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RESEARCH REPORT

Gendered Risks, Poverty, and Vulnerability: Case Study of the Raskin Food Subsidy Program in Indonesia

Sirojuddin Arif

Muhammad Syukri

Rebecca Holmes

(Overseas Development Institute)

Vita Febriany



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Vita Febriany

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Overseas Development Institute
111 Westminster Bridge Road
London SE1 7JD
UK

Tel: +44 (0)20 7922 0300 Fax: +44 (0)20 7922 0399
www.odi.org.uk

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ABSTRACT

Gendered Risks, Poverty, and Vulnerability Case Study of the Raskin Food Subsidy Program in Indonesia

Sirojuddin Arif, Muhammad Syukri, Rebecca Holmes, Vita Febrinay
Overseas Development Institute and SMERU Research Institute

This study investigates gender dimensions of risks and the extent to which such risks are addressed in Indonesia's social protection policy. It is structured around the following four areas: understanding the diversity of gendered economic and social risks; a gender analysis of social protection policy and design; effects of social protection on gender equality, food security and poverty/vulnerability reduction at the community, household and individual level; and implications for future policy and programming to improve social protection effectiveness. The study employs a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods, including desk review, key informant interviews, a household questionnaire, focus group discussion and life histories. Based on data collected in two research sites, Tapanuli Tengah of North Sumatra province and Timor Tengah Selatan of East Nusa Tenggara province, the study found that, despite its prevalence, attention to gender inequality has been minimal in social protection policy. This owes particularly to lack of awareness of and commitment to gender issues among policymakers. In food security in particular, gender insensitivity results fundamentally from program design, which does not take into account women's specific vulnerabilities in food access. The program has relatively equal impacts on men and women but has no significant impacts in relation to reducing specific risks and vulnerabilities facing women.

Keywords: Gender, social protection, risks, food insecurity, food subsidy, Indonesia

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
Bappenas	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National Development Planning Board)
BKKBN	National Family Planning Coordinating Board
BLPS	Social Empowerment Fund
BLT	unconditional cash transfer
BOS	School Operational Assistance
BPS	Statistics Indonesia
Bulog	Badan Urusan Logistik (Logistics Board)
CCT	conditional cash transfer
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CPRC	Chronic Poverty Research Centre
DPR	House of Representatives
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FGD	focus group discussion
GAPRI	Movement for Anti-Impoverishment for Indonesian People
GDI	Gender Development Index
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HH	Households
Jamkesmas	Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat (Health Insurance for the Poor program)
Jamsostek	Jaminan Sosial Tenaga Kerja (Social Insurance for Workers program)
ILO	International Labor Organization
INGO	international NGOs
KDP	Kecamatan Development Project
KUR	People's Business Credit
NGO	nongovernment organization
OPK	Special Market Program
P2DTK	Underdeveloped Area Development
P2KP	Urban Poverty Reduction Program
PISEW	Regional Infrastructure for Social and Economic
PKH	conditional cash transfer
PKK	Family Welfare Empowerment
PNPM	National Program of Community Empowerment
PPIP	Rural Infrastructure Development
Propenas	Program Pembangunan Nasional (National Development Plan)
PSA	Food Subsidy Program (Mozambique)
PUAP	Agricultural Enterprises Development
Raskin	Beras untuk Rumah Tangga Miskin (Rice for Poor Households)
SPP	revolving fund for poor women
Susenas	Survey Sosial-Ekonomi Nasional (National Economic Survey)
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization

GLOSSARY

<i>belis</i>	bride price in the marriage traditions among the Timor
<i>gotong royong</i>	mutual assistance
<i>kecamatan</i>	sub-district
<i>kelurahan</i>	village-level administrative area located in an urban center
<i>lurah</i>	head of the <i>kelurahan</i>

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study is part of a larger research project that involved a number of different countries in Africa (Ethiopia and Ghana), Latin America (Mexico and Peru), South Asia (Bangladesh and India) and Southeast Asia (Indonesia and Vietnam). All the research partners had the same goal of assessing the gender dimensions of social protection programming as well as its impacts on people's well-being. This report specifically examines the gendered dimensions and impacts of the Indonesian subsidized food program, Raskin (Rice for Poor Households), which have until now been under-researched.

Research was conducted in four research sites in two districts: Tapanuli Tengah and Timor Tengah Selatan. The research methodology involved a mixed methods approach of qualitative and quantitative work. This included a desk review, key informant interviews, a household questionnaire, focus group discussions (FGDs) and life histories. Conceptually, the study aimed to understand the importance of gendered social and economic risks, especially gender inequality, to support more effective social protection programming to address poverty, vulnerability and food insecurity.

The literature on economic and social vulnerabilities shows that limited employment opportunities and inadequate pay, among others, constitute major causes of economic vulnerability for Indonesian women. Women's employment opportunities are significantly fewer than those for male workers. This is partly a result of the country's national development strategy, which does not accommodate women's interests. Indonesia's transformation from agriculture to a mixed economy of agriculture and modern industry has put female workers in a marginal position. In the informal sector, where most female workers are concentrated, women often have to work in marginal sectors such as domestic work or in high-risk jobs like sex work. Furthermore, women receive lower wages. Pirmana (2006) noted that female workers received only 71.2% to 76.7% of the wages received by their male counterparts in 1999–2004. Women's lower position is much more apparent if we also take into account violations of female workers' rights in the labor market or the workplace.

In relation to food insecurity in particular, evidence indicates that, despite Indonesia's growth during the most recent food and financial crises, child malnutrition cases have been rising. Among these cases, 28% of children are underweight and more than 44% are stunted.

Gender inequality is also driven by social and cultural factors. In many instances, social inequality between men and women has further worsened inequality of access to economic resources. For instance, women's domestic responsibilities, which are one of the most common social risks facing women, often hinder them from active participation in the labor market. Meanwhile, discriminatory practices against women, such as inheritance systems that give land ownership only to men or prioritization of boys over girls in education, may also contribute to the lower position of women. Another risk lies in women's lack of access to decision making at state, community and household level. Even on issues closely related to women's interests, like health and child delivery, it is often men who make the final decision. Last but not least, many traditional views on gender relations and women in particular, which often prioritize men over women, remain in place and affect public attitudes towards women. In the workplace, for instance, a number of labels, to some degree derived from cultural views on women, have negative effects on women's position or wages. Some women also suffer from domestic violence and sexual abuse.

Out of these two types of risks, namely, economic and social risks, people are more cognisant of the former. As such, most coping strategies are taken to tackle problems considered economic. In Tapanuli Tengah, taking loans from local stalls or relatives or neighbors and undertaking additional paid jobs are the main coping strategies for the poor. Poor people in Timor Tengah Selatan have more options, ranging from undertaking more paid jobs, to sale of assets, to relying on government assistance.

Unfortunately, policymakers have also neglected social risks. Understandings of social risks, and of gender inequality in particular, have not been effectively integrated into social protection policy and programming in Indonesia. Social protection policy has been very much influenced by the devastating effects of the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98. Most of the efforts made to develop social protection policy since then have focused on the provision of social assistance, such as food subsidies, cash transfers, school assistance and health insurance for the poor. Some promotional measures, such as community development, have brought attention to the lack of employment opportunities. Nevertheless, policy has generally been shaped by the idea of mitigating the adverse impacts of economic shocks. Transformation of unequal social relations that may hinder people's movement out of poverty, including gender inequality, has not been adequately included. However, there are some important exceptions, such as the education stipend for girls, women's participation in community-led social protection activities and the recent conditional cash transfer (PKH), which integrates gender considerations to some extent by targeting mothers or adult women in the family and pregnant women and those with children under 15 years, and also including antenatal and reproductive health care among the conditions with which program beneficiaries need to comply.

Despite a number of laws that strongly encourage gender equality, as well as ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) by the government in 1984 and Presidential Instruction 9/2000 on gender mainstreaming, lack of awareness of and commitment to gender equality is apparent among policymakers. Interviews with key informants indicated that this results primarily from the influence of cultural norms or practices that belittle the role of women. A number of new laws to enhance gender equality are more or less ignored when they cross cultural practices, which are often taken for granted. Second, the role of women focal points, including the Ministry of Women's Empowerment, has been minimal in enforcing the integration of gender into social protection as well as government policy in general. This problem has been exacerbated by the fact that gender mainstreaming is not effective at local level. In spite of the central government's instruction to establish women's empowerment agencies at every sub-national level, it appears that gender mainstreaming is not given due importance at local level, and there is concern that local governments lack the capacity and priority to collect sex-disaggregated data.

In the case of the food subsidy in particular, the Raskin program has not taken into account women's specific vulnerabilities in terms of food insecurity. Evidence shows that, in Indonesia, women's specific interests in food security entail the problems of child and maternal under-nutrition. Such issues are not considered in the food subsidy program—malnutrition is generally handled regionally, with interventions concentrated in certain areas where the number of children with malnutrition is high. In practice, the fact that little attention has been given to gender dimensions has led to a lack of attention to the concerns of women or groups of women, such as widows or female heads of household. In the disbursement process, women's participation is minimal. Their role is limited to taking rice, not taking part in the decision-making process.

Regarding the gendered impacts of the program, the benefits of Raskin are shared by all members of the household, often with a larger part given to the children. Other indirect effects for children are noticed, for example increased investment in children's education as parents may save some money because of the cheaper price of Raskin rice. Our research found no gender discrimination in the allocation of Raskin rice and in expenditure on children's education: the benefits are shared equally between men and women, boys and girls. However, as gender needs may differ between men and women, it is also important to take these into account. In relation to food security in particular, women's roles and responsibilities in managing household food, as well as their specific vulnerability to food insecurity (e.g., during pregnancy), have important effects on child under-nutrition—problems that are not adequately considered by food subsidy programs like Raskin. Therefore, the fact that the benefits of Raskin are shared equally by men and women does not necessarily indicate positive impacts of the program in terms of gender equality.

However, a number of entry points exist to strengthen the gender sensitivity of the program's design and implementation, including promoting women's participation in program governance structures (community meetings), strengthening the focus on existing gendered vulnerabilities in terms of food insecurity and under-nutrition and especially drawing attention to lifecycle vulnerabilities (pregnancy and nursing, young children), as well as supporting linkages with ongoing gender mainstreaming tools such as collecting and analyzing sex-disaggregated data and gender budgeting to support gender-sensitive programming.

Just as important is the need to recognize the limitations of Raskin as an effective tool for food security. Evidence clearly demonstrates that women's vulnerability to poverty and food security needs to be addressed by measures such as securing women's employment opportunities, addressing wage disparities to increase incomes and supporting agricultural production. In this way, there is a need to think strategically about the links between food subsidy programs and other programs that may have greater opportunities to support progress towards women's empowerment.

I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

There is growing consensus among researchers that gender matters in poverty reduction. Gender inequality appears to influence not only the possibility of people becoming poor but also how men and women experience poverty. First, more women than men live in poverty: according to Cornwall et al. (cited in Holmes and Jones, 2009), women constitute 70% of the world's poor. Second, experiences of living in poverty vary between men and women, even within the same household. The widely accepted notion that resources are not shared equally among household members only confirms this, and in general women suffer more than men. Traditional divisions of labor often lead to women having to work longer hours, bearing the double burden of working and caring for other household members (Gondowarsito, 2002). This can be exacerbated in times of shock or crisis. Based on a longitudinal study that took place in Cirebon both before and after the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98, Breman and Wiradi (2004) found that women were more severely affected by crisis both economically and socially. Cross-country observation reveals that food crises often lead to women having to bear more of a burden, as they are usually the ones who have responsibility for food in the household (Holmes et al., 2009).

In line with this argument, gender analysis is needed in any poverty reduction program—including social protection—so as to ensure effectiveness in terms of achieving the stated objectives. Without a clear understanding of the gender differences of the issue at hand, it is difficult for programs to reach poor women and to address gender inequality. Gender-blind programs may end up with limited benefits for women, or even be counterproductive in terms of women's empowerment (Noerdin, 2006). A clear example is given by a number of government programs on women, such as Family Welfare Empowerment (PKK). Despite PKK's stated objective to empower women, a focus on improving women's capacities to handle domestic tasks meant that PKK did not acknowledge the specific problems facing rural women, and at the same time reinforced women's domestic responsibilities (Suryakusuma, 2004; Wieringa, 1992).

The importance of social protection programming in Indonesia increased significantly as a result of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis: the introduction of programs was a key policy response to the rising poverty and food insecurity levels caused by the crisis. Such programs have grown and been modified into a broader social protection package over the past decade (Appendix 1). Social protection policy in Indonesia covers a number of programs, geared mainly towards income security—and to some extent food security—for the poor, through targeted cash transfers, food subsidies and supporting households' investment in human capital through education scholarships and subsidies. There have been positive effects on poverty reduction, especially during the crisis (Sumarto et al., 2008), but gender sensitivity varies from one program to another. How far these social protection programs have really addressed gendered risks and vulnerabilities remains a big question, and so far little attention has been paid to answering it.

With a focus on social protection, this report investigates the gender dimensions and impacts of the Raskin (Rice for the Poor) subsidized food program and assesses the extent to which gender inequality has been addressed in the program's design and implementation. The gender aspect of the program has been under-researched, even though women have a significant role to play in maintaining household food security. Traditional gender rules define that it is women, not men, who bear the responsibility for cooking household food, for example.

1.2 Methodology

The research methodology involved a mixed methods approach of qualitative and quantitative work, structured around the following four areas:

1. Understanding the diversity of gendered economic and social risks;
2. Gender analysis of social protection policy and design;
3. Effects of the social protection program on gender equality, food security and poverty/vulnerability reduction at the community, household and intrahousehold level;
4. Implications for future policy and program design to improve social protection effectiveness.

Research was conducted in four research areas in two districts: Tapanuli Tengah and Timor Tengah Selatan. The former is located in the western part of the country, in North Sumatra province, and the latter is located in East Nusa Tenggara (Nusa Tenggara Timur) province, a poor region in the eastern part of Indonesia. There is evidence that the western part of Indonesia is generally more food secure than the eastern part (as well as benefiting more from economic development) (Table 1). As such, a comparison of cases from each region may generate a better understanding not only of issues related to food insecurity in the country but also how social protection (and food security programs in particular) has worked so far and may be adapted to different localities. The fieldwork was conducted in two villages in each district, drawing on a matched purposive sampling technique which considered their similarities in terms of poverty ranking in order to ensure their comparability.

Table 1. Research Areas in Brief

	Tapanuli Tengah	Timor Tengah Selatan
Poverty level ^a	24%	67%
Gender Development Index (GDI) ^b	58.4	38.1
GDI ranking ^b	135	334
Food insecurity ^c	Priority 3 (Scale 6)	Priority 1 (Scale 6)
Culture (as relevant to gender)	Patrilineal	Belis (marriage tradition)
Ethnic background	Batak	Timorese
Food security program (Raskin)	Yes	Yes
Conditional cash transfer (PKH) coverage	Yes	Yes
Rural/urban	Rural—semi-urban	Rural—semi-urban
Agro-ecological characteristics	Mountainous	Dry climate
Malnutrition rates (% children (<5) underweight ^c	35≤45	≥45

^aSuryahadi et al., 2005.

^bBPS et al., 2004.

^cFood Security Board Indonesia and WFP, 2005.

With regard to data collection, the study employed a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods (Table 2).

Table 2: Overview of Research Methodology

Methodology	Details
Desk review	Secondary data and program document analysis
Key informant interviews	National (policymakers, donors, international agencies, civil society, researchers); subnational (government and nongovernment implementers)
Household questionnaire	A total of 103 households
Focus group discussions	Eight FGDs with beneficiaries, four with females and four with males
Life histories	16 life histories (eight men and eight women) at different life/social stages: adolescence; married; single household heads (divorced, abandoned or widowed); elderly

The main objectives of the desk review were: to map key gender-specific vulnerabilities in the country; to identify how gender is (or is not) already discussed and integrated within the context of policies and programs at national level; to carry out a gender audit/mapping of the main programs and the extent to which they integrate gender considerations; and to contextualize Raskin within the country's broader national social protection framework and related policy debates.

Using semi-structured questionnaires, key informant interviews were carried out at the national level in October 2009 to provide a broader understanding of social protection design decision-making processes and to explore the political economy dimensions of the integration of gender into policies and programs. At subnational level, key informant interviews with implementing agencies aimed at generating a better understanding of the key challenges in implementing social protection at the local level, and the implications/impacts of these challenges on households and individuals.

During the household survey, program beneficiaries were asked to identify two main quantifiable trends: (i) the dominant vulnerabilities and risks among households below the poverty line and the extent to which these risks are gendered and generational; and (ii) household and individual coping strategies in the face of the above risks, including both informal and formal social protection mechanisms. FGDs were then used to tease out the details of the social protection effects – both direct and indirect – at the individual, household, and community levels.

Finally, the use of life histories (with beneficiaries who represented different life/social stages, from adolescence to old age) allowed for a more in-depth exploration of individuals' gendered experiences of risk and vulnerability, and the individual, household, community and policy factors that shape available coping/resilience strategies. They also provided insights into the relative importance of the Raskin program in diverse individuals' lives.

1.3 Report Overview

The report is structured as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the conceptual framework that underpins the analysis, highlighting the importance of understanding gendered economic and social risks at the individual, household and community levels. Chapter 3 maps out the patterning of gender-specific risks and vulnerabilities in the Indonesian context and Chapter 4 discusses the extent to which these are reflected in social protection policy and programming.

Chapter 5 discusses the Raskin program and the extent to which gender has been integrated into its design and implementation. Chapter 6 then turns to an analysis of our fieldwork findings on the effects of Raskin on gender dynamics at the individual, household and community levels. Chapter 7 explores the drivers of program impacts. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes and highlights key policy implications of our findings.

II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: GENDERED ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RISKS AND SOCIAL PROTECTION RESPONSES¹

This conceptual framework aims to identify sources of risk and vulnerability at individual, household and community levels which contribute to food insecurity and poverty, and to assess the extent to which social protection responses are sensitive to gender-specific risks and vulnerabilities.

2.1 Food Security

Food security exists when all people at all times have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Food security is achieved through three essential components: **availability, access** and **utilization** (preparation and consumption of food and the biological capacity of individuals to absorb and utilize nutrients in the food that they eat).

The concept of food security can be applied at various levels, from the global to the individual. Approaches often address the links between sustainable development, poverty reduction and the promotion of food security through policies and programs at the macro, meso and micro level. This can include: ensuring that agricultural trade is conducive to fostering food security for all through an open market-oriented world trade system; promoting rural development, including sustainable agricultural, fishery and forestry production and management of natural resources; enhancing women's access to agricultural credit, natural resources, technology and information; and ensuring that children and other vulnerable groups can adequately access and utilize food.

Our conceptual framework focuses on issues of food security at household and individual level.² At household level, food security is linked to household capacity to ensure a sustainable livelihood and to provide food, protection and care. This is highly dependent on intrahousehold dynamics, household composition, power relations and individuals' bargaining power. Women's empowerment, education levels and status within the household are strongly correlated with outcomes in health, nutrition, and food security. Our framework therefore draws particular attention to gender and age differences in access and utilization (e.g., household income and access to food, intrahousehold resource allocation, health and nutrition status of children) and examines the mechanisms by which social protection can strengthen individual and household food security, directly or indirectly.

2.2 Social Protection

Social protection, commonly defined as encompassing a subset of interventions for the poor—carried out formally by the state (often with donor or international nongovernment organization (INGO) financing and support) or the private sector, or informally through community or inter- and intrahousehold support networks—is an increasingly important approach to reduce

¹This chapter is based on Holmes and Jones (2009).

²This is based on our research project proposal.

vulnerability and chronic poverty, especially in contexts of crisis. To date, however, the focus has been mainly on economic risks and vulnerability—such as income and consumption shocks and stresses—with only limited attention to social risks. Social risks, however—such as gender inequality, social discrimination, unequal distributions of resources and power at the intrahousehold level and limited citizenship—are often just as important, if not more important, in pushing households into poverty and keeping them there. Indeed, of the five poverty traps identified by the 2008–2009 Chronic Poverty Report, four are nonincome measures: insecurity (ranging from insecure environments to conflict and violence); limited citizenship (a lack of a meaningful political voice); spatial disadvantage (exclusion from politics, markets, resources, etc., owing to geographical remoteness); and social discrimination (which traps people in exploitative relationships of power and patronage) (CPRC, 2008).

Drawing on Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler's (2004) framework of social protection, the objectives of the full range of social protection interventions fall under four headings: protective, preventive, promotive, and transformative.

The objectives of the first three relate to: reducing income poverty and enhancing real incomes and economic productivity; improving household food security; and protecting or increasing investment in human capital through income-based approaches. **Protective** measures seek to smooth consumption and income; **preventive** measures aim to prevent households falling (further) into poverty in the advent of a shock or stress; and **promotive** measures aim to support households to invest in productive activities, enhancing real incomes and capabilities.

The **transformative** mechanism of the framework aims to address concerns of social equity and exclusion. Importantly, this ‘political’ or ‘transformative’ view extends social protection to arenas such as equity, empowerment and economic, social and cultural rights.

It is argued that a comprehensive social protection approach combining mechanisms to achieve all four objectives (or with explicit linkages to complementary interventions with these objectives) will best achieve the goals of reducing poverty and vulnerability (see Box 1).

Box 1. Conceptualizing Social Protection

In Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler's (2004) framework of social protection, the objectives of the full range of social protection interventions are fourfold:

- *Protective*: Providing relief from deprivation (e.g., disability benefits or noncontributory pensions);
- *Preventive*: Averting deprivation (e.g., through savings clubs, insurance, or risk diversification);
- *Promotive*: Enhancing real incomes and capabilities (e.g., through inputs transfers); and
- *Transformative*: Addressing concerns of social equity and exclusion by expanding social protection to arenas such as equity, empowerment and economic, social and cultural rights, rather than confining the scope of social protection to respond to economic risks alone through targeted income and consumption transfers.

Social protection refers to a set of instruments (formal and informal) that provide:

- Social assistance (e.g., regular and predictable cash or in-kind transfers, including fee waivers, public works schemes, food aid);
- Social services targeted to marginalized groups (e.g., family counseling, juvenile justice services, family violence prevention, and protection);
- Social insurance to protect people against risks of shocks (typically health, employment, and environmental);
- Social equity measures (e.g., rights awareness campaigns, skills training) to protect against social risks such as discrimination and abuse.

2.3 The Gender Dimensions of Economic and Social Risks

Poor households typically face a range of risks, which include political, environmental, economic and social risks. Vulnerability to risk, and its opposite or alternative, resilience, are both strongly linked to the capacity of individuals or households to prevent, mitigate or cope with such risks. Vulnerability is influenced by individual and household demography, age, dependency ratios, location, social capital, ownership of assets and access to resources. Both economic risks (including the economic impact of environmental and natural risks) and social risks are influenced by gender dynamics and may have important differential impacts on men and women. Because they are socially constructed, gender roles and responsibilities are highly varied, and infused with power relations (WHO, 2007). Figure 1 maps out the ways in which economic and social risks can be reinforced or mediated from the macro to the micro level through, for example, policy interventions, discriminatory practices embedded in institutions (e.g., social exclusion and discrimination in the labor market) and community, household, and individual capacities and agency. Opportunities to enhance the integration of gender at each of these levels are highly context specific, and depend on the balance between formal and informal social protection mechanisms within a country as well as on the profile of the government agencies responsible for the design and implementation of formal mechanisms.

Vulnerability to economic and social risks are intertwined—understanding this intersection is critical to social protection program design and implementation in order to be effective in reducing poverty and improving food security. Meanwhile, although a number of social protection initiatives have to varying degrees addressed gendered social and economic risks, this has often been uneven and informed by narrow understandings of gender relations. For example, social assistance and public works programs often target women, informed by arguments that the involvement of women in development leads to greater program effectiveness and investment of additional income in family well-being. Food subsidy programs (such as the Raskin program in Indonesia) often target the household as a unit, although the intrahousehold allocation of food is often unequal, discriminating against women and girls. To be effective, social protection programs require more than a narrow focus on women beneficiaries, that is, not only shaping the type of risk that is tackled but also influencing program impacts at the community and household levels.

2.3.1 Gendered Economic Risks

Economic risks can include declines in national financial resources and/or aid flows, terms of trade shocks or environmental disasters. Stresses might include long-term national budget deficits and debt, lack of a regulatory framework and/or enforcement of health and safety standards at work and lack of an economically enabling environment. Given men's and women's differential engagement in the economy (i.e. the labor market), the impacts of macroeconomic shocks are highly gendered. For example, in times of economic crisis, women are often the first to lose jobs in the formal sector, such as in Korea during the financial crisis of 1997/98 (World Bank, 2009). In other parts of East Asia, including Indonesia and the Philippines, women gained in overall employment because of their lower wages and lower levels of union organisation (World Bank, 2009). Cuts in public expenditure are also likely to affect women more (in many contexts) because they tend to have greater responsibility for household health and education access. The effects on men and male identities of economic malaise are also increasingly recognized. Silberschmidt (2001), for instance, highlights the way in which rising unemployment and low incomes are undermining male breadwinner roles and resulting in negative coping strategies, such as sexually aggressive behaviour and gender-based violence, in a bid to reassert traditional masculine identities.




Figure 1. Impact pathways of vulnerability to economic and social risks

Source: Holmes and Jones, 2009.

At the meso or community level, the impacts of economic shocks are mediated by, for example, gender-segmented labor markets and institutional rules and norms (e.g. absence of affirmative action to address historical discrimination of women and marginalized social groups), which lead to poor access and utilization of productive services by women. Women in general have less access to credit, inputs (such as fertilizer), extension services and, therefore, improved technologies (World Bank, 2009), which undermines their resilience to cope with stress and shocks.

How poor households are able to cope with and mitigate the impacts of shocks and ongoing stresses also depends on a number of factors at the micro or intrahousehold level. Household members' vulnerability is shaped by household composition (e.g., dependency ratios, sex of the household head, number of boys and girls in the household), individual and household ownership and control of assets (land, labor, financial capital, livestock, time and so on), access to labor markets, social networks and social capital and levels of education. Women typically have lower levels of education, less access to and ownership and control of productive assets and different social networks to men, leading to lower economic productivity and income generation and weaker bargaining positions in the household. In times of crisis, moreover, underlying gender biases may mean that women's or female-headed households' assets are more vulnerable to stripping than those of men, the impact of which may be lengthy if what has been sold cannot be replaced. Women's bargaining position and entitlements may also be reduced more rapidly than those of male members of households (Byrne and Baden, 1995).

2.3.2 Gendered Social Risks

Social sources of vulnerability are often as or more important barriers to sustainable livelihoods and general well-being than economic shocks and stresses (CPRC, 2008). At a macro level, social exclusion and discrimination often inform and/or are perpetuated by formal policies, legislation, and institutions (e.g., low representation of women or minority groups in senior positions). In many countries, however, efforts to ensure that national laws and policies are consistent in terms of providing equal treatment and/or opportunities to citizens irrespective of gender, caste, race, ethnicity, religion, class, sexuality and disability are often weak or uneven, and hampered by a lack of resources to enforce such legislation, especially at the subnational level.

At the meso or community level, absence of voice in community dialogues is a key source of vulnerability. For instance, women are often excluded from decision-making roles in community-level committees, and this gender-based exclusion may be further exacerbated by caste, class or religion. Some excluded groups are reluctant to access programs or claim rights and entitlements, fearing violence or abuse from more dominant community members. Another critical and related variable is social capital. Poverty may be compounded by a lack of access to social networks that provide access to employment opportunities but also support in times of crisis. It can also reinforce marginalization from policy decision-making processes.

At the micro or intrahousehold level, social risk is related to limited intrahousehold decision-making and bargaining power based on age and/or gender, and time poverty as a result of unpaid productive work responsibilities and/or familial care work. All of these can reduce time and resources available for wider livelihood or coping strategies, and may contribute to women tolerating discriminatory and insecure employment conditions and/or abusive domestic relationships. Life-course status may also exacerbate intrahousehold social vulnerabilities. Girls are often relatively voiceless within the family, and a source of unpaid

domestic/care work labor. The elderly (especially widows) also tend to face particular marginalization, as they come to be seen as nonproductive and in some contexts even a threat to scarce resources.

2.4 Applying a Gender Lens to Food Subsidy Programs

Food subsidy programs usually offer a proportion of staple food at a subsidised rate, often on a monthly basis, specifically targeted at poor households. They have been a popular mechanism in many countries to address ongoing levels of food insecurity and malnutrition, for example in India and Pakistan, as well as a response to macro-level shocks to protect the poor from sharply increased food prices, as in Indonesia during the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis and more recently in the Philippines as a result of the 2007/08 food price crisis. Food subsidies can have important direct and indirect effects on household well-being: given that the majority of total income in poor households is spent on food, availability of subsidized food not only supports consumption but also can release household income for other expenditure, such as health and education expenses.

Although the potential benefits of food subsidies are important, various studies have highlighted the challenges associated with policy and implementation, including high rates of corruption, dilution of benefits among beneficiaries because of targeting errors and leakages, late and unpredictable delivery and poor quality food (Hastuti et al., 2008; Pasha et al., 2000; Saxena, 2001). More recently, there have been calls for reforming such food subsidies into cash transfers or other alternatives, on the basis that subsidies are often entrenched in vested interests of particular groups and are a costly and inefficient mechanism to promote food security (e.g., Cook, 2009; Farrington et al., 2004).

Taking a gender perspective to food subsidy programs highlights a number of important issues. First, some food subsidy programs specifically target women to address lifecycle vulnerabilities or to respond to labor market inequalities. In Mozambique, the Food Subsidy Program (PSA) specifically includes malnourished pregnant women in the eligibility criteria (identified by nurses during antenatal consultations) (Taimo and Waterhouse, 2007). In Bangladesh, innovative responses to the food price crisis in 2007/08 recognized women's disadvantages in the urban labor market and included a price subsidy on cereal grains for women garment and tea workers as part of the government's larger response to rising food prices (Köhler et al., 2009).

Second, Quisumbing and McClafferty (2006) argue that recognizing gender and intrahousehold dynamics to inform projects and policies is essential: resources targeted at the household level can end up poorly distributed if intrahousehold inequalities are not accounted for, and may reinforce and perpetuate unequal power relations. The authors argue that assumptions are often made that subsidizing food can increase consumption by the most vulnerable members in a household. Taking a collective view of the household, one which recognizes bargaining power and disagreement within households, suggests that additional policy measures can be taken to promote more equal distribution of resources within the household. This approach emphasizes increasing women's empowerment, status, and decision-making in the household. In other words, food subsidies should not be considered the only way to improve child nutrition: increasing mothers' access to resources through credit schemes or income transfer programs may be more effective (Quisumbing and McClafferty, 2006).

Third, and linked to the above point, an analysis of the Sri Lankan rice subsidy program found important gendered effects of the program, even though there was no explicit consideration of gender effects in its design. An evaluation by Sahn and Alderman (1996) (in Ezemenari et al., 2002) examined how men's and women's decision to participate in the labor market and the number of hours they worked was affected by a household's receipt of a rice subsidy. The authors found that, for rural or urban men and urban women, the transfer did not influence the decision to participate in the labor market. However, the transfer appeared to decrease the probability of female labor force participation in rural areas. Unfortunately, no data are available to show whether reduced time working was translated into increased leisure time or home production activities, or whether the decline in work for women led to a decline in income and patterns of consumption.

These issues point to a number of important policy considerations to bear in mind in relation to gender and food security/social protection policies in general, and subsidies in particular:

- Policymakers must design programs that do not exacerbate gender inequalities but aim to improve efficiency. A key message is that the gender of the transfer recipient matters for household expenditure (Ezemenari et al., 2002).
- Programs need to account for the fact that women and men experience and respond to shocks differently (Ezemenari et al., 2002).
- The dual role of women has strong implications for differential labor incentive effects between men and women in social protection design (Ezemenari et al., 2002).
- There are programs in which particular gender effects need to be incorporated (Ezemenari et al., 2002).
- The effects of food aid, subsidies and rehabilitation programs must consider women the principal providers of food for the household. In documentation and registration procedures, women should have the right to register in their own name and programs should ensure that women household heads receive benefits (FAO/WFP 2005, in World Bank, 2009).
- In the interests of sustainable improvements to children's nutritional status, women's status should be increased. Options for realizing this change include policy reform to eradicate gender discrimination and policies and programs that seek to reduce power inequalities between women and men by proactively promoting "catch-up" for women. Examples include: targeting women for access to new resources; implementing cash transfer programs that promote girls' entry into education and health care systems; introducing labor-saving water and fuel technologies; providing subsidies for child care for working parents; and initiating programs to improve the nutritional status of adolescent girls and young women (Quisumbing and McClafferty, 2006).

III. OVERVIEW OF GENDERED RISKS AND VULNERABILITIES IN INDONESIA

Indonesia has undergone many changes during the past five decades of national development. Despite some slowdowns in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the high rate of economic growth the country enjoyed during the pre-crisis period has made a significant contribution to the improvement in people's welfare. As Figure 2 indicates, poverty incidence decreased significantly, from 40% in 1976 to 11.3% just before the crisis. Yet, as this high growth may have led to different effects on men and women, more detailed analysis is needed to enable a more appropriate understanding of the nature of this development, especially in terms of gender differentials between men and women.




Figure 2. Official poverty rates in Indonesia, 1976–2009

Source: Suryahadi et al., 2010.

3.1 Gender Dimension of Poverty in Indonesia

According to Suryahadi et al. (2010), it is quite difficult to define the gendered nature of poverty in Indonesia, as no data disaggregated by sex are available at individual level. National Social-Economic Survey (Susenas) data, produced by Statistics Indonesia (BPS) to generate official statistics on poverty incidence in the country, use the household as the unit of analysis of any poverty measurement. Consequently, we have to look at other indicators to see the gender imbalance in poverty incidence, as well as disaggregating poverty by sex at household level.

Data on male- and female-headed households show that, despite a higher rate of poverty among male-headed households (17.7% versus 15.9% for female-headed households in 2004), they have relatively better life quality. In 1999, the World Bank found that male-headed households had higher expenditure levels, by 14.4% and 28.4% in urban and rural areas, respectively. This gap became even wider in 2002, at 15.8% for urban and 31.1% for rural areas (World Bank, 2006). In fact, the number of female-headed households increased from 12.3% in 2006 to 12.9% in 2008, meaning more women living in poverty over the past couple of years (Suryahadi et al., 2010).

Another way to measure the gender dimension of poverty is to look at gender imbalances between male and female workers, especially the working poor in both domestic and international labor markets. By definition, the working poor refer to individuals who, despite their work, remain in poverty, because of limited income or dependant expenses (ILO, 2009, in Suryahadi et al., 2010). By considering differences in the labor participation rate between men and women, it is apparent that the proportion of the female working poor is higher. There are 216 male working poor (21.6%) for every 1,000 male workers but 238 female working poor (23.8%) for every 1,000 female workers (Suryahadi et al., 2010). As is discussed in the next section, female workers also receive lower wages than their male counterparts.

With regard to food security in particular, an increase in women's income is positively correlated with an increase in household expenditure on food, but it is also women who have to bear more of a burden when household income decreases or during economic shocks. During 1996-1998 (Asian crisis years), prevalence of maternal malnutrition increased from 15% to 18%. In 1998, in Central and East Java provinces, 81% of poor pregnant women could not afford to eat eggs, meat or fish even once a week (ADB, 2006a). A number of factors were responsible for this, including poverty, job losses, and decreased wages, but also traditional views that prioritize men as the breadwinners (Mboi, 1996, in Gondowarsito, 2002).³

3.2 Gender and Economic Risks and Vulnerabilities

Literature reviews on economic risks and vulnerabilities show that limited employment opportunities and inadequate pay constitute major causes of economic vulnerability for Indonesian women. Sociocultural issues may also contribute, as discussed further in the next section. For instance, it is apparent that women's responsibility for taking care of the children often hinders their active participation in the labor market. Discriminatory practices, such as an inheritance system that allows land ownership only to men, may also contribute to the lower position of women in the household economy. From a macroeconomic perspective, though, it is apparent that there are far fewer employment opportunities for female workers than for male workers. In 2003, the absolute number of male workers was nearly double that of female workers: regardless of their educational background, women found it more difficult to find paid jobs (Suryahadi, 2004). In that year, there were only 31 million female workers, whereas the number of male workers amounted to 60 million. Employment of females stagnated in 1998-2001 and even decreased after 2002. This was to some extent a result of the Asian financial crisis, although the number of male workers continued to rise (ADB, 2006a).




Figure 3. Employment growth by sex, Indonesia, 1990–2003

Source: ADB, 2006a.

³In certain communities in East Nusa Tenggara, for instance, traditional prioritization of the husband partly explains the high rate of maternal and children mortality in the region (Gondowarsito, 252).

In terms of wage differentials, many surveys show that women receive lower wages than men. According to Pirmana (2006), female workers received only 71.2% to 76.7% of the wages their male counterparts received in 1999-2004. There is also some evidence that this is not always related to the different positions held. A comparative study by Suryahadi (2004) reveals that such lower wages were received not only by uneducated or unskilled women but also by those from high educational backgrounds who have relatively high positions as part of professional careers.

Women's lower position in the labor market is to some degree caused by Indonesia's national development strategy, which does not accommodate women's interests. Indonesia's transformation from agriculture to a mixed economy of agriculture and modern industry has put female workers in a marginal position. As Table 3 indicates, this development has changed not only the structure of the national economy but also the structure of the labor market. Whereas the share of agriculture in GDP as indicated by its economic added value decreased significantly from 1970 to 1997, from 45% to only 16%, the proportion of Indonesian people living in urban areas increased more than twofold in the period, to more than one-third of the country's total population (37%). Consequently, the pattern of employment changed significantly, with a large number of agricultural laborers transforming into off-farm urban workers. The share of the nonagricultural sector in employment creation in 1982 was only 45.8%, but by 2002 this figure had increased quite significantly, to 55.1%. A more salient feature of this transformation is that the composition of urban workers had changed from only 17.4% in 1982 to 35.8% 20 years later (World Bank, 2006).

Table 3. Indonesia's Structural Transformation, 1970–1997

Structural Indicator	1970	1997
Agriculture's added value (% of GDP)	45	16
Agricultural employment (%)	66	55
Urban population (%)	17	37
Trade (% of GDP)	28	56

Source: World Bank, 1999 cited in Wie, 2004.

What is critical to note from this transformation is that, although the share of manufacturing in GDP rose considerably from 1960 to 1994, from only 9% to 24%, the number of workers in manufacturing increased only slightly in the same period, from 11% to 13%. Thus, in spite of its rising share in GDP, manufacturing failed to absorb millions of people excluded from agriculture: the number of workers in agriculture had declined sharply from 73% in 1960 to 46% in 1994 (Baswir et al., 2003). Many of these workers preferred to migrate to urban areas to find jobs in the informal sector, given limited employment opportunities in rural areas. From a gender point of view in particular, this structural transformation appears to have brought fewer advantages for women. From 1990 to 2003, the female labor force participation rate dropped significantly, from 49.2% to 40.3%. Although a similar trend was found among male workers, it was not as sharp (ADB, 2006a).

In many cases, the decrease in employment opportunities was followed by a decrease in wages. In the agriculture sector, loss of employment opportunities for rural women was exacerbated by a decrease in their agricultural wages. In response to the increasing cost of production demanded by modern agricultural systems, new types of working arrangements were introduced, such as closed harvest or planting systems. In contrast with the old system, which allowed the participation of everyone, the closed system allowed only certain people to take part in harvesting or planting. As women had dominated these two activities, the number of employment opportunities for women

decreased significantly. This was followed by a decrease in the wages received by female workers (Hüsken, 1998). Women's share of total production decreased from 12.9% in the open system to only 6.9% under the closed system. In addition, a female worker might receive only half of the total wages she had previously received under the open system.

After the Asian financial crisis, employment opportunities for women became a major issue in both rural and urban areas. In rural areas, a significant number of women lost their jobs: the number of women employed in paid jobs dropped considerably from its peak in 1997 of around 4 million to only 1.9 million in 2003. Many of these women migrated to find jobs in the cities, as indicated by an increase in the number of female workers in urban areas in the same period. However, the trend did not continue: the number of female urban workers began to decline in 2002 (ADB, 2006a).

Urban female workers had to face no less difficult a situation. Women in the formal sector are typically concentrated in low-paying jobs or low-skilled occupations (ADB, 2006a). This results not only from the workers' low educational background but also from certain policies that tend to marginalize female workers. Women were pushed into certain types of occupation that give low wages, such as the garment and textile industry, to support the country's infant industry development. The government further used the low wages of female workers as one of the country's comparative advantages for foreign investors. This problem has been worsened by a disregarding of women's rights in the labor market and in the workplace (Table 4). Some of these discriminatory actions are deeply intertwined with women's social risks, as the next section discusses.

Table 4. Violations of Women's Rights in Working Places

Type of Discrimination	Explanation
Barriers to or nonexistent menstruation leave	Ranging from complicated or unfriendly procedure to prohibition of leave during menstruation.
Pregnancy not allowed for nonpermanent workers	Nonpermanent female workers are not allowed to have a baby during the contract period, otherwise their contract will be terminated. They are not provided with pregnancy or maternity benefit.
Unfriendly facility or working conditions	Time restrictions on going to the bathroom, unfriendly health facilities.
Fewer employment benefits for married female workers	Married female workers are often considered single workers to reduce the amount of employment benefit the company has to pay. This occurs on fundamental items like child and family assistance and health insurance.
Wage discrimination	Male workers' salaries include some employment benefits, like child and family assistance, whereas female workers' salaries do not. In some cases, male workers receive a salary on a daily basis but female workers receive theirs on a contract basis, which is usually lower.
Contract or recruitment discrimination	Companies recruit only unmarried women and do not take those over 25 years old. As such, women find fewer employment opportunities.
Career development barriers	Maternity and menstruation leave often obstruct female workers' career development as assessments usually take this leave into consideration.

Source: Various sources, including Hidajadi (n.d.); Mundayat et al., 2008; and Subiyantoro, 2004.

In the informal sector, which often serves as an economic safety net for those excluded from formal jobs, women often work in marginal sectors such as petty trade, unskilled or low-paid jobs or domestic work (Hartini, 2003). In fact, data show that women dominate the informal sector. Whereas the share of male workers in the urban informal sector rose from 39% to 45% in 1998-2003, the share of female workers increased from 46% to 49% in the same period (ADB, 2006a). The figure was even higher in rural areas, with the share of female

workers in the informal sector increasing from 80% to 86% in 1998-2003 (male workers increased their share from 72% to 78% in 1997-2003). Wages in the informal sector often fluctuate and workers often do not have any access to social security. Consequently, they are more vulnerable to economic shocks or stresses.

Related to economic vulnerabilities, environmental degradation such as deforestation may also lead to gendered impacts on women. Take the case of palm oil plantations in Sambas, West Kalimantan, for instance. As reported by Subiyantoro (2008), the expansion of palm oil plantations had a number of effects on women, ranging from the loss of employment opportunities to difficulties in accessing clean water. The forests used to provide women with abundant raw materials to make various handicrafts, such as rattan mats. Conversion of forest into palm oil plantations not only reduced women's economic opportunities but also forced some women to start up new businesses, as their husbands lost their jobs after the forest became plantations.

Economic shocks such as the Asian financial crisis also have an adverse impact on women. In Indonesia, despite overall improvements in malnutrition rates during the 1990s, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2008) reported, that during the drought and crisis of 1997/98, mothers from poor families responded by reducing their own dietary energy intake in order to feed their children better, resulting in increased maternal under-nutrition. Household purchases of more nutritious protein-rich foods were reduced in order to afford the main staple (rice), leading to increased prevalence of anaemia in both mothers and children. The effects were particularly severe for infants conceived and weaned during the crisis, as this has long-term and intergenerational effects on the growth and development of children. What is of great concern now is that, despite Indonesia's growth during the most recent food, fuel and financial crisis, child malnutrition has been rising. Overall, 28% of children are underweight, more than 44% are stunted and a high prevalence of anaemia remains among children and women (WFP, n.d.).

3.3 Gender and Social Risks and Vulnerabilities

In many cases, social risks and vulnerabilities are deeply intertwined with economic ones, as the latter may be caused directly by the former or vice versa. For women in particular, these social risks or vulnerabilities may result from domestic roles and duties as well as certain norms or social constructs. Partly because of these "traditional" obstacles, women remain left behind by their male counterparts in many aspects of economic and social development.

To begin with, in spite of increasing awareness of men in relation to taking part in managing domestic chores, women are still considered the main holders of domestic responsibility. In many places, particularly in rural areas, the idea of gender equality has not been widely circulated and the traditional gender division of labor has not undergone any significant changes. Depending on household characteristics, this may harm women as wives and mothers in a number of different ways. First, women usually have longer working hours than men: other than domestic chores, women also need to work. In urban areas, especially among informal and factory workers, a number of participatory poverty assessments have revealed that women's responsibility for earning some money has increased in the past 10 or 15 years (Rahayu and Suharyo, 2004). However, the assessments did not find similar trends of increasing paid work for rural women. Second, many women lose jobs or employment opportunities because of their domestic responsibilities. Unavailability of other family members, especially older daughters or other female family members, and of child care

facilities often prevents women from taking jobs outside the home. Meanwhile, even though it is not explicitly mentioned as a reason for excluding women from work, many women in the formal sector are refused their previous position after giving birth (see Table 4).

Still related to work, lack of education or skills is another problem that may prevent women from getting better-paid jobs. Data show that the literacy rate of females aged 15 years old and above (88.8%) is lower than that of males in the same age group (95.2%) (UNDP, 2009). The gap is much bigger among the poor: the literacy rate of women in the poorest quintile reached 75.7% in 2002, whereas that of males reached nearly 90% (Jalal and Sardjunani, n.d.). Another indicator shows that, despite female students' higher net enrollment rate at primary and secondary schools, their net enrollment rate at senior high school and tertiary level is lower than that of male students (ADB, 2006a). To some degree, this explains the lower position of female workers in the labor market. Even female graduates of senior high school find it difficult to find good paid jobs in the formal sector. Women's domination of the informal sector confirms this situation.

Without an appropriate policy to address the problem, it is likely that women's education will continue to fall behind that of their male counterparts. Despite the government's serious efforts to ensure the implementation of nine years of compulsory education for both male and female students at primary and junior high schools, there has been no significant effort to increase female student enrollment at senior high school and university levels. The government's policy to provide free education through School Operational Assistance (BOS) covers only primary and junior high schools. People have to rely on their own resources to send their children to senior high schools and universities. The dropout rate of female students at these two higher levels is much higher than that of male students. The enrollment rate of male students at senior high school (38.8%) is higher than that of female students (37.7%). Similarly, at tertiary levels, net enrollment of female students (8.3%) is lower than that of male students (9.2%) (ADB, 2006a).

Another risk comes from women's lack of access to decision making in the family and society in general, as well as at state level. The number of women holding strategic positions in the state bureaucracy is considerably lower than the number of men. In the post of *kabupaten* (district) head, for example, women held only five out of 336 seats (1.5%) in 2002 (ADB, 2006a). In the House of Representatives (DPR), despite affirmative action to increase the number of female lawmakers to at least 30% of the total number of members, this was still far below the stated objective (18%).⁴ In terms of quantity, which often really matters in the case of voting,⁵ this small number has made it difficult for female lawmakers to articulate their voices.

Meanwhile, at household level, even though women play a significant role in managing household income, their position is generally lower than that of husbands, who usually dominate decision making, especially on issues considered strategic (Rahayu and Suharyo, 2004). Even on issues closely related to women, like health and child delivery, it is often men who make the final decision. Evidence indicates that such practices have serious effects on women's well-being. As noted before, prioritisation of husbands as breadwinners in some communities in Nusa Tenggara Timur partly explains the high rate of maternal mortality rate in the region. The practice also negatively affects women's daily food intake (Mboi, 1996 cited in Gondowarsito, 2002).

⁴This number is higher than the number of female lawmakers in the 2004–2009 period (11%) (Saraswati, 2004).

⁵Personal interviews with a female lawmaker at DPR, 23 October 2009.

It is also important to note that many traditional views that prioritise men over women remain in place. For instance, it used to be common practice among many different ethnic groups in Indonesia to prioritize boys over girls, as boys were seen to be the ones who would continue the family name. Boys would go on to participate in public life and girls would replace their mothers in domestic matters, therefore boys' education was seen as top priority. Even though such views may have changed among the younger generation, the fact that the female enrollment rate is lower than the male enrollment rate indicates that these views may prevail. Another case of male prioritization can be seen in inheritance practices. Except for a few cases of matrilineal kinship systems, such as that of the Minangkabau of West Sumatra, in which land is inherited through the female line (Jendrius, 2007), most ethnic groups in Indonesia practice inheritance customary laws that prioritize sons over daughters. This results from traditional views that men are superior to women, as men usually bear the responsibility for feeding the family (Hutagalung et al., 2009). This often puts women in a vulnerable position, without land to call their own. If a woman's husband passes away, land owned by the deceased man will go to his relatives, unless he has a son.

It is not only in private matters that traditional views on gender affect women's well-being. Evidence indicates that such negative perspectives also affect public attitudes towards women. In the workplace in particular, as Table 5 indicates, a number of labels, derived to some degree from cultural views of women, have a negative effect on women's positions or wages.

Table 5. Labels Given to Female Workers and the Consequences

“Positive”	Consequences	“Negative”	Consequences
1. Accurate	1. Female laborers are given easier tasks with low economic value, such as cutting, sewing and packing	1. Reserved	1. Companies choose male staff over females to be supervisors
2. Obedient and disciplined	2. Female laborers get small salaries	2. Give up easily when facing a problem	2. Female laborers are prone to maltreatment by male supervisors
3. Afraid to corrupt		3. Indecisive	
4. Not demanding		4. Avoid risks	
5. Follow procedures		5. Physically weak	
6. Patient		6. Not visionary	
7. Can survive routines		7. Family oriented, not work oriented	3. Stricter rules for female laborers, for example they are not allowed to get married or to have children in certain periods of time

Source: Subiyantoro, 2004.

In public policy, a typical case of gender negligence is seen in the case of conflict or disaster management. Women's specific needs are often neglected, as emergency aid is often seen as gender neutral. Most aid is given in the form of food or kitchen utensils. Even though this supports women, as it is usually they who cook, their needs certainly go beyond utensils, which in fact help all people in camps in general. For instance, women often find it difficult to obtain napkins or find a place for feeding children. Food supplements or vitamins highly needed by pregnant or lactating mothers are often ignored amid abundant medical aids (Subiyantoro, 2008). Meanwhile, damage to public facilities caused by disaster or armed conflict makes it even more difficult for women to access health facilities (El-Muttaqien, 2008). Furthermore, disasters or conflicts have different effects on men and women, with the latter often suffering more. Women have to take care of their family members as well as providing food in public kitchens (Subiyantoro, 2008). During conflict in particular, there is evidence of increases in violence against and sexual harassment of women (El-Muttaqien, 2008).

3.4 Overview of Gendered Risks and Vulnerabilities in the Research Sites

Tapanuli Tengah and Timor Tengah Selatan are located in different parts of Indonesia. Tapanuli Tengah is located in the western part of the country, in North Sumatra province, and Timor Tengah Selatan is located in the province of East Nusa Tenggara, considered as among the poorest regions of the country. The fieldwork in Tapanuli Tengah was carried out in Sawah Lama and Muara Dua (not real names), whereas that in Timor Tengah Selatan was conducted in Ujung Atas and Sungai Tua (not real names). In spite of their geographical and livelihood differences, agriculture remains the main source of income for the majority in all four villages, but different types of crops mean that livelihoods are quite varied. Villagers in Sawah Lama and Muara Dua have various income sources, including rice cultivation, rubber extraction, palm oil fruit and other types of casual work. The majority of people in Sawah Lama work on paddy fields whereas most of those in Muara Dua work on rubber plantations. Villagers in Ujung Atas and Sungai Tua rely predominantly on maize as their main staple food. Table 6 below briefly describes the socioeconomic condition of the villages.

Table 6. Socioeconomic Condition of the Research Sites

	Tapanuli Tengah		Timor Tengah Selatan	
	Sawah Lama	Muara Dua	Ujung Atas	Sungai Tua
Area	43.29km ² ^a	6.02km ² ^a		
Population	1,081 people ^a	2,813 people ^a		
Households	239 HHs ^a	637 HHs ^a		
Livelihoods	Rice cultivation, rubber extraction, palm oil fruit	Rubber extraction, rice cultivation	Maize cultivation	Maize cultivation
Ethnicity	Batak	Batak	Timor	Timor
Religion	Islam and Christian ^a	Islam and Christian ^a	Christian	Christian
Raskin beneficiaries	118 HHs (real beneficiaries include nearly all villagers)	290 HHs (real beneficiaries include 350 HHs)	380 HHs (real beneficiaries include all HHs, 732)	276 HHs (actual beneficiaries include 470 HHs)
Female-headed households	Around 20 HHs (8.4%)	Around 50 HHs (7.8%)		
Poverty rate	Approx. 75%	Approx 70%		
Raskin allocation	3.540kg	b		

Source: All information compiled from interviews with key informants, except ^a(from sub-district officials), ^b Sub-district government decided that some of the Raskin rice allocated to Muara Dua should be transferred to a neighboring village to meet the higher demands of the rice in this village.

3.4.1 Economic and Environmental Risks and Vulnerabilities

Evidence shows that the two districts have different types of economic risks and vulnerabilities. In Tapanuli Tengah, it appears that land ownership shapes people's economic security. Interviews with some key informants revealed that only a small number of villagers have their own land. Out of 52 respondents, randomly selected from among Raskin beneficiaries, 29 (55.8%) claimed that they do not have land (Table 7) and that they have to rent land, sharecrop other people's land or work as agricultural laborers. In contrast, nearly all respondents in Timor Tengah Selatan have their own land. Out of 51 respondents, only one

rents land. However, because of the soil topography and the dry climate, maize is cultivated only once a year, resulting in a number of food-insecure months every year.

Table 7. Land Ownership and Control

Type of Land	Timor Tengah Selatan		Tapanuli Tengah	
	% of HHs	Size of Land (ha)	% of HHs	Size of Land (ha)
Own cultivated land	45	0.7	16	0.8
Rented-in land	1	0.5	1	0.5
Rented-out land	1	1.5	-	-
Sharecropped-in land	-	-	28	0.7
Sharecropped-out land	1	0.5	4	0.3
Other type of land (like uncultivated land)	17	1.3	4	0.9

Sources: Calculated from the household survey.

In Tapanuli Tengah, households that do not have land could rent land or sharecrop, but this does not guarantee work for all family members, male and female. According to local custom, rubber extraction is male work whereas rice cultivation is female work, but the majority of land in both villages is dry, used for rubber plantations – paddy fields constitute only a small part of the village area. This means that employment opportunities for female villagers are fewer than those for men. This affects not only female villagers who rent in or sharecrop land, but also women from households unable to do so, who have to work as agricultural workers instead. Limited employment opportunities in the village mean that female villagers look for agricultural jobs outside instead, with many women working on palm oil plantations in neighboring villages. Some women go to work in the paddy fields. However, such jobs are not always available all year, and there is also no guarantee that they will be able to find such work outside the village. Women state that, on average, they work for only three or four days a week.

Female villagers are economically more vulnerable than men also in terms of wages they receive. According to local tradition, a male worker receives approximately Rp 35,000 (\$3.89) per day, whereas a female worker receives only Rp 23,000 (\$2.56) per day, even for the same type of work. Women often have no choice but to work for lower wages. In both female and male FGDs, participants said that rubber extraction pays on average Rp 150,000 (\$16.67) to Rp 200,000 (\$22.22) per week. However, workers receive this only after two weeks of working. Other problems arise during the rainy season in particular, as heavy rainfall makes rubber extraction much more difficult.

In contrast, women in Timor Tengah Selatan usually work together with their husbands in their fields. Local custom maintains that it is mostly men who are responsible for preparing the land, which is considered tough work, whereas women play a significant role during the harvest period. It is women's task to harvest the maize and men's to take the harvest home. Despite women's significant contributions in agriculture, the widely accepted view is that it is men who work in the fields, with women only helping their husbands. To some degree, the persistence of this perspective is deeply rooted in local inheritance practices, which prioritise sons over daughters. The logic of marriage exchanges among the Timor, traditionally called belis, requires the bridegroom and his family to present a certain amount of goods in exchange for the bride's position as a member of her husband's family. Under such a system, parents usually transfer land to the son after their marriage. Only certain families, usually rich ones,

provide their daughters with land after the marriage. Because of this, the man is seen as the breadwinner, which further marginalizes the woman's position in agriculture. In Timor Tengah Selatan, this attitude means that income earning is the husband's responsibility, while the wife must do household chores and take care of household dependants.

In terms of cash income, as in Tapanuli Tengah, women in Timor Tengah Selatan have less access to employment opportunities than men. Owing to the prevalence of subsistence farming, demand for a cash income is not as high as in Tapanuli Tengah. However, as some household necessities cannot be gained from the fields, e.g. salt, sugar, side dishes, cooking spices, children's school fees and other household needs, they need to be bought to supplement maize production, which is usually for own consumption. Some households may obtain a cash income from selling tamarind or other agricultural products besides maize. However, as this may not generate enough money to cover all the household's needs, people still need to do side jobs. In this, men have far more opportunities, such as in construction or carpentry, which are considered men's work. A few women have opened small stalls in front of or near their house, although the most widely practised activity for female villagers is weaving cloth. Not every piece of cloth is sold in the market – some is worn by the women themselves or by other family members.

Seen from a longer-term perspective, dependency on the husband as the breadwinner, which contributes to fewer employment opportunities and lower wages for women, leads to economic dependency. Apart from in social matters, especially in terms of husband–wife power relations in the household, the impacts of this can be seen clearly during economic shocks or crises. In late 2008, many women in Tapanuli Tengah were forced to work – for those who had not worked before—or to work harder and longer because of the global economic crisis. This was particularly because of the drop in the price of rubber, from Rp 12,000 (\$1.33) to Rp 4,400 (\$0.490) per kilogram. At an individual level, a husband's death or a divorce will put a woman in a very difficult situation. In Figure 4, the death of NS's husband forced her to enter the labor market to feed her three young children. Her husband had previously worked to support the family while she took care of the children. The death of her husband affected her well-being considerably, as well as that of her three children.




Figure 4. NS after the death of her husband

Source: Life history.

3.4.2 Social Risks and Vulnerabilities

In both Tapanuli Tengah and Timor Tengah Selatan, traditional norms on gender and household chores have affected women's participation in both economic activities and public life. Traditional gender roles maintain that it is wives' responsibility to do the household chores as well as caring for children. Men acknowledge that some household work should be done together as a couple, like fetching water or wood and caring for the children, but in practice women do the majority of the household work. Consequently, women have to spend a significant part of their time managing domestic matters and taking care of the children, whereas men usually spend just a few hours a week helping their wives clean the house or care for the children. Meanwhile, both husbands and wives have to work to obtain an income. As Table 8 shows, no fewer than 85% of female respondents in Tapanuli Tengah reported economic activities as their main daily activity. In contrast, only 6.5% claimed that their main activity is managing domestic matters. For many women, the double burden of earning some money and managing household chores has resulted in time poverty. Some also reported that responsibility for the household chores and for caring for the children has kept them from getting a better job. One respondent stated that she stopped working as a trader because of increased domestic responsibilities after her second child was born.

Table 8. Main Activities of Poor People in Tapanuli Tengah

Activity	Husbands (%)	Wives (%)
Subsistence farming	49	66
Commercial farming	17	4.5
Agricultural work	17	13
Daily waged employment (not regular/permanent)	5	2
Regular waged employment	0	0
Household chores	0	6.5
Care of household dependants	0	0
Unemployed	5	2
Other	7	6

Source: Calculated from the household survey.

Working hours in Timor Tengah Selatan are more flexible, as people usually work their own land. Women go to the field after finishing the cooking and other domestic chores. Moreover, women's works usually reaches a peak only during the harvest period, which is usually in February at the earliest and April or May at the latest. From August to December, the land is prepared by men for the next year's production, so women's workload is not so demanding. It is in this context that the results of the household survey on villagers' main activities, especially female villagers' activities, should be read. Data collection was conducted during the land preparation period, so is subject to a time bias: it appeared that 45% of women in Timor Tengah Selatan had household chores as their main activity (Table 9). Nevertheless, in Timor Tengah Selatan domestic chores are unlikely to prevent women from participating in economic activities.

However, the attitude towards this labor division, that household chores management belongs to women and income generation to men, poses some problems for women in relation to engaging in economic activities. Whereas women in Tapanuli Tengah can undertake paid employment, women in Timor Tengah Selatan cannot, as paid jobs are usually taken by men.

For example, it is difficult for women to do casual work, like construction work, as this is usually given to men, although women can also do such work. Women can only open small stalls in front of their house or weave clothes to get money. Even so, some widows have to prepare the land themselves, in spite of the commonly held view that this work is suitable only for men.

Table 9. Main Activities of Poor People in Timor Tengah Selatan

Activity	Husbands (%)	Wives (%)
Subsistence farming (1)	91	46
Commercial farming (2)	2.5	0
Agricultural work (5)	0	0
Daily waged employment (not regular/permanent) (11)	0	0
Regular waged employment (12)	2	0
Household chores (16)	0	45
Care of household dependants (17)	0	5
Unemployed (15)	2.5	0
Other	2	4

Source: Calculated from the household survey.

In Tapanuli Tengah, traditional views on men's and women's roles obstruct women's economic activities to a certain degree, especially in terms of getting better wages for their work. According to local tradition, as shown earlier, male workers are paid more than female workers, even for the same type of work. The common view is that this is because men are stronger than women. In fact, physical strength is not the only determinant of a good worker. One key informant, male, said that in the paddy fields he prefers to employ women, because they are usually more patient than men. Men also stop to smoke and therefore rest more than female workers. "People here think that men are stronger. But for me, I prefer to hire women, they do not smoke ... if you take male workers, they smoke ...They often take cigarette breaks. In contrast, women take fewer breaks (male villager, Tapanuli Tengah, 2009)."

Another social risk is women's limited participation in public decision-making, which usually occurs in hamlet or village meetings. In Timor Tengah Selatan, if not by hamlet or village leaders, community decisions are usually made by male villagers without involving female villagers. Some female respondents said that this may have resulted from the prevalence of a patriarchal culture that often sees women as merely complementary to men. If women are involved in meetings, their role is usually limited to preparing food.

Different factors restrict women in Tapanuli Tengah from participating in community meetings. In Muara Dua, the head of the village acknowledged that, even though women are also invited to meetings, because they are usually conducted at night very few women can attend. Night is the best time for male villagers, as they have to work during the day, but women find it difficult to leave home at night, as they usually have to take care of their children. If meetings are conducted during the day, women can participate and be more involved in the decision-making process. For example, according to interviews, under the National Community Empowerment Program (PNPM Mandiri), at least 50% of meeting participants had to be women. By changing the time of meetings to during the day, women could participate and, in fact, more women than men started attending meetings.

3.4.3 Coping Strategies

Out of the two types of risks and vulnerabilities, namely, economic and social, people are more cognisant of the former and oblivious to the latter. As such, most coping strategies are taken to tackle economic problems. In Tapanuli Tengah, taking a loan from a local stall or from relatives or neighbors and undertaking additional paid jobs are the main coping strategies of poor households. It is usually husbands who take out loans.

Poor people in Timor Tengah Selatan have more options than those in Tapanuli Tengah. As Table 10 indicates, these include undertaking more paid jobs, sale of assets and relying on government assistance (29.8%, 23.4% and 21.3%, respectively). At 13%, getting a loan is also a coping strategy, but its intensity is considerably lower than in Tapanuli Tengah (43.2%).

Table 10. Main Coping Strategies in the Research Sites

Coping Strategy	Tapanuli Tengah (%)	Timor Tengah Selatan (%)
Increased indebtedness (to local stalls/relatives)	43.2	12.8
Undertake more paid jobs	31.6	29.8
Reduced quality and quantity of food consumption	6.3	7.5
Distress sale of assets	3.2	23.4
Rely on government assistance	2.1	21.3

Source: Calculated from the household survey.

IV. INTEGRATION OF GENDER INTO THE SOCIAL PROTECTION AGENDA

Development of social policy in Indonesia was very much influenced by the crisis in 1997/98. Prior to this, most social policies were generally targeted at all citizens, regardless of their economic status. They were integrated into ministerial programs like those in health and education. Targeted social programs were quite limited in number and usually focused on specific vulnerable groups like the elderly or the disabled. To mitigate the severe impact of the crisis on people's welfare,⁶ the government of Indonesia implemented a number of social safety net programs, consisting of four main components: food security, health, education and employment creation (Sumarto et al., 2001). Some programs were later modified, and a number of new programs were also added to help develop a more institutionalized form of social protection policy in the country. This section highlights key issues faced by the government of Indonesia in this agenda, with specific attention to assessing the extent to which gender has been integrated into social protection policy to date.

4.1 Social Protection in Indonesia

After the 1997/98 crisis, there were some major developments in the provision of social protection by the state. In contrast with the pre-crisis period, when people had to rely predominantly on their own assets or help from relatives, neighbors or close friends to mitigate difficulties (Cook, 2009), a number of assistance programs are now provided by the state.

To begin with, it is worth noting that, in spite of differences in defining social protection, there is growing consensus among scholars and practitioners to do so in a broader way, to include not only social assistance and promotional measures but also social insurance (Voipio, 2007). In terms of the types of risks that social protection interventions should address, as discussed in Section 2, Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2007) and Holmes and Jones (2009) argue that social protection should take into consideration not only economic risks and vulnerabilities but also social ones. Without addressing social risks and vulnerabilities, safety nets or other similar programs would be only 'economic protection' and not 'social protection'. For this purpose, social protection should be transformative in such a way that it addresses social risks and vulnerabilities. Derived from this idea, some argue for social protection to include regulations or policies aimed at enhancing the social position of certain people or groups of people, in addition to the inclusion of such measures in every social protection program.

Seen from this perspective, Table 11 indicates that most of the efforts taken by the government to develop social protection policy since the 1997/98 crisis have focused very much on the provision of social assistance and promotional measures, such as Raskin, the unconditional cash transfer program (BLT), the conditional cash transfer program (PKH), community development, BOS, and health insurance for the poor.

⁶During the peak of the 1997 crisis, an additional 36 million people fell into poverty (Sumarto et al., 2001).

Table 11. Social Protection Programs in Indonesia

Program	Design	Coverage
<i>Protective: Social assistance (protection and productivity-enhancing measures)</i>		
Food subsidy (Raskin)	Sale of subsidised rice to targeted poor households	17.1 million poor households (2010)
Unconditional cash transfer (BLT)	Cash transfer for poor households in times of economic shock	19.2 million poor households (2008)
Conditional cash transfer (PKH)	Provision of allowance for chronically poor households for human development	720,000 chronically poor households (2009)
<i>Protective: Social services</i>		
School Operational Assistance (BOS)	General subsidy for all students at elementary and secondary schools	35.8 million students (2008)
Health Insurance for the Poor (Jamkesmas)	Free basic medical services with referral system to public hospitals for poor people	72 million poor people (2008)
<i>Preventative: Social insurance</i>		
Social Insurance for Workers (Jamsostek)	Employment accident, health care, old age and death benefits	23.73 million employees in formal sector
<i>Promotive</i>		
People's Business Credit (KUR)	Provided up to Rp 5 million (\$555.56) for small entrepreneurs	Targeted 2 million people in 2008 and 4 million in 2009
Revolving Fund for Poor Women (SPP)	Revolving fund for poor women	
Social Empowerment Fund (BLPS)	Provision of business capital for people's business groups	3,907 business groups in 80 districts in 32 provinces
National Program of Community Empowerment (PNPM Mandiri)	Basic social infrastructure in poor villages in order to enhance local development and create employment opportunities	14.1 million people (2008)
Agricultural Enterprises Development (PUAP)	Provided Rp 1 million (\$111.11) per agricultural group	Given to 10,573 agricultural villages in 33 provinces
<i>Social equity and socially transformative measures (issues of social equity and exclusion)</i>		
Gender quota (in general elections, PNPM Mandiri)		
<i>Other social protection mechanisms</i>		
Social assistance for elderly people	Provision of cash transfer of Rp 300,000 (\$33.33) per person per month	Targets 10,000 elderly people (2010)
Social assistance for troubled migrant workers	Provision of social assistance for migrant workers having problems while abroad	Targets 29,818 migrant workers in Malaysia (2010)
Social assistance for street children	Provision of allowance for children's families	Targets 165 households in Jakarta
Social assistance for disabled people	Provision of cash transfer of Rp 300,000 (\$33.33) per person per month	Targets 17,000 disabled people (2010)
House repair	Provision of allowance for poor households to repair their house	2,346 houses in 13 provinces (2010)

Source: Various sources.

In 2004, a Social Protection Law was passed in Indonesia. Implementation has been slow, however: the government has argued that it needs time to prepare the institutional infrastructure and cites budgetary constraints.⁷ Some argue that the government has in actual fact been rather reluctant to implement the law. More than five years after it was passed, the regulations needed to support its implementation are not yet ready. Some efforts have been made, such as the formation of an implementing agency, but it may still be some time before the law really comes into force (Suara Karya, 2009).

Implementing social assistance programs is in practice much easier than putting in place social insurance programs, because the latter require not only financial sustainability but also a solid legal framework and institutional arrangements. There is great concern about this limited attention to social insurance. Of particular importance is how to extend coverage to include not only formal workers but also informal ones (ILO, 2008). Out of 36 million formal workers in the country, only 10.5 million (11% of the total labor force) are covered by the Jamsostek Social Insurance for Workers program. This does not include another 61.5 million workers (63% of the total labor force) in the informal sector in both urban areas (16.1 million people or 17% of the total labor force) and rural ones (45.4 million people or 47% of the labor force) (ILO, 2008).

There are also a number of challenges to the effective implementation of other social protection instruments and, with regard to social assistance itself, a number of issues remain unsolved. First, regarding program efficiency and effectiveness, leakage and undercoverage are still widespread in many programs. Second, a more fundamental question touches on the need to rearrange the institutional structure of program implementation, which means approaching the sensitive issue of the politics of social protection. Social protection programs in Indonesia are fragmented in many different agencies, with low coordination among them. Despite an increasing discourse on social protection so far, little attention has been given to the issue of social risks and vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, one cannot deny that the government has improved the quality of the programs: despite weaknesses and limitations in implementation, efforts have shown a clear progression towards equity and efficiency in terms of targeting the poor (Sumarto et al., 2008). In some regions, local government initiatives have further widened the coverage of programs carried out by the central government.

Be that as it may, the slow progress of social protection in Indonesia is a result not only of the government's limited capacity but also of other factors, such as political parties and the people themselves. Political parties and lawmakers at the DPR do not seem to consider social protection an important issue. Even though a specific commission is already in place to handle the issue of social welfare (Commission VIII), there has been no significant effort to mainstream social protection policy.⁸ Meanwhile, civil society demands for the implementation of social protection policy have been not high either. Social protection is a minor issue among nongovernment organizations (NGOs). Most NGOs seem to pay more attention to political rights than to economic and social ones, within which issues of social protection may be categorized. Indonesian trade unions also pay little attention to social protection policy. These organizations defend the rights of their members, such as on minimum wages, using a case-by-case approach, without linking to the broader strategic issue of social insurance for workers.⁹

⁷Interview with an official from the National Development Planning Board (Bappenas), Jakarta, 23 October 2009.

⁸Interview with a female lawmaker, Jakarta, 23 October 2009.

⁹Interviews with a male national NGO activist, concerned with the issue of poverty and social protection.

Meanwhile, despite some progress by the government on implementing social assistance programs (Sumarto et al., 2008), a number of problems remain. Reports suggest that leakages and undercoverage are still common. In the Raskin program, for instance, it seems that there has been no significant improvement in the way the government has handled problems of leakages and undercoverage. In spite of severe criticism by many agencies on this particular aspect, there has been no real change in the distribution of Raskin rice. From 2002–2006, the proportion of subsidized rice received by poor households in the two lowest quintiles remained the same, at approximately 52% (Hastuti et al., 2008).

Conventional explanations argue that leakages and undercoverage were very much influenced by the accuracy of poverty data supplied by BPS. However, in looking at BPS efforts to update the poverty data, especially by undertaking a socioeconomic survey of potential program recipients (Iriana, n.d.), it seems that the crux of the matter lies elsewhere, especially in the institutional structure of program implementation. As such, the issue is not only administrative, that is, one of data accuracy, but also, more fundamentally, political—related to power relations among different state and nonstate actors involved in program implementation. Evidence indicates that the problem is in every level of state bureaucracy, from district to national level.

Social protection programs in Indonesia are fragmented and spread across many different agencies. Coordination has been found to be very weak among these different agencies. Down to the local level, it is apparent that the use of the village administration for such individually targeted subsidy programs is not a good choice. Close relations between village headpeople and their staff and other villagers have made it difficult for the village administration to refuse villagers' demands, which often contradict program objectives. In the case of Raskin, for instance, evidence from various regions indicates that it is quite difficult for village governments to refuse villagers' demands to distribute Raskin rice equally to all villagers. Obviously, this contradicts the stated objective of the program of acting as a targeted subsidy for poor households.

4.2 Integration of Gender in the Social Protection Agenda

Generally speaking, women's rights are highly appreciated in the state regulations. By law, women have the same rights and obligations as their male counterparts. The 1945 Constitution Article 27 Verse 1 clearly states that 'All citizens have equal status before the law and in government and shall abide by the law and the government without any exception.' Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 12 below, this principle of gender equality has been accommodated in a number of laws and other regulations. Besides, a number of strategic policies have been also made by the government to accelerate gender equality in Indonesia. In 1998, a special commission was formed to eliminate all forms of violence against women. Several years later, gender inequality was officially included in the National Development Plan (*Propenas*) 2000–2004. Not less importantly, the government in 2000 renamed the Ministry of Women's Roles to the Ministry of Women's Empowerment. It was hoped that, with a new name, the ministry would approach women's issues in Indonesia in a way that concentrates more on root causes. More recently, an affirmative action has been taken to ensure women's representation in the DPR by issuing a gender quota for female lawmaker candidates. In the 2009 general election, the regulation stipulates that political parties should ensure that their candidate lists include 30% women nominees.

Table 12: Laws and Regulations on Gender Equality in Indonesia

Law	Legal Stipulation
Law 7/1984 on the Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)	<p>Article 2(b) stipulates that the state 'shall make appropriate regulations and other measures, including suitable sanctions, to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women.'</p> <p>Article 2(c) states that the state 'shall provide legal protection of all women's rights on the same basis as men's rights, and ensure through a competent, national judicature system and other state agencies effective protection of women from all forms of discrimination.'</p>
Law 39/1999 on Human Rights	<p>Article 20(2) stipulates that slavery or slave trafficking, trafficking of women and all other type of actions with a similar purpose are prohibited by law.</p> <p>Article 48 states that women are entitled to education and teaching at all levels or types of education.</p> <p>Article 48 states that women have the right to choose jobs or professions. By law, they also have the right to legal protection from any threat that may affect their safety or health in their work or profession.</p>
Presidential Instruction 9/2000 on Gender Mainstreaming	This instruction requires the mainstreaming of gender issues in state agencies and their programs.

Source: Noordin, 2006.

Nevertheless, it is apparent that these laws and regulations cannot guarantee the elimination of gender inequality in all aspects of women's lives, as their effects are very much dependent on their implementation. Furthermore, the extent to which programs consider gender inequality depends on the capacity of government officials as program implementers to integrate gender concerns. Gender awareness among state departments varies. Some departments show significant concern for gender issues in their programs, whereas many others appear to have no awareness of gender inequality or the potential gendered impacts of their programs. This results primarily from the influence of cultural norms or practices that belittle the role of women, and a lack of awareness of the importance of gender equality for effective program outcomes. A number of new laws to enhance gender equality often do not really matter in comparison with the embedded nature of cultural practices. Meanwhile, in order to implement gender equality awareness more effectively, another instrument is needed to oversee and ensure the process of translation of policy into actual programs. A number of key informants suggested that Presidential Instruction 9/2000 on Gender Mainstreaming is not effective on its own and needs supervision. Such a role should be played by the Ministry of Women's Empowerment, but relatively limited capacity in the ministry is a key constraint.

In social protection in particular, inclusion of gender perspectives has varied across different programs. Gender-specific vulnerabilities have been taken into consideration in the design of certain programs but neglected in others. This has been enforced primarily by donors, international organizations and NGOs. Under such circumstances, awareness may also be highly dependent on a program's implementation. It may disappear with the termination of the program or its replacement by other programs. During the 1997/98 crisis period, for instance, gender components were included in social safety net programs, such as the provision of food supplements for children and pregnant/lactating mothers and the specific allocation of scholarship for female students. Unfortunately, these components disappeared with the replacement of social safety nets programs for the health and education sectors by Jamkesmas Health Insurance for the Poor program and BOS, respectively.

Among a number of government-implemented social protection programs, the integration of gender can be seen particularly in the Kecamatan Development Project (KDP), which in 2007 became the model for PNPM Mandiri as a national poverty reduction program, and the PKH conditional cash transfer program. The latter is modelled on conditional cash transfer programs in Latin America in terms of the way the allowance is transferred, specifically to women in the household.

In KDP, specific attention is paid to women by taking affirmative action in favor of female villagers. In KDP Phase I, the program guidelines required that women be invited to village meetings or involved in decision-making. This requirement has been further enhanced in Phase II by establishing a specific meeting for women's groups. The program also requires that, out of three projects implemented, one project should come from a women's group. Finally, 25% of the budget should be allocated to microcredit for poor women.

Meanwhile, unlike in the BLT unconditional cash transfer program, PKH guidelines state that the allowance should be received by wives or adult female members of recipient households. Using such features, it is hoped that the program will increase women's access to resources, which will result in increasing their position and allow them greater decision-making in the household.

V. RASKIN PROGRAM POLICY AND DESIGN

The Raskin program is an extension and refinement of the Special Market Program (OPK) that was put into place by the government in 1998 in an effort to deal with the impacts of the 1997/98 financial crisis. OPK was part of the Social Security Net program, which involved increasing food security, job opportunities and incomes and access to basic services, particularly education and health (Suryahadi et al., 1999). In terms of increasing food security, through OPK the government provided 10kg of subsidised rice at the price of Rp 1,000 (\$0.11) per kg¹⁰¹¹ (at the same time the market price rice was Rp 2,500 (\$0.28) per kg) for each target household to support household food consumption. Based on National Family Planning Coordinating Board (BKKBN) data, the government determined that OPK would be targeted to 7.3 million households, or approximately 15% of all Indonesian citizens (Rahayu et al., 1998). To improve on some weaknesses, particularly in order to refine targeting so that only poor households received the rice, the government then implemented a number of changes, including changing the name of the program to Raskin (Rice for Poor Households) (Suharyo and Rahayu, n.d.).

5.1 Design, Coverage, and Targeting

In terms of design, in many ways the Raskin program does not differ greatly from OPK, in that it involves the distribution of subsidized rice to poor households. However, a number of aspects were added in order to improve on weaknesses, in terms of determining targets and program coverage. First, the amount of rice received by each household each month increased from 10kg to 20kg in 2002. Second, coverage was extended to include those grouped as Prosperous Households I program recipients.¹¹ In OPK, targets included only those grouped as Pre-Prosperous Families. Third, as a result of the extension of coverage, the number of poor household program recipients increased quite significantly. In 2001, OPK covered 8.7 million poor households; in 2002, the number of Raskin recipients was at 9.8 million poor households.

The Raskin implementation guidelines determine that, in order to ensure that subsidised rice is received only by poor households, BKKBN data need to be further studied in consultation with the village. This should include village government officials, local leaders, PKK officials, NGOs and other relevant parties. However, changes to the list of recipients can be carried out only within the already determined recipient quota framework (Hastuti and Maxwell, 2003).

As the Raskin program developed, there were many changes in its implementation. The biggest change was in the determination of targets. In 2006, the government changed from using BKKBN community welfare classification data to using data on poor residents as released by BPS in 2006. Data on poor residents from BKKBN were considered to contain many weaknesses, in that they were not based on clear poverty criteria. For example in addition to the economic condition of households, BKKBN included the religious condition

¹⁰From October to November 1998, when OPK was being implemented, the price of medium-quality rice was approximately Rp 2,500 (\$0.28).

¹¹Households can be classified by the BKKBN in terms of their well-being into five categories, according to their ability to meet all basic needs as well as secondary and tertiary needs, namely: Preprosperous; Prosperous Household I; Prosperous Household II; Prosperous Household III; and Prosperous Household III Plus. The more needs are met, the more prosperous the household is. A Preprosperous Household, for instance, cannot meet minimum basic needs. In contrast, a household under Prosperous Household I is able to meet minimum basic needs but unable to meet other social or psychological needs. This classification has been criticized for mixing economic indicators of well-being with noneconomic ones.

of a household as one of the criteria for determining the welfare level of residents. To improve on these weaknesses, the government, through BPS, conducted a survey on the socioeconomic condition of households in 2005 as a basis for arranging data on poor people in the country. Based on the results of this survey, it was determined that, in 2006, 10.8 million households should be Raskin program recipients. As seen in Table 13 below, the number is continually updated, and by 2007 had risen to 15.8 million poor households. This number increased to 18.8 million households in 2009 but then fell to 18.5 million households based on official poverty data in Indonesia.¹²

Table 13. Number of Raskin-Recipient Households, 2002–2009

Year	Total HHs			Allocation (Tonnes)
	Total Poor HHs ^a	Target HHs	Target HHs as % of Total	
2000	16,000,000	7,500,000	46.9	1,350,000
2001	15,000,000	8,700,000	58.0	1,501,274
2002	15,135,561	9,790,000	64.7	2,349,600
2003	15,746,843	8,580,313	54.5	2,059,276
2004	15,746,843	8,590,804	54.6	2,061,793
2005	15,791,884	8,300,000	52.6	1,991,897
2006	15,503,295	10,830,000	69.9	1,624,500
2007	19,100,905	15,800,000	82.7	1,896,000

^aTo 2005, data for poor families came from the BKKBN; in 2006 and 2007, BPS data was used.

Source: Hastuti et al., 2008.

Another significant change is the fluctuation in the amount of rice received. When Raskin was first implemented in 2002, every recipient household received 20kg of rice per month. This was reduced to 15 kg per month in 2006 and 10 kg in 2007. After rising again to 15 kg per month in 2008, there is a plan for the allocation of rice per household to be reduced again to 13 kg per month in 2010. Initially, the increase in the amount of subsidized rice per family was based on consideration of how much rice a poor household would need per month. With an average of four to five people in each household, it was estimated that the average amount of rice needed by each poor household would be 45 kg per month. Thus, the 10 kg of rice per month given as aid was considered too small to reduce the problems of the poor. Despite this, the total amount of rice to be distributed to each household each month was not clearly determined in the program's implementation guidelines. In 2005, for example, the implementation guidelines stated only that each recipient household in the program would receive between 10 kg and 20 kg of rice per month (Hastuti et al., 2008).

However, in practice, the total amount of rice received by poor households in many places is less than has been determined. The main reason for this is that the actual number of program recipients is more than the quota of Raskin recipients determined by the government. As Table 14 shows, the difference between the quota and the number of actual recipients (between 2002 and 2004, under Raskin) is between 26% and 38%. Research findings in various regions show that, to avoid social conflict, especially between the community and the village government, the rice is given to anyone who feels that they have the right to receive it.

¹²There is usually a time lag between official data on poverty and recipient targeting. The issue becomes more complex as the budget is allocated annually. Poverty data for 2008 are therefore based on the previous year's survey. The same data are also used for calculating the budget.

Government targeting methods are not carried out at the village level. Changes to improve the accuracy of program targeting, that is, rice only for those who are poor, in the form of a consultation meeting at the village level, instead have become a legitimisation for the village government to distribute Raskin rice almost equally to all village residents. Some exceptions have arisen in certain villages where village governments have been able to overcome social pressure from residents (Olken et al., 2001).

Table 14. Estimated Target and Realization of OPK and Raskin (2000-2004)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Number of poor families		15,000,000	14,782,000	15,135,561	15,746,843
Quantity of disbursed rice (tons)	1,353,248	1,481,829	2,235,137	2,023,698	2,060,198
Target (plan):					
• Targets (families)	7,500,000	8,700,000	9,790,000	8,580,313	8,590,804
• Targets/poor families (%)		58	66	57	55
• Rice quantity (kg/family/month)	15.0	14.2	19.0	19.7	20.0
Realization:					
Beneficiaries (families)	10,934,861	8,316,185	12,333,923	11,832,897	11,664,050
Beneficiaries/poor families (%)		55	83	78	74
Beneficiaries/target (%)	146	96	126	138	136
Rice quantity (kg/family/month)	10.3	14.8	15.1	14.3	14.7

Source: Isdijoso and Rahayu (n.d.).

In our two research areas, Raskin rice is divided evenly, except in some specific cases in urban areas. In Timor Tengah Selatan, the head of the Sector II Regional Production Subdivision from the Regional Economic Sector Secretariat stated that, in some regions, Raskin rice is divided evenly among all village residents (male, interview, 6 November 2009). The heads of villages as implementers in the field said that, if the rice is not divided evenly, residents who do not receive it will not be willing to participate in village *gotong royong* (mutual assistance) activities (all male, interview, 11 November 2009). Thus, even distribution is carried out based on deliberations with village organizers and prominent community members. The head of the village in Sungai Tua stated that the Raskin rice in his village is allocated to only 276 households but he distributes it to 470 (male, interview, 20 October 2009). In Tapanuli Tengah the situation is similar. The head of the village in Sawah Lama stated that almost all households in his village, that is, 239, receive Raskin rice, although the allocation is actually for only 118 households (male, interview, 14 October 2009). Exceptions are found in urban areas located close to the central government. One *lurah* (head of the *kelurahan*)¹³ stated that, although there have been some implementation adjustments, the number of Raskin recipients has remained in line with the quota determined by the government (male, interview, 26 October 2009). Strict control by the district government, the media, and NGOs has demand that the *kelurahan* government comply closely with program implementation guidelines.

¹³A *kelurahan* is a village-level administrative area located in an urban center.

5.2 How Gender Sensitive is the Raskin Program?

Men and women have different food needs, to a certain extent. This is especially true for pregnant women and those who are breastfeeding, who require nutritious foods in addition to extra vitamins and other supplementary foods, not only for their own health but also for the baby they are carrying or the child they are feeding. Evidence shows that many poor women cannot fulfill this need. Children, meanwhile, who are still growing, also need extra nourishment. There are many cases of child malnutrition in Indonesia.

However, these data are not always taken into consideration when food subsidy programs like Raskin are designed. Malnutrition is generally handled regionally, with interventions concentrated in certain areas where the number of children with malnutrition is high.¹⁴ Certain households—those which receive the PKH—now pay more attention than previously to the food intake of their children and of pregnant or breastfeeding members of the household. However, of the 6.5 million very poor target households, only 720,000, spread over 13 provinces, have so far been reached. The government plans to implement the program until 2015, by which time the target of 6.5 million chronically poor households will have been reached (Hutagalung et al., 2009). Meanwhile, the specific needs of children and pregnant or breastfeeding women were not taken into account when Raskin, with a larger target number—18.5 million households all over Indonesia—was designed. The government argued that the program aimed primarily to help very poor households with food, so the main consideration was the amount of food, especially rice, provided.¹⁵

In practice, the fact that little attention has been given to gender dimensions has led to a lack of attention to women's concerns or the interests of certain groups of women, such as widows or female heads of households. Evidence shows that attention to these two groups of women is given on a personal basis, for example attention from the head of a village or his staff to the condition of an individual widow or female head of household. Attention is not given as part of a systemic effort to include gender-sensitive issues in program design. If the head of a village is not concerned, or if the living conditions of a widow do not require special attention, the head of the village will not pay special attention. This situation could have been avoided had the program explicitly regulated the need for gender mainstreaming in the program's execution.

With regard to public participation, the program guidelines suggest that the head of the village has the authority to call meetings to discuss and decide whether the program's target list is appropriate. However, there is no effort to make sure that women have a say in village meetings. Interviews with key informants and discussions with villagers revealed that the meetings involve only village heads and village administration staff or some village leaders, most of whom are male. Although male villagers are usually not involved, their gendered needs and interests are represented by those who attend the meetings. In contrast, females have no way to voice their thoughts. They are present in meetings only as beneficiaries, as recipients of rice. Local tradition suggests that, since cooking is women's responsibility, they are the ones who receive the Raskin rice. However, in terms of policymaking, they are not involved and not allowed to access decision-making processes.

¹⁴See, for example, interventions by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Food Program (WFP) in some areas in West Nusa Tenggara and East Nusa Tenggara. These programs take into account the fact that, in these areas, the rate of malnutrition is the highest and the poverty level is the worst compared with other areas. Another consideration is the limited amount of funds (interview with staff member of WFP, Jakarta, 2009).

¹⁵If we consider the varying amount of rice given every year, it seems that the amount of funds available also has an effect on the program design.

VI. IMPACTS OF THE RASKIN PROGRAM AT INDIVIDUAL, HOUSEHOLD, AND COMMUNITY LEVELS

This section highlights the impact of the Raskin program at individual, household, and community levels.

6.1 Impacts at the Individual Level

Households in Indonesia have strong communal identity. Many of our respondents emphasized that they collectively consume or do not consume foods. In the words of community members, '*ada sama dimakan, tidak ada sama ditahan*' (if they have food, all family members will eat. Otherwise, if they have no food, all of them must restrain themselves). For community members, the family entity cannot be reduced to its individual members. When asked to point out who owns valuable resources, respondents always referred to the family as a single entity and not to certain individual members such as the father, mother or children. This also occurs in relation to consumption. When respondents were asked who receives more benefits from the Raskin program, their answer was that the whole family receives the benefits because all of them eat rice.

Our qualitative information shows there is no systematic gender differentiation, in terms of cultural norms or social practices, between father and mother or boys and girls in terms of consumption patterns. On the other hand, our quantitative survey illustrates some individual-level differences between children's and adults' and, to some extent, men's and women's consumption patterns. The most obvious difference is between adults and children. Some households reported that they give children more food. The reasons are that children are the most important members of the family, they are unable to cope with hunger and they are of school-going age so they need more nutritious food (they consider rice to be more nutritious than, for example, maize). However, when the children grow up, they are treated as other adult family members who have to eat the same type of staple food.

Furthermore, interestingly, the survey shows that Raskin has different effects on every individual member of a family. When respondents were asked whether they reduce food consumption in a time of food shortage, almost all answered that they do, with the total percentage varying across four categories of household members. The highest percentage in Tapanuli Tengah was for female adults (mother/older sister) but in Timor Tengah Selatan it was for male adults; the lowest in both areas was for young girls. Boys are in between. Table 15 shows a more detailed picture of this. Even though the data show more about reducing consumption, this also has a strong correlation with Raskin. Those household members who eat more will, presumably, consume more Raskin rice, and the opposite is also true.

Table 15. Reduction of Food Consumption by Household Members during Food Shortages in Both Sites

HH Member Categories	Average (%)	Tapanuli Tengah (%)	Timor Tengah Selatan (%)
Adult males	93.3	88.8	100
Adult females	95.9	96.8	94.1
Boys	79.4	81.4	75
Girls	75.6	78.5	69.2

Source: Calculated from the household survey.

From Table 15, it can be seen that, on average, adult women reduce their food intake the most when the household does not have enough food. According to respondents, a possible reason why adult females and not adult males reduce their food intake is that adult males are the breadwinners. Working to fulfill their responsibilities requires a great deal of energy, so they need to eat more. If we examine the details by region, in Timor Tengah Selatan more adult men stated that they are the ones who reduce their food intake if the family does not have enough food. This can be explained by the availability of various types of food besides rice and maize. When they experience food shortages, adult men can eat other foods, such as sweet potatoes, nuts and bananas.

A qualitative explanation for the differences between girls and boys was not found, because differences given by informants and respondents referred more often to age. This means that, when there is a food shortage, generally all children, both boys and girls, are treated specially and food is given to them first. The data above show that the difference between boys and girls is not too significant. Any difference may be caused by traditional gender roles, according to which boys are considered stronger than girls so girls must be put first in obtaining the main staple food.

As such, the biggest benefit of the Raskin program in terms of individual family members is gained by girls, followed by boys, adult males, and finally adult females. The benefit is an opportunity to eat the most rice when staple food stuffs are limited. Respondents in FGDs in Timor Tengah Selatan also considered that eating rice is better than eating maize and makes children smarter. However, it must be noted that only the FGDs in Timor Tengah Selatan underlined the prioritisation of children for rice from Raskin. Although beside the staple food there is maize, children are not yet able to consume this, as the texture is rough. In Tapanuli Tengah, rice is the main staple food for both children and adults.

Our staple food is maize but the children do not want to eat it; they want rice because they have been eating rice since they were little. So if Raskin rice runs out, we look for money to buy rice to give to the children. (Male FGD, Ujung Atas, Timor Tengah Selatan 2009)

By eating rice the children will be smarter but if we don't have money they are forced to eat maize. (Female FGD, Sungai Tua, Timor Tengah Selatan 2009)

Maize is our staple food so we eat maize. But small children, we give them rice, (Female FGD, Sungai Tua, Timor Tengah Selatan 2009)

One more probable reason, other than cultural factors, why gender differences in food consumption are not so conspicuous in either the quantitative data or the qualitative information is related to the (lack of) severity of the food shortage. Based on the survey data, cases of food insecurity in both research sites are 'not too bad,' in the sense that the people never suffer from terrible famine. Such a situation may stop them from needing to formulate a coping mechanism that prioritizes certain family members over others based on gender considerations.

As indicated in Table 16 below, 54% of respondents never experience food shortage at all; 8% experience food shortages once a week; 5% once a month; 13% once in two to four months; and 20% once in five months or more. There is only a slight difference between the two sites, except in incidence of food shortage once in five months (17% in Tapanuli Tengah (Table 17) and 24% in Timor Tengah Selatan (24%) (Table 18). This difference indicates that season has an influence on food security in both areas, with the latter worse off than the former.

Table 16. Household Members and Food Insecurity in Both Sites

HH Members	Never (%)	Once a Week (%)	Once a Month (%)	Once in 2-4 Months (%)	Once in 5 Months (%)	Total (%)
1–2	43	9	9	9	29	100
3–5	58	6	4	15	17	100
5–11	56	9	3	12	20	100
Total	54	8	5	13	20	100

Source: Calculated from the household survey.

Table 17. Household Members and Food Insecurity in Tapanuli Tengah

HH Members	Never (%)	Once a Week (%)	Once a Month (%)	Once in 2-4 Months (%)	Once in 5 Months (%)	Total (%)
1–2	33	11	22	11	22	100
3–5	57	5	5	14	19	100
5–11	59	9	4	14	14	100
Total	54	8	8	13	17	100

Source: Calculated from the household survey.

Table 18. Household Members and Food Insecurity in Timor Tengah Selatan

HH Members	Never (%)	Once a Week (%)	Once a Month (%)	Once in 2-4 Months (%)	Once in 5 Months (%)	Total (%)
1–2	50	8	0	8	33	100
3–5	59	7	4	15	15	100
5–11	50	8	0	8	33	100
Total	55	8	2	12	24	100

Source: Calculated from the household survey.

To go deeper into the situation of food insecurity at the individual level, we also collected information on household meal frequency. In both areas, only about 16% of households eat twice a day, 3% eat twice plus snack and 1% eat irregularly; the rest, that is, 80%, eat three times a day. The number of household members contributes to food insecurity in the household. The more household members, the higher the possibility of a household eating fewer than three times a day, and vice versa.

Table 19. Household Members and Food Insecurity in Both Sites

HH Members	Frequency of Eating per Day			
	3 Times	2 Times Plus Snack	2 Times	Irregular
1–2	86	5	9	0
3–5	85	4	11	0
5–11	70	0	27	3
Total	80	3	16	1

Source: Calculated from the household survey.

Table 20. Household Members and Food Insecurity in Tapanuli Tengah

HH Members	Frequency of Eating per Day			
	3 Times	2 Times Plus Snack	2 Times	Irregular
1–2	78	0	22	0
3–5	95	0	5	0
5–11	67	0	28	5
Total	80	0	18	2

Source: Calculated from the household survey.

Table 21. Household Members and Food Insecurity in Timor Tengah Selatan

HH Members	Frequency of Eating per Day			
	3 Times	2 Times Plus Snack	2 Times	Irregular
1–2	92	8	0	0
3–5	78	7	15	0
5–11	75	0	25	0
Total	80	6	14	0

Source: Calculated from the household survey.

The tables above show a slight difference between Tapanuli Tengah and Timor Tengah Selatan, in the sense that the severity of food shortage is higher in the former than in the latter. Even though the proportion of households that have three meals a day is the same (80%), the proportion of households that eat twice a day is higher in Tapanuli Tengah (18%) than in Timor Tengah Selatan (14%). Furthermore, if households in Timor Tengah Selatan usually eat regularly, in Tapanuli Tengah about 2% eat irregularly. However, it is worth noting that there are different traditions of consumption in the two sites. Households in Tapanuli Tengah eat rice as their sole staple food. In Timor Tengah Selatan, households usually have more variety. For breakfast, instead of rice or maize, adult family members eat potatoes, bananas or peanuts. For lunch they eat maize and for the dinner they eat rice. They always try to provide children with rice. The tradition of Timor Tengah Selatan households eating more than one sort of food makes them less vulnerable to food shortages than households in Tapanuli Tengah, which rely on one staple food.

6.2 Impacts at the Household Level

The effects of Raskin at the household level relate to the dynamics of the household economy. In order to determine these, we have to first understand the proportion families spend on rice alone compared with their total household spending, how many kilograms of rice they consume per month and how much Raskin contributes to their rice consumption.

To begin with, it is interesting to note that household spending for food-related expenses is higher in Tapanuli Tengah than it is in Timor Tengah Selatan. As Table 22 shows, a large portion of poor households in Timor Tengah Selatan (39%) spend only 50% of their income on food-related expenses. In contrast, the largest portion of poor households in Tapanuli Tengah (63%) spends 80% of their income on food-related expenses. The reason for this difference is that people in Timor Tengah Selatan are more subsistent, allowing them lower food-related expenses than in Tapanuli Tengah. Since poor people in Timor Tengah Selatan

have farms that, to some extent, can sustain their daily consumption, they need less money than people in Tapanuli Tengah to buy food for daily consumption.

Table 22. Proportion of Expenses Used for Food in Both Sites

Expenses Used for Food/ Total Expenses (%)	Tapanuli Tengah (%)	Timor Tengah Selatan (%)	Total (%)
50	8	39	24
60	4	4	4
70	15	12	13
80	63	29	45
90 or more	10	16	13
Total	100	100	100

Source: Calculated from the household survey.

Table 23. Rice Consumption per Month in Both Sites

Variable	Average	Tapanuli Tengah	Timor Tengah Selatan
Rice consumption (kg/month)	37.6	51.4	23.5
Raskin contribution (%)	35	22.3	48.6

Source: Calculated from the household survey.

In terms of rice consumption, there are variations across regions and households. These are determined to some extent by the importance of rice to household consumption (as the main or a secondary staple food), and also by the size of the household (the greater the number of household members, the more rice consumed). As mentioned, since rice is a secondary staple food in Timor Tengah Selatan, their need for rice is lower than in Tapanuli Tengah, where rice is the main staple. The average amount of rice consumed is 23.5 kg per month in Timor Tengah Selatan and 51.4 kg per month in Tapanuli Tengah. Average Raskin contribution to household rice consumption is about 35%. This varies according to the region, for the reasons mentioned above. Average contribution of Raskin in Tapanuli Tengah is 22.3% and in Timor Tengah Selatan it is 48.6%. Furthermore, in each site there are also variations in terms of respondents' perceptions of the extent to which Raskin contributes to their rice consumption, ranging from zero to over 100%. A more complete picture of the variations is presented in Table 24.

Table 24. Contribution of Raskin to Rice Consumption per Household in Both Sites

Contribution (%)	Average (%)	Tapanuli Tengah (%)	Timor Tengah Selatan (%)
0–25	48.5	75	21.5
25–50	33	19.2	47
50–75	11.6	3.8	19.6
75–100	3.8	-	7.8
>100	2.9	1.9	3.9

Source: Calculated from the household survey.

Respondents and FGD participants stated that there are a number of benefits to receiving Raskin. The biggest benefit for their families is the help to the household economy. Before they received Raskin, they had to spend a lot of money buying rice; afterwards, they could save the difference in price between Raskin rice (Rp 1,600, or \$0.17) and rice at the market (Rp 6,000-6,500, or \$0.67-\$0.72). If a household receives 30 kg of rice, the money they can save ranges from Rp 132,000-147,000 (\$14.67-\$16.33), which is a lot of money for poor people. As explained by FGD participants in Tapanuli Tengah, the money saved can be allocated to other needs, such as side dishes, children's school needs, paying off debts, improving the quality of family consumption by purchasing more nutritious foods and so on.

Happy of course. To buy four of those containers of rice is Rp 100,000 [\$11.11]. Then comes Raskin, which is Rp 30,000-70,000 {\$3.33-\$7.78], where else can we get that? Of course we are happy. (Male FGD, Muara Dua, Tapanuli Tengah, 2009)

If there is Raskin we can save money, and the money can be used to buy side dishes. If there is no Raskin we cannot buy side dishes, only vegetables, so we don't get to taste side dishes. (Female FGD, Tapian, Tapanuli Tengah, 2009)

There is [a benefit], we don't have to buy rice. If we have this help we can pay off debts. (Female FGD, Tapian, Tapanuli Tengah, 2009)

If when Raskin comes we are behind on our children's school fees, we pay the school fees. School fees cannot go unpaid. Sometimes if it rains we cannot tap [the rubber trees], and we go into debt. Then after the harvest we pay. (Female FGD, Muara Dua, Tapanuli Tengah, 2009)

When there is Raskin, I have some money left ... so I pay some of my debt to the shop. (Female life history respondent, Muara Dua, Tapanuli Tengah, 2009)

Interestingly, results of another SMERU study in progress¹⁷ stand out against this finding. This latter study shows that, when poor people receive aid in the form of a cash transfer, some of them use it to cover not only existing needs, such as paying off debts, fulfilling daily basic needs, etc, but also, and predominantly, 'newly created' needs, such as purchasing televisions, clothes, bicycles and livestock, repairing the house and so on, which were not covered by their low income. Even though they receive various transfers, the frequency of their debt is not significantly reduced.¹⁶

Some families benefit greatly from Raskin at times when their incomes are insufficient, for example fishermen when there are storms or high tides and farmers when there is a long rainy season or a long dry season. In times like these, respondents felt that Raskin is very beneficial in terms of fulfilling their families' food needs.

So that's our story, if we get it [income from fishing] once, we don't get it twice. So luckily Raskin comes. Sometimes when there is Raskin, storms come, or there is a time of scarcity before the harvest. Like now. At the seafront now, everyone is suffering losses. It's been three months. So we only just have enough to eat. Even those who get some, it's not as much as we would have bought for one day. So actually Raskin really helps us, but the way of helping is not satisfactory. We haven't even taken a breath, it's already gone. So that's how it is. (Male FGD, Tapian, Tapanuli Tengah, 2009)

Another issue is that Raskin has not had any negative impact at all on households. Respondents asserted that the Raskin program has not caused any conflict within households, although it also has not reduced already existing potential for conflict. It seems that this is

¹⁶See Arif et al (2010) 'Assessing the Roles of Women in the New Indonesia's Conditional Cash Transfer Program,' which study covers Cirebon and Kupang, and Timor Tengah Selatan.

because of the insignificant Raskin amounts, which cannot decrease the potential for household conflict, one of the largest of these being the lack of ability to fulfill household needs. Raskin was also considered not to have caused a reduction in family members' participation in work, given that amounts are not significant enough to influence the whole household economy to reduce working hours or volume of work. Respondents made the following statements:

[Incidents of fighting] are just the same ... No one actually hits, they only use words. Except for with children. (Female FGD, Sungai Tua, Timor Tengah Selatan, 2009)

When would we have the time to count the money? The weekly shopping can't even be done! There is no more spare money. Even though we work from 7 in the morning until 6 in the evening. (Female FGD, Sawah Lama, Tapanuli Tengah, 2009)

For me there is no change. Because even if we have Raskin, there is no obstacle for me to work hard, I get money and put the rice aside, I cannot use the money because it is to cover other debts. That's my chance to sometimes cover my debts. (Male FGD, Tapian, Tapanuli Tengah, 2009)

6.3 Impacts at the Community Level

According to respondents and key informants, the most visible impact of Raskin on the community is the emergence of jealousy between recipients and nonrecipients—not all recipients are very poor—some are actually middle class and some could even be categorized as rich. Because of a lack of clear criteria for receiving Raskin, all residents demanded to take part. Thus, in almost all villages, Raskin is divided evenly between all residents, both poor and rich. According to one village head, when Raskin rice is not divided equally, people who do not receive rice do not want to help in gotong royong activities, leaving this responsibility to those who receive Raskin.

But people who have money got it. No [the village head did not inform how much rice should actually be received by each recipient household], the point is one sack per person, the rich, the poor, some of it wasn't eaten but was sold ... But some people who weren't poor got it, whoever wants to. (Female FGD, Tapian, Tapanuli Tengah, 2009)

Indeed, the village head gave it to everyone because the residents were being insistent. (Male FGD, Sungai Tua, Timor Tengah Selatan, 2009)

Raskin is for heads of poor families but the village head's and officials' policy was to divide it evenly among everyone. Because when we work [*gotong royong*], those who don't receive Raskin don't come out and work. (Male FGD, Sungai Tua, Timor Tengah Selatan, 2009)

An interesting fact in terms of mode of Raskin distribution is the difference between rural and urban villages. In rural villages, Raskin rice is distributed evenly among all citizens, regardless of their economic condition. In urban villages, rice is divided strictly among beneficiaries listed by BPS. In one village in Tapanuli Tengah, rice is not divided among all citizens, according to one informant, because the village is located near the district capital. The village worries that, if they give the rice to noneligible recipients, the district government, the media, and NGOs will find out and punish or report them. However, in one urban village in Timor Tengah Selatan, the rice is not divided among all inhabitants because from the beginning there was no such 'deal' between the headman and nonrecipients. Poor households consider the whole amount of rice (15 kg/month) their right and will share it with nobody. Nevertheless, social and political conditions at the village level should also be taken into account. The heterogeneity of an urban village, usually inhabited by various ethnic groups, contributes to

power relations and the power balance: no majority can impose its interests. Solidarity with regard to recipients sharing with nonrecipients is not going to work.

Aside from the negative impact described above, no further negative impacts were found at community level. There was no evidence of an assumption that a program like Raskin encourages the formation of solidarity between poor groups. When asked why Raskin recipients do not put aside some of the rice they receive to go towards public interests at the village level, or forming a business group, male FGD participants in Sungai Tua, Timor Tengah Selatan, answered that they had not thought of these sorts of things. When it was explained that Raskin rice could be collected, for example one can per recipient, and used as capital to develop a village supply of rice in storage, one participant said, “We could, we’ll suggest it to the village head” (Male FGD, Sungai Tua, Timor Tengah Selatan, 2009).

6.4 Perceptions of Raskin

Generally, the Raskin program is considered beneficial for the community. Many survey respondents, approximately 40%, consider the program to have a very high level of benefits; 25% consider that it has average benefits; 29% think it has low benefits; and about 7% believe it has no benefit at all. As Table 25 shows, there is quite a clear variation between the two sample districts. In Timor Tengah Selatan, the community satisfaction level tended to be high, whereas in Tapanuli Tengah the community tended to be less satisfied. This is probably caused by the different net benefits felt by recipients in the two regions owing to the different consumption patterns of the local communities, as explained previously.

Table 25. Degree of Benefits of Raskin in Both Sites

Benefits of Raskin	Timor Tengah Selatan (%)	Tapanuli Tengah (%)	Total (%)
Very high	51	28	40
Average	25	24	25
Low	24	34	29
No impact	0	14	7
Total	100	100	100

Source: Calculated from the household survey.

Going further, a number of effects were sources of satisfaction or dissatisfaction for respondents in terms of Raskin. Many respondents (32%) felt that Raskin could increase consumption in their households, particularly of rice; 23% said that Raskin could reduce the expenditure burden on households; and around 18% considered that Raskin helps them pay off debts. Once again, differences can be seen in the two sample districts. In Timor Tengah Selatan, the majority of respondents (59%) felt that Raskin has helped them greatly increase household consumption and about 31% felt that Raskin could increase livelihood certainty. In Tapanuli Tengah, many respondents (38%) stated that Raskin is very helpful in reducing the burden on household expenditure and about 27% felt that Raskin makes it possible for them to pay off their debts (Table 26).

Table 26. Positive Impacts of Raskin in Both Sites

Positive Impact of Raskin	Timor Tengah Selatan (%)	Tapanuli Tengah (%)	Total (%)
Increased certainty in terms of livelihood	31	4	18
Increased household consumption	59	4	32
Increased access to basic health services		2	1
Increased access to basic education services		4	2
Reduced household tension between men and women		2	1
Reduced time poverty for women		4	2
Other		2	1
Can pay off debts		27	13
Reduced household expenditure burden	8	38	23
Help when the harvest fails/waiting for the harvest season		6	3
Help during long rainy/hot seasons	2	6	4
Total	100	100	100

Source: Calculated from the household survey.

The different information between Timor Tengah Selatan and Tapanuli Tengah above can be understood by looking at the socioeconomic contexts of the regions. As explained previously, the characteristic of food insecurity in Tapanuli Tengah mostly reflects a lack of access to food sources—that is, they have to purchase rice. This means that rice is a very important component of household expenditure. Aside from that, their food insecurity is also related to the uncertain income and work of respondents. When they cannot go to sea, or they cannot tap rubber in the rainy season, they have no choice but to go into debt. The more frequently their income decreases, the bigger their debt. Thus, Raskin is very helpful to them because it reduces the expenditure burden and can also help them to pay off existing debts.

In Timor Tengah Selatan, the subsistent way of living makes it possible for villagers to cope when there is no rice. They can still eat, even if this means relying on maize and other crops from their gardens. However, because many of them have children who cannot eat maize or cassava, they still have to buy rice. To do so, they need work. Having Raskin has greatly helped them increase consumption of rice in the household and also to ensure that their children can still eat rice at times when they cannot work to buy rice.

There are also those who are unhappy with Raskin. Even those who are satisfied with the program feel there are some aspects of the program that are not satisfactory. The two sample regions have similar views in this regard. The biggest issue causing dissatisfaction among respondents is the amount of rice they receive. This is the main issue because, in reality, recipients do not get the amount of Raskin rice determined in the program's design, which is 15 kg per household per month. On average, respondents in the two regions receive only half of the rice promised, that is, about 7.5 kg. In almost all areas, the remainder is divided among nonrecipient residents.

Some respondents also thought that Raskin can help them only in the short term and not over time. Respondents stated that the rice is around for less than one week, although in Timor Tengah Selatan some respondents said that they benefit from Raskin for more than a month. Respondents were also unhappy with the difficult requirements: they have to pay Raskin money upfront and not in installments. In some villages in Timor Tengah Selatan, some respondents had to pay in full for the next distribution period in order to obtain the rice for the current period.

Table 27. Negative Impacts of Raskin in Both Sites

Negative Impact of Raskin	Timor Tengah Selatan (%)	Tapanuli Tengah (%)	Total (%)
Transfer does not satisfy	67	52	60
Requirements take too long to fulfill	15	4	10
Only beneficial in short term, no long-term or ongoing change	18	19	18
Not flexible in terms of current household activities		7	3
Creates conflict in the community		15	7
Other		4	2
Total	100	100	100

Source: Calculated from the household survey.

VII. DRIVERS OF PROGRAM IMPACTS

This section highlights key issues that may affect the quality of program implementation in terms of both gender sensitivity and the implementation itself. Meanwhile, other than the program's institutional arrangements, certain socioeconomic problems and geographical conditions appear to affect the differential benefits of Raskin for program recipients.

7.1 Design and Institutional Structure

With regard to the issue of gender in particular, there has been insufficient attention to differences between men and women in terms of ensuring food security. Policymakers in central government aimed the Raskin program at households and did not consider gender dimensions within the household.¹⁷ This may be a result of a lack of awareness of gender equality among many policymakers in the country. There is also a misconception that gender issues are related only to women performing better in their traditional tasks. Gender issues are viewed parochially, as having to do with women only, without considering the connection to the roles of men, let alone the balance of power relations between women and men. Consequently—as reflected in programs for women conducted by the New Order government through PKK, which is still in existence—programs that are supposed to empower women instead have emphasized their domestic role. The Raskin program does not have a negative impact on the role of women in the family or in society, but the absence of gender analysis in its design has meant that the different concerns of men and women in terms of access to food have been sidelined. In addition, the program has proven to be insensitive towards children, who are under the care of their mothers on a daily basis.

The lack of gender awareness in the program's design has been exacerbated by negligence with regard to women's role in its institutional structure. Despite the involvement of various institutions, no gender focal point has been invited to participate, from national level to village level. At central level, implementation is under the control of the Central Raskin Coordinating Team, which includes various ministries and boards at central level, including the Coordinating Ministry for the Financial Sector, the Ministry for Internal Affairs, the National Ministry for Planning and Development, Statistics Indonesia and the Logistics Board (Bulog). Bulog has the task of supplying and distributing rice to the region, but otherwise is parallel with other institutional members of the Central Raskin Coordinating Team, which is led by the secretary of the Coordinating Ministry for the People's Welfare. This institutional structure is then replicated at lower government levels (province and *kabupaten/kota*). As at central level, these teams require coordination among agencies, that is, among institutions at provincial and district level, with the coordination implementer usually the Provincial and District Government Secretariat Office.

In practical terms, the biggest workload seems to fall on the implementing institutions at the bottom level, including *kecamatan* and village governments. Bulog, as the rice supplier and distributor, is required to distribute the rice only to the distribution point, which is the *kecamatan* office. Bulog states that the funds available are not enough for it to be able to distribute rice to the village level. Thus, distribution beyond this point is handed over to *kecamatan* and village governments. In practice, the village government is the backbone of the program's implementation because it is directly involved with recipient households and the

¹⁷Interviews with an official of the Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare, Jakarta, 5 November 2009.

community in general. It also has to face complaints or objections from those who are not satisfied and to take care of the administration of payments. In this, it has to collect payments from households that receive Raskin rice and send this to Bulog at central level. However, according to some heads of villages, there is no incentive to do this work. Institutions at higher levels consider this job part of their role as village officials.

According to the implementation guidelines, district governments were to be asked to provide supplementary funds to support the implementation of the Raskin program. However, many *kabupaten*, including in the research sites, have not provided enough funds for these activities, meaning that there are no operational funds available at lower levels, that is, *kecamatan* and village levels. If funds are in fact available, they are often not transparent (Hastuti and Maxwell, 2003). As a result, village governments have to seek out their own operational funds. As in other regions, the four villages in this study collect operational funds from recipient households, that is, by increasing the price of the rice from the central government standard price of Rp1,600 [\$0.18] per kg to Rp2,000 [\$0.22] per kg. The extra money is to be used for operational costs, especially to pay for the transportation of the rice from the center of the *kecamatan* to the villages. For villages that are located far away or that are hard to reach, the cost may be higher. Aside from paying for transportation fees, some heads of villages stated that some of the money is used to give a small amount of compensation to those who are involved in the distribution of rice in the village, especially those who transport it from the *kecamatan* center to distribution points in the villages.

Within this kind of institutional structure, most of the responsibility for the implementation of the Raskin program is on the shoulders of the village government. The success or failure of the program in line with its objectives is very much determined by the role of the village. However, at the same time, because of close social relationships between village residents and heads, village heads cannot avoid social pressure from nonrecipient village residents who want to receive Raskin rice. These requests arise for a number of reasons. First, as indicated by program evaluations, there are still many residents in the lowest two income quintiles who do not receive Raskin rice. Second, some groups consider that Raskin rice is assistance from the government and thus that every citizen has the right to receive it. Because requests are often a product of sociopolitics at local level, such as political pressures on village heads, it is difficult for many heads to refuse them, so they divide the rice among more recipients than those listed as official recipients by the district government.

Under such circumstances, in many villages targeting has to a degree been replaced by self-selection. Those who consider themselves eligible to receive the subsidised rice take it when it is disbursed in their village, conditional on their having money to purchase it. Many poor households cannot actually buy the rice because they do not have enough money. In some places, availability of money itself is not a guarantee, as rice is usually given on the basis of ‘first come first served.’ This could be because the rice is insufficient to distribute to all the people standing in line to buy it, or because people are still working in the fields when the rice is distributed. It can also be more difficult for old people or single parents, either male or female widows. Old people might find it difficult to compete with other people in queuing for the rice, and male or female widows might miss out on information about the distribution of the rice as they often have to work harder to support their children. Unfortunately, such issues are rarely taken into consideration by village leaders during consultation on Raskin distribution. Instead of prioritizing people in need, consultation is often carried out to provide legitimacy to the village government to distribute the rice to more villagers to reduce the social tension caused by the program’s implementation. However, in the view of poor people, this actually harms them as it reduces the amount of rice they receive.

7.2 Socioeconomic Conditions of Food Security of the Research Sites

The magnitude of the benefits received by the program recipients is also influenced by the socioeconomic conditions as well as the geographical situation of the area in which they live. The two research sites, Tapanuli Tengah and Timor Tengah Selatan, have very different socioeconomic and geographical conditions, which end up affecting their food security. Whereas the main staple food of Tapanuli Tengah is rice, in Timor Tengah Selatan rice is the second main staple after maize. Thus, in Tapanuli Tengah more agricultural land for food crops is allocated to rice. In Timor Tengah Selatan, most agricultural land is planted with maize and none is now used for rice.¹⁸

Second, compared with Timor Tengah Selatan, Tapanuli Tengah still has sufficient water, which makes it possible to harvest more than once a year. Only certain areas can be harvested only once. The land is also relatively fertile. In Timor Tengah Selatan, on the other hand, not one area can be harvested more than once because there is no access to water, except in the rainy season, which is only three or four months per year. The land is very dry and as hard as a rock, so it is difficult to plant young crops. These circumstances often have an impact on the size of the harvest that can be used for household food.

Finally, poor residents in Tapanuli Tengah work mostly as laborers, plantation farmers or small-scale fishermen. This type of livelihood does not always guarantee a sufficient and constant income to support the family. In Timor Tengah Selatan, almost all the poor (about 92%, compared with about 30% in Tapanuli Tengah) own their own land for farming. Nevertheless, they do not work on all of it, leaving approximately half of it uncultivated. The head of one village in Timor Tengah Selatan estimated that approximately 50% of the land in the village is not worked because the owners are unable to do so or because they are unenthusiastic. Part of the reason for this inability or lack of enthusiasm is the hardness and dryness of the land, which also has many rocks on the surface. In addition, some land is located in locations that are difficult to access.

As such, it can be assumed that food insecurity in Tapanuli Tengah is caused mostly by limited access to food, resulting primarily from lack of ownership of rice fields and lack of sufficient income to provide food for the family. Production factors are not an issue in this region. The Tapanuli Tengah Agricultural Agency explained that the production of rice in the area is up to about 280,000 tons per year, and the size of the production area is about 28,000 hectares—1 ha produces 9.8 tons per year. Thus, the government has given Tapanuli Tengah a ranking of only three (of six priority levels, one being the highest) in terms of food insecurity.

In the case of Timor Tengah Selatan, it seems that food insecurity is caused mostly by production factors, that is, lack of productive or workable land available to produce food for the family. This is because the land is dry and there is very limited rainfall. Because natural factors are more dominant here, apart from other factors such as poverty, the government has ranked Timor Tengah Selatan as a number one priority on the national food security map.

¹⁸According to one life history respondent aged over 60 years old, before the 1960s, in some areas in Timor Tengah Selatan, including the two villages in the sample, a lot of land was planted with rice. At that time, every family owned its own rice fields so never had to buy rice. Later, rice plantations disappeared from the area, for reasons the respondent could not explain.

Looking at the information above, it is highly likely that the impact of the Raskin program on the two areas is different. Factors that determine the difference include: (i) the fact that food insecurity in Tapanuli Tengah is a problem of access (purchasing power), whereas in Timor Tengah Selatan food insecurity is a problem of availability (production factor); and (ii) the fact that for Tapanuli Tengah rice is the main staple food, whereas in Timor Tengah Selatan rice is the second main staple. Related to this second factor, the difference between the two can be seen in the total household rice consumption in each area. The quantitative data show that average household consumption of rice in Tapanuli Tengah is far higher than that in Timor Tengah Selatan, that is, 51.4 kg per month in Tapanuli Tengah and only 23.5 kg per month in Timor Tengah Selatan.

Therefore, the contribution of Raskin, which provides the same amount of rice in all regions, that is, 15 kg per month per household, to food security for poor households in Timor Tengah Selatan is certainly bigger than that in Tapanuli Tengah.

VIII. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This study has shown that gender inequality faces women in Indonesia through various risks and vulnerabilities. These relate to the economic sphere but also permeate certain social practices and views, which belittle women's role and put them in a more vulnerable position than men.

In the economic sphere, sources of vulnerability include lack of employment opportunities, lack of adequate pay for female workers and violation of women's rights at the workplace. As our research findings show, women receive lower wages than men, even for the same work. In the informal sector, in which most female workers have been concentrated since the last decade, women often have to work in marginal sectors such as domestic work or in high-risk jobs like sex work. In relation to food insecurity, it is most commonly women and children who suffer from malnutrition (Hadiprayitno, 2010): evidence indicates that, despite Indonesia's growth during the most recent food and financial crises, child malnutrition cases have been rising. Among these cases, 28% of children are underweight and more than 44% are stunted.

Women's equal participation in economic and social development has also been hampered by certain social views and practices on gender issues and on the division of labor between men and women. These may cover household matters such as women's domestic responsibilities, power relations between husbands and wives or public issues like women's access to decision-making. Traditional cultural views and stereotypical labels on women pose another source of risk. In many areas, women's inferior position has been worsened by violence and sexual abuse.

Unfortunately, understandings of gender inequality have not been integrated effectively into social protection policy and programming in Indonesia, which has been very much influenced by the devastating effects of the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. In this context, policy has been oriented to mitigate the adverse impacts of economic shocks on people's well-being, without acknowledging the importance of addressing social inequalities, including gender inequalities. However, there are important exceptions, such as the education stipend for girls, women's participation in community-led social protection activities and the recent PKH conditional cash transfer, which integrates gender considerations to some extent by targeting mothers or adult women in a family, targeting pregnant women and those with children under 15 years and including antenatal and reproductive health care among the conditions with which beneficiaries need to comply.

Our key informant interviews pointed to a number of reasons for this limited integration of gender across social protection policy and programming in the country. First, there is limited attention and commitment to gender equality issues at the policy level in terms of poverty reduction programming in general, which in part results from gaps in knowledge on gender and poverty (especially regional variations) and the relatively weak power and narrow mandate of the state Ministry of Women's Empowerment at the national level. Although the ministry made contributory inputs into the 2004 Social Protection Law, its role since its passage has been minimal, mainly because its mandate is policy oriented and not operational.

Second, people have limited knowledge on the links connecting the gendered dimensions of poverty and vulnerability with social protection programs. Furthermore, although there are strong women's organisations working on gender issues, their focus is on broader issues, such as politics and democracy, and sector-specific issues, such as maternal mortality and migration, rather than on social protection.

Third, mainstreaming gender at national and subnational levels has to date faced many challenges. Our interviews suggested that, despite the availability of mainstreaming tools, the impact and visibility of gender remain a problem, partly because of weaknesses in the Ministry of Women's Empowerment, limited funding for women's organizations and an inability to change institutional incentives to better integrate gender concerns. Moreover, mainstreaming gender through the decentralization process at a time when decentralization itself is facing many demands as a relatively new governance structure has resulted in a loss of power, visibility and impact of gender mainstreaming instruments, such as gender budgeting. Previously, the Ministry of Women's Empowerment's structure went down to the lowest governance level, but now each region has its own policies. Gender mainstreaming seems not to be given due importance at local level, and there is a concern that local governments lack the capacity and priority to collect sex-disaggregated data for improved gender-sensitive policy and program design.

With regard to the issue of food insecurity in particular, gender mainstreaming in the food subsidy program needs to consider the different dimensions of food insecurity facing women and men. Moreover, our study findings show that the sources of food insecurity may vary among regions depending on geographical conditions and the livelihoods of the poor. Poor people in Tapanuli Tengah suffer from lack of employment opportunities and income, thus lower purchasing power to buy food. Food insecurity in Timor Tengah Selatan is defined by the problems of food production, especially lack of fertile land, extreme seasonal changes and water unavailability during the dry season. The two regions also have different food staples – rice in Tapanuli Tengah and maize in Timor Tengah Selatan. In terms of food security, then, in Timor Tengah Selatan the pre-harvest period is likely to be the most difficult, as the previous year's yields may have run out. This assessment does not include the threat of harvest failure. In Tapanuli Tengah, in contrast, difficulties in ensuring daily consumption may occur throughout the year depending on the price of rubber and the availability of side jobs to support a low income from rubber extraction. Some households often face food shortages during a year; a few experience food shortage every week.

The impact of the Raskin program in the two research sites is very much influenced by the nature of food insecurity and people's preferences regarding food consumption among household members. At an individual level, the benefits seem to be enjoyed more by younger people, as children are viewed as the most important members of the household and are more vulnerable to hunger than adults. In Timor Tengah Selatan in particular, the benefits are greater for children because the rice can replace maize as their main daily staple (rice is considered better than maize). At a household level, the Raskin program has generally improved the quantity as well as the quality of food intake, usually by enabling the provision of more side dishes. It has also had some side-effects in relation to easing households' financial burden, especially with regard to paying for children's education or settling household debts: as Raskin rice is much cheaper than the market price, recipients may have some extra money to meet other household expenditures. Finally, at the community level, the study found no impact of the program, either positive or negative. In the early years of its implementation, the program led to social tension and jealousy among villagers, especially between recipients and nonrecipients as well as between nonrecipients and the village administration. In many places, problems disappeared when the rice was distributed almost equally among all villagers. However, such an approach clearly reduces the benefits for eligible recipients, as they receive less than what they are technically allocated.

With regard to the gender dimensions of the impacts, findings in our research sites showed that Raskin rice is distributed relatively evenly between men and women in households. Adult women in Tapanuli Tengah reduce food consumption the most during food shortages, but it is adult men who do so in Timor Tengah Selatan. Villagers in Tapanuli Tengah explained that husbands are the ‘breadwinners’ so they may need more food than wives. In contrast, in Timor Tengah Selatan, villagers said that husbands or adult men reduce maize consumption because they eat other types of food besides maize. Instead of gender differences, it seems that age differences are more influential in defining people’s decision making over food intake during hard times: both quantitative and qualitative information reveals that villagers tend to prioritize children over adult household members, because they feel that children, both sons and daughters, are weaker and thus more vulnerable than adults. In this, girls reduce their consumption less than boys, possibly because of traditional cultural views that boys are generally stronger than girls. The side benefits of Raskin for children are higher if we also consider increased expenditure on children’s education, as mentioned above.

Nevertheless, the fact that the benefits of Raskin are shared equally between men and women does not necessarily indicate positive impacts of the program on gender equality. In the long term, Raskin may have positive impacts as its benefits help parents support the nutrition and education of boys and girls equally, but the program has no significant impacts on gender inequality, either economically or socially, especially in the perspective of wives.

Even so, a number of entry points exist to strengthen the gender sensitivity of the program’s design and implementation, including promoting women’s participation in program governance structures (community meetings), strengthening the focus on existing gendered vulnerabilities in terms of food insecurity and under-nutrition and especially drawing attention to lifecycle vulnerabilities (pregnancy and nursing, young children). In addition, a number of opportunities at the policy level could be harnessed to support the integration of gender into social protection programs more broadly. The positive influence of donors is seen as important in supporting progress towards gender-sensitive social protection design features and updating the collection of sex-disaggregated data on poverty and vulnerability across the country.

At the national level, gender legislation in Indonesia is very comprehensive (e.g., presidential decrees on gender mainstreaming), but limited political traction means that the translation of this framework into action is limited. The identification of allied ministries and agents of change in the government is therefore key. Bappenas – one of the most influential institutions in social protection – has been identified by the state Ministry of Women’s Empowerment as a potentially important ally in terms of gender responsiveness. The recent gender budgeting program strengthens gender budgeting in other ministries through the Ministry of Finance, to be completed by 2011. Finally, although decentralization presents many challenges, as discussed above, it also offers important opportunities in gender mainstreaming, including: increasing the number of women in political positions; improving the collection and analysis of gender-disaggregated data and statistics for better-informed policymaking; and laws to carry out district gender budgeting.

At the program level, just as important is the need to recognise the limitations of Raskin as an effective tool for food security. Evidence clearly demonstrates that women’s vulnerability to poverty and food security needs to be addressed by measures such as securing women’s employment opportunities, addressing wage disparities to increase incomes and supporting agricultural production. In this way, there is a need to think strategically about the links between food subsidy programs and other programs which may have greater opportunities to support progress towards women’s empowerment.

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APPENDIX

Social Protection Programs in Indonesia

Type of Social Protection	Program Information	Program Design	Program Linkages	Program Objectives	Targeting/Eligibility	Coverage	Result/Outcomes
In-kind transfer (food subsidy). Includes 15kg of rice per month at subsidised price of Rp 1,600 (\$0.18) per kg (current market price is Rp 5,000 per kg, or \$0.56).	Raskin (Rice for Poor Households). The program has been in place since 1998 after the financial crisis hit the country in 1997. Initially, it was called the Special Market Program (OPK). In order to focus the targeting, the program was changed to Raskin in 2000. From the beginning, the program has been implemented by Bulog under the supervision of the Ministry of Social Welfare and funded by the central government.	The amount of subsidy (15kg per month at subsidised price) was based on the average need of a household with 4-5 members. It targets households without specifying further whether actual recipients are male or female members of household. Usually, it is the husbands who are entitled to the program. But if the husband is busy at the time of rice disbursement, the wife may also take the rice.	Raskin recipients usually also received Jamkesmas and BLT. Those categorized as chronic poor also receive PKH. Some of them also participate in employment creation or revolving credit programs (PNPM). Additionally, those with children at primary and secondary school also enjoy government subsidies in the education sector.	To maintain food security of poor households, or keep their consumption level from falling below the poverty level.	Since 2006, the government has used poverty data (PSE05 module) provided by the BPS. The program guidelines state that those below the poverty line and vulnerable to poverty are eligible for the program. Before 2006, targeting was based on National Family Planning data: those categorized as Pre-Prosperous and Prosperous I were eligible.	In 2009, the program covered 18.5 million poor households, a slight decline from 19.1 million in the previous year. Initially, OPK covered only 7.5 and 8.7 million poor households in 2000 and 2001, respectively. Later, it increased to 10.8 and 15.8 million poor households in 2006 and 2007, respectively.	The program has helped poor households maintain their food security. It has also suffered from some weaknesses: leakage and undercoverage; the cost has been more expensive than stated because of additional transportation costs from distribution point to villages; the amount of rice is often less than the stated amount, as it is often distributed to more recipients. In some places, the rice is even distributed equally to all members of the community. Finally, its monitoring is not conducted properly and the program does not provide a complaint mechanism.

Type of Social Protection	Program Information	Program Design	Program Linkages	Program Objectives	Targeting/Eligibility	Coverage	Result/Outcomes
General subsidy for education. Recipients are schools, dependent on the number of students. In 2009, the subsidy was about Rp 297,000 (\$33) and Rp 570,000 (\$63.33) per year for students of primary and junior high schools, respectively in rural areas, and Rp 400,000 (\$44.44) and Rp 575,000 (\$63.89) in urban areas.	BOS (School Operational Assistance). The program was developed from a previous one on social safety nets for the education sector, which consisted of scholarships for students from poor households and block grants for schools. In 2005, the program changed to BOS, which allocates money to all students at primary and junior high (scholarships for senior high school students from poor households were maintained and the number slightly increased). Some of the money is meant to support poor students especially, but the amount is limited. From the outset, it has been maintained by the Ministry of Education and funded by the central government.	The program provides primary and secondary schools with a certain amount of money to run teaching and other school activities. The program requires that schools receiving the grant do not take tuition fees from their students. Thus, all students, regardless of their sex or the welfare status of their parents, enjoy the benefits of the program.	For those categorized as poor households, the government also provides a rice subsidy, health insurance and CCT in shock periods. Dependent on their eligibility, they may also have access to employment creation or revolving fund programs provided by PNPM. The chronic poor in particular may also receive PKH.	To ease people's burden of paying school tuition fees for primary and junior high school and to help children complete 9 years of compulsory basic education.	No targeting as all primary and junior high schools may receive the grant conditional on their willingness to be audited. At the household level, all households who have primary and junior high school-age children may receive the benefits of the program regardless of their welfare status. Some additional benefits may be received by poor households as the program also provides specific allowances to support students from such households.	The program covers 35.8 million primary and junior high school students.	The program has helped schools maintain their operational costs and improve their services for students in terms of school facilities and extracurricular activities. It has also helped increase school participation by students from poor households and lower education costs in general. Some studies have found that the management of the fund is often not transparent because of the dominant role of school principals. Only a few schools provide a transportation allowance from BOS funds to students from poor households as required by the program implementation guideline.

Type of Social Protection	Program Information	Program Design	Program Linkages	Program Objectives	Targeting/Eligibility	Coverage	Result/Outcomes
Health insurance. This provides poor households with free health services and a referral system at public health centers and hospitals.	Jamkesmas (Health Insurance for the Poor). The program has been implemented since 2008. Previously, this government program for the health sector was implemented under a different scheme. Right after the 1997/98 crisis, the government implemented a social safety net for the health sector that provided subsidies for medical services, like medicine, and health cards for poor households for free health services. The program was later changed (to Askeskin) in 2005 and finally implemented as Jamkesmas. The program is managed by the Ministry of Health in cooperation with PT Askes and funded by the central government.	The program provides health insurance for members of poor households. Every member of the household receives the insurance card regardless of their sex. The cards guarantee their right to have free basic health service at public health centers or public hospitals they are referred to.	Recipients usually also receive a food subsidy (Raskin) and BLT. Those categorized as chronic poor also received PKH. Some may also have access to employment creation or revolving credit (PNPM). Those with children of primary and secondary school age also enjoy government subsidies in the education sector.	To help poor households cover the costs of basic health services and referral schemes provided by public health centers or hospitals or midwives. Initially, under the social safety net model, the program also provided food supplements (e.g., vitamin tablets) for children and pregnant mothers from poor households.	Individual targeting based on household welfare condition. Those categorized as poor (including chronic) and near poor are the targeted recipients.	The coverage is 76.4 million people. Disaggregated data is not available.	SMERU studies found that health services by service providers, including quality of drugs, are of low quality. There is insufficient socialization of free health services for poor people and limited access by poor people to further medication in public hospitals. Other reports indicate problems in the disbursement of funds to public hospitals. Last but not least, different data on the number of poor people cause leakages and undercoverage.

Type of Social Protection	Program Information	Program Design	Program Linkages	Program Objectives	Targeting/Eligibility	Coverage	Result/Outcomes
Unconditional cash transfer. This provides Rp100,000 (\$11.11) per month. The program is usually given for a one-year period, with the fund distributed quarterly.	BLT (unconditional cash transfer). This is an unconditional transfer implemented only after an economic shock. The program has been implemented twice so far, once in 2005 after an increase in the price of fuel and once in 2008, for the same reason. Funded also by the central government, the program is implemented by the Ministry of Social Affairs in cooperation with the post office.	The program is aimed at households. Nevertheless, it is husbands who usually receive the money. Based on traditional gender roles, the program defines the husband as the recipient of the program so it is their names that appear on the program card. However, if the husbands are busy at the time of disbursement, their wives are also allowed to collect the money, which is given in cash, in the post office close to their home.	Recipients usually also receive the food subsidy (Raskin) and health insurance. Some who are categorized as chronic poor also receive PKH. Some also have access to employment creation or revolving credit programs (PNPM). Those with children at primary and secondary school also enjoy government subsidies in the education sector.	Distributed after an economic shock, the program is meant to keep the welfare status of vulnerable households from falling into poverty, or poor households from falling further into poverty.	Individual targeting based on household welfare condition. Those categorized as poor (including chronic) and near poor are the targeted recipients.	The program covers 18.5 million poor households. Initially, it covered only 15.5 million in the first round. But because of complaints, and poverty data updating by BPS, the number of recipients was increased to 19.1 million poor households in 2008.	Studies have found that the program has helped the poor and vulnerable to mitigate the impacts of economic shocks by maintaining their household consumption level. The transfer is usually used for daily consumption, child education, health and other urgent household needs. Nevertheless, leakage and undercoverage were still found in many places. SMERU studies also found weak coordination among the program stakeholders and, in some cases, funds are distributed equally to all members of the community, which violates the purpose of the program.
Conditional cash transfer. This provides chronic poor households with an allowance, ranging from Rp 600,000 to Rp 2,200,000 (\$66.67-\$244.44) per year, dependent on the composition of the households, such as the number of children at junior high school.	PKH (conditional cash transfer). The program has been in place since 2007 but is still being piloted in 13 provinces. The program is managed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and funded by the central government.	The allowance is given on the condition that households take care of their children's health and education. Further, the program targets mothers or female members of the household on the assumption that it is mothers who usually take care of children's education and health. The allowance is given every three months in cash; recipients should collect the money themselves in selected post offices.	As PKH recipients are chronic poor, they also receive Raskin, BLT and health insurance programs. If they have children at primary and junior high school, they also receive the benefits of BOS. Furthermore, when available, they may also participate in employment creation programs that provide cash for work.	To improve the quality of human development especially in chronic poor households, by providing an allowance for health and education maintenance. In the long term, the program aims at cutting the intergeneration transfer of poverty from parents to their children.	Only those categorized as chronic poor and having children under five or primary and junior high school-age and/or pregnant mothers could access the program.	By now, the program covers 1.75 million chronic poor households.	The program helps the chronic poor meet the cost of their children's education and health needs and the specific nutrition needs of young children and pregnant or breastfeeding mothers. Some of the funds are used to cover daily basic needs. Monitoring is not conducted properly and there is weak coordination between stakeholders. SMERU also found that some recipients do not meet requirements related to their children's school attendance or immunisation and regular weight checks.

Type of Social Protection	Program Information	Program Design	Program Linkages	Program Objectives	Targeting/Eligibility	Coverage	Result/Outcomes
Community empowerment. This provides a block grant to communities to build basic infrastructure. The amount of money ranges from Rp 1–3 million (\$111.11-\$333.33), dependent on the population. For 2009, the total allocated amount was Rp16.1 trillion.	PNPM Mandiri (National Program of Community Empowerment). Launched nationally in 2007, the program evolved from a number of others implemented since the 1990s: KDP, Urban Poverty Reduction Program (P2KP), Regional Infrastructure for Social and Economic Development (PISEW), Rural Infrastructure Development (PPIP) and Underdeveloped Area Development (P2DTK). It is conducted by several departments under coordination of the Ministry of Social Welfare and funded by the central government.	Other than developing basic infrastructure for poor people, such as roads and clean water facilities, the program also aims at creating employment opportunities for poor people. About 20–25% of the grant is meant to constitute a revolving fund (capital assistance) for members of the community. Women have better access to the revolving fund, but their participation in infrastructure development is often limited. This is because of a common perception that construction is men's work, not suitable for women. Participants receive about Rp 40,000 (\$4.44) per day.	The program serves as an umbrella for all poverty reduction programs. It supports or complements direct social assistance or subsidies targeted at poor individuals.	To accelerate poverty reduction as well as regional and infrastructure development.	Initially, the program was meant to accelerate the development of underdeveloped areas. It used geographical targeting to choose area beneficiaries. The program has now been scaled up to cover more areas, but communities have to compete for the grants. At the community level, the opportunity to participate in public works is based on self-selection.	The coverage of the program for 2009 was 6,408 <i>kecamatan</i> . It had increased significantly from 2,361 <i>kecamatan</i> in 2007 and 4,768 <i>kecamatan</i> in 2008.	In 2007, 67% of the grant was used to develop rural infrastructure, 17% for women's microcredit facilities, 12% for education programs and 4% for the health sector. In terms of employment creation, the program employed 14.4 million workers in 2008. It appeared that basic infrastructure developed by the program could improve people's economic activities. The unemployment rate in PNPM-recipient villages was 1.5 percent lower than that in non-PNPM recipient villages.

Type of Social Protection	Program Information	Program Design	Program Linkages	Program Objectives	Targeting/Eligibility	Coverage	Result/Outcomes
Microcredit. The program provides up to Rp 5million (\$555.56) for small entrepreneurs or more for bigger enterprises.	KUR (People's Business Credit). The program started in 2007 with the issuing of Presidential Instruction 6/2007. The program was inspired by the fact that small enterprises need capital assistance to run or develop their business.	In order to implement the program, the government involved a number of commercial banks to channel credit to the recipients. The government also worked with microfinance institutions to broaden coverage.	Poor people may also access some other government social protection programs including Raskin, BLT, and Jamkesmas.	To accelerate the development of the real sector as well as small and micro enterprises. It also aims at anticipating the rise of unemployment as a result of the impacts of the global financial crisis.	The program targets small enterprises.	The program aimed to cover 2 million people in 2008 and another 4 million people in 2009.	Not all enterprises can gain access to credit facilities because of difficulties in meeting the credit requirements. In the case of those receiving the loan, there is some that many have difficulties in paying the loan.
Social insurance. The program insures against work accidents, illness, death, and funeral risks, but not unemployment. In the case of retirement, the program only gives a lump sum payment from a mandatory savings scheme paid by program participants, plus interest.	Jamsostek (Social Insurance for Workers). Jamsostek has been in place since 1999. However, the origins of employees' social security can be traced back to the preindependence period. A step to reform the program was in 1977, with the establishment of Employees' Insurance, later modified into Jamsostek in 1999.	Participation in the program is based on the premium paid by employees and their employers. It does not differentiate between male and female workers in program participation. Related to gender-specific needs in particular, the program provides pregnancy and maternity care for female workers or employees' wives.	Jamsostek is a contributory social security system. It has no formal linkages with other social protection systems.	The objective of the program is to provide basic protection for employees and their families against socioeconomic risks that may affect them as a result of work-related accidents, illness, death, or old age. There is no specific gender objective in the program design.	Until now, the program has targeted only employees of the formal sector. Some new initiatives are being taken by PT Jamsostek as the implementing agency to also target those in the informal sector.	Coverage of the program is now still limited to the formal sector. The program covers 23.73 million employees (7.94 million active workers and 15.79 million nonactive workers).	Since most of the labor force works in the informal sector (60-65%), the program covers only a small part of the economically active population. Female workers are often considered single regardless of their marital status: as they are usually not seen as the main income generator in the household, employers do not want to pay their contributions as married workers.

The SMERU Research Institute

Telephone : +62 21 3193 6336

Fax : +62 21 3193 0850

E-mail : smeru@smeru.or.id

Website : www.smeru.or.id