkan sebagaimana mestinya.

**Ditetapkan di Jakarta  
Pada tanggal 16 Mei 2008**

**MENTERI SOSIAL RI**



**H. BACHTIAR CHAMSYAH, SE**



Salinan Surat Keputusan ini dsampaikan kepada Yth.:

1. Ketua Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (BPK).
2. Menteri Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat.
3. Para Pejabat Eselon I di Lingkungan Departemen Sosial RI.
4. Para Gubernur di Seluruh Indonesia.
5. Para Pejabat Eselon II di Lingkungan Departemen Sosial RI.
6. Kepala Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan Pembangunan (BPKP).
7. Para Kepala Dinas/ Instansi Sosial Seluruh Indonesia.
8. Kepala Pusat Penyusunan Perundang-Undangan dan Bantuan Hukum Departemen Sosial RI.
9. Kepala Biro Keuangan Departemen Sosial RI.
10. Kepala Biro Perencanaan Departemen Sosial RI.
11. Direktur Utama PT. Pos Indonesia.
12. Direktur Utama PT. Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk.



DEPARTEMEN DALAM NEGERI  
PUSAT DATA INFORMASI KOMUNIKASI DAN TELKOM

Register Nomor:

**FORMULIR BERITA**

PANGGILAN	JENIS	NOMOR	DERAJAT
DARI : MENTERI DALAM NEGERI UNTUK : YTH. SDR. GUBERNUR SELURUH INDONESIA TEMBUSAN : 1. YTH. BPK PRESIDEN RI (SEBAGAI LAPORAN) 2. YTH. BAPAK WAKIL PRESIDEN 3. YTH. MENTERI KOORD. BIDANG PEREKONOMIAN 4. YTH. MENTERI KOORD. BIDANG KESRA 5. YTH. MENTERI KOORD. BIDANG POLHUKAM 6. YTH. MENTERI NEGARA PERENC. PEMBANGUNAN/KEPALA BAPPENAS 7. YTH. MENTERI KEUANGAN 8. YTH. MENTERI SOSIAL 9. YTH. MENTERI KOMUNIKASI DAN INFORMATIKA 10. YTH. KEPALA BPS 11. YTH. KEPALA POLRI 12. YTH. SDR. BUPATI DAN WALIKOTA SELURUH INDONESIA 14. YTH. DIRUT PT POSINDO 15. YTH. DIRUT PT BANK RAKYAT INDONESIA			
KLASIFIKASI NOMOR	SANGAT SEGERA		
	<p>SEHUBUNGAN DENGAN RENCANA PEMERINTAH UNTUK MELAKSANAKAN PROGRAM BANTUAN LANGSUNG TUNAI (BLT) KEPADA RUMAH TANGGA MISKIN (RTM) DI SELURUH INDONESIA SECARA BERTAHAP YANG AKAN DIMULAI PADA TAHAP PERTAMA DI 6 (KOTA BESAR) ANTARA LAIN KOTA MEDAN, BANDUNG, SEMARANG, SURABAYA, MAKASAR DAN KOTA-KOTA DI PROVINSI DKI JAKARTA PADA BULAN JUNI 2009. SERTA TAHAP SELANJUTNYA AKAN DIKUTI SELURUH PROVINSI DI LUAR 6 (ENAM) KOTA TERSEBUT. DIMINTA PERHATIAN PARA GUBERNUR UNTUK MELAKUKAN LANGKAH LANGKAH PERSIAPAN DI WILAYAH MASING-MASING DENGAN MEMPERHATIKAN HAL-HAL SEBAGAI BERIKUT:</p> <p>A. MEMBERIKAN DUKUNGAN SEPENUHNYA UNTUK KELANCARAN PELAKSANAAN PROGRAM BLT DAN MENKOORDINASIKAN LEBIH LANJUT DENGAN PARA BUPATI DAN WALIKOTA SERTA JAJARAN TEKNIS TERKAIT TERUTAMA BPS SELAKU PENYEDIA DATA RTM DAN PT. POSINDO SETEMPAT SELAKU PENYALUR BLT.</p> <p>B. PROSEDUR PELAYANAN PEMBERIAN BLT DI KANTOR-KANTOR POS AGAR DIATUR SEDEMUKAN RUPA SEHINGGA TETAP TERJAGA KETERTIBAN, KENYAMANAN, DAN KELANCARANNYA. HAL-HAL YANG MENYEBABKAN TIMBULNYA ANTRIAN PANJANG DAN BERDESAK-DESAKAN AGAR DIHINDARI DENGAN POLA PENJADWALAN PELAYANAN PENGAMBILAN BLT YANG TEPAT. UNTUK IN LANGKAH-LANGKAH PENGAMANAN AGAR SEDINI MUNGKIN DIANTISIPASI MELALUI KOORDINASI DENGAN JAJARAN KEPOLISIAN SETEMPAT DAN DUKUNGAN PELIBATAN SATPOL PP.</p> <p>C. MEMINGGAT KEBERADAAN DATA RTM PENERIMA BLT MERUPAKAN SALAH SATU FAKOR KUNCI KELANCARAN PENYALURAN DI LAPANGAN, MAKA SEBAGAI DASAR AKAN TETAP DIGUNAKAN DATA RTM SANGAT MISKIN, MISKIN, DAN HAMPIR MISKIN. DITEGASKAN AGAR SELAMA BERLANGSUNGNYA PROGRAM BLT TAHUN 2009 INI TIDAK MEMBUKA ATAU MENEMBAH PENDAFTARAN BARU RTM DAN SEBALIKNYA TETAP SECARA KONSISTEN MENGGUNAKAN DATA YANG SUDAH ADA SAMPAI NANTINYA ADA PEMBAHARUAN DATA KEMBALI PADA TAHUN 2009.</p> <p>D. UNTUK MEMBERIKAN PEMAHAN KEPADA JAJARAN PEMERINTAH TERUTAMA DITINGKAT KECAMATAN DAN DESAKELURAHAN SERTA MASYARAKAT LUMAS, AGAR DILAKUKAN PULA LANGKAH-LANGKAH SOSIALISASI MENGENAI TUJUAN PEMBERIAN BLT DAN POLA PENGATURANNYA DENGAN MEMANFAATKAN BERBAGAI MEDIA YANG ADA TERMASUK FORUM-FORUM KOORDINASI DI DAERAH.</p> <p>E. DALAM PELAKSANAAN PROGRAM BLT AGAR DIUPAYAKAN ADANYA KETERLIBATAN PEMERINTAH DESAKELURAHAN DAN JAJARAN RTM/ SETEMPAT DI BAWAH KOORDINASI CAMAT SERTA DIDUKUNG TOKOH-TOKOH MASYARAKAT.</p> <p>G. DEMIKIAN UNTUK MENJADI PERHATIAN DAN DILAKSANAKAN</p> <p style="text-align: right;">MENDAGRI Tanggal Waktu Pembuatan Mei 2008</p>		
Pengirim : MENTERI DALAM NEGERI Nama : H. MARDIYANTO Jabatan : MENTERI DALAM NEGERI Tanda tangan :	No Kode	Waktu Terima    Kirim	Lalu Lintas Paraf

## APPENDIX 5

Decree of the Bupati of Tapanuli Tengah No. 537.2/Sosnakertrans/2008 30 June 2008 on the Determination of the Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah Direct Cash Transfer Program Implementing Unit (UPP-BLT)



### BUPATI TAPANULI TENGAH

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KEPUTUSAN BUPATI TAPANULI TENGAH  
NOMOR : 537.2 / Sosnakertrans/2008

#### TENTANG

#### PENETAPAN UNIT PELAKSANA PROGRAM BANTUAN LANGSUNG TUNAI (UPP-BLT) KABUPATEN TAPANULI TENGAH

#### BUPATI TAPANULI TENGAH,

- Menimbang** :
- a. bahwa dengan kenaikan harga dasar bahan bakar minyak mengakibatkan harga kebutuhan pokok meningkat, hal ini akan menambah kesulitan bagi warga miskin untuk beradaptasi dengan perkembangan harga dipasar;
  - b. bahwa untuk mendukung upaya perlindungan sosial masyarakat miskin, sesuai dengan Instruksi Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 3 Tahun 2008 tanggal 14 Mei 2008, Hal Pemerintah Republik Indonesia memberikan Bantuan Langsung Tunai untuk Rumah Tangga Sasaran (BLT-RTS) untuk itu perlu Penetapan unit Pelaksana Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai (UPP-BLT) Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah;
  - c. bahwa berdasarkan pertimbangan huruf "a" dan huruf "b" diatas perlu menetapkan Keputusan Bupati tentang Penetapan Unit Pelaksana Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai (UPP-BLT) Tahun 2008 Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah.
- Mengingat** :
1. Undang-Undang Nomor 7 Drt Tahun 1956 tentang Pembentukan Daerah Otonomi Kabupaten-kabupaten dalam Lingkungan Daerah Provinsi Sumatera Utara (Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1956 Nomor 58, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 1092);
  2. Undang-Undang Nomor 10 Tahun 2004 tentang Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang-Undangan (Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2004 Nomor 53, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 4389);
  3. Undang-Undang Nomor 32 Tahun 2004 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah (Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2004 Nomor 125, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 4437);

4. Undang-Undang Nomor 33 Tahun 2004 tentang Perimbangan Keuangan antara Pemerintah Pusat dan Pemerintah Daerah (Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2004 Nomor 126, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 4438);
5. Undang-Undang Nomor 45 Tahun 2007 tentang Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Nasional Tahun 2008 (Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2007 Nomor 133, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 4778);
6. Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 79 Tahun 2005 tentang Pedoman Pembinaan dan Pengawasan Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan Daerah (Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2005 Nomor 165, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 4593);
7. Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 38 Tahun 2007 tentang Pembagian Urusan Pemerintahan antara Pemerintah, Pemerintahan Daerah Provinsi dan Pemerintahan Daerah Kabupaten/ Kota (Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2007 Nomor 82, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 4737);
8. Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 54 Tahun 2005, tentang Tim Koordinasi Penanggulangan Kemiskinan (TKPK);
9. Instruksi Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor : 03 Tahun 2003 tentang Pelaksanaan Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai untuk Rumah Tangga Sasaran ( BLT - RTS );
10. Keputusan Gubernur Sumatera Utara Nomor : 900/ 2214/ K/ 2008 tentang Penetapan Unit Pelaksana Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai ( UPP - BLT ) Provinsi Sumatera Utara Tahun 2008;
11. Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah Nomor 26 Tahun 2007 tentang Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Dinas - Dinas Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah,

**MEMUTUSKAN :**


**Menetapkan** : **KEPUTUSAN BUPATI TENTANG PENETAPAN UNIT PELAKSANA PROGRAM BANTUAN LANGSUNG TUNAI (UPP-BLT) KABUPATEN TAPANULI TENGAH.**

**PERTAMA** : Menetapkan Unit Pelaksana Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai Rumah Tangga Sasaran Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah dengan susunan anggota sebagaimana tercantum dalam lampiran Keputusan ini.



- KEDUA** : Unit Pelaksana sebagaimana dimaksud diktum pertama bertugas:
1. mengelola Unit Pelaksana Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai (UPP-BLT) untuk dapat bertugas secara intensif selama proses Pelaksanaan Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai di Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah.
  2. melakukan Pembinaan, Supervisi, dan Pengawasan terhadap Pelaksanaan Bantuan Langsung Tunai Rumah Tangga Sasaran Kabupaten dan Unit Pelaksana Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai Kecamatan.
  3. mengkoordinasikan dalam Pelaksanaan Pendamping terhadap PT. Pos Indonesia pada saat Pembagian Kartu Bantuan Langsung Tunai dengan melibatkan Tenaga Kesejahteraan Masyarakat (Karang Taruna, Taruna Siaga Bencana /TAGANA, PSM, Tokoh Agama, Tokoh Masyarakat).
  4. memberi Perlindungan khusus bagi Kelompok Rentan (Penyandang Cacat, Ibu Hamil, dan Lanjut Usia serta Rumah Tangga Sasaran yang sakit) penerima Bantuan Langsung Tunai.
  5. membuat laporan Pelaksanaan Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai Rumah Tangga Sasaran sesuai dengan tugas dan kewenangan yang dimiliki ke Menteri Sosial Republik Indonesia melalui Gubernur Sumatera Utara.
- KETIGA** : Segala biaya yang timbul akibat ditetapkannya keputusan ini dibebankan pada dana APBN.
- KEEMPAT** : Keputusan ini mulai berlaku sejak tanggal ditetapkan dengan ketentuan apabila terdapat kekeliruan didalamnya akan diadakan perbaikan sebagaimana mestinya.

Ditetapkan di Pandan  
pada tanggal 30 Juni 2008



**Tembusan :**


1. Menteri Sosial Republik Indonesia di Jakarta
2. Ketua DPRD Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah di Pandan
3. Inspektur Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah di Pandan
4. Masing- masing yang tersebut dalam lampiran Keputusan ini.

Lampiran : Keputusan Bupati Tapanuli Tengah  
Nomor : 537-7/SOSNAKERTRANS/2008  
Tanggal : 30 Juli 2008

**SUSUNAN ANGGOTA UNIT PELAKSANA  
PROGRAM BANTUAN LANGSUNG TUNAI (UPP-BLT)  
KABUPATEN TAPANULI TENGAH TAHUN 2008**

---

1. Ketua : Kepala Dinas Sosial Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah
2. Sekretaris : Kepala Bidang Kesejahteraan, Bantuan Sosial dan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat
3. Bendahara : Togu Sihombing
4. Anggota :
  1. Kepala Bupati Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah
  2. Kepala Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah
  3. Kepala Bagian Humas Setdakab Tapanuli Tengah
  4. Kepala Kantor Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa dan Perempuan Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah
  5. Managara Siambaton, SE
  6. H. Solehuddin Harahap, S.Ag
  7. Asmaria Batubara
  8. Demetria Tampubolon, SH
  9. Jusman Nur Silitonga

  
TUANG LUMBANTOBING



## APPENDIX 6

### Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah Statistics Indonesia Document on the BLT 2008 Program and the Verification and Update of the Targeted Households Database



**Badan Pusat Statistik**  
**Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah**  
Jl. N. Daulay No.- Pandan.- Tapanuli Tengah 22611 Telp/Faks . (0631) 371082

Nomor : 12041. .... Pandan, 19 Juni 2008  
Lampiran : --  
Perihal : **Program BLT 2008 dan Verifikasi  
serta Pemutahiran Data base RTS**

Kepada Yang Terhormat :

Ketua Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah  
Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah  
di.

#### Pandan

Menanggapi surat Ketua Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah nomor 170/681/2008 tanggal 17 Juli 2008, dengan hormat kami berikan penjelasan tentang tugas Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) dalam penyaluran program BLT 2008, antara lain :

1. Sesuai Inpres Nomor 3 Tahun 2008, tentang Pelaksanaan Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT) untuk Rumah Tangga Sasaran (RTS) maka pelaksana dari Inpres tersebut adalah: Menko Polhukam, Menko Perekonomian, Menko Kesra, Menteri Keuangan, Meneg PPN/Kepala Bappenas, Menteri Sosial, Mendagri, Menteri Kominfo, Meneg BUMN, Jaksa Agung, Panglima TNI, Kepala BPS, Kepala BPKP, Gubernur dan Bupati/Walikota.
2. Tugas BPS meliputi :
  - Melakukan kegiatan Penyedia data RTS-BLT bersama Pemkab/Pemkot.
  - Memberikan akses data Rumah Tangga Sasaran (RTS) kepada Instnsi Pemerintah lain yang melakukan kegiatan kesejahteraan sosial.
3. Sebagai penyedia data RTS-BLT 2008 perlu diberitahukan bahwa data yang digunakan sebagai data dasar (database) penentuan RTS penerima BLT 2008 di Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah bersumber dari 2 sumber. Hal ini terjadi karena, Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah termasuk dari 97 Kab/Kota yang melakukan kegiatan Survei Pelayanan Dasar Pendidikan dan Kesehatan (SPDKP) tahun 2007, yang menghasilkan RTS penerima Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH). Dimana hasil dari kegiatan SPDKP ini juga digunakan sebagai dasar penentuan RTS penerima BLT 2008.
4. Kedua sumber data dasar penentuan RTS penerima BLT 2008 tersebut adalah:
  - a. Data dasar (database) RTS penerima BLT 2005/2006 (keadaan 31 Mei 2006). Jumlah RTS penerima BLT 2005/2006 secara nasional 19,1 juta RTS, dan untuk Kab Tapanuli Tengah sebanyak 35.861 RTS.

- b. Data hasil Verifikasi pelaksanaan SPDKP tahun 2007. Kegiatan ini dilakukan di 8 Kecamatan, yaitu Kecamatan Pinangsori, Badiri, Tukka, Sitahuis, Tapani Nauli, Sosor Gadong, Sirandorong dan Manduamas.


➔ Pada kegiatan SPDKP 2007 **sebagian penerima** BLT 2005/2006 (sangat miskin dan sebagian miskin) diverifikasi kembali oleh tim SPDKP (1 Tim terdiri dari 3 orang), bila kondisi ekonominya mampu diberi kode 1 dan bila tidak mampu diberi kode 2. RTS yang telah diverifikasi tersebut dan bila berkode 1 (mampu ekonominya) dihapus dari database RTS penerima BLT 2008 dan bila berkode 2 tetap sebagai penerima BLT 2008

Pada kegiatan SPDKP 2007 tersebut juga dilakukan penelusuran/sweeping untuk mencari RTS yang sangat miskin dan memenuhi syarat PKH (Memiliki ibu hamil dan atau balita dan atau anak usia sekolah 6-15 tahun) dan bukan merupakan penerima BLT 2005/2006. RTS hasil penelusuran tersebut dimasukkan sebagai RTS penerima BLT 2008.

5. Jadi data RTS penerima BLT 2008 di Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah adalah:
- Untuk Kecamatan Sibabangun, Lumut, Sukabangan, Pandan, Kolang, Sorkam, Sorkam Barat, Barus, Barus Utara dan Andam Dewi masih menggunakan data RTS penerima BLT 2005/2006 dan nama-nama telah diserahkan kepada Bapak Sekretaris Daerah Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah tanggal 19 Mei 2008.
  - Sedangkan untuk Kecamatan Pinangsori, Badiri, Tukka, Sitahuis, Tapani Nauli, Sosor Gadong, Sirandorong dan Manduamas menggunakan kombinasi penerima BLT 2005/2006 dan hasil verifikasi SPDKP 2007, dan nama-nama telah diberikan kepada Dinas Sosial dan Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi Kab. Tapanuli Tengah tanggal 10 Juni 2008.
6. Jumlah RTS Penerima BLT 2008, secara nasional jumlahnya 19.023 juta RTS, dan Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah sebanyak **34.900** RTS (Kartu BLT).
7. Perlu diingat bahwa RTS penerima BLT 2008 merupakan **Rumah Tangga Sangat Miskin, Miskin dan Mendekati Miskin**.
8. Pendistribusian Kartu BLT 2008 kepada RTS penerima BLT menjadi wewenang dan tanggung jawab PT Pos bekerjasama dengan aparat desa/kelurahan. Sebelum Kartu BLT didistribusikan **Petugas PT Pos dan aparat desa/kelurahan melakukan verifikasi terbatas terhadap keberadaan dan kelayakan RTS penerima BLT tersebut**.
9. Pada saat pendistribusian Kartu BLT dan pencairan dana BLT 2008, BPS tidak berperan juga dalam pelaksanaan verifikasi terbatas tersebut.

10. BPS akan melakukan Updating terhadap RTS penerima BLT 2008 yang telah diverifikasi terbatas oleh PT Pos atau aparat desa/kelurahan tersebut, pada bulan September – Oktober tahun 2008, dengan tujuan menyediakan data untuk semua program pengentasan kemiskinan (Penajaman Program BLT 2009, Program Raskin, Program Jamkesmas/Askeskin, Program Reforma Agraria dan Program BOS). Dimana informasi yang akan dikumpulkan, sesuai dengan kebutuhan masing-masing program antara lain:

- i. Jamkesmas : Nama anggota rumah tangga/Keluarga
- ii. PKH : Jenis Kelamin, Umur, Status Sekolah, Balita, Usia Pendidikan Dasar, WUS, Status Pekerjaan
- iii. Program Reforma Agraria : Lapangan Pekerjaan
- iv. Bos : Nama murid SD dan SLTP

  
Kepala,  
DINAR BUTAR-BUTAR, SE, M.Si  
NIP.340011676

Ternbusan disampaikan kepada Yth;

1. Kepala BPS Provinsi Sumatera Utara di Medan.
2. Bupati Tapanuli Tengah di Pandan.

## APPENDIX 7

Decree of the Head of the Kabupaten Cianjur Civil Records, Demography, Labor, and Social Affairs Agency No. 466.1/1729/DSTKC on the Formation of the Direct Cash Transfer Program Implementing Unit for Targeted Households (UPP-BLT)



**PEMERINTAH KABUPATEN CIANJUR**  
**DINAS SOSIAL TENAGA KERJA KEPENDUDUKAN DAN CATATAN SIPIL**  
Jalan Raya Bandung KM. 4,5 Telp. (0263) 261221 – 262464 Cianjur 43281

KEPUTUSAN KEPALA DINAS SOSIAL TENAGA KERJA KEPENDUDUKAN DAN  
CATATAN SIPIL KABUPATEN CIANJUR

NOMOR : 466.1/1729 /DSTKC

TENTANG

PEMBENTUKAN UNIT PELAKSANA PROGRAM BANTUAN LANGSUNG TUNAI  
RUMAH TANGGA SASARAN ( UPP BLT )

- 
- Menimbang** :
- a. bahwa dengan adanya kebijakan kenaikan harga Bahan Bakar Minyak (BBM) maka perlu diluncurkan program untuk membantu masyarakat miskin agar tetap memenuhi kebutuhan dasarnya, mencegah penurunan taraf kesejahteraan masyarakat akibat kesulitan ekonomi dan meningkatkan tanggung jawab sosial bersama.
  - b. bahwa untuk membantu masyarakat miskin sebagaimana dimaksud dalam butir a, perlu program bantuan yang sangat bermanfaat dan diperlukan yaitu Bantuan Langsung Tunai yang dalam pelaksanaannya diperlukan koordinasi antar lintas sektor yang terkait dalam program untuk kelancaran pelaksanaannya.
  - c. bahwa atas dasar hal tersebut, perlu dibentuk Unit Pelaksana Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai Rumah Tangga Sasaran ( UPP BLT-RTS) yang ditetapkan dengan Keputusan Kepala Dinas.
- Mengingat** :
1. Undang-undang Nomor 14 Tahun 1974 tentang Ketentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Kesejahteraan Sosial (Lembaga Negara RI Tahun 1974 Nomor 53, Tambahan Lembaga Negara RI Nomor 3039 ).
  2. Intruksi Presiden RI Nomor 3 Tahun 2008 tentang Pelaksanaan Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai untuk Rumah Tangga Sasaran..



- c. Memberikan perlindungan khusus bagi kelompok rentan ( Penyandang Cacat, Ibu Hamil dan Lanjut Usia serta RTS yang Sakit)
- d. Membuat Laporan pelaksanaan program BLT – RTS sesuai dengan kewenangan yang dimiliki,

**KEEMPAT** : Segala biaya yang diperlukan untuk kelancaran pelaksanaan tugas Unit Pelayanan Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai Rumah Tangga Sasaran dibebankan kepada Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara ( APBN)

**KELIMA** : Hal-hal yang belum diatur dalam Keputusan ini sepanjang mengenai teknis pelaksanaannya akan diatur kemudian dan merupakan bagian yang tidak terpisahkan.

**KEENAM** : Keputusan ini mulai berlaku sejak tanggal ditetapkan

**PETIKAN** : disampaikan kepada masing-masing yang berkepentingan untuk diketahui dan dilaksanakan sebagaimana mestinya.

Ditetapkan di : C I A N J U R

Pada Tanggal : 7 Juli 2008

KEPALA DINAS SOSIAL TENAGA KERJA

KEPENDULUKAN DAN CATATAN SIPIL

KABUPATEN CIANJUR



**DRS. H. M. RUSLI HARTONO MM**

NIP. 010 081 190

TAMBUSAN Keputusan ini disampaikan kepada Yth :

1. Departemen Sosial Republik Indonesia di Jakarta
2. Gubernur Jawa Barat di Bandung
3. Kepala Bagian Hukum Sekretaris Daerah Kabupaten Cianjur

## APPENDIX 8

Decree of the Demak Bupati No. 420/369/2007 on the Coordination and Implementing Team for the Fuel Subsidy Reduction Compensation Program (PKPS BBM), Kabupaten Demak, 2007 Budget Year



**KEPUTUSAN BUPATI DEMAK  
NOMOR : 420 / /2007**

**TENTANG**

**PEMBENTUKAN TIM KOORDINASI DAN TIM PELAKSANA  
PROGRAM KOMPENSASI PENGURANGAN SUBSIDI  
BAHAN BAKAR MINYAK (PKPS BBM)  
KABUPATEN DEMAK TAHUN ANGGARAN 2007**

**BUPATI DEMAK**

- Mengingat :**
- a. bahwa dalam rangka meringankan beban masyarakat miskin terhadap pelayanan Bidang Pendidikan, Kesehatan, Kesejahteraan Sosial, Perikanan, dan Non Keuangan / Koperasi. Pemerintah menyelenggarakan Program Kompensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan Bakar Minyak (PKPS-BBM) melalui sumber pembiayaan dari APBN yang dilaksanakan oleh Dinas teknis dengan melibatkan instansi terkait ;
  - b. bahwa untuk tindak lanjut program dimaksud, perlu dibentuk Tim Koordinasi dan Tim Pelaksana Program Kompensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan Bakar Minyak (PKPS-BBM) Kabupaten, guna mensinergikan sistem sosialisasi, pelaksanaan, monitoring dan pelaporannya;
  - c. bahwa untuk maksud tersebut huruf a dan b, perlu ditetapkan dengan Keputusan Bupati
- Mengingat :**
1. Undang- undang Nomor 13 Tahun 1950 tentang pembentukan Daerah – daerah Kabupaten dalam lingkungan Provinsi Jawa Tengah.
  2. Undang-undang Nomor 17 Tahun 2003 tentang Keuangan Negara;
  3. Undang-undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2004 tentang Perbendaharaan Negara ;
  4. Undang- undang Nomor 10 Tahun 2004 tentang Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang-undangan;
  5. Undang- undang Nomor 15 Tahun 2004 tentang Pemeriksaan, Pengelola dan Tanggung Jawab Keuangan Negara;
  6. Undang- undang Nomor 32 Tahun 2004 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah;

7. Undang-undang Nomor 33 Tahun 2004 tentang Perimbangan keuangan antar Pemerintah Pusat dan Pemerintahan Daerah;
8. Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 16 Tahun 1976 tentang Perluasan Kotamadya Daerah Tingkat II Semarang ;
9. Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 79 Tahun 2004 tentang Pedoman Pembinaan dan Pengawasan Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan Daerah ;
10. Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 58 Tahun 2005 tentang Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah ;
11. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 22 Tahun 2005 tentang Bahan Bakar Minyak ( BBM ) ;
12. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 8 Tahun 2006 tentang Perubahan Keempat atas Keputusan Presiden Nomor 80 Tahun 2003 tentang Pedoman Pelaksanaan Pengadaan Barang / Jasa Pemerintah .
13. Instruksi Presiden Nomor 3 Tahun 1993 tentang Peningkatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan ;
14. Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor 13 Tahun 2006 tentang Pedoman Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah .
15. Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor 26 Tahun 2006 tentang Pedoman Penyusunan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah Tahun 2007 :
16. Peraturan Menteri Negara Koperasi dan Usaha Kecil dan Menengah Republik Indonesia Nomor 13/Per/M.KUKMIX/2005 tentang Petunjuk Teknis Program Perkuatan Koperasi Jasa Keuangan Syariah/unit Jasa Keuangan Syariah Untuk Pemberdayaan Usaha mikro ;
17. Keputusan Menteri Sosial Nomor 01/PRS-1/KPTS/2005 tanggal 11 April 2005 tentang Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Subsidi Tambahan Biaya Permakanan ;
18. Keputusan Menteri Kesehatan Republik Indonesia Nomor 33.2/MENKES/SK/2006 tentang Penyelenggaraan Program Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan Bagi Masyarakat Miskin Tahun 2006 ;
19. Keputusan Kepala Kantor Wilayah Departemen Agama Propinsi Jawa tengah nomor KW.11.4/3/PP.006/766/2007 tanggal 26 Januari 2007 .



- Mempertahikan** : 1. Surat Direktur Jenderal manajemen Pendidikan Dasar dan menengah Departemen Pendidikan Nasional Nomor 435/C.C3/OT/2006 Tanggal 18 Januari 2006 tentang Pembentukan Tim PKPS BBM Bidang Pendidikan Tahun 2006 ;
2. Keputusan Gubernur Jawa tengah Nomor 425/05/1/2007 tanggal 5 Januari 2007 tentang Pembentukan Tim PKPS-BBM Bidang pendidikan Provinsi Jawa Tengah.

#### MEMUTUSKAN

- Menetapkan** :
- KESATU** : Membentuk Tim Koordinasi Program Kompensasi Pengurangan Suosidi Bahan Bakar Minyak (PKPS-BBM) Kabupaten Demak Tahun Anggaran 2007 sebagaimana tersebut dalam lampiran I Keputusan ini ;
- KEDUA** : Membentuk Tim Pelaksana Program Kompensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan Bakar Minyak (PKPS-BBM) Kabupaten Demak Tahun Anggaran 2007, untuk Bidang Pendidikan, Kesehatan, Kesejahteraan Sosial, Perikanan, dan Non Keuangan/Koperasi sebagaimana tersebut dalam lampiran II, III, IV, V, VI, dan VII Keputusan ini ;
- KETIGA** Tim Koordinasi sebagaimana dimaksud Diktum PERTAMA mempunyai Tugas sebagai berikut :
- a. Mensosialisasikan Program Kompensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan Bakar Minyak (PKPS-BBM) Bidang Pendidikan, Kesehatan, Kesejahteraan Sosial, Perikanan, dan Non Keuangan/Koperasi Tingkat Kabupaten Demak;
  - b. Memberikan dukungan atas kelancaran koordinasi, pelaksanaan dan pengendalian Program Kompensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan Bakar Minyak (PKPS-BBM) di wilayah Kabupaten Demak ;
  - c. Melakukan monitoring pelaksanaannya dan melaporkan hasilnya secara periodik kepada Bupati, Gubernur dan Menteri serta Pejabat Dinas/Instansi terkait ;
  - d. Memberi arahan kepada Tim Pelaksana Program Kompensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan Bakar Minyak (PKPS - BBM) Kabupaten Demak.
- KEEMPAT** Tugas Tim Pelaksana sebagaimana dimaksud Diktum KEDUA mempunyai Tugas sebagai berikut :
- a. Menyelenggarakan Program Kompensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan Bakar Minyak (PKPS-BBM) sesuai dengan masing-masing bidang termasuk melakukan koordinasi dengan instansi terkait ;

- b. Melaksanakan tugas operasional dalam perencanaan, pelaksanaan, pemantauan, pengendalian dan evaluasi program masing-masing bidang ;
- c. Masing-masing bidang menyusun laporan penyelenggaraan PKPS-BBM secara periodik kepada Tim Koordinasi Kabupaten

**KELUWA** : Segala biaya yang timbul sebagai akibat diterbitkannya Keputusan ini dibebankan pada Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara ( APBN ) dan Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Daerah (APBD) Kabupaten Demak ;

**KELUWAW** : Pada saat berlakunya Keputusan ini maka Keputusan Bupati Demak Nomor 420/369/2006 tanggal 29 Mei 2006 tentang Pembentukan Tim Koordinasi dan Tim Pelaksana Program Kompensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan Bakar Minyak (PKPS-BBM) Kabupaten Demak Tahun Anggaran 2006 dicabut dan dinyatakan tidak berlaku.

**KETUJUH** : Keputusan ini mulai berlaku pada tanggal ditetapkan.

Ditetapkan di Demak  
pada tanggal : 5 MARET '07

BUPATI DEMAK

  
TAFTA ZANI

**TEMBUSAN** : Keputusan ini disampaikan kepada Yth :

- 1 Menteri Kesra Republik Indonesia ;
- 2 Menteri Dalam Negeri Republik Indonesia ;
- 3 Menteri Pekerjaan Umum Republik Indonesia ;
- 4 Menteri Pendidikan Nasional Republik Indonesia ;
- 5 Menteri Agama Republik Indonesia ;
- 6 Menteri Kesehatan Republik Indonesia ;
- 7 Menteri Sosial Republik Indonesia ;
- 8 Menteri Negara Percepatan Pembangunan Daerah Tertinggal Republik Indonesia ;
- 9 Menteri Keuangan Republik Indonesia ;
- 10 Kepala Bappenas Republik Indonesia ;
- 11 Gubernur Jawa Tengah ;
- 12 Kepala Dinas Kirtaru Prop. Jateng ;
- 13 Kepala Dinas Pendidikan Prop. Jateng ;
- 14 Kepala Kahwil Depag Prop. Jateng ;
- 15 Kepala Kesejahteraan Sosial prop. Jateng ;
- 16 Kepala BAPPEDA Prop. Jateng ;
- 17 KETUA DPRD Kabupaten Demak ;
- 18 Kepala Badan/Dinas/Kantor/Bagian terkait di lingkungan Pemerintah Kab. Demak ;
- 19 Tim Koordinasi PKPS BBM Kabupaten Demak ;
- 20 Tim yang bersangkutan
- 21 Penitip

LAMPIRAN I : KEPUTUSAN BUPATI DEMAK  
NOMOR : 420/62/'07  
TANGAL : 5 MARET '07

**SUSUNAN KEANGGOTAAN TIM KOORDINASI  
PROGRAM KOMPENSASI PENGURANGAN SUBSIDI  
BAHAN BAKAR MINYAK ( PKPS-BBM )  
KABUPATEN DEMAK TAHUN ANGGARAN 2007**

No	KEDUDUKAN DALAM TIM	JABATAN DINAS
■	<b>PELINDUNG</b>	BUPATI DEMAK
■	<b>PENGARAH</b>	WAKIL BUPATI DEMAK
■	<b>KETUA</b>	KEPALA BAPPEDA KABUPATEN DEMAK
■	<b>WAKIL KETUA</b>	ASSISTEN EKONOMI DAN PEMBANGUNAN SEKDA KABUPATEN DEMAK
■	<b>SEKRETARIS</b>	KEPALA BIDANG PEMERINTAHAN DAN SOSIAL BUDAYA BAPPEDA KABUPATEN DEMAK
■	<b>ANGGOTA</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• KEPALA DINAS PENDIDIKAN KABUPATEN DEMAK</li><li>• KEPALA DINAS KESEHATAN KABUPATEN DEMAK</li><li>• KEPALA DINAS KESEJAHTERAAN SOSIAL KABUPATEN DEMAK</li><li>• KEPALA DINAS PERMUKIMAN DAN PRASARANA WILAYAH KABUPATEN DEMAK</li><li>• KEPALA BADAN PENGELOLAAN KEUANGAN DAN KEKAYAAN DAERAH KABUPATEN DEMAK</li><li>• KEPALA KANTOR DEPARTEMEN AGAMA KABUPATEN DEMAK</li><li>• KEPALA KANTOR PEMBERDAYAAN MASYARAKAT KABUPATEN DEMAK</li><li>• KEPALA KANTOR KOPERASI DAN PEMBINAAN UKM KABUPATEN DEMAK</li><li>• KEPALA KANTOR KELAUTAN DAN PERIKANAN KABUPATEN DEMAK</li><li>• KEPALA BAGIAN KESEJAHTERAAN RAKYAT SETDA KABUPATEN DEMAK</li><li>• KEPALA BAGIAN PEREKONOMIAN SETDA KABUPATEN DEMAK</li></ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• KEPALA BAGIAN HUKUM DAN PERUNDANG-UNDANGAN SETDA KABUPATEN DEMAK</li><li>• KEPALA BAGIAN PENGENDALIAN PEMBANGUNAN SETDA KABUPATEN DEMAK</li><li>• KEPALA BIDANG PRASARANA WILAYAH BAPPEDA KABUPATEN DEMAK</li><li>• KEPALA BIDANG EKONOMI DAN PENGEMBANGAN DUNIA USAHA BAPPEDA KABUPATEN DEMAK</li><li>• BKKBN KABUPATEN DEMAK</li><li>• DIREKTUR RUMAH SAKIT SUNAN KALIJAGA KABUPATEN DEMAK</li><li>• CAMAT SETEMPAT .</li></ul>
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BUPATI DEMAK

  
TAFTA ZANI



## APPENDIX 9

### Decree of the Head of the Social Affairs Office Number 326, 2008 on the Formation of the BLT-RTS Program Implementing Unit in Kabupaten Bima, 2008 Budget Year



#### KEPUTUSAN KEPALA DINAS SOSIAL

NOMOR 326 TAHUN 2008 M / 1429 H

#### TENTANG PEMBENTUKAN UNIT PELAKSANA PROGRAM BLT-RTS KABUPATEN BIMA TAHUN ANGGARAN 2008

#### KEPALA DINAS SOSIAL

- Membaca : a. Instruksi Presiden Nomor 3 Tahun 2008 tentang Pelaksanaan Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai untuk Rumah Tangga Sasaran ( BLT-RTS ).  
b. Surat Sekretaris Jenderal Departemen Sosial RI Nomor: 01/BLT-RTS/VI/2008 perihal Tindak Lanjut Rakomas Program BLT.
- Menimbang : a. bahwa untuk kelancaran pelaksanaan Kegiatan Penyaluran BLT di masing-masing wilayah, dipandang perlu membentuk Unit Pelaksana Program BLT Tingkat Kabupaten Bima;  
b. bahwa Nama-nama yang tercantum pada lampiran keputusan ini dianggap mampu dan memenuhi syarat untuk duduk sebagai Unit Pelaksana Program BLT Tingkat Kabupaten Bima.
- Mengingat : 1. Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1974 tentang Ketentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Kesejahteraan Sosial ( Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1974 Nomor 53, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 3039 );  
2. Undang-Undang Nomor 17 tahun 2003 tentang Keuangan Negara;  
3. Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2004 tentang Perbendaharaan Negara ; ( Lembaran Negara Tahun 2004 Nomor 4 Tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 4355 );  
4. Undang-Undang Nomor 15 Tahun 2004 tentang sistem Pemeriksaan Pengelolaan dan Tanggung Jawab Keuangan Negara;  
5. Undang – Undang Nomor 32 Tahun 2004 Pemerintahan Daerah ( Lembaran Negara Tahun 2004 Nomor 125, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 4437 ); sebagaimana telah diubah dengan Undang – Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 2005 tentang Penetapan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang – Undang Nomor 3 Tahun 2005 tentang Perubahan atas Undang – Undang Nomor 32 Tahun 2004 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah menjadi Undang – Undang ( Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2005 Nomor 10, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 4548 );  
6. Keputusan Presiden RI Nomor 72 Tahun 2004 tentang perubahan atas Kepres RI Nomor 42 Tahun 2002 tentang Pelaksanaan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara.  
7. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 8 Tahun 2006 tentang Perubahan keempat atas Keputusan Presiden Nomor 80 Tahun 2003 tentang Pedoman Pengadaan Barang dan Jasa Instansi Pemerintah;  
8. Instruksi Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 3 Tahun 2008 tentang Pelaksanaan Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai untuk Rumah Tangga Sasaran;  
9. Peraturan Menteri Sosial Republik Indonesia Nomor 82 / HUK / 2005 tentang Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Departemen Sosial Republik Indonesia;  
10. Peraturan Menteri Keuangan Republik Indonesia Nomor 59/ KMK.06/2005 tentang Sistem Akuntansi dan Laporan Pemerintah Pusat;  
11. Peraturan Menteri Keuangan Republik Indonesia Nomor 134/PMK.06/2005 tentang Pedoman Pembayaran Dalam Pelaksanaan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara;  
12. Peraturan Direktur Jenderal Perbendaharaan Nomor PER-66/PB/2005 tentang Mekanisme Pelaksanaan Pembayaran Atas Beban Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara;  
13. Peraturan Direktur Jenderal Perbendaharaan Nomor PER-16/PB/2008 tentang Petunjuk Pencairan Dana Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai Untuk Rumah Tangga Sasaran Tahun Anggaran 2008;  
14. Surat Perjajian Kerjasama antara Departemen Sosial Republik Indonesia dengan Bank Rakyat Indonesia dan PT. Pos Indonesia Nomor 417/SJ-KEU/VI/2008, Nomor B.250-DIR/HBL/05/2008 dan Nomor PKS. 42/Dirut/0508 tentang Pelaksanaan Penyaluran BLT untuk RTs.

## MEMUTUSKAN

- Menetapkan :
- PERTAMA** : Membentuk Tim Unit Pelaksana Program BLT-RTS Tingkat Kabupaten Bima Tahun Anggaran 2008, dengan susunan Personil sebagaimana tercantum dalam Lampiran Keputusan ini.
- KEDUA** : Tugas dan tanggung jawab Unit Pelaksana Program BLT Tahun 2008 adalah :
1. Melaksanakan Rapat berkala pembahasan proses penyaluran Kartu dan Pencairan Dana oleh Rumah Tangga Sasaran ( RTS )
  2. Melakukan Koordinasi dengan Instansi terkait dan Institusi kelembagaan masyarakat melalui rembuk dusun/kampung/desa dalam kerangka Penggantian Kartu yang dinyatakan tidak berhak sebagai RTS-BLT Tahun 2008.
  3. Membuat laporan tertulis secara berjenjang tentang permasalahan dan penanganan masalah yang berkaitan dengan penyaluran Bantuan Langsung Tunai.
- KETIGA** : Segala biaya yang timbul akibat dikeluarkannya keputusan ini dibebankan pada DIPA Sekretariat Jenderal Departemen Sosial Republik Indonesia Tahun Anggaran 2008 Nomor: 0332.0/069-03.0/2008.
- KEEMPAT** : Keputusan ini mulai berlaku pada tanggal ditetapkan dengan ketentuan apabila dikemudian hari terdapat kekeliruan dalam penetapan ini akan diadakan perbaikan sebagaimana mestinya.

DITETAPKAN DI : RABA – BIMA,  
RABA TANGGAL : 23 Juni 2008  
20 Jumadil Akhir 1429 H



- Tembusan** : di Sampaikan dengan hormat kepada :
1. Menteri Sosial RI di Jakarta (sebagai laporan );
  2. Gubernur Nusa Tenggara Barat di Mataram
  3. Bupati Bima di Raba-Bima;
  4. Kepala Dinas Kesejahteraan Sosial dan PP Prop. NTB di Mataram;
  5. Kepala Bappeda Kab. Bima di Raba-Bima;
  6. Dirut PT. Pos Indonesia Cabang Bima di Raba-Bima;
  7. Kepala BPS Kabupaten Bima di Raba-Bima;
  8. Kepala Dinas Perhubungan Komunikasi dan Informatika Kab. Bima di Raba-Bima;
  9. Kepala Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa Kab. Bima di Raba-Bima;
  10. Yang bersangkutan untuk diketahui dan dilaksanakan.

Lampiran : Surat Keputusan Kepala Dinas Sosial Kabupaten Bima  
 Nomor : 326 Tahun 2008  
 Tanggal : 23 Juni Tahun 2008 M / 1429 H  
 Tentang : Susunan Tim Unit Pelaksana Program BLT- RTS Tingkat Kabupaten Bima Tahun 2008.

NO.	NAMA	JABATAN DALAM UPP BLT- RTS	KETERANGAN
1.	H. Muhammad Qurban, SH <i>Dun</i>	Ketua	SPJ 6/6 <i>(Dun)</i> ✓
2.	Drs. Muhammad <i>Dinas Sofid</i>	Sekretaris	<i>Agot</i> ✓
3.	Drs. H. Masykur H.MS <i>DPMBS</i>	Anggota	<i>Mjnt</i> ✓
4.	Amar Ma'ruf, SH <i>Bggp</i>	Anggota	<i>Iep</i> ✓
5.	Nurdin, S. Sos <i>Infokan /</i>	Anggota	<i>Obir</i> ✓
6.	Drs. Nashrul Wajdi <i>BPS</i>	Anggota	
7.	Drs. H. M.Rafidin Ibrahim Roy <i>gini</i>	Anggota	
8.	M. Natsir, SH <i>Senel</i>	Anggota	
9.	Drs. Jaharuddin <i>Dinas Sos</i>	Sekretariat	
10.	Noor Hidayat, SE <i>Dun Sand</i>	Sekretariat	
11.	Drs. M. Amin <i>Dun</i>	Sekretariat	
12.	Rukmini <i>Dun</i>	Sekretariat	

  
 Kepala Dinas Sosial Kab. Bima  
**H. MUHAMMAD QURBAN, SH**  
 NIP. 610010950



## APPENDIX 10

### Decree of the Head of Social Affairs Office Number 327, 2008 on the Formation of Coordination Meeting Committee for the Direct Cash Transfer Program for Targeted Households at the Kabupaten Bima Level, 2008 Budget Year

#### PEMERINTAH KABUPATEN BIMA DINAS SOSIAL

Jalan Garuda No. 2 Telp. (0374) 43229 Fax (0374) 43666 Kota Bima

KEPUTUSAN KEPALA DINAS SOSIAL

NOMOR : 327 TAHUN 2008 M / 1429 H

#### TENTANG PEMBENTUKAN PANITIA RAPAT KOORDINASI BANTUAN LANGSUNG TUNAI RUMAH TANGGA SASARAN TINGKAT KABUPATEN BIMA TAHUN ANGGARAN 2008

KEPALA DINAS SOSIAL,

- Menimbang : a. bahwa untuk kelancaran pelaksanaan Kegiatan Rapat Koordinasi Bantuan Langsung Tunai Rumah Tangga Sasaran ( BLT-RTS ) Tingkat Kabupaten Bima Tahun Anggaran 2008, dipandang perlu untuk membentuk Panitia Pelaksana;
- b. bahwa Pembentukan Panitia Rapat Koordinasi sebagaimana dimaksud huruf a diatas, perlu ditetapkan dengan Keputusan Kepala Dinas Sosial Kabupaten Bima;
- Mengingat : 1. Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1974 tentang Ketentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Kesejahteraan Sosial ( Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1974 Nomor 53, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 3039 );
2. Undang-Undang Nomor 17 tahun 2003 tentang Keuangan Negara;
3. Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2004 tentang Perbendaharaan Negara ; ( Lembaran Negara Tahun 2004 Nomor 4 Tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 4355 );
4. Undang-Undang Nomor 15 Tahun 2004 tentang sistem Pemeriksaan Pengelolaan dan Tanggung Jawab Keuangan Negara;
5. Peraturan Presiden Nomor 8 Tahun 2006 tentang Perubahan keempat atas Keputusan Presiden Nomor 80 Tahun 2003 tentang Pedoman Pengadaan Barang dan Jasa Instansi Pemerintah;
6. Instruksi Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 3 Tahun 2008 tentang Pelaksanaan Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai untuk Rumah Tangga Sasaran;
7. Peraturan Menteri Sosial Republik Indonesia Nomor 82 / HUK / 2005 tentang Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Departemen Sosial Republik Indonesia;
8. Peraturan Menteri Keuangan Republik Indonesia Nomor 59/ KMK.06/2005 tentang Sistem Akuntansi dan Laporan Pemerintah Pusat;
9. Peraturan Menteri Keuangan Republik Indonesia Nomor 134/PMK.06/2005 tentang Pedoman Pembayaran Dalam Pelaksanaan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara;
10. Peraturan Direktur Jenderal Perbendaharaan Nomor PER-66/PB/2005 tentang Mekanisme Pelaksanaan Pembayaran Atas Beban Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara;
11. Peraturan Direktur Jenderal Perbendaharaan Nomor PER-16/PB/2008 tentang Petunjuk Pencairan Dana Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai Untuk Rumah Tangga Sasaran Tahun Anggaran 2008;
12. Surat Perjajian Kerjasama antara Departemen Sosial Republik Indonesia dengan Bank Rakyat Indonesia dan PT. Pos Indonesia Nomor 417/SJ-KEU/V/2008, Nomor B.250-DIR/HBL/05/2008 dan Nomor PKS. 42/Dirut/0508 tentang Pelaksanaan Penyaluran BLT untuk RTS;

## MEMUTUSKAN

Menetapkan :

- PERTAMA** : Membentuk Panitia Pelaksana Kegiatan Rapat Koordinasi BLT-RTS Tingkat Kabupaten Bima Tahun Anggaran 2008, dengan susunan Panitia sebagaimana tercantum dalam Lampiran Keputusan ini.
- KEDUA** : Panitia yang dibentuk sebagaimana dimaksud diktum PERTAMA bertugas :
1. Melaksanakan Pengarahan Kegiatan Rapat Koordinasi berdasarkan Peraturan yang berlaku;
  2. Menyiapkan dan melaksanakan administrasi kegiatan dilapangan;
  3. Melaksanakan Bimbingan BLT-RTS terhadap Peserta Kegiatan
  4. Menyiapkan teknis operasional untuk kelancaran pelaksanaan Rapat Koordinasi BLT-RTS;
  5. Melaporkan dan mempertanggung jawabkan pelaksanaan tugas kegiatan kepada Kepala Dinas Sosial Kabupaten Bima.
- KETIGA** : Segala biaya yang timbul akibat dikeluarkannya keputusan ini dibebankan pada Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Negara melalui DIPA Sekretariat Jenderal Departemen Sosial Republik Indonesia Tahun Anggaran 2008.
- KEEMPAT** : Keputusan ini mulai berlaku pada tanggal ditetapkan dengan ketentuan apabila dikemudian hari terdapat kekeliruan dalam penetapan ini akan diadakan perbaikan sebagaimana mestinya.

DITETAPKAN DI : RABA – BIMA,

PADA TANGGAL : 23 Juni 2008

20 Jumadill Akhir 1429 H



**Tembusan** : di Sampaikan dengan hormat kepada :

1. Menteri Sosial RI di Jakarta (sebagai laporan );
2. Gubernur Nusa Tenggara Barat di Mataram;
3. Bupati Bima di Raba-Bima;
4. Kepala Dinas Kesejahteraan Sosial dan PP Prop. NTB di Mataram;
5. Kepala Bappeda Kab. Bima di Raba-Bima;
6. Dirut PT. Pos Indonesia Cabang Bima di Raba-Bima;
7. Kepala BPS Kabupaten Bima di Raba-Bima;
8. Kepala Dinas Perhubungan Komunikasi dan Informatika Kab. Bima di Raba-Bima;
9. Kepala Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa Kab. Bima di Raba-Bima;

Lampiran : Surat Keputusan Kepala Dinas Sosial Kab. Bima  
Nomor : 327 Tahun 2008  
Tanggal : 23 Juni Tahun 2008 M / 1429 H

**SUSUNAN PANITIA, PENGARAH, DAN NARASUMBER PELAKSANAAN RAPAT KOORDINASI  
BANTUAN LANGSUNG TUNAI RUMAH TANGGA SASARAN ( BLT- RTS )  
TINGKAT KABUPATEN BIMA TAHUN ANGGARAN 2008**

NO.	JABATAN DALAM DINAS/INSTANSI	JABATAN DALAM TIM	KETERANGAN
1.	Bupati Bima	Pengarah	
2.	Kabid. Perenc. Pembangunan Sosial dan Budaya	Narasumber	
3.	Kepala PT. Pos Indonesia Cabang Bima	Narasumber	
4.	Kepala BPS Kab. Bima	Narasumber	
5.	Kabid. BJS Dinsos Kab Bima	Ketua Panitia	
6.	Kasubag Prog dan Laporan	Anggota	
7.	Kasubag Keuangan	Anggota	
8.	Kasi PSFM	Anggota	
9.	Bendahara Pengeluaran	Anggota	

  
Kepala Dinas Sosial Kab. Bima  
**H. MUHAMMAD QURBAN, SH**  
NIP. 610010950

## APPENDIX 11

### Decision of the BLT-RTS Coordination Meeting, Kabupaten Bima, 2008

#### KESEPAKATAN RAPAT KOORDINASI BLT- RTS 2008

1. RTS YANG MENINGGAL DUNIA PENGGANTINYA HARUS DARI TEMPAT YANG SAMA DAN DITETAPKAN MELALUI REMBUG DESA
2. KEPALA DESA YG MENGEMBALIKAN DATA VERIFIKASI UTK PENCAIRAN DANA BLT
3. TIDAK BISA DIWAKILKAN UNTUK MENGAMBIL BLT
4. KHUSUS BAGI PENERIMA BLT YANG TIDAK BISA JALAN/ TIDAK ADA YANG MENGANTAR PT POS AKAN MENGANTAR LANGSUNG
5. JIKA TIDAK MEMPUNYAI KTP BISA MENGGUNAKAN KETERANGAN DOMISILI
6. PENERIMA BLT YANG PINDAH KOTA / PROPINSI TIDAK BISA MENERIMA BLT.
7. PENERIMA BLT YANG PINDAH PERMANEN DAPAT DICARIKAN GANTINYA ATAU UANGNYA DIKEMBALIKAN KE KAS NEGARA.
8. WAKTU PENCAIRAN DANA BLT TERGANTUNG DATA VERIFIKASI YANG DIKEMBALIKAN OLEH KADES.
9. UNTUK KECAMATAN SOROMANDI KHUSUS DESA SAI DAN SAMPUNGU PEMBAYARAN BLT DILAKUKAN DI DESA SAL.
10. UNTUK KECAMATAN DONGGO KHUSUS DESA BUMIPAJO, RORA DAN PALAMA PEMBAYARAN BLT DILAKUKAN DI DESA RORA.
11. UNTUK KECAMATAN PARADO PEMBAYARAN BLT DILAKUKAN DI KANTOR CAMAT.

#### PERWAKILAN PESERTA:

1. DINAS SOSIAL KAB. BIMA  
( H. MUHAMMAD QURBAN SH)
2. PT. POS KAB. BIMA  
( KADEK SUMARDANA)
3. BPS KAB. BIMA  
( RUSDY MUHAMMAD, S. Si)
4. BAPPEDA KAB. BIMA  
( DRS. H. ISHAK JON MD)
5. CAMAT SAPE  
( SYAFRUDDIN DAUD S. Sos)



1. \_\_\_\_\_
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_
4. \_\_\_\_\_
5. \_\_\_\_\_



## APPENDIX 12

### Decision of the Ternate Walikota Number 151, 2008 on the Formation of a Coordination Team for the Direct Cash Transfer for Targeted Households Program Implementing Unit (UPP BLT-RTS) Kota Ternate



## WALIKOTA TERNATE

### KEPUTUSAN WALIKOTA TERNATE NOMOR 151 TAHUN 2008

#### TENTANG

#### PEMBENTUKAN TIM KOORDINASI UNIT PELAKSANA PROGRAM BANTUAN LANGSUNG TUNAI-RUMAH TANGGA SASARAN (UPP BLT-RTS) KOTA TERNATE

#### WALIKOTA TERNATE,

- Menimbang :
- bahwa untuk kelancaran pelaksanaan program pemberian bantuan langsung tunai untuk rumah tangga sasaran dalam rangka kompensasi pengurangan subsidi bahan bakar minyak, maka dipandang perlu dibentuk Tim Koordinasi Unit Pelaksana Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai-Rumah Tangga Sasaran (UPP BLT-RTS) Kota Ternate;
  - bahwa berdasarkan pertimbangan sebagaimana dimaksud pada huruf a, perlu menetapkan Keputusan Walikota tentang Tim Koordinasi Unit Pelaksana Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai-Rumah Tangga Sasaran (UPP BLT-RTS) Kota Ternate
- Mengingat :
- Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1974 tentang Ketentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Kesejahteraan Sosial (Lembaran Negara Tahun 1974 Nomor 53, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 3039);
  - Undang-Undang Nomor 11 Tahun 1999 tentang Pembentukan Kotamadya Daerah Tingkat II Ternate (Lembaran Negara Tahun 1999 Nomor 45, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 3824);
  - Undang-Undang Nomor 17 Tahun 2003 tentang Keuangan Negara (Lembaran Negara Tahun 2003 Nomor 47, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 4286);
  - Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2004 tentang Perbendaharaan Negara (Lembaran Negara Tahun 2004 Nomor 5, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 4355);
  - Undang-Undang Nomor 10 Tahun 2004 tentang Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang-undangan (Lembaran Negara Tahun 2004 Nomor 53, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 4389);
  - Undang-Undang Nomor 32 Tahun 2004 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah (Lembaran Negara Tahun 2004 Nomor 125, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 4637) sebagaimana telah diubah dengan Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 2005 tentang Penetapan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Nomor 3 Tahun 2005 tentang Perubahan atas Undang-Undang Nomor 32 Tahun 2004 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah (Lembaran Negara Tahun 2005 Nomor 108, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 4548);
  - Undang-Undang Nomor 33 Tahun 2004 tentang Perimbangan Keuangan antara Pemerintah Pusat dan Pemerintahan Daerah (Lembaran Negara Tahun 2004 Nomor 126, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 4438);
  - Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 55 Tahun 2005 tentang Dana Perimbangan (Lembaran Negara Tahun 2005 Nomor 137, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 4575);
  - Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 58 Tahun 2005 tentang Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah (Lembaran Negara Tahun 2005 Nomor 140, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 4578);

10. Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor 13 Tahun 2005 tentang Pedoman Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah sebagaimana telah diubah dengan Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor 59 Tahun 2007;
11. Peraturan Menteri Sosial Nomor 32/HUK/2005 tentang Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Departemen Sosial.
12. Peraturan Daerah Kota Ternate Nomor 15 tahun 2007 tentang Organisasi Dinas-Dinas Daerah Kota Ternate (Lembaran Daerah Kota Ternate Tahun 2007 Nomor 15, Tambahan Lembaran Daerah Nomor 30).

- Memperhatikan :
1. Instruksi Presiden R.I Nomor 3 Tahun 2008 tentang Pelaksanaan Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai untuk Rumah Tangga Sasaran.
  2. Surat Kepala Dinas Sosial Provinsi Maluku Utara Nomor 005/255/DS.I/VII/2008 tanggal 1 Juli 2008 Perihal Rapat Koordinasi UPP BLT-RTS Kabupaten Kota.

**MEMUTUSKAN :**

- Menetapkan :
- PERTAMA** : Membentuk Tim Koordinasi Unit Pelaksana Program Bantuan Langsung Tunai Rumah Tangga Sasaran (UPP BLT-RTS) Kota Ternate dengan Susunan Keanggotaannya Sebagaimana tercantum dalam Lampiran Keputusan ini.
- KEDUA** : Tugas Tim sebagaimana dimaksud Diktum Pertama adalah melakukan koordinasi dan keterpaduan secara lebih intens, pengawasan dan melaksanakan evaluasi dalam pelaksanaan program dimaksud.
- KETIGA** : Segala biaya yang timbul sebagai akibat dikeluarkannya Keputusan ini dibebankan pada Anggaran Tugas Pembantuan Dinas Tenaga Kerja dan Sosial Kota Ternate yang dialokasikan oleh Departemen Sosial Tahun 2008.
- KEEMPAT** : Keputusan ini mulai berlaku pada tanggal ditetapkan.

Ditetapkan di Ternate  
pada tanggal 18 Juli 2008

WALIKOTA TERNATE,



Drs. H. SYAMSIR ANDILI

Tembusan, disampaikan kepada Yth :

1. Menteri Sosial R.I di Jakarta
2. Gubernur Maluku Utara di Ternate.
3. Ketua DFRD Kota Ternate di Ternate.
4. Kepala Dinas Sosial Provinsi di Ternate.
5. Inspektur Kota Ternate di Ternate
6. Kepala Dinas Pendapatan, Pengelolaan Keuangan dan Aset Daerah Kota Ternate di Ternate.
7. Yang bersangkutan untuk diketahui dan dilaksanakan sebagaimana mestinya.



LAMPIRAN : KEPUTUSAN WALIKOTA TERNATE  
NOMOR 151 TAHUN 2008  
TANGGAL 18 JULI 2008

DAFTAR : SUSUNAN KEANGGOTAAN TIM KOORDINASI UNIT PELAKSANA PROGRAM  
BANTUAN LANGSUNG TUNAI RUMAH TANGGA SASARAN (UPP BLT-RTS)  
KOTA TERNATE

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- Penanggung Jawab** : Walikota Ternate
- Ketua** : Kepala Dinas Tenaga Kerja dan Sosial Kota Ternate
- Sekretaris** : Sekretaris Dinas Tenaga Kerja dan Sosial Kota Ternate
- Anggota** :
1. Kepala Bappeda Kota Ternate
  2. Kepala BPS Kota Ternate
  3. Kepala Bagian Humas & Protokoler
  4. Kepala Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Kota Ternate
  5. Kabid. Bansos Dinas Tenaga Kerja dan Sosial Kota Ternate
  6. Kasie. Pemberdayaan Fakir Miskin dan Orsos Dinas Tenaga Kerja dan Sosial

WALIKOTA TERNATE,



Drs. H. SYAMSIR ANDILI

## APPENDIX 13

### Example of a Coupon from the Direct Cash Transfer Program

**PEMERINTAH REPUBLIK INDONESIA**  
**KUPON BANTUAN LANGSUNG TUNAI**  
**PROPINSI JAWA BARAT**

**NOMOR KIP** : 320310000400167S  
**N A M A** : MA IMI A  
**JUMLAH ART** : 1  
**ALAMAT** : KR MALADAMPIT RT 03/02 DUSUN DSN 2  
SIMPIANG RW 02 RT 03 Kel. SIMPIANG Kec  
PAGELARAN Kab/Kota GIANJUR

**KANTOR BAYAR** : PAGELARANCANJUR 43266

Tanda Tangan / Cap Jempol  
Pemegang Kartu

Menteri Keuangan  
Republik Indonesia  
*Sri Mulyani*  
**SRI MULYANI INDRAWATI**

3203100004001671  
Disobek dan dikirim  
ke KPRK **1**

Penerima Cap Pos Petugas

3203100004001672  
Disobek dan dikirim  
ke KPRK **2**

Penerima Cap Pos Petugas

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