

RESEARCH REPORT

**A Qualitative Study on the Impact of the
PNPM-Rural in East Java, West Sumatra,
and Southeast Sulawesi**

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The SMERU Research Institute

Jakarta

July 2013

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A Qualitative Study on the Impact of the PNPM-Rural in East Java, West Sumatra, and Southeast Sulawesi / Muhammad Syukri et al. -- Jakarta: SMERU Research Institute, 2013.

xv, 76 p. ; 30 cm. -- (Research Report SMERU, July 2013)

ISBN 978-979-3872-890-2

1. PNPM-Rural

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362.57 / DDC 22

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We express our thanks to John Voss, G. Kelik Agus Endarso, and Lina Marliani from the World Bank, who have supported this research, for their technical guidance, valuable comments, and suggestions provided during the course of the study.

Our thanks also go to all the community members in all the sample areas who have been willing to become respondents and informants and have taken part in providing valuable information for this study. Our sincere thanks also go to the PNPM implementers who, in the middle of their busy schedule, were willing to meet and discuss with the research team. We also highly appreciate all the help given by the *kecamatan* heads, *puskesmas* heads, village officials, and *posyandu* cadres who have spent their precious time to make it possible for the researchers to meet and discuss with the community. We would also like to extend our appreciation to the local government officials at the *kabupaten/kota* and *kecamatan* levels in the study areas who had granted the permit to conduct this research. Our high appreciation also goes to the regional researchers for their dedication to the research by working hard despite the limited conditions.

ABSTRACT

A Qualitative Study on the Impact of the PNPM-Rural in East Java, West Sumatra, and Southeast Sulawesi

Muhammad Syukri, Sulton Mawardi, and Akhmadi

This study aims to look at the impact of PNPM Rural especially on poverty reduction, community participation, and the accountability, transparency, and responsiveness of the government at the village level. In addition, this study also examines the impact of PNPM-Rural on the fulfillment of the poor's primary needs in rural areas as well as the extent to which empowerment has occurred. The study was carried out in 18 villages in three provinces, namely East Java, West Sumatra, and Southeast Sulawesi. Initially, this study was designed to divide the research areas into treatment and control areas. However, because in 2010, PNPM-Rural covered all districts, there was no longer any research area that could be fully regarded as control areas. In terms of methodology, this study uses a qualitative panel and compares the results of the 2010 PNPM Impact Study with the 2007 PNPM Baseline Study. In general, this study finds that PNPM-Rural has been implemented properly. For the open menu program, almost all the villages used it for infrastructure development. However, only a small part of the SPP-PNPM program was actually accessed by the poor. In relation to poverty, there has been a decrease to varying degrees in almost all the research areas. It is only on the issues of participation, transparency, and accountability that the study finds a big difference between what happened inside and outside the program. Participation, transparency, and accountability worked very well in the implementation of PNPM-Rural. However, outside PNPM-Rural, namely in the village administration or in the implementation of programs other than PNPM-Rural, participation, transparency, and accountability remained low. Furthermore, there was almost no PNPM project in the study areas that corresponded to the primary needs of the poor. This may indicate that the PNPM program had not been successful in terms of empowering the poor.

Keywords: PNPM-Rural, impact, poverty, participation, transparency, accountability

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADD	: Alokasi Dana Desa	Village Funds Allocation
APBD	: Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah	regional budget
BLT	: Bantuan Langsung Tunai	Direct Cash Transfer
BMN	: Badan Musyawarah Nagari	<i>Nagari</i> Consultative Council
BMT	: <i>baitul maal wa tammwil</i>	Islamic microfinance institution
BOS	: Bantuan Operasional Sekolah	School Operational Assistance
BPD	: Badan Permusyawaratan Desa	Village Consultative Body
BPKB	: Bukti Pemilikan Kendaraan Bermotor	Vehicle Ownership Certificate
BPRN	: Badan Perwakilan Rakyat Nagari	<i>Nagari</i> House of Representatives
FK	: fasilitator kecamatan	<i>kecamatan</i> fasilitator
FGD	: diskusi kelompok terfokus	focus group discussion
Gardu Taskin	: Gerakan Terpadu Pengentasan Masyarakat Miskin	Integrated Movements for Poverty Reduction
Jamkesda	: Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah	Regional Health Insurance for the Poor
Jamkesmas	: Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat	Health Insurance for the Poor
JPD	: Jalan Poros Desa	Village Axis Road
JUT	: Jalan Usaha Tani	Farm Road
KAN	: <i>Karapatan</i> Adat Nagari	<i>Nagari</i> Customary Council
KK	: kepala keluarga/kartu keluarga	household head/family card
Kopwan	: Koperasi Wanita	Women's Cooperative
KPMD	: kader pembangunan masyarakat desa	Village Community Development Cadres
KTP	: kartu tanda penduduk	ID card
KUBE	: Kelompok Usaha Bersama	Cooperative Work Group
KUD	: Koperasi Unit Desa	Village Unit Cooperative
LKMD	: Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa	Village Community Resilience Institution
LPM	: Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat	Community Empowerment Institution
MAD	: musyawarah antardesa	intervillage consultative meeting
MAN	: musyawarah antarnagari	inter- <i>nagari</i> consultative meeting
<i>musdes</i>	: musyawarah desa	village consultative meeting
<i>musjor</i>	: musyawarah jorong	<i>jorong</i> consultative meeting
MTs	: madrasah sanawiah	Islamic junior high school
<i>musrenbang</i>	: musyawarah perencanaan pembangunan	development planning consultative meeting
NU	: Nahdatul Ulama	a religious-social organization
PAUD	: pendidikan anak usia dini	early childhood education
Pamsimas	: Penyediaan Air Minum dan Sanitasi Berbasis Masyarakat	Community-based Clean Water and Sanitation Supply
PDAM	: Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum	Local Water Supply Company
PJOK	: penanggung jawab operasional kegiatan	Person in charge of a project
PKH	: Program Keluarga Harapan	Family of Hope Program

PKK	: Pemberdayaan dan Kesejahteraan Keluarga	Family Welfare Empowerment
PNPM	: Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat	National Program for Community Empowerment
PNS	: pegawai negeri sipil	civil servant
<i>polindes</i>	: pondok bersalin desa	village maternity post
<i>posyandu</i>	: pos pelayanan terpadu	integrated health service post
PPK	: Program Pengembangan Kecamatan	<i>Kecamatan</i> Development Program
PU	: Pekerjaan Umum (Dinas)	Public Works (Agency)
<i>puskesri</i>	: pusat kesehatan nagari	<i>nagari</i> health center
<i>puskesmas</i>	: pusat kesehatan masyarakat	community health center
<i>pustu</i>	: puskesmas pembantu	secondary <i>puskesmas</i>
PTO	: Petunjuk Teknis Operasional	Technical Guidelines for Operation
RA	: raudatul atfal (TK Islam)	Islamic kindergarten
RAPBDes	: Rencana Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Desa	Village Budget Plan
Raskin	: Beras untuk Rumah Tangga Miskin	Rice for the Poor
RT	: rukun tetangga	neighborhood unit consisting of several households
RTM	: rumah tangga miskin	poor households
RTSM	: rumah tangga sangat miskin	very poor household
RW	: rukun warga	administrative unit consisting of several RT
SD	: sekolah dasar	elementary school
SMA	: sekolah menengah atas	senior high school
SMP	: sekolah menengah pertama	junior high school
SPP	: Simpan Pinjam Perempuan	Women's Savings and Loan
TK	: taman kanak-kanak	kindergarten
TKI	: tenaga kerja Indonesia	Indonesian migrant worker
TPK	: tim pelaksana kegiatan	program implementation team
UEP-SP	: Usaha Ekonomi Produktif-Simpan Pinjam	Savings and Loan-Urban Economic Unit
UPK	: unit pelaksana kegiatan	project implementing unit

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

The National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM) Mandiri is a poverty reduction program launched by the Government of Indonesia in 2007. The biggest component of the program is for the empowerment of the village community. Following the format of its predecessor, the *Kecamatan* (Subdistrict) Development Program (PPK), the PNPM Mandiri encourages community participation in every stage of the program. Based on what is agreed by the community, the village administration then submits development proposals to the *kecamatan* level. The program requires that the block grants be allocated for distribution at the *kecamatan* level; the villages must then compete to prove that they deserve the grant based on the principles of urgency and significance for the poor community.

To evaluate the impact of the program, The SMERU Research Institute in cooperation with the PNPM Support Facility (PSF) conducted a qualitative evaluation study. In general, this study compared the sample villages' recent condition with their condition prior to the program implementation, the data of which had been collected through a baseline study in 2007. The data collection was done through focus group discussions (FGDs), in-depth interviews, and monitoring of the PNPM-Rural activities. The study was conducted in 18 villages in 9 *kabupaten* (districts) in 3 provinces, namely East Java, West Sumatra, and Southeast Sulawesi. Following the sampling method of the baseline study, the locations of the study were divided into three categories: (i) villages/*nagari*ⁱ that had participated in PPK phase two (PPK-II) since 2002 and were recipients of the PNPM in 2007 (hereafter referred to as K1); (ii) villages/*nagari* that had not participated in PPK-II but were recipients of the PNPM in 2007 (hereafter referred to as K2); and (iii) villages/*nagari* that had not participated in PPK-II nor the PNPM in 2007 but were recipients of the PNPM in 2009 (hereafter referred to as K3), when the government proved their commitment on the inclusion of every *kecamatan* in the program implementation. The whole study was conducted between March and October 2010.

Characteristics of Study Areas

All the sample villages are rural areas that mainly depend on farming. Some of the villages are located in coastal areas, but the majority of the villagers live from farming and keeping livestock. In addition to farming, the villagers work in small trading sector as kiosk owners and in service sector as *ojek* (motorcycle taxi) service providers, construction workers, or migrant workers. In the last two years, many villagers in Kabupaten Bombana and Kabupaten Konawe Selatan (Southeast Sulawesi) have worked at public gold mining sites both as miners and as providers of goods and services for the miners.

The condition of roads in the sample villages relatively varies. In East Java Province and West Sumatra Province, most of the village and *dusun*ⁱⁱ roads are in good condition, whereas in Southeast Sulawesi Province, many parts of the *kabupaten* or even provincial roads that pass the sample villages are in a very bad condition. During the past three years, most of the damaged roads have been repaired, partly funded by the PNPM. However, inadequate public transport facilities remain an unsolved problem and the villagers generally rely on *ojek* for transportation.

ⁱA *nagari* is a village-level administrative unit in the West Sumatra Province.

ⁱⁱA *dusun* is an administrative area within a village, consisting of a number of RT (neighborhood units).

In the sectors of basic education and health, most of the sample villages are already equipped with adequate facilities. However, primary schools are not available in some villages in Southeast Sulawesi, so the children have to attend schools at the not-so-near neighboring villages. Other education facilities such as preschools, junior high schools, and senior high schools are generally unavailable in villages other than the *kecamatan* capitals. Health facilities in the sample villages in Southeast Sulawesi are still lacking in numbers. In other sample villages, health facilities such as *polindes* (village maternity posts), *pustu* (secondary *puskesmas*ⁱⁱⁱ), and *posyandu* (integrated health service posts) are available, but their conditions are in need of improvement.

In terms of clean water supply, most of the sample villagers do not consider it as a major issue. However, some villagers from certain *dusun* or RT^{iv} still find it difficult to access it. Economic facilities such as traditional markets are accessible for the sample villagers in general.

Main Findings

1. Implementation of the PNPM-Rural

Almost all sample villages chose infrastructure projects for the open menu program category. Only one village (in Dharmastraya) submitted a proposal of a non-infrastructure activity—training on developing home industries. The infrastructure that was constructed was roads, bridges, irrigation systems, waterways, school buildings, and *posyandu*. The villages chose infrastructure projects because (i) there was not adequate infrastructure at the study area; (ii) the PNPM was regarded as a program for the general public; (iii) they wanted to cushion the negative impact of targeted programs such as the Direct Cash Transfer—Indonesia’s unconditional cash transfer (BLT), Rice for the Poor (Raskin), Family of Hope Program (PKH), and Health Insurance for the Poor (Jamkesmas); (iv) the elite and nonpoor villagers had biased opinions during the decision-making process.

The Women’s Savings and Loan (SPP) program is considered greatly beneficial because it has (i) developed the recipients’ businesses, (ii) improved households’ financial capacity, and (iii) replaced loan sharks. The recipients used the program fund to develop their old business and to create new business. The program implementers required that recipients already have their own business. A small portion of the program fund was used for households’ urgent needs. Especially in Ngawi, SPP has reduced the villagers’ dependency on loan sharks since the program offered competitive interest rates and simple procedures for those who have already had their own business.

The PNPM implementers limited the poor’s access to the SPP program by imposing strict requirements for fear that the poor would not be able to repay the loan. There were also cases in which certain people cheated to get the fund, by falsely including the names of the poor on the list of people who submitted the program proposal. The fund would then be used by the cheating nonpoor for their own benefit.

ⁱⁱⁱ*Puskesmas* stands for *pusat kesehatan masyarakat* (community health center).

^{iv}An RT, or neighborhood unit, is the smallest unit of local administration consisting of a number of households.

The SPP fund disbursement was then considered as a prerequisite to get the open menu program by most of the program implementers in the villages and the village officials. Therefore, many community members did whatever they could to get the fund, including by means of deception. For example, many business groups applying for the SPP loan were instantly established only to get the fund. In many areas, names of the poor were falsely included on the list of fund recipients; but when the money was disbursed, it was distributed among the nonpoor. However, conversely, in a village in Kabupaten Gresik, East Java, the community leaders deliberately refused to get the SPP fund for fear that they would not be able to repay the loan, which means an automatic failure in getting the open menu program.

Generally, the villagers' involvement in the decision-making for the open menu program and the SPP was merely instrumental, only to fulfill the program's formal requirement. The increasing number of villagers being present at the PNPM meetings did not fully alter the village elite's domination in the decision-making process. The villagers, particularly the poor, were still passive participants. The condition was due to some factors: (i) kinship, (ii) patronage system, (iii) the village elite's reluctance to live by the principles of democracy, and (iv) the elite's feeling of superiority over their fellow villagers. These factors caused inequality during the decision-making process.

The increasing women's participation in the PNPM planning and implementation processes could not eliminate men's dominance, which was less noticeable in the special forum for women, a meeting held to generate women's ideas, which would propose one suggestion for the SPP and another for the open menu program. However, men's dominance was still apparent in the special meeting because in some sample villages, the final decisions for the suggestions from the special forum were made at the village level. The decision-makers at this level were the village elite, which is dominated by men.

In the sample villages in general, there were no serious conflicts related to the implementation of PNPM. However, in a small number of sample villages, the PNPM implementation could lead to and even has caused conflicts, such as conflicts of interests between *lorong*^v / *dusun*, conflicts between the village administrations and the program implementation team (TPK), between the TPK and the community, and between the locals and the nonlocals (those who migrated to the villages from other places), and conflicts regarding supplies of goods and services. In addition to lack of knowledge of the program and thus lack of program socialization, the cause of the conflicts was because there was not enough coordination with or involvement of relevant people in the program implementation. In West Sumatra, the area unit for the program implementation was *lorong*. Therefore, the *nagari* leaders felt that they were not involved, so no one could facilitate communication between *lorong*. Lack of coordination also created conflicts between the village administration and the TPK, while conflicts between the locals and the nonlocals were triggered by jealousy over economic gap—the villages where the nonlocals live are more developed than those where the locals live—just like what happened in Dharmasraya. With the PNPM requiring the community's self-help, the program funds were often granted to the nonlocals' villages. This is due to the fact that the roads there were wider and the villagers had more lands, so when requested, they were willing to give up their lands for the program. At the locals' villages, the roads were narrow and the villagers were not willing to give away their small lands, so they did not get the PNPM physical programs.

^vA *lorong* is a *dusun*-level administrative unit in the West Sumatra Province.

The *kecamatan* facilitators considered that the workloads given to them were not evenly spread among the available resources. Some facilitators had working areas covering 10 villages, while some others had to facilitate more than 50 villages, just like what happened in one *kecamatan* (not a sample *kecamatan*) in Kabupaten Agam, West Sumatra. Moreover, the facilitators thought that the technical and administrative works, such as the monthly report writing, have taken most of their time, so they could not make the most of their job as facilitators.

The *kecamatan* facilitators also believed that there should have been special facilitators who were assigned to empower the SPP recipients because they already had heavy workload and not all facilitators at the *kecamatan* had the skills related to microcredit empowerment. There were microcredit facilitators at the *kabupaten* level, but they were actually more needed at the *kecamatan* level.

2. Governance, Participation, and Representation in Decision-making

In most of the sample villages, the decision-making process generally involved only the village elites—the village officials and community leaders. The village elite and most of the villagers believed the village elite already represented the whole community. Other members of the community were usually passive participants when they were present, only listening to and agreeing to what the elite decided. Some villagers, especially the poor, did not attend the meetings because they felt inferior. Other reasons for the villagers' absence in the meetings were apathy, unfavorable time of the meetings, and not getting any invitation.

During the decision-making process at the village level, women were often represented by formal institutions regarded to speak for women, such as the Family Welfare Empowerment (PKK) or *Bundo Kanduang* in West Sumatra. Consequently, women were less represented than men. However, compared to the condition eight or three years ago, more women have attended the decision-making process at the village level although this did not really change the fact that men still dominated the process. In addition, most villagers still believe that men are the leaders, so they, instead of women, should make the decisions.

The system of representation did not function properly, clearly seen from the absence of mechanisms at the RT/*dusun* level to get the villagers' aspirations or to disseminate results of the village meetings. No meeting was held to absorb the villagers' aspirations because the village elite claimed to have understood the villagers' problems more than the villagers themselves. The village elite also thought that not all the decisions made and information gathered from the village meetings should be disseminated to the community, especially if money was involved. The fact that the villagers very rarely asked their leaders about any information, decisions, and activities at the village level added to the problem. Information was usually given to the villagers during informal meetings such *arisan*^{vi} and religious gatherings.

The villagers were generally passive when it came to information on development, except for that on direct aid such as Raskin and BLT. At the village or *dusun* level, such information was usually given orally from the head of the village to the head of *dusun*/RW^{vii}/RT and then from the head of *dusun*/RW/RT to the villagers. The information

^{vi}An *arisan* is a social gathering in which the participants operate a savings and loans mechanism.

^{vii}An RW is a unit of local administration consisting of several RT (neighborhood units) within a *kelurahan* (a village-level administrative area located in an urban center).

was generally on the program's activities and implementation. Information regarding activity funds or budget was seldom given to the public. Moreover, the village administration staff generally gave information which was instructive or mobilizing, such as the information on community work.

When there were problems or unsatisfactory results, the villagers generally did not voice their complaints or dissatisfaction to the village administration. They only talked about the problems among themselves or with the community leaders. Only a few villagers were willing and had the courage to tell the village administration. This condition was due to some factors, such as the villagers' reluctance, fear to the village officials, and apathy (because of previous unattended complaints).

In general, the participation model set out by the PNPM did not have any significant impact on the government system (participation, transparency, and accountability) at the village level. This was apparent from the comparison of villages that had been beneficiaries of the PNPM since 2002, 2007, or 2009. Only one village claimed to feel the impact of the PNPM on activities other than PNPM. In other villages, participation and transparency applied during the PNPM implementation were regarded as the program's special features that did not have to be applied on other programs.

The fact that PNPM did not have any significant impact on the government system in general was caused by some factors, namely: (i) the elite's dominance and the villagers' lack of initiative, thus preserving the status quo; (ii) absence of guarantee (incentives) for the village officials and villagers that if they had applied the PNPM mechanisms on other programs, they would have been given something in return, such as a project; and (iii) the village officials' and villagers' tendency to live by the existing norms. If a program or an activity did not require participation, transparency, and accountability, they would not impose those requirements.

3. Poverty and Its Dynamics

There were less poor people in the majority of the sample villages compared to the previous eight or three years with varied declining rates among the villages. Factors that have brought about the decline were, among others, (i) new job opportunities or job opportunity expansion such as the gold mine exploitation in Kabupaten Bombana, Southeast Sulawesi; (ii) opportunities to be migrant workers; (iii) regional segregation, creating new economic centers; and (iv) new factories/plantations at the neighborhood. In addition, the decline was also caused by the rising prices of plantation commodities in West Sumatra and sea commodities in Southeast Sulawesi. Other factors were the better rural roads, the increase of farming productivity, and government aids. PNPM indirectly contributed by facilitating the construction of public infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, and irrigation systems and farm roads for the farming sector.

There were more poor people in two villages in East Java than before. The increase was due to the decrease in sea commodities productivity caused by environmental degradation (sea pollution by the industrial wastes) and the decline in labor participation caused by industrial mechanization. In both cases, the villagers did not make use of the PNPM as an instrument to solve the problems.

Poverty characteristics were mainly connected by the villagers to the aspects of asset ownership, daily needs (including education and health) fulfillment, and types of

occupation. For example, having minimum assets and no fulltime job was considered as the main reason for someone to be poor. This belief has not changed significantly in the last eight or three years.

The determiners of poverty dynamics included factors of economy, social, public and government institution frameworks, government's support, and programs' targeting. Economic factors, such as the rise and fall of prices of farm/sea commodities and prices of daily needs, as well as government aids, played the biggest role in the cases of some poor households whose economic condition has fluctuated for the past eight years.

The condition of the poor to remain poor was generally caused by the absence of skills and capital to improve their life. It was specifically because (i) there was a limited number of alternative job opportunities in addition to their main field work, which is in the farming sector; (ii) the poor were generally junior high school graduates and had only traditional skills (as farmers, fishers, or construction workers); (iii) they did not have enough capital, especially capital funds. Although there had been some aids offering capital funds, what they really needed was financial aid, like direct cash transfer, that they did not have to repay. Other significant factors, according to the villagers, were their mental attitude that they did not feel the passion to develop or that they felt satisfied easily, not being able to be productive due to old age, being economically dependent widows, and the increasing prices of daily needs.

Poverty reduction programs, especially those with special targets, such as BLT, Raskin, and Jamkesmas, significantly contributed in helping the poor so that they would not get poorer. The BLT funds, the Jamkesmas cards, and the Raskin subsidized rice were considered to have helped the poor with their daily needs regarding emergency cash needs, health expenses, and food. The three programs have also been regarded as the top three of government programs which are the most beneficial for the poor. Unfortunately, the program targeting was in the hands of the village elites with no room for the poor to decide or for transparency.

The PNPM was regarded as playing an insignificant role in reducing poverty. This was because the program implementers did not think that it was a poverty reduction program. They thought it was merely a village development program. Consequently, they did not put the poor as top priority. This was apparent from the facts that they made project plans without considering the benefits for the poor; that they did not specifically include the poor on the list of workforce for the PNPM construction projects; and that they did not exclude the poor when they required self-help.

4. Dynamics of Access and Quality of Public Services

In general, the sample villages already had public service facilities in the education, health, water supply, and economy (market) sectors. This has contributed to the increase of the villagers' access to public services during the past eight or three years. In this regard, PNPM was thought to have been quite beneficial since it helped to provide additional facilities or to improve the condition of the existing facilities, including the road repairs. Besides, the road infrastructure improvement facilitated by the program was also considered helpful in improving the villagers' economy. However, in some sample villages, for some community members, public facilities were still difficult to access. This was caused by, among others, (i) the limited number of facilities, (ii) the unavailability of public transport to reach the facilities, and (iii) the absence of quality services especially health services.

Regarding the quality of public services, the villagers thought that it needs to be improved. In the health sector, for example, Jamkesmas card holders felt that they were not treated as well as other patients were. In some sample villages, civil administration services, especially the obtainment of ID card and family card, were considered to have become more complicated since the villagers had to go to the *kabupaten*.

5. Dynamics of Needs and Their Fulfillment

In almost all sample villages, the poor's main needs were job opportunities, capital loan, and skills upgrade. Then, they also needed scholarships, free health services, and infrastructure to support their main livelihood (such as an irrigation system and farm roads). The government and some groups of villagers have made efforts to fulfill the needs, but to no real avail. It was because (i) the existing programs were not adequate to fulfill the villagers' needs; (ii) there were sociocultural conditions in the villages, such as social envy, the elites' or the poor's bias judgments, and (iii) there were deviations or there was ineffectiveness during the program implementation that lessened the impact on the villagers' needs fulfillment.

PNPM-Rural was seldom used to fulfill the villages' primary needs. The PNPM open menu program was often used to build general infrastructure that did not directly cater the poor's needs. This is due to the fact that the PNPM is viewed as a village development program targeted at the village community and not as a program targeted at the poor. The SPP could partly fulfill the needs for capital loans, but it was difficult for the poor to gain access to the program due to its strict condition that required a person to have a business before applying for a loan.

The PNPM has not been fully successful in empowering the village community. This is due to the following factors (i) the improper structure of power in the villages where the elites were dominant, marginalizing the poor; (ii) the PNPM empowerment model became mechanistic, in which facilitators were only told to make sure that the program stages were properly conducted and not to open the villagers' eyes or to improve the villagers' capacity with regard to the program objectives, which are to encourage the creation of good governance (participation, transparency, and accountability) and improve the villagers' economic capacity based on self-help; (iii) the case of the disagreement between the program's mechanism and the local cultural characteristics, in which PNPM encourages individual participation in the program's activities as well as in the village/*nagari* administration matters, while the local culture such as in West Sumatra urges stronger communal representation by restoring the *nagari* administration tradition; (iv) the ineffective work of the facilitators due to heavy loads of technical and administrative works; and (v) the poor quality and experience of facilitators as well as the frequent area rotation for the facilitators and high turnover of facilitators.

I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

In August 2006, the government launched a poverty reduction umbrella program which is named National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM) Mandiri. Under this umbrella program, there are numerous types of PNPM and one of the biggest is PNPM-Rural (PNPM-Perdesaan). The design of PNPM-Rural is based on its predecessor, that is, the *Kecamatan* (Subdistrict) Development Program (PPK). This program was already implemented in 2007 and currently (2010), its implementation has covered 4,805 *kecamatan*. In general, PNPM aims at reducing poverty, increasing cooperation between the community and regional government to improve the effectiveness of poverty reduction, increasing community's participation in the development process, improving the regional government's capability in providing public service, and improving the capacity of social institutions in the regions.

After PNPM-Rural had been implemented for three years, The SMERU Research Institute in cooperation with the PNPM Support Facility (PSF) conducted a qualitative study to learn the latest condition as well as the changes that occurred in relation with the goals of PNPM in reducing poverty, increasing community's participation, and strengthening regional government institutions. To deeply explore the changes that took place, the results of this study will be compared with the results of the baseline study of PNPM-Rural which was already carried out in 2007. Therefore, it can be determined what the changes are, how far have the changes taken place, and what have caused those changes.

1.2 Research Objectives

This study attempts to collect data on the changes that have occurred from time to time and the impacts that were brought about by PNPM-Rural by comparing it with the results of the baseline study conducted in 2007. Therefore, this study will go to sample areas that are the same as the sample areas of the baseline study. The main objectives of the qualitative study of the evaluation of the impact of PNPM-Rural are

- a) to document the latest condition related to the principles and goals of PNPM-Rural after the program has been conducted for two years in the treatment (and control) areas;
- b) to document and analyze the changes that have occurred from time to time as well as to determine what has PNPM-Rural contributed to the changes; and
- c) to understand the main reasons and factors that have caused the changes from time to time and that have probably affected the implementation as well as the results of the program.

Moreover, this study investigates issues related to poverty, poverty targeting, and access to markets and public facilities, regional government, and empowerment as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Research Questions

	Research Questions	Topics To Be Studied
Poverty and Poverty Targeting	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How does the community (village/government) understand poverty, its causes, and its solutions? 2. How has poverty changed in the community in the past two years? 3. How does the community (village/government) target the poor? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community's (village/government) understanding on the characteristics of poor household. - Community's (village/government) understanding on the reasons why a poor household becomes poor. - Have the factors affecting poverty in the community changed in the last two years? - Community's understanding (village/government) on ways to move out of poverty. - Poverty targeting in the village (namely, for project location and determination of recipients)
Government, participation, and transparency	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. How have the inclusivity, transparency, and responsiveness of the village administration in the decision-making process changed in the past two years? 5. How much is the demand of the community towards participation and information and what are the changes in the past two years? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Information flow in the village (from top to down and vice versa). - Community's participation in the village in decision-making, both in the whole activities and in the activities of PNPM-Rural only. - The performance of the representation system (<i>dusun</i>¹/RT²) and the implementation of PNPM-Rural. - Problem solving by the village administration, including the mechanism for complaint handling/conflict resolution in PNPM-Rural. - Responsiveness of the village administration towards the needs and problems of the village people. - Expectation of the village community on the result of community participation versus the decision-making of the village representative/administration or elites. - Changes of perception among the villagers on the importance of participation and access to information in order to fulfill needs.
Empowerment and village needs	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. How have participation in decision-making and access to information affected the ability of the community to fulfill their needs and what are the changes in the past two years? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Priority of the village needs (for example, infrastructure or service). - Strategy to fulfill needs/solve problems. - Results of various activities including the development managed by the community. - Experience in applying numerous strategies to solve problems (successes and failures). - Reasons behind limited access to services (health, education, clean water, administration) and market. - Perception on service quality (health, education, clean water, administration). - Cooperation among the community in the neighborhood, in various village layers and among the formal and semiformal groups. - Roles and responsibilities of social institutions versus the village administration in solving problems.

¹A *dusun* is an administrative area within a village, consisting of a number of RT (neighborhood units).

²An RT, or neighborhood unit, is the smallest unit of local administration consisting of a number of households.

1.3 Research Methodology

This impact evaluation study is a qualitative study that attempts to compare the condition of the treatment areas with the condition of the control areas in three different periods of time, which are a year ago (2009), three years ago (2007), and eight years ago (2002). The year 2009 was when all areas that became control areas during the baseline study had accepted the program (becoming treatment areas). The year 2007 was when the baseline study was implemented and 2002 was when PPK, as the predecessor of PNPM-Rural, had started. The purpose of comparing the treatment areas with the former control areas in three periods of time is to investigate the characteristics of the changes that occurred in relation with the length of the implementation of the program. It is assumed that the longer the implementation of the program, the stronger the institution and the more likely it succeeds, and vice versa.

Data collection was carried out with four methods: in-depth interviews, focus group discussions (FGD), observation on the process or results of PNPM activities, and relevant document collection. In-depth interviews based on interview guidelines were conducted with key informants and household informants. Key informants consist of government officers related to the implementation of PNPM in *kecamatan* and villages such as *kecamatan* heads or persons in charge of projects (PJOK), village heads, heads of village development affairs, or *dusun* heads; PNPM implementers such as *kecamatan* facilitators (FK) and project implementing units (UPK) at the *kecamatan* level, and project implementing teams (TPK) and Village Community Development Cadres (KPMMD) at the village level; active community leaders in the village both male and female; and common people that consists of the poor and the middle/rich, male and female.

In addition, FGDs were conducted five times in every village. All FGDs covered one FGD with the village community's representatives which included government officers and community leaders, two FGDs with the poor community in which male and female FGDs were conducted separately, and two FGDs with the middle/rich community where male and female FGDs were conducted separately. Besides the interviews and FGDs, there were also observations on the process (when it is available during the field visit) or the results of PNPM activities. Finally, various relevant documents were collected, both prior to and during the field visit.

Table 2. Categories and Number of Informants

Key informants for in-depth interviews (at the <i>kecamatan</i> and village levels)	<i>Kecamatan</i> heads/PJOK	1
	Project implementers at the <i>kecamatan</i> level (FK/UPK)	1
	Village heads	1
	Other village officials (head of affairs/ <i>dusun</i> /RT)	2
	Male community leaders	1
	Female community leaders	1
	Project implementers/former project implementers in the village (TPK/KPMMD)	1
	Total:	8
Village informants (at the village level)	Male residents from the poor group	1
	Female residents from the poor group	1
	Male residents from the middle/rich group	1
	Female residents from the middle/rich group	1
	Total:	4
Focus group discussions (at the village level)	FGD with village representatives (village officials and leaders)	1
	FGD with poor male residents	1
	FGD with poor female residents	1
	FGD with middle/rich male residents	1
	FGD with middle/rich female residents	1
	Total:	5

1.4 Study Areas

The study areas for this qualitative study of PNPM impact evaluation is the same as those for the 2007 PNPM-Rural baseline study, which are located in three *kabupaten* in East Java, three *kabupaten* in West Sumatra, and three *kabupaten* in Southeast Sulawesi. The study areas in the three provinces are divided into three time categories, namely K1 for areas which have been receiving treatment since 2002, K2 for areas which have been receiving treatment since 2007, and K3 for areas which have been receiving treatment since 2009.

Table 3. Study Area Categories

Province Location Category	East Java	West Sumatra	Southeast Sulawesi
In PNPM 2007 , as treatment <i>kecamatan</i> ; had previously received PPK 2 .	2 villages in 2 <i>kecamatan</i>	2 villages in 2 <i>kecamatan</i>	2 villages in 2 <i>Kecamatan</i>
In PNPM 2007 , as treatment <i>kecamatan</i> ; had not received PPK 2 before.	2 villages in 2 <i>Kecamatan</i>	2 villages in 2 <i>kecamatan</i>	2 villages in 2 <i>kecamatan</i>
In PNPM 2009 , as treatment <i>kecamatan</i> ; had not received PPK 2 or PNPM 2007 before (control areas for impact evaluation).	2 villages in 2 <i>kecamatan</i>	2 villages in 2 <i>kecamatan</i>	2 villages in 2 <i>kecamatan</i>

Areas which were previously designated as control areas, namely those which had not received PPK 2 or PNPM 2007, since 2009 have started receiving the programs. Therefore, in this study, there are no longer any areas which may be categorized as control areas in the true sense. That is why the comparative analysis between treatment and control areas cannot be conducted accurately. In this condition, what can be done is the interperiodic analysis. By observing changes that happened to the areas which have been receiving treatment at different times, it is expected to be able to see the PNPM-Rural's contribution towards the changes. Furthermore, in each *kecamatan*, two villages were chosen for different welfare categories: a poor village and a middle/rich village. The detailed list of study areas can be seen in Table 4.

Table 4. Study Areas

No.	Province/ <i>Kabupaten</i>	<i>Kecamatan</i>	Village/ <i>Kelurahan</i> ^a (not real name)	Category
East Java				
1.	Gresik	Bungah	Wetan	Category 2, poor village
2.		Kedamean	Kulon	Category 1, middle village
3.	Lumajang	Tempursari	Lor	Category 1, poor village
4.		Rowokangkung	Kidul	Category 3, middle village
5.	Ngawi	Sine	Jejeg	Category 3, poor village
6.		Paron	Ndoyong	Category 2, middle village
Southeast Sulawesi				
7.	Bombana	Rarowatu	Kenanga	Category 1, poor village
8.		Poleang Timur	Melati	Category 2, middle village
9.	Konawe Utara	Sawa	Mawar	Category 3, poor village
10.		Asera	Kamboja	Category 1, middle village

11.	Konawe Selatan	Moramo	Anggrek	Category 2, poor village
12.		Ranomeeto	Cempaka	Category 3, middle village
West Sumatra				
13.	Dharmasraya	Koto Baru	Nagari ^b Gantuang	Category 2, poor village
14.		Sitiung	Nagari Rantau Jorong ^c Taruko	Category 1, middle village
15.	Solok	IX Koto Sungai Lasi	Nagari Bukik Barisan	Category 1, poor village
16.		Gunung Talang	Nagari Darek	Category 3, middle village
17.	Agam	Sungai Puar	Nagari Tanah Tinggi	Category 3, poor village
18.		Tilatang Kamang	Nagari Luhak Jorong Koto Tengah	Category 2, middle village

^aA *kelurahan* is a village-level administrative area located in an urban center.

^bA *nagari* is a village-level administrative unit in the West Sumatra Province.

^cA *jorong* is a *dusun* in West Sumatra.

From the description above, it is seen that there are three comparisons carried out simultaneously in this study: comparisons between the treatment and controls areas; interperiodic comparisons between K1, K2, and K3; and comparisons between poor and rich areas. These three-dimensional comparisons capture the complexity of the problems regarding implementation and effectiveness of PNPM-Rural.

1.5 Characteristics of the Study Areas

1.5.1 Topography and Demography

The villages that are included in this study are the exact same villages that were enrolled in the 2007 baseline study. Therefore, the general information on the villages' characteristics now and back then in 2007 is almost identical, except if there have been any changes in the past three years. The topography has not undergone any significant change compared to three years earlier. Some of the study villages are remote villages; some hilly, while some others flat. A small number of villages are located in coastal areas; for example, Desa Wetan in Kabupaten Gresik and part of Desa Mawar in Kabupaten Konawe Utara. The study villages are divided into developed and poor villages. The developed ones are usually located very near the city, or at least near the administrative center, so they have urban characteristics. These villages are Jorong Koto Tengah, Nagari Luhak, Kabupaten Agam; Desa Cempaka, Kabupaten Konawe Selatan; Nagari Darek, Kabupaten Solok; etc. The poor villages are usually situated rather far from the city or administrative center, except for Desa Kidul, Kabupaten Lumajang, which is situated quite near Kota Lumajang, and Desa Tanah Tinggi, Kabupaten Agam, which is near Kota Bukittinggi, even though it is quite far from the *kabupaten* capital. Some villages are adjacent to a forest such as Desa Lor, Kabupaten Lumajang, and Desa Kenanga, Kabupaten Bombana. Especially the people of Kenanga complain about their village being flanked by a protected forest, thus decreasing the size of their arable land. Their opinion is that if part of the forest were allowed to be managed by the locals, it would help alleviate the burden of poverty they have to shoulder.

In East Java, Desa Ndoyong, Kabupaten Ngawi, has the largest area, 87.78 km². But, it also has a large population of 7,723 people. The smallest sample area is Desa Jejeg, Kabupaten Ngawi, which is only 21.64 km² and has a relatively small population of 1,296 people. The most densely populated areas are Nagari Gantuang, Kabupaten Dharmasraya (10,389

people/17.40 km²), Desa Lor, Kabupaten Lumajang (8,762 people/55.71 km²), and Nagari Darek, Kabupaten Solok (8,017 people/15.66 km²). The least populated area is Desa Mawar, Kabupaten Konawe Utara (369 people/20.00 km²).

The distance of the study villages from their respective *kabupaten* capital is quite far, on average, more than 20 km. Four villages that are quite close to their *kabupaten* capital are Nagari Darek, Kabupaten Solok (5 km), Desa Ndoyong, Kabupaten Ngawi (9 km), Desa Kidul, Kabupaten Lumajang (approximately 8 km), and Desa Kenanga, Kabupaten Bombana (17 km). Three farthest villages are Nagari Luhak Jorong Koto Tangah (80 km) and Nagari Tanah Tinggi (65.7 km), both located in Kabupaten Agam, although they are very close to Kota Bukittinggi; and Desa Kamboja, Kabupaten Konawe Utara (75 km). The rest of the villages lie around 20–45 km from their *kabupaten* capital through relatively difficult terrain due to the hills or damaged roads.

Administratively, the villages/*nagari* are divided into several *dukuh* or *jorong* (for West Sumatra), namely around two to five *dukuh* or *jorong*. In East Java and Southeast Sulawesi, on average, the number of *dusun/dukuh* per village is around two to four. Desa Jejeg, Kabupaten Ngawi, has only two *dusun/dukuh*, namely Dusun Sukomulyo and Dusun Jejeg, whereas the *nagari* usually have around two to five *jorong* on average.

1.5.2 The Socioeconomic Condition

Most of the PNPM villages in Java, West Sumatra, and Southeast Sulawesi are of the agricultural village type, be it dominated by rice fields (irrigated or rain-fed), *palamija* (secondary) crops, vegetables, or plantations and forests. Only Desa Wetan, Kabupaten Gresik, is truly a coastal village. Other than that, part of Desa Kamboja, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, is categorized as a coastal area. Nevertheless, only a small number of the people in this village work as fishers. Most of the villagers work as fish farmers.

Generally, the people in the study areas are farmers, either farmland owners, tenant farmers, or farm hands. One case that is conspicuous is the description of Nagari Luhak Jorong Koto Tangah, Kabupaten Agam, which is economically also supported by the non-agricultural sector; more than 50 household heads work as civil servants. More than 50% of the land in the PNPM study villages is agricultural land. For example, 62% of the land in Desa Kulon is used for agricultural purposes and in Nagari Darek, the agricultural land reaches 80%. The land produces a variety of agricultural commodities. The villages in Java commonly produce rice, sugar cane, vegetables, and *palamija* crops. Besides producing rice, the villages in West Sumatra and Southeast Sulawesi produce plantation crops such as rubber, coffee, cashew, cocoa, palm oil, and candlenut, as well as various vegetables. However, as rice producing areas, the villages rely solely on the rain, and as a consequence, can only harvest rice once a year, followed by *palamija* crop planting. Only Desa Wetan, Kecamatan Bungah, Kabupaten Gresik, produces saltwater fish and farmed fish.

The villages in Southeast Sulawesi are less developed in the agricultural sector compared to the villages in the two other provinces. This is because agriculture is relatively new to villages in Southeast Sulawesi. The villages in Konawe Selatan or Bombana had just been introduced to rice field agriculture in the late 1970s, when transmigration was at its peak. According to the locals, the transmigrants had taught them how to cultivate rice fields. The villages in Konawe Utara, besides relying on agriculture, also reap benefits from plantations. There are several large plantations that provide alternative jobs for the locals. The community of Kabupaten Bombana, and even Southeast Sulawesi communities in general, since the middle of 2007 until

2008, when the business was at its peak, had discovered and gotten the advantage of running gold mines. Some of the locals tried to supply the needs of the miners. Nevertheless, in 2009, the regional government had forbidden the people from operating illegal mines. The locals believed that there had been some kind of lobbying from the business people to the regional government to take over the mines; therefore, the government issued the law forbidding illegal mining. At the moment, only very few locals dare to mine without permits.

From the market access point of view, there are no significant problems in almost all of the study areas. In almost all villages, there is a market, or at least a *pasar kaget* (literally, “sudden market”; similar to a Sunday market) that operates once a week for two to three hours in the morning. The village farthest from a market is Nagari Rantau Jorong Taruko, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, which is approximately 20 km away from the nearest market, due to the ineffectiveness of the local market and Village Unit Cooperative (KUD). The farmers in this *nagari* usually sell their agricultural and plantation produce to the intermediary traders who then take the produce to the market.

1.5.3 The Government

In general, there are three kinds of institutions in the study villages, namely the village/*nagari* administration institutions, social-religious institutions, and organizations formed by assistance programs. Even though formally each of these villages has a Village Consultative Body (BPD), this institution has yet to function optimally. The institutions that are more dominant are the village/*nagari* administration institutions and religious organizations.

The villages in Java, particularly in East Java where this study was conducted, are the bases of the religious organization Nahdatul Ulama (NU). Because of that, organizations affiliated to NU such as Muslimat and Fadayat are very actively involved in social activities in these villages. Besides that, informal organizations and groups such as farmers’ groups, *arisan* groups, and *tablilan* groups are also active and thriving. On the other hand, the social organizations that are thriving in villages in Southeast Sulawesi are the ones affiliated to village officials such as the Village Family Welfare Movement (PKK), Karang Taruna (a village youths’ organization), *posyandu* (integrated health service post), farmers’ groups, etc. The social organizations active in West Sumatra are mostly extensions of the *adat* (customary)/*nagari* organizations.

In the political field, in the past few years, the villages in East Java, Southeast Sulawesi, and West Sumatra have shown different conditions. The study villages in East Java have shown that transition in power happens festively. On the other hand, in Southeast Sulawesi, the election of village heads is not that lively. The tendency is that not many people are interested in running for the election. This is partly because most of the people come from one large family and have tight familial relationships. In such an atmosphere, a campaign vying for power is considered unethical. In addition, the dull election race is also caused by the lack of incentives for the village head. A village head in Konawe Selatan said that his economic condition has become stagnant ever since he became the village head. A completely different condition is found in villages in Java, where the incentives received by village heads are quite significant. In Kabupaten Lumajang, for example, a village head could receive up to 5 million rupiah from his paycheck and *tanah bengkok* (village-owned land that is bequeathed to the ruling village head).

In West Sumatra, *adat* organizations are so strong and influential that in the *nagari* where the study was conducted, there was no bustle of a *wali nagari* (village head) election. The *nagari* administration in West Sumatra is evidently a communitarian governing model with a

representation of *kaum* (familial groups from various generations of the same clan) which is strongly accounted. A village in Kabupaten Agam has designed a representation model in the village administration with a “one *kaum* one chair” system in decision-making within the *nagari*. Each and every decision made can only be legitimate if it has been approved by the *kaum* representatives (usually represented by the *mamak*, or head, of each *kaum*) which can be numerous. Other than that, the boundaries of a *nagari* are not determined based upon normal territorial administration, but by *adat* laws.

1.6 Research Team and Schedule

This study was conducted by The SMERU Research Institute researchers headed by Muhammad Syukri, assisted by five other core researchers, namely Sulton Mawardi, Akhmadi, Sirojuddin Arif, Kartawijaya, and Asep Kurniawan. In each study province, the SMERU researchers were assisted by twelve regional researchers. A small team of one core researcher from SMERU and two regional researchers was responsible for carrying out a study in each village.

As a whole, this study took six months, from March to September 2010. The preparation was done from March to the middle of April 2010 which was continued by field visits from April 18th to June 10th 2010. From the middle of June to July, the finalization of field notes and village reports was carried out. Then, at the end of July, the results of the study were analyzed. Finally, the report was written until the end of August.

1.7 Report Structure

This report consists of seven main chapters, plus an executive summary and various relevant appendices. Chapter I is the introduction that gives descriptions of the study, research methodology, and the characteristics of the study areas. Chapter II describes the implementation of PNPM-Rural in the study areas. This part is the gateway for explanations about the successes or failures of the program. Chapter III discusses the various aspects relevant to the government, participation, and accountability. This chapter reinforces the explanations about the implementation and impact of PNPM-Rural on the strengthening of regional government institutions. In Chapter IV, the dynamics of poverty are discussed. This part shows the most recent poverty conditions and the contribution of PNPM towards the reduction of poverty in the regions. Next, Chapter V explains the availability and accessibility of public facilities. Chapter VI describes the needs of the rural community and how they are fulfilled. In these two last chapters, the main problems of the rural community are evident and it is shown how the community utilizes PNPM to solve these problems. Furthermore, in these two parts, it can be seen whether or not there has been empowerment. The final chapter, Chapter VII, describes the conclusions and recommendations.

II. IMPLEMENTATION OF PNPM-RURAL IN STUDY AREAS

2.1 General Description of the Program and Its Implementation

PNPM-Rural is one of the programs under the umbrella of PNPM-Mandiri. This program is directed towards the development of rural areas by granting an amount of funds through the *kecamatan* which will be managed by the rural communities themselves based on the mechanism that has been set. In this program, the *kecamatan* are given a block grant the amount of which is dependent on the population and poverty level of each *kecamatan*. To get the block grant, every village has to compete by submitting a proposal for a project to be implemented. For that, the village people have to choose a village facilitator who is going to assist with the socialization and planning processes. These people then hold meetings to discuss the needs and development priorities of their village.

PNPM-Rural is based on the open menu principle and can be categorized into four groups, which are: (i) developing or improving basic infrastructure which economically benefit the poor; (ii) improving education and health services; (iii) supporting the community's economic activities; and (iv) conducting Women's Savings and Loan (SPP) programs.³ Based on the open menu principle, the community has to choose a development project that they need in a village consultative meeting (*musdes*) that must be attended by every element of the village. After all proposals are collected, there is an intervillage consultative meeting (MAD) that is attended by village representatives who will then discuss to make the final decision on which project is to be funded. After the block grant is allocated, social and technical consultants will help with the socialization, planning, and implementation. The village meeting has to choose some people that will become a part of the implementation team who will execute the project. Technical facilitators will help the implementation team to arrange the infrastructure plan, project budget, quality verification, and supervision. A more detailed description about the flow of PNPM process can be seen in Figure 1.

In the study areas, in general, the stages as seen in Figure 1 were applied by all villages. However, there was a village in Kabupaten Agam (not a sample village) that received a sanction because it failed to hold the *musdes* for Socializing the Result of the MAD on Proposal Determination. According to a *kecamatan* official, it was because the village's program proposal failed to compete in the *kecamatan* MAD, so the representative did not feel the need to inform their loss to the village people.

In areas that follow all the program stages, it was found that there were differences in the implementation quality from one village to another. The differences were mostly due to the high rate or low rate as well as the quality of the community's participation in various program activities.

³*Penjelasan IV, Petunjuk Teknis Operasional (PTO) PNPM Perdesaan* [Explanation IV of the 2008 Technical Guidelines for Operation]. Direktorat Jenderal Pembangunan Masyarakat dan Desa (PMD), 2008).




Figure 1. Flow chart of PNPM-Rural

Source: *Petunjuk Teknis Operasional PNPM Mandiri-Perdesaan* [Technical Guidelines for the PNPM Mandiri-Rural's Operations]. Direktorat Jenderal Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dan Desa, Departemen Dalam Negeri, 2008: 41).

Besides implementation quality, in the study areas, there were also other cases found such as:

- a) delays in the completion of activities such as the case occurring in a village in Kabupaten Agam;
- b) delays in funds disbursements such as the cases occurring in Kabupaten Ngawi, Bombana, Konawe Utara, and Agam;
- c) SPP funds embezzlement by the group chairman such as the case occurring in Kabupaten Gresik;
- d) SPP arrears such as the case occurring in Kabupaten Konawe Selatan;
- e) hires of third party to do infrastructure work which was supposed to be undertaken by the community itself such as the cases occurring in Kabupaten Agam, Konawe Utara, Bombana, and Dharmasraya; and
- f) lack of matching funds from the regional budget (APBD); thus, no funds were granted by the central government such as the case occurring in di Kabupaten Konawe Utara.

In addition, there were indications that the MAD on Proposal Determination process was conducted just as a formality, when in fact the decisions had previously been taken among the village heads. Several modus operandi discovered were by:

- a) adjusting the project budget with the number of activities that would be decided in the MAD so that every village could get a share;
- b) putting forward projects with a small budget as a priority so that more projects could be funded; and
- c) agreeing on a decision to not prioritize any village that had been granted a project in the following year.

These indications were caused by the program's mechanism and procedures which are considered by the community as complicated and time consuming. A member of KPMD in East Java said, "We keep having a meeting and discussing with no results. It was just wasting people's time" (interview, male, 32, Kabupaten Ngawi, 23 April 2010).

2.2 Implemented Activities

In general, PNPM activities which were conducted in the study areas were related to infrastructure development. Although there are four kinds of activities suggested in the PNPM-Rural, in its implementation PNPM-Rural is often focused on two main programs, that is, the SPP program and the infrastructure program. The open menu program allows people to choose numerous activities in the list of activities that covers physical activities, empowerment, capacity building, etc. However, in the study areas, except in one village, all open menu programs proposed by the community were related to infrastructure, such as road hardening or asphaltting; or the repair or building of a bridge, water channel, irrigation system, school building (kindergarten (TK))/early childhood education (PAUD), integrated health service post (*posyandu*), and so on. A *lorong* in Kabupaten Dharmasraya that chose a noninfrastructure program proposed and received training for female homemakers on baking.

The great aspirations of the village community towards the infrastructure programs are, among others, because (i) there is a lack of main infrastructure in the village, (ii) there is an understanding that PNPM is a program for all and, thus, has to be allocated on something that can benefit all people, (iii) PNPM is created as a minimiser of social envy caused by other programs that only benefit certain groups, and (iv) there is an indication of elite dominance in the village decision-making. These will be elaborated further in Chapter VI.

2.3 Women's Savings and Loan (SPP)

The SPP program has been running well and is considered effective by the people. Two villages were found not embracing SPP because no business group in either village met the criteria of SPP-PNPM and there was one village that refused SPP because of the wrong understanding that if there were SPP arrears, it would be denied the open menu program. The people thought that SPP is effective in taking over the role of bank *titil* (daily bank/loan shark) which has a quite strong influence in several villages, especially in East Java and Southeast Sulawesi. A female community leader in Kabupaten Ngawi said that in her village, there used to be many bank *titil*. But now, the number has decreased because she has worked hard to encourage people to borrow money from SPP-PNPM instead. An informant said, "Many people used to borrow money from bank *titil*. This worsens one's economic condition. That's why I suggest people to borrow money here [SPP-PNPM]" (interview, female, 47, Kabupaten Ngawi, 22 April 2010).

Moreover, SPP is also considered to give contribution to developing people's existing business and, in some cases, it can stimulate the community to create new businesses. An informant said, "Like me now, with the capital I got from PNPM, I build a business and it's developing" (Middle-class Women's FGD, 26, Kabupaten Bombana, 6 June 2010),⁴ while another informant said, "Road building helps because it can smooth out the traffic and SPP made women feel like a king" (Middle-class Men's FGD, 40, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 14 May 2010).

Finally, SPP can also improve household financial capacity. Even though, according to the understanding of SPP recipients, the funds are supposedly used to open a new business or strengthen their existing one, there is also some part of the funds that is used to pay for household needs.

PNPM also provides social funds that can be used for important needs, such as, if there is a family member who gets sick, then SPP money is used. (Interview, male, 46, Kabupaten Ngawi, 21 April 2010)

The problem is that the people who received [SPP] use the money for education, to pay for [children's] school tuition, because it was urgent. So, it's not used for business. (Interview, female, 42, Kabupaten Konawe Selatan, 7 June 2010)

Nevertheless, some problems related to the implementation of SPP appeared. Firstly, the poor had difficulty in accessing SPP because in the study areas, PNPM implementers in the *kecamatan* and villages required that every resident who wanted to apply for credit had a business of their own. This was to make sure that they were able to return the money as scheduled. Therefore, most of the recipients were from a more prosperous group. A facilitator in Southeast Sulawesi firmly said that SPP was not meant for the poor, but for those who already had a better economic condition (interview, male, 35, Kabupaten Konawe Selatan, 10 June 2010). The following informants stated similar things.

⁴Looking at the requirements entailed in the informant's village, it seemed that those who could access SPP were only the nonpoor households, as the requirements are quite hard to meet. According to an informant who is also a KPMD in one of the village samples in Kabupaten Ngawi, the requirements are that the creditor has to be a resident of the village, sign the agreement, obey the rules, own a business, be obliged to save some funds for frozen savings as much as 10% of the total loan, loan service as much as 2% of the total loan, and the return period is 10 months maximum (10 installments). Especially for individual creditors (not collective), they have to have a collateral (usually in the form of a Certificate of Vehicle Ownership/BPKB) and are willing to become a *Pokmas* (community group) member. In this context, the decrease in the number of people borrowing money from bank *titil* is only seen in the nonpoor group. For the poor group, bank *titil* is still relied upon because it does not apply any burdensome requirements.

The loan is supposedly for the poor, but if you are really poor, you will not be lent. The poor who have not yet had a business are also forbidden to borrow money because they are considered unable to repay. (Poor Men's FGD, 50, Kabupaten Ngawi, 24 April 2010)

Whereas for SPP, it seems that no women from poor families were eager to apply for the loans. This is because the first thing that the program implementer said was not how to manage the loans well, but instead they are threatened in case they are not able to return the money. So, the poor women do not dare to borrow money because they have no collaterals. (Interview, male, 60, Kabupaten Konawe Selatan, 3 June 2010)

In that matter, I do find many women are actively involved in some groups. But, I don't want it because I feel burdened if I have to be in the group which receive the loans and return them with high interests. (Interview, female, 54, Kabupaten Konawe Selatan, 5 June 2010)

With such burdensome requirements, poor households fear applying for loans. In addition to their misunderstanding of the program, this fear is also caused by the program implementer who "frightens" the poor people so that they do not apply for the loans and encourage them to transfer the loans under their name to those who own a business. This is done by the program implementer at the village level under the understanding that SPP channeling is a part of the requirements to get the grant for the open menu program. If the village does not take SPP, it will not get the open menu program. A program implementer in Kabupaten Ngawi said that open menu programs which were frequently realized in the form of infrastructure development projects were really needed by the local people, so they tried hard to actuate SPP loans, including by "outsmarting" the implementation.

Here, SPP payment is running smoothly due to the sanction implication. If there is often a delayed payment, the physical funds will be put off. So, the TPK is also involved in reminding the people to pay their loan instalments. (Interview, male, 56, Kabupaten Ngawi, 22 April 2010)

That [SPP] also becomes one of the requirements to get the physical [program]. If SPP payments are late, the people will not get the physical funds. That's why, the head of the village also interferes. If one person's credit payment is in arrears, the village won't get the physical program. (Interview, male, 35, Kabupaten Konawe Selatan, 10 June 2010)

However, in one village in Kabupaten Gresik, East Java, the concern that the failure of the SPP program to run smoothly would have an impact on the inability of accessing the open menu program encouraged the community leaders to refuse the SPP program. Whether or not the success of SPP program would have an impact on the open menu program is not explained convincingly by program implementers in the field. Some of them assume that SPP has an impact on the open menu program because of the requirement stating that the SPP proposal (if there is one) would be automatically included in the three proposals which are put forward in the MAD.

In addition, there were many attempts to bend the regulation of the program so that the village people can get the benefits easily. One of the indications found was the establishment of instant business groups to fulfill the requirement of applying for SPP. Actually, based on SPP regulation, the business groups should have existed and been actively operating for at least one year. This condition appears in nearly all villages as explained by a community leader in Kabupaten Konawe Selatan, "So far, the business groups are usually established in order to get the loans. So, the benefit is getting a share of the funds" (interview, male, 60, 3 June 2010).

There were also cases where the names of the poor were being used by those having better economic condition so that they can become SPP recipients. However, this misuse of names is considered legal; on the one hand, it is a way out to the problem of SPP funds channeling if it is conducted based upon the regulation of the program. But, on the other hand, there is a demand that SPP funds are channeled to the fullest. A KPMD in Kabupaten Konawe Selatan explained as follows:

SPP [recipients] can become either a direct or indirect beneficiary. An indirect beneficiary means, for example, using my name, but the money is used by others, and that is allowed [according to PNPM]. This is called indirect benefit. It means a person borrows [SPP] and another person manages it. ... This is because PNPM prioritizes RTM [poor households], but because they cannot return the money, so non-RTM make use of it. (Interview, female, 42, Kabupaten Konawe Selatan, 7 June 2010)

Box 1 **Misuse of the Poor's Name in SPP**

Anggrek is a village in Kabupaten Konawe Selatan, Southeast Sulawesi. In this study, the village is classified as a poor village. In reality, the number of the poor in this village is indeed high. According to some informants in the village, the poverty level is still around 35%. PNPM implementers' data for 2010 shows that the number of very poor and poor households in this village is 101 out of 162 households, or around 62%. Compared to previous data, there is an increase in the number of poor households in this village because in the past three consecutive years, the PNPM implementers' data shows that the number of RTM is only 147 households.

This village has received PNPM since 2007. They allocated the PNPM-open menu funds to build a kindergarten building (2007) and drainage systems twice (2008 and 2009). Besides, they have received PNPM-SPP three times, in 2007 for four borrowers' groups (80 members), in 2008 for one borrowers' group (20 members), and in 2009 for one borrowers' group (20 members).

Based on the PNPM official data from the local *kecamatan*, out of the six groups that received SPP with a number of 120 people, only 10 people did not come from poor households. This happened during the 2009 SPP program. However, based upon an informant's information in the village, most of the recipients of SPP were not from poor households, but from the middle-class and even the rich households. This was also admitted by a PNPM implementer in the village. According to the implementer, this happened because there were almost no poor households that wanted to receive SPP loans since they were afraid that they would not be able to return the money. Since no one wanted to receive SPP, the program implementer in the village was forced to outsmart the system by using the names of RTM. Hence, in the official documents, the RTM's names were listed as the recipients, but after the loans were disbursed, the funds were given to other people who owned a business and could certainly return the loans on scheduled time. This had to be done because, according to the informant, if they did not take the SPP, their village would not get the infrastructure project that they really needed. According to another informant, the RTM whose names were used also agreed to the scheme because they were made to believe that if they got the loan, they would not be able to return it. If they were not willing to have their names used, their village would not receive the infrastructure project. Thus, they did not have any options.

2.4 Institutions in the *Kecamatan* and Village

Viewed from the organizational structure, the institutions implementing PNPM are in accordance with the stipulations of the program, both at the *kecamatan* and village levels. What is felt to be not proportionate is the number of personnel, especially the *kecamatan* facilitators (FK). In a certain *kecamatan*, an FK could have such a light burden because he/she only handles a small number of villages, whereas in another *kecamatan*, the FK could have an immense workload due to the large number of villages under his/her jurisdiction. In the study areas, most of the *kecamatan* have more than ten villages. Having a large number of

villages/*lorong* to supervise, it is assured that an FK cannot carry out many of the empowerment duties such as villagers' group development, the strengthening of SPP recipients' businesses, etc. An FK who supervises 21 villages in Kabupaten Konawe Selatan stated that the administrative work, which has something to do with putting together monthly reports for the 15 project recipient villages, alone has expended all his time, leaving no spare time for the empowerment activities. Besides the disproportion of personnel to the workload, several FK also complain about the lack of microcredit facilitators. The need for micro credit facilitators has apparently become pronounced more because the FK have no time to supervise SPP recipients' groups that can total up to hundreds in just a single *kecamatan*. Admittedly, there are now some microcredit facilitators at the *kabupaten* level, but according to a facilitator in West Sumatra, these facilitators are needed more at the *kecamatan* level to implement empowerment activities associated to SPP. The facilitator thinks that because the SPP program is very important and widespread, it is perfectly natural to have a professional facilitator especially to ensure the smooth running of the program.

At the village level, the PNPM institutions are marked by the local elite's dominance of key positions. In almost all of the study villages, the PNPM implementers, namely the TPK, KPMD, TP (monitoring team), etc., are part of the elite circle due to power or familial relationships. Basically, the election mechanism orchestrated by PNPM makes it possible for everybody to elect and be elected. But, because of the dominance of the village elite in various decision-makings, the existing mechanism is rendered void. The dominance of the village elite in the PNPM institutions is, among others, caused by the lack of alternative human resources besides the village elite and the disinclination of the nonelites to be involved in activities that are considered to be part of the elite's turf. This belief that project administration in general, including PNPM, is the "village elite's turf" is the result of the nonelites having rarely been involved in the management of government programs or aids.

Regarding the function of SPP recipients' groups, there has been no further development aside from the fact they are only used as a means of obtaining loans. In terms of time and welfare categories, there is no difference between regions regarding the groups' function. The SPP recipients' groups' lack of development is because the group members and program implementers see the groups merely as a prerequisite to receive an SPP loan. There has not been any concrete effort made by either the PNPM implementers (in this case, the FK) or the community to improve the institutional capacity of the SPP recipients' groups so that they can function more than just a borrowers' group.

2.5 Community Participation

The community's participation at each stage of the PNPM-Rural is quite active. FGDs from various study areas show that the number of community members attending PNPM meetings is larger than any other meeting that has been held in the villages. The percentage of participation is different for every area. For example, an informant in one of the villages in Lumajang said that the participation rate was approximately 70% of the adults in village. In a village in Kabupaten Konawe Selatan, Southeast Sulawesi, the meetings were only attended by 30 to 60 people out of a population of 900. This number was considered high because there had never been a meeting that attracted as many people before. The high attendance rate of the PNPM activities is because:

- a) PNPM is considered as a "cash" program, that is, a program that does not merely dole out promises, but shows instant realizations. This can be seen from a respondent's comment, "PPK, because everybody here can directly reap the benefits such as the benefits of having

easy access to clean water. The people here don't have to walk far to get water anymore. Water comes to our houses" (interview, male, 42, 5 June 2010).

- b) The people feel sceptical towards development planning through the development planning consultative meeting (*musrenbang*) because after years of planning, nothing has been realized. A village head in Kabupaten Bombana said, "I have been the village head for eight years now, but many of the plans are not realized because of the pending. The pending happened because of lack of lobbying" (interview, male, 42, 4 June 2010).
- c) In some areas, the competitiveness is very evident where the *dusun* members flock to the village hall to vote for their *dusun*'s development proposals. Some members come because of their own awareness to win the competition, but some others come because of the *dusun* officials' prodding.

Even though the people's participation rate in PNPM is quite high, many indications show that their participation is merely instrumental, only to fulfill the program requirements. A program implementer in one of the *orong* in Kabupaten Agam said that he had to come to the village people's houses and persuade them to come to the *musala* (small prayer room) to participate in the *orong* consultative meeting (*musjor*). Still concerning this matter, a village head in East Java said, "The system [to involve large numbers of community members] was not yet practiced in 2002 because this system was developed to fulfill the PNPM's requirements and in 2002 PNPM has not been implemented in this village yet" (interview, male, 40, Kabupaten Gresik, 22 April 2010).

In the majority of villages, few community members participate actively. Only a small percentage of them dare to speak up, give suggestions, or object when they disagree on a suggestion. An informant's statement describes this condition.

In such a meeting, the women are also invited. But, the same as with the men, they play no part at all. They [the women] are passive listeners. Oftentimes, after the meetings, they speak their minds, but only to other women or to other participants, not to the village head" (interview, male, 53, community figure, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, 16 June 2010).

The people's fear to express their opinions and objections, on the one hand, is because they are unaccustomed to speaking in a formal forum such as a meeting. An informant from Dharmasraya said that the first time she had ever set foot in the *wali nagari*'s office was the day she was invited as an FGD participant by the SMERU researchers. "And then, if you are poor, you will never be invited, Sir. This is the first time in my whole life to be invited to this office, Sir" (Poor Women's FGD, 32, 13 May 2010).

Besides that, some other informants voiced out their aspirations as follows:

The people invited to the meetings are the intellectuals, Sir. (Poor Women's FGD, 33, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 13 May 2010)

Lai pernah buk wak di undang rapek PKK, tapi wak dak ngarati doh, tu aniang se wak, kok apo-apo hasil rapek biasonyo wak tau dari kawan-kawan balellong atau di lapau nyo otaan di urang [I have once been invited to the PKK meeting, but I didn't understand anything at all, so I kept silent. I usually understand the results of the meetings from my *balellong* friends, or from the coffee shop gossips]. (Interview, female, 26, Kabupaten Solok, RTSM⁵, 12 May 2010)

⁵RTSM stands for *rumah tangga sangat miskin*, meaning very poor household.

In addition, the passiveness also happens because of the dominance of the village elite. The poor and the nonelites, especially the women, do not dare voice their requests or objections because they think that the only ones who are in the position to speak are the intelligent village elites as described above. The village elite's dominant position in the various studied areas is caused by, among others, the familial system or relationship, or patronal relationship. The patronal system is evident in villages in Java, where the economic structure creates patron-client relationships between employers and employees or between landlords and farm hands. In villages in West Sumatra, familial relationship which is translated into the communitarian governing system, namely the *nagari*, has a very large role in handing over the power to the *nagari* elite. Lastly, in the villages in Southeast Sulawesi, the familial relationship, even though not transformed into a formal system like that in West Sumatra, gives an undeniable power to the village elite.

In such cases, it is impossible for the nonelites and the poor to deny the wills of the village elite because between them and the elite are many layers of relationships. It has been known that in rural communities, the poor do not only have a formal administrative relationship with the village elite, but also have economic relationships (employer and employee), sociocultural relationships (between the head of a *kaum* and the *kaum* members/between *mamak* and nephews/nieces in West Sumatra) and familial relationships. Each layer of relationship has its consequences which are not to be viewed lightly if someone does something to jeopardize the relationship: losing a job, banned from the *kaum*, disowned by the family, etc. These statements describe this condition:

Those involved in decision-making are the RT, RW⁶, village administration and its officials, village institutions and community representatives from all areas, and community figures. In this place, Sir, *abot sawangane*, which means respect for the elders, is strictly held. So, the elders are asked for their opinions first. (Interview, male, 39, RT head, Kabupaten Gresik, 23 April 2010)

As good community members who understand their rights and duties, it is probably very important for the village people to be directly involved in decision-making. But, if all community members are simultaneously involved in the decision-making, it would be taxing on the available resources, either in the sense of location or time. So, the method and system to be employed in Desa A [the name of the village is obscured] are through cooperation of the Bamus (Consultation Council) with the representatives of 58 *kaum*. As an example, to construct a *perna* [*nagari* regulation], the Bamus will make a [regulation] draft that is then given to the 58 representatives of the *kaum*. The representatives will discuss the draft with all of their *kaum* members. All suggestions are compiled to be re-discussed with the Bamus and *wali nagari* and combined with all other *kaum*'s' compilations before they are made into a regulation. (Interview, male, 60, *wali nagari*, Kabupaten Agam, 10 May 2010)

The rich have been employing the poor as farm hands. Without the jobs provided by the rich, the poor would become even more impoverished. (Interview, male, 53, village head, Kabupaten Gresik, 21 April 2010)

Pertaining to the women's participation, all informants confirm that there has been a significant rise. Within PNPM, there are forums that are specifically formed for women. In these meetings, women actively voice their opinions. According to an informant, in some villages, such as those in West Sumatra, women can be more active than men.

⁶An RW is a unit of local administration consisting of several RT (neighborhood units) within a *kelurahan*.

Women are clearly more active now. We are also invited whenever there are meetings to make decisions because we have new groups formed by PNPM. So, if there are any decisions to be made connected to the program, then we can voice our opinions. (Interview, female, 45, RTM, Kabupaten Ngawi, 25 April 2010)

Ever since PNPM was launched, women's participation has risen exponentially; sometimes, they are even more active than the men. (Interview, male, 40, TPK member, Kabupaten Agam, 16 April 2010)

In the past, maybe because of the system in Minang or because of the terrain here, the women's participation rate in the *jorong* consultative meetings was quite low. But, since PNPM requires women to be represented, the women started to become more involved in decision-makings. (Interview, male, 33, *jorong* head, Kabupaten Agam, 16 May 2010)

About the women, I hear that it's getting better because women are now always present in meetings, either group meetings or not. (Interview, female, 54, RTM, Kabupaten Konawe Selatan, 6 June 2010)

Nevertheless, women's activeness does not always work in the decision-making process. The men still hold more power in deciding. The only decision-making medium that is relatively sterile from men's influence is the women's consultative forum which produces one SPP suggestion and one open menu suggestion. The minimum domination of men in this forum is because this forum is attended by women only. But, it does not mean that this forum is completely devoid of men's domination. In some places, such as a village in Kabupaten Gresik, women's suggestions, especially about SPP, are re-negotiated at the village level. Based upon the decision of the village elite, which is dominated by men, they concluded that they would not propose for the SPP. Their consideration was that they were afraid if their citizens would not dutifully pay back the credit. According to them, if SPP repayment is in arrears, their village will not get any open menu program. Therefore, rather than jeopardizing the open menu program, they would rather not propose for the SPP.

Nevertheless, in PNPM forums, both the ones for women only and the mixed ones, not all the village women are involved. It is likely that only the women from the more prosperous families participate in the meetings. Some female informants from the less prosperous families said that they were never invited, let alone participated in the meetings in the village hall.

The women rarely attend meetings; only the men do. I get information about the meetings from my husband. He talks about the meetings after he gets home. (Poor Women's FGD, 38, Kabupaten Lumajang, 24 April 2010)

Women's participation now compared to that in 2002 has not shown any improvement. If it is said to improve, it's minimal. Women's representatives are often invited to meetings, but they are unenthusiastic about them and rarely come. (Interview, male, 40, Kabupaten Gresik, 22 April 2010)

But, all this time, Sir, when women are invited to meetings, they only come for the sake of attending them. They rarely speak or give suggestions. (Interview, female, 42, Kabupaten Konawe Selatan, 7 June 2010)

The lack of improvement of the poor women's participation is, among others, caused by many internal and external factors. The internal factors include their being occupied with their own job and life, feeling out of place or unimportant to attend the meeting, being old or ill, or being a widow. The external factors include not being invited, living far from the meeting venue, etc. But from all of the reasons given by the informants, it seems that the most dominant ones are the internal factors. This can be seen from the statements mentioned above and also in the "Participation" section in the following chapter. The poor, especially the poor women, feel that it is inappropriate for them to attend meetings at the village hall because they are not "important people" or "intellectuals".

III. GOVERNMENT, PARTICIPATION, AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE VILLAGE

In some sample villages, especially in Southeast Sulawesi, and some villages in West Sumatra, the village administration's institutions have not been well functioning yet. Oftentimes, those institutions only have names, but do not have any activities. The village administration only acts passively waiting for instructions from the higher-level governments and has no initiatives to encourage its people to develop the villages based upon its own capacity. In some other villages, particularly in East Java, the village administration tends to be more dynamic, open, and participative. The accountability of the village elite is also high.

Institutionally, except for West Sumatra villages, all villages actually have the same organizational elements. And the same thing is the government mechanism because all villages are under the same regulations and law. In West Sumatra, the government at the village level is characterized by a local nomenclature, that is, the use of the term *nagari* with its elements for the lowest government unit. Although using a local nomenclature, basically those functions existing in the village administration also exist in a *nagari* administration.

The different performances among the village/*nagari* governments generally lie in the human resources, both the officials in the village administration and the community. In addition, not less important in influencing the performance of the village administration is the ability of their budget to move the wheel of the administration, not only the budget from the village/*nagari* itself, but also that sourced from external funds or the higher-level governments.

3.1 Information Flow and Transparency in the Village

Generally, the village elite, particularly the village/*nagari* head, controls and becomes the source of any information related to the life in the village. There are no mechanisms, forums, or media which formally necessitate and ensure that the information reaches the community. In this context, whether or not information reaches the community is not determined by the system but based on "the kind-heartedness" of the village elites. So, it is not based on the obligation as the village administration. Some information is passed on to the community by the village head or *wali nagari* through the head of *dusun/jorong* or RT head. The RT head is then asked to pass on the information to the community by using the regular local means and routine religious meetings in the village. For certain cases, the information is sometimes passed on formally through meetings in the village hall. But, this only occurs occasionally.

The information that is generally passed on by the village official is information on programs from higher-level governments and also on voluntary community work activities (*kerja bakti*). But, information on programs is not always conveyed openly, meaning only to the target recipients. There is a tendency that the village administration passes on more information concerning the obligations of the village community, while on the aspects that are related to the rights of the village community, generally the village administration has not been transparent. A village head in East Java explained, "Not all information should be passed on to the community, especially that concerning the budget. As far as the budget is concerned, it cannot be exposed openly" (interview, male, 45, Kabupaten Lumajang, 22 April 2010). Besides, the information passed on to the community is normally partial. Any information which is more detailed or related to a project's finance or budget, for example, is not conveyed. None of the informants who are not part of the village elites can tell and know how much assistance money has been

received by their village and how has the village administration spent it. One informant said, “I even have no idea what ADD [Village Funds Allocation] program is, let alone anything about budgeting” (Middle-class Men’s FGD, 41, Kabupaten Lumajang, 25 April 2010).

In the matter of transparency, there is a different perception between the village officials and elite, and the community in general. The village officials and elite assume that the village administration has already been transparent when it comes to development programs as well as other governmental aspects. On the contrary, some community members assume that the village administration is not transparent because they are not willing to explain the various existing programs clearly. The following quotations describe the information flow and transparency in the sample villages.

The information which is usually not spread in the community is the information about assistance for the poor. Sometimes, we know about it only after there are people who get the assistance. (Interview, male, 72, Kabupaten Solok, 1 May 2010)

Sometimes, the information does not reach the community because it stops at the RT level. Information from the village officials never reaches the community because the RT heads never convey the results of meetings between them and the village officials. This information is usually obtained from a chat with people from a different RT. ... There has never been any transparency about the results of meetings in the village hall. (Interview, male, 46, Kabupaten Gresik, 23 April 2010)

If there is a meeting in the *nagari*, the people who participate are normally the community figures. The poor are never invited. So far, the *orong* and *nagari* parties, if they hold a meeting, they never inform the results of the meeting. I just know the information from my neighbors. (Poor Men’s FGD, 31, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 13 May 2010)

For the past three years, PNPM has been the only one that distributes the information well, while for other public services, the way of information distribution has been same. (Interview, male, 38, Kabupaten Bombana, 6 June 2010)

The fact that the information is not distributed maximally and transparently is due to the obstacles in the social structure and the institutional infrastructure of the village community, especially those concerning with the wide relationship gap between the village elite and the community. In all sample villages, the village elite still consciously pose themselves as being more superior, knowledgeable, and responsible than the common people. On the other hand, the community in general acts passively, and even tends to be ignorant, towards any information concerning many village life aspects. They usually just wait for the information to be conveyed by the officials. Rarely does the community proactively ask for information to the village officials. The following quotations reflect this reality.

If it is let known by the *wali orong* [*orong* head], then I will know the information. If it is not, I will not get the information. (Interview, male, 72, RTM, Kabupaten Solok, 13 May 2010)

Here, the people are not active enough to seek information. Only when there is an invitation or they are visited by the village officials will they get the information. (Interview, male, 31, middle-class villager, Kabupaten Bombana, 8 June 2010)

No need to ask questions to the *orong*. For us, working at the rice field is more important. (Interview, male, 49, middle-class villager, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 26 April 2010)

The apathetic attitude of the community towards the information concerning the village administration is probably because the community has no concern for the information. For most village people, what is important is that the work they do daily can run well. This kind of community attitude can possibly lead to the absence of urgency in the village officials to run the

government transparently. In this context, both the community and the village officials do not seem to consider transparency in the government as a crucial topic to discuss, let alone realize.

The information flow as explained above has not changed in the last eight or three years, except for the information flow in PNPM which is more well structured through group meetings, posters, and attachments of financial accountability reports during project implementation. However, the model of information flow from PNPM does not give many impacts towards other program models or other village policies. Out of the village samples, only one village was found to have citizens who demanded that other programs imitate the transparency model applied by PNPM.

Box 2 **Accountability in Desa Wetan**

The implementation of PNPM in Desa Wetan, Kabupaten Gresik, has started since 2007. At that time, the program activity was program socialization, planning from the bottom up to the proposal agreement at the village level, and the MAD at the *kecamatan* level. Desa Wetan's open menu proposal at that time was the building of a kindergarten building in Dusun Karang Liman which was proposed by the women's group and was included in the ranking list of funded programs. The implementation of the building project was realized in 2008. For the implementation of PNPM 2009, the proposal of Desa Wetan was in the form of drainage repair in Dusun Wetan which was included in the ranking list of non-funded programs, but in 2010, it became a funded program under the Optimization PNPM (PNPM *Optimalisasi*). This PNPM *Optimalisasi*, according to one of TPK members in Desa Wetan, is "the agreement of all parties to choose a non-funded proposal from 2009 to be directly implemented without going through planning from the bottom as usual." When this study was conducted, the drainage development was still in the planning stage. The physical development had not been carried out yet.

For the three years of PNPM existence in Desa Wetan, if seen physically, the benefits have not been felt yet by the locals because this village has only received one physical development. Nevertheless, if seen from the perspective of transparency and accountability, at least, a model such as PNPM has given an impact to the community, that is, the changing of their perspective on how a development project should be accountably reported. After seeing how PNPM was accountably reported regarding all development matters implemented, the village people demanded that a model like PNPM is also applied to other development programs. This was clearly stated by a KPMD in Desa Wetan.

The way PNPM reported the financial budget by attaching the information on the information board makes people want to have a reporting mechanism just like that for all projects implemented in the village. There was once a self-managed project from the Government of Kabupaten Gresik to build a *madrasah* (madrasa, or Islamic school) which was rejected by the community because it could not fulfill the people's demand to have the report written in details and attached on the information board. (Interview, female, 40, 25 April 2010)

3.2 Participation and Representation in Policymaking

In most study areas, decision-making at the village level is usually carried out in meetings attended by the village elite (the village officials, BPD, LPM (Community Empowerment Institution), PKK, RW/RT, and community figures). They are considered to have already represented the community: "It is not necessary to invite all village people because their opinions are already represented. ... If the community figures are already invited, the people are already represented" (interview, male, 38, village official, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, 6 June 2010). In some other sample villages, some village people are involved in village meetings. But, at most, they only listen or verify decisions that have already been made by the village head or the village administration. At least, there are three reasons why the village people, especially the poor, are not directly involved in decision-making processes. Firstly, just like at other government levels, the community has already been represented by various institutions formed to represent the community. Secondly, technically, it does not seem to be possible to involve the people directly in decision-making processes because of, among others, the

limitation of the meeting room capacity and the accommodation cost. Thirdly, a meeting that involves a large number of people is inefficient as explained in the following statement. “All villagers do not need to be made present in the meetings because they can make the meeting chaotic and it becomes difficult to reach an agreement. It is enough with the representatives only” (interview, male, 40, village official, Kabupaten Gresik, 22 April 2010).

Direct community involvement can only occur at the *dusun*/RT level. Unfortunately, very few villages hold meetings both at the *dusun* and RT levels. Meetings frequently held at the *dusun*/RT level are only the informal ones, such as *pengajian* (Quran recitation), *yasinan* (Quran recitation to pray for the dead), or *arisan*, which are not meant to discuss village problems.

Informants or community members in the sample villages have different comments on the decision-making process like the one explained above. First of all, there is a community group that considers that their participation has been represented by the village elite and the community figures attending the decision-making process. This group of people believes that whatever is decided by the village administration must be the best decision.

I just believe in them because they have the capacity. Like *wali jorong*, he is chosen and trusted by the community, in accordance with the saying, “*didahulukan salangkab, ditinggikan sarantiang*” [a leader who is close to his/her people]. ... It is enough because if all people are present in a higher forum, imagine how crowded the meeting will be. The total population in Nagari A [the name of the *nagari* is obscured] is around 2,500 people. If half of the population is adults, it means 1,200 people will attend the meeting. (Interview, male, 36, middle-class citizen, Kabupaten Agam, 15 May 2010)

All of us really trust the RT [head] and *kasun* [*dusun* head]. They will prioritize and care about the community’s interest. So, we put our faith in the hands of the RT head and *kasun*. (Interview, female, 45, RTSM, Kabupaten Ngawi, 24 April 2010)

It is good if *kadus* [*dusun* head] represents his/her people [in the meeting] because *kadus* also knows what his/her people need. The RT here does not function; *kadus* functions more. (Interview, female, 48, RTSM, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, 9 June 2010)

Secondly, there is a community group that is critical and considers that the decision-making process does not completely reflect people’s aspirations. In other words, some decisions accommodate the interests of the village elite more than the interests of the community. To prevent bias decisions in favor of the village elite, they want the decision-making process to directly involve the community. Some informants said,

Well, sometimes it is adequate, but sometimes it is not. It’s adequate if it can represent the people’s aspirations. It’s not adequate if they put forward their personal interests or if it is just for the sake of agreeing on any decision. It seems like that. (Interview, male, 49, RTSM, Kabupaten Gresik, 26 April 2010).

I don’t think we are [adequately represented] because poor people like me have more needs than other people do. (Interview, female, 54, RTSM, Kabupaten Konawe Selatan, 8 June 2010).

It is not enough if only the *jorong* [head] represents the people because *wali jorong* doesn’t really know the people’s conditions. *Wali jorong* doesn’t exactly know what the people need. And what is worse is that now many people in the community of Jorong Koto Tengah do not like the present *wali jorong*. Many people want the present *wali jorong* to step down, but he doesn’t want to because he expects that when Jorong Koto Tengah becomes a part of Kota Bukittinggi, he will be made a civil servant. (Interview, female, 29, middle-class citizen, Kabupaten Agam, 17 May 2010).

In the implementation of PNPM, the participation and representation of the community can be classified as high. All informants admitted it. But, the good level of participation and representation in PNPM has in fact little influence on other policy processes and programs. Participation in the policymaking and programs in the village have generally experienced no changes. Participation and representation are still seen as normative and formal. As a result, there is no fixed pattern to further absorb aspirations regarding the needs and interests of the village people in general. And there are no patterns which make it possible for the active involvement of the people in formulating needs as well as in decision-making. This condition is also supported by the local culture and, thus, it becomes a tool of legitimation for the village elite as well. For example, the term *abot sawangane* (Javanese) which in the local culture means to give priority to the leaders and elders is often used as an excuse to break the deadlock over participation and representation of the community. The following quotations describe community's opinions on their representation and participation in the decision-making process at the village level.

Although the community figures invited to the meetings are quite many, there are infrequent debates in this kind of meeting. In the meetings, the one who talks a lot is the village head and the other village officials, while the other participants of the meetings just concur. (Interview, male, 38, village official, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, 6 June 2010)⁷

No need to invite all people because there are representatives. (Interview, male, 48, village official, Kabupaten Gresik, 26 April 2010)

The important thing is that we can be aware of the issues discussed and actually, every community member [should be invited], but we are sometimes not invited. There are those who are invited, but they are too lazy and bored if they have to attend meetings all the time. (Interview, female, 40, Kabupaten Bombana, 4 June 2010)

We concur to whatever is decided by the village officials, especially on the things that are related to the village development ... I never get involved in any decision-making. I just follow the decision and it's all up to the village officials. (Interview, male, 60, RTM, Kabupaten Gresik, 28 April 2010)

The problem is that those who attend the meetings are only the community figures, Sir. (Poor Group's FGD, male, 45, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 13 May 2010)

The people are perhaps going to be interested to come to the meeting if the meeting is related to an assistance that is going to be distributed. ... There are many meetings that are not related to assistance distribution. (Interview, female, 44, RTM, Kabupaten Agam, 15 May 2010)

Especially for women's participation and representation, most of the informants in all sample villages exclaimed that since the implementation of PNPM, formally the participation of women in the decision-making process has experienced an increase. In this matter, women's participation is generally still instrumental because it is more out of the necessity to meet the formal requirement of the program. Besides, the increase of the participation generally occurs in the middle to upper class community. For the poor community's group, women's participation tends to stay the same, or in certain villages, it is even decreasing. The poor women's position is still marginal. This fact is reflected in the following statements.

We have to admit that it still has little influence. Because the way other activities are done is still unlike PNPM. Only the community figures and the village officials are often involved.

⁷In the Poor Men's FGD (Kabupaten Konawe Utara), some FGD participants stated that the one who usually does the talking is only the village head. Even the village officials do not usually say much; they just listen. They said that if the village officials themselves only listen, then the village people attending the meetings will stay silent even more.

The women being involved are only the community figures. If it is PNPM, all people are involved and know the development of the program. (Interview, male, 40, KPMD member, Kabupaten Gresik, 25 April 2010)

The representatives of PKK are invited, where the members of PKK come from the middle-class group. Women from the poor community are never invited. When it was still a village administration, women from the poor community were represented in meetings by women as well, but since it was changed into a *nagari* government, there has been no women's representation from the poor community anymore. Rarely do they get invited. (Poor Men's FGD, 31, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 13 May 2010)

I am invited when there is only an election, Sir. ... I am never invited, Sir. Only now am I invited to the *wali nagari* office (to become an FGD participant of this study), Sir. (Poor Women's FGD, 33, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 3 May 2010)

Women might be invited to meetings discussing women's matters. (Interview, male, laki-laki, village official, Kabupaten Ngawi, 21 April 2010)

In a meeting like that, women are also invited. But, just like their male counterparts, there are no roles to play. They [the women] come only as listeners. Oftentimes, after the meeting is finished, then they speak out their ideas. But, they only talk about it with other women or other participants of the meeting, not to the village head. (Interview, male, 38, village official, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, 6 June 2010)

Women's involvement in decision-making is minimal. They stay silent most of the time and are less superior compared to the men. Their involvement has improved [though] compared to the time before PNPM. (Interview, male, 51, Kabupaten Gresik, 23 April 2010)

In *nagari* meetings, there are no women invited. If it is a *Bundo Kanduang* meeting, they are invited, but the participants are selected. (Poor Women's FGD, 66, Kabupaten Solok, 12 May 2010)

What's the use of attending the meetings? There are already those who are responsible for each field. ... In *nagari* meetings, there are the *nagari* officials. In *Bundo Kanduang* meetings, there are its members. If it is a *Bundo Kanduang* meeting, there are members that attend. If we come, those people are given meal boxes. We just watch while they eat. (Poor Women's FGD, 40, Kabupaten Solok, 12 May 2010)

3.3 Representation System

The representation system in the village is formally regulated by the law through the village's duty to form a BPD. BPD is expected to be able to perform as a legislative body at the village level that ideally receive and channel community aspirations. In villages of K1, K2, and K3 categories, it turns out that BPD and other representation systems have not functioned optimally. The community regards the institution or person that is supposed to be representing the community's interests in the formulation of community's needs, programs' decisions, and policies tend, until present time, to become a legitimation tool of the village administration. This is indicated by the absence of special meetings at the community level (RT/RW/*dusun/jorong*) to absorb community's aspirations as well as to inform how far have the aspirations been realized.

According to respondents, even though the village administration system recognizes *dusun*- and RT-level governments, there are no planned activities in the *dusun* and RT except for giving information to the people as ordered by the village head. At the *dusun* or RT level,⁸ there are no routine meetings held to discuss problems occurring at the RT or hamlet level. However, in the context of representation system, some people consider that the system is already good because it represents the community's aspirations in general, while some others are unsatisfied because they do not think it is transparent. If explored further, community members who consider that the representation system has already fulfilled their aspirations do not base their consideration on the reality whether or not the system has run well. This kind of attitude is dominantly caused by the social relations that place leaders' domination as something absolute. These are reflected by the following statements.

I don't think we need to [take part in making decisions]. We have people representing us already. That should be enough. We all have faith in the RT and *dusun* heads. They surely prioritize and care about the community's interests. So, we give full authority to the RT and *dusun* heads. We never [complain]. And whatever the decision is, I accept it. If there are dissatisfied people, it is never more than people whispering to one another, but they do not do anything. (Interview, female, 45, RTM, Kabupaten Ngawi, 24 April 2010)

Well, it's already enough if we have *wali jorong* to represent us because he knows the people's condition better and he has been given the authority to represent the people. (Interview, female, 32, RTM, Kabupaten Solok, 15 May 2010)

Rarely do people ask about the decisions from meetings attended by community figures because they have complete faith that they will be represented by the community figures. (Interview, male, 40, RTM, Kabupaten Lumajang, 24 April 2010)

If it's about complaints on the village decision, it has never happened before. The community usually accepts the decisions that have been decided because they believe in their representatives in the village institution. (Interview, male, 49, *dusun* head, Kabupaten Ngawi, 27 April 2010)

On the contrary, those who are disappointed with the representation system practices that have been applied all this time have the following arguments.

Well, sometimes it is adequate, but sometimes it is not. It's adequate if it can represent the people's aspirations. It's not adequate if they put forward their personal interests or if it is just for the sake of agreeing on any decision. It seems like that. (Interview, male, 49, RTSM, Kabupaten Gresik, 26 April 2010).

It is not enough if the community is only represented, but they have to know the conclusion from the meeting. (Interview, male, 38, middle-class citizen, Kabupaten Bombana, 8 June 2010)

The decision all depends on what the *wali nagari*, *jorong* head, and other *nagari* officials want. (Interview, male, 36, middle-class citizen, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 16 May 2010)

The village administration makes policy through a meeting held with concerned village officials without the village community being present. ... The people should be involved if there is a meeting at the village hall. But here, we are never invited. So, if something happens, we just tell one another. (Interview, male, 46, middle-class citizen, Kabupaten Gresik, 23 April 2010)

⁸Regarding the RT or *dusun* head, some FGD participants from the poor men's group said that the RT and *dusun* heads just get paid without doing any work, meaning that they get incentive from their position, but they do not function at all.

3.4 Complaints, Conflicts, and the Solution Mechanism

In the sample villages, it can be said that there has never been any serious conflict related to the implementation of the program. The conflicts that occur have never been so massive that they create social tensions or horizontal mass conflicts between community groups. At the village level, this is probably the reason why there has never been any conflict or complaint resolution mechanism to handle conflicts and complaints caused by any program or policy at the village level. When conflicts or complaints happen, the solution is handled sporadically and it is usually the village head who acts as the main actor in solving the problem. These conflicts can generally be solved through explanations and consultations involving community figures.

During PNPM implementation, conflicts have ever occurred in several sample areas such as in Nagari Tanah Tinggi and Nagari Marapi (Kabupaten Agam), and Desa Waru (Kabupaten Ngawi) (the last two nagari/village are not sample villages). For Nagari Marapi, the case was around the suspicion of the locals concerning the decrease in the water debit because of the PNPM clean water project in Nagari Singgalang that took the water from the water source in Nagari Marapi. In Nagari Tanah Tinggi, the case involved Jorong Pakan Baru, Jorong Padang Gantiang, and Jorong Simpang Limo regarding the use of PNPM roads in Jorong Pakan Baru and Jorong Padang Gantiang to carry materials for the PNPM road building project in Jorong Simpang Limo. According to Tanah Tinggi's *Wali Nagari*, this conflict would not have happened if the *nagari* administration had been involved in the program implementation, especially in the coordination between *jorong*, because the *jorong* administration has no authority whatsoever, except for the extension of *wali nagari*'s authority. Therefore, resolving a problem in and between *jorong* is more effective if it involves the *nagari* administration.

In Desa Waru, the case was caused by a disagreement among some of the villagers regarding the *talud* (breakwater) building proposal that later became the village proposal. Some citizens who disagreed regarded those who formulated the proposal as incompetent (it was likely that the proposal formulation was not transparent).⁹ The first case could be solved well by involving the *kecamatan* head and the Public Works (PU) Agency of Kabupaten Agam. For the second case, the problem could be solved at the *nagari* level. For the case in Desa Waru, it is still in the process of finding the solution. The *kecamatan* facilitator is handling the case. Outside the three conflicts, other PNPM implementation conflicts occur within the village scope such as conflicts between the village administration and TPK, conflicts between TPK/community and certain interest groups, and also conflicts related to the procurement of goods and services. However, these conflicts did not trigger any social tension and the problems could be solved internally at the village level.

Pertaining to the complaints of the community towards the performance of the village administration and/or a program implementation, most of the respondents stated that the village community generally says nothing. They tend to keep the matter to themselves or talk about it with their fellow citizens. This condition is, among others, due to the feeling of reluctance and fear towards the officials, as well as the loss of hope because the complaints they conveyed have never been responded to positively. This phenomenon is recorded in the following quotations.

Never conveyed any complaints to the *jorong* or *dusun* head. ... I'm afraid that I would be ridiculed or that I would be a gossip target in the community. Rather than being gossiped by others, [it is better] not to convey any complaints. (Interview, male, 51, RTM, Kabupaten Agam, 13 May 2010)

⁹The researchers do not have more information on this village because it is not a sample village.

I never conveyed it [complaint] to the village administration. The complaint only becomes the talk at the community level. (Interview, male, 38, middle-class citizen, Kabupaten Bombana, 8 June 2010)

If there is a dissatisfaction/complaint, people tend to feel shy or reluctant to convey the problem and usually just gossip with one another. (Interview, female, 60, middle-class citizen, Kabupaten Lumajang, 25 April 2010)

I usually only tell my friends. If I don't get Raskin [Rice for the Poor], I don't dare to tell the *jorong* head. And I couldn't stand keeping it to myself either. So, I share the problem with my friends. We can laugh while talking about it, Sir. (Poor Men's FGD, 44, Kabupaten Solok, 16 May 2010)

Even if there are people who are dissatisfied, they just tittle-tattle over the problem, but they don't do anything. (Interview, female, 45, RTM, Kabupaten Ngawi, 24 April 2010)

Even if we complain, it will be useless. No one will pay attention because the ones who protest are considered as common people. (Interview, female, 46, middle-class citizen, Kabupaten Lumajang, 26 April 2010)

3.5 Accountability and Responsiveness of the Village Administration

In general, in all the sample villages, a systematic mechanism for village administration's accountability and responsiveness is not available. The village administration's accountability still depends a lot on the leadership of the village head, not yet on the institutional system. Made worse by the condition in which the community members who generally still put themselves in the inferior position in the leader-people relation, the village head becomes a dominant figure. The village administration is then identical to the village head. Based on this, the community has different assessments over the accountability of the administration. For a village/*nagari* that has a capable and responsive village head/*wali nagari*, the local community generally regards the village government as having a high accountability. On the contrary, for a village/*nagari* that is lead by a village head/*wali nagari* whose leadership does not really meet the bar, the community in general assesses their village administration to have a low accountability.

This phenomenon appears, among others, because in the village administration practices, the village head never gives the accountability reports regarding the work performance of the village administration openly to the village community. Even if there is an accountability report, it is only submitted to the BPD at the most. In one of the sample villages in Southeast Sulawesi, a BPD member even stated that the BPD had never received any report regarding the income and expenditure of the village administration, including ADD/RAPBDes (Village Budget Plan) funds, from the village head.

Not all information has to be reported to the people, especially that involving budgeting. Budgeting issues should not be widely open. (Interview, male, 45, Kabupaten Lumajang, 22 April 2010)

Nyo ganjia mah buk, kok ado pitihnyo warga dak tau doh, pi kok nan kabagotong royong capek warga tau mah [This is different, Ma'am. If it concerns money, the people know nothing and don't need to know, but if it's about *gotong royong* [voluntary mutual cooperation in the neighborhood] the people are informed quickly]. (Interview, female, 54, Kabupaten Solok, 13 May 2010)

For ADD, the supervision is unlike the usual [strict]. The inspectorate is the one that develops and also controls. So, that is that. ... But, PNPM is supervised and followed regularly, while the volume has been predetermined. But, if it's another project, such as ADD, there is no supervision, just a program alone, the report, well, you can make it the way you want. ... You plan it by yourself and implement it by yourself. Yeah, that's our regional head. (Interview, male, 45, Gapoktan head, Kabupaten Konawe Selatan, 9 June 2010)

There are ADD financial problems managed by the village, such as unclear budgeting for *posyandu*; supplement foods for children five and under are also unclear. For Dusun B [the name of the *dusun* is obscured] citizens, in the end, PKK and activities for children five and under use the *pengajian* funds. There is a *jimpitan* rice assistance program [“pinches” of rice collected for charity]. ... If we want to protest, it’s useless. They won’t listen to our protest because they think of us as common people. The village head’s wife ran for legislative member last year [2009] and lost, and she seemed to have fallen into a lot of debts, so the ADD operational funds as well as the Raskin funds were used first for her businesses. She rented the *tanah bengkok* [meant for village officials] to other parties when it was still idle. When it was finally going to be used and it was claimed by the respective officials, the lessee forced the village head/his wife to pay back and they even brought police and soldiers along. Being used to dealing with soldiers and police, to them, protests submitted by village people are not worth their attention. (Interview, female, 46, middle-class citizen, Kabupaten Lumajang, 26 April 2010)

Aside from the village head’s leadership, the community’s assessment over the accountability of the village administration is also influenced by political aspirations. The supporters of village head candidates who lost in the election generally tend to give an unsatisfactory assessment towards the elected village head. A village head in di Kabupaten Gresik, for example, stated, “We’ve done our best but they [the supporters of the village head candidate who lost the election] still think that what we’ve done are all mistaken, let alone if we make real mistakes” (interview, male, 40, 22 April 2010). Community assessment on the village administration’s accountability also depends on whether their interest is accommodated or not, without considering other factors. For BLT (Direct Cash Transfer or Indonesia’s unconditional cash transfer), for example, the poor people who do not receive BLT will instantly accuse that the village administration is not accountable, shows favoritism, etc., while in fact, the authority to decide BLT recipients is not in the hands of the village administration.

The following quotations give a description on respondents’ perception towards the accountability and responsiveness of the village administrations in the sample areas.

Most of the village people are already quite happy with the existing services. (Interview, male, 40, RTM, Kabupaten Lumajang, 24 April 2010)

The administration has not yet been able to be fully responsible for its community. (Poor Men’s FGD, 37, Kabupaten Gresik, 23 April 2010)

Once I suggested to the village head to plea to PDAM to install PDAM water pipes up to RT 8. The village head said, “God willing, I will propose to it.” But, until now, there has been no news from the village head regarding the development of his proposal. (Interview, male, 40, RTM, Kabupaten Ngawi, 25 April 2010)

3.6 Impact of PNPM on Good Governance in the Village

As seen above, PNPM management model which puts forward participation, transparency, and accountability has not had an impact on the management of the village administration, both on the bureaucracy management and the management of programs received by the village. Based on information from and observation in the villages, it seems that this is caused by the following factors.

First, as described in Chapter II, the strong domination of the village elite and the lack of initiative from the community have contributed to the *status quo* to continuously be well established. Community members are usually afraid or reluctant to suggest changes to the existing mechanisms that are related to participation and, even more, transparency and

accountability. Demanding better transparency and accountability means challenging the ruling village elite. After a while, this condition creates indifference among the community members.

Second, there is no guarantee for the community that if they duplicate the mechanism applied by PNPM in programs and activities in the village, they can earn something (project). Participative planning in PNPM will certainly end with a project, while planning involving as much community participation as possible through the *musrenbangdes*, for example, may not necessarily give birth to a project. This condition is worsened by the fact experienced by those who take part, especially, in the *musrenbangdes*, that from year to year, their proposals have never been realized. Besides, in certain cases such as the cases in several villages in Southeast Sulawesi, after the proposal that had been designed participatively was realized, in fact those who got to reap the benefits were only certain people from the village elite. On the other hand, for the village elite, such mechanism as the PNPM will obviously be a disadvantage for them, in the sense that their domination will be removed along with the removal of various privileges that they enjoy.

Third, there is an indication that the community and village officials lean towards a normative attitude. If a program or certain activity does not require participation, transparency, and accountability, they will not demand it either. Such normative logic is apparently becoming stronger because there is no critical awareness as well as sufficient understanding among community members about what ideal governance is.

Box 3

Elite Capture in the Agricultural Tools and Machines Assistance Program

The management of various programs is vulnerable to the village elite's hijacking. In a sample village in Southeast Sulawesi, this phenomenon has occurred over and over again and there has no concrete resistance from the community. According to the informants, in 2005, the farmers' groups in the village were asked by the government to submit a proposal to get agricultural tools. These groups suggested asking for tractors. Then, the government gave four tractors to the village. Each farmers' group got one tractor. According to farmers' groups' prior agreement, the tractors could be used by both the members of the farmers' groups and the nonmembers. The difference was only in the rental costs. If the one who rented the tractor was a member of the farmers' groups, he would have to pay Rp650,000, but if he was not, he would have to pay for Rp700,000. It was agreed that the rental money would be used as funds of the farmers' groups to fix any damage to the tractors and the rest for the farmers' groups' savings.

However, since 2008, it has been no longer clear whether the tractors are still owned by the farmers' groups or by individuals. What is obvious for the farmers' group members is that the tractors have always been dominated by the head of the farmers' group. The money from renting the tractors has never been reported to the members. From the start of the farmers' groups' establishment, the members (who became FGD participants) have even never received the groups' dividends.

A similar thing occurred in the case of tractors (poison pump machines) assistance. In the beginning, the farmers' groups received the machines for the groups to use, but then the machines were taken over by the head of the farmers' group for his own personal use. Another case was the case in which the house renovation assistance was first allocated for the house of the village secretary. According to informants, the village secretary was not poor and so he had no right to receive that house renovation assistance. An informant from a poor household said,

I don't really know for sure, but other people, which are many, and I have never been involved. Even during PNPM, we were not involved. Usually during data collection, our names are listed but when the assistance is obtained, we do not get any. In fact, those who are not in the list get the assistance. One example is the house assistance. There were some houses, including mine, that were listed and even photographed, but when the assistance was received, it was the village secretary and the village head who received the assistance instead. (Interview, male, 38, RTM, Kabupaten Konawe Selatan, 7 June 2010)

IV. THE DYNAMICS OF POVERTY IN THE STUDY AREAS

4.1 Poverty and Its Dynamics

The concept of poverty has evolved from merely someone's inability to fulfill his/her basic needs to the concept that poverty is a complex condition involving social and moral dimensions. As the dynamics of social, economic, political, and cultural lives evolve, the concept of poverty also turns multidimensional. Poverty involves the dimensions of health, nutrition, education, vulnerability, powerlessness, inequality, social exclusion, and voicelessness. In general, it can be said that the problem of poverty is related to political and social ideas that reflect the community's expectations and aspirations. Poverty is a condition where a certain life standard considered decent by the society is not fulfilled.

Respondents in the study areas, including those who are poor, generally still perceive poverty in its most basic form, namely someone's inability to fulfill his/her basic needs. This phenomenon probably indicates that the poverty occurring in the sample areas is absolute in nature. The explanations that follow depict the aspects related to the level and condition of the local poverty.

4.1.1 Poverty Indicators

In all sample villages, the poverty has similar indicators/characteristics. Both the FGD and the in-depth interview results reveal that the dominant poverty characteristics are centered upon the aspects of asset ownership, daily needs fulfillment, and types of livelihoods. In the asset ownership aspect, the poor are usually characterized by (i) bad/uninhabitable housing conditions; (ii) lack of sanitation facilities/MCK (bathrooms, laundries, and latrines), or having them but in an unhealthy condition; (iii) lack of assets or valuable furniture/home electronics; and (iv) lack of capital goods such as rice fields, plantations, fish farms, or fishing boats. The following quotations illustrate the characteristics of poverty in the asset ownership aspect.

In general, the poor live in bad houses. (Village Representatives' FGD, 45, Kabupaten Gresik, 23 April 2010)

Tak andik [poor], bamboo houses, woven bamboo walls, dirt floors, clay tile roofs, lamps with electricity from the neighbor's house, small houses. (Village Representatives' FGD, 41, Kabupaten Lumajang, 22 April 2010)

The poor families' houses have palm leaf roofs. The ventilation is not adequate. (Village Representatives' FGD, 45, Kabupaten Konawe Selatan, 13 May 2010)

They don't have adequate household furniture. (Interview, male, 56, community figure, Kabupaten Lumajang, 23 April 2010)

Not having MCK. ... You've got to run to the stream. (Poor Women's FGD, 45, Kabupaten Bombana, 4 June 2010)

A communal MCK, on the river or ponds. (Poor Women's FGD, 28, Kabupaten Solok, 11 May 2010)

Lack of arable land. (Poor Women's FGD, 51, Kabupaten Solok, 12 May 2010)

For the *bansaik* [poor], some have land and some don't. Even if they do, it's very limited. (Poor Women's FGD, 64, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 12 May 2010)

Fishers are ... poor. The ones who are wealthy are usually boat owners. (Poor Women's FGD, 50, Kabupaten Gresik, 22 April 2010)

Ingin bakabun tanab ndak ado, wak tiok pagi lah poi ka ladang urang [I want to farm, but I don't have any land. Every morning, I go to work on someone else's land. (Poor Women's FGD, 37, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 13 May 2010)

Not all respondents agree that the condition of one's house is an important indicator of poverty. Their opinion is based upon the fact that there are some community members who have nice and inhabitable houses, but lack any productive assets or regular incomes, and thus still experience difficulties in fulfilling their basic daily needs. Therefore, the household is categorized as poor. The nice houses are usually built by their relatives or children.

In the aspect of daily needs fulfillment, the indicator of poverty is generally associated with difficulties in fulfilling food, clothing, health, and educational needs. The following statements describe the lives of the poor in the sample areas.

Enough to buy food for the day, while for the next days, we'll cross that bridge as we come to it. (Poor Women's FGD, 38, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, 4 June 2010)

We go to the traditional healer first. If we don't get better, then we go to the *puskesmas* [community health center]. (Village Representatives' FGD, 43, Kabupaten Agam, 11 May 2010)

Well, because of our extreme poverty, we are mostly elementary school dropouts. So, we are unable to find any other job [besides being farm hands]. (Village Representatives' FGD, 40, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, 4 June 2010)

[They] can't afford the doctor. (Interview, female, 21, community figure, Kabupaten Gresik, 23 April 2010)

Tak andik ... difficult to get healthcare. Some go to traditional healers; some go to drugstores [to buy over-the-counter medicine such as Bodrex and Mixagrip]. *Tak andik* ... Many don't go to school ... Some go to *pesantren* [Islamic boarding school] ... Most are only elementary school graduates. (Village Representatives' FGD, 38, Kabupaten Lumajang, 24 April 2010)

Parents educate their children up to junior high school only. (Village Representatives' FGD, 41, Kabupaten Lumajang, 24 April 2010)

In the types of livelihoods aspect, the sample communities characterize the poor as a group of people who do not have regular jobs and/or have low-paying jobs such as farm hands, rubber tappers, construction workers, and sand miners.

Even though we already do odd jobs. You can say that we do any kind of menial labor. (Interview, male, 49, poor citizen, Kabupaten Gresik, 22 April 2010)

The poor and very poor, they receive wages from the wealthy. (Village Representatives' FGD, 53, Kabupaten Solok, 11 Mei 2010)

They work as daily laborers. (Middle-class Women's FGD, 45, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 14 May 2010)

They work as tenant farmers ... In other words, they have nothing. (Interview, male, 31, village official, Kabupaten Gresik, 24 April 2010)

Work as rice scavengers from the discarded rice stalks. They don't have any land. They work as farm hands in other people's rice fields. (Interview, male, 47, village official, Kabupaten Solok, 13 May 2010)

It's hard [for them] to find a living. They usually search for vegetables in the forest to sell. They don't have regular jobs. (Interview, female, 28, middle-class citizen, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, 5 June 2010)

Besides the indicators mentioned above, some respondents in the sample villages also included other poverty indicators. In Desa Kulon, Gresik, for example, they characterized the poor as a group of people who are self-conscious and do not socialize much with the general population. It is as if the poor "isolate" themselves so that the village authorities have difficulties in involving them in community activities. But this "self-isolation" is perhaps a reflection of their pragmatic mindset. The poor usually spend all their time trying to fulfill their basic needs, as described by the statement, "There has been a *posyandu* for a long time. It is about 300 m from my house. I know that it is scheduled once a month on Mondays, but I never bring my children to the *posyandu*. I have no time. All my time is spent in the plantation cutting rubber" (interview, female, 38, poor citizen, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 12 May 2010). To a certain extent, the "self-isolation" is also perhaps a reflection of their perplexity and even loss of hope as a result of the difficulties they face in their lives, as seen in this following statement, "The poor are narrow-minded and are always bewildered because they seem to be hitting brick walls. *Aku iki kerjo opo, usaha opo ...? Kok kabeh ora iso ...?*" [What job should I do? What business can I do? Why can't I do anything?] (interview, male, 63, poor citizen, Kabupaten Lumajang, 27 April 2010).

Sociologically, there may be many factors that can explain the poor's self-consciousness. But it is perhaps simply associated with their relative position in the society. In a community where the proportion of the poor is small, making them the minority, the inclination to self-consciousness increases. In Desa Kulon where the proportion of the poor is only around 15%, the sentiments of belonging to the "failure" group are stronger. On the other hand, in Desa Kenanga, Bombana, where the poor amount to 68% of the population, the poor have no self-consciousness or difficulties in socializing with other members of the community. This is proven by the following statement, "There is no significant difference and there is no problem in the social relationships. [It is the poor] who in fact can finish the job whenever they [the wealthy] throw parties. The wealthy just sit around and wait for their coffees to come. Hahaha" (Village Representatives' FGD, 44, Kabupaten Bombana, 4 June 2010).

Another indicator that characterizes the poor is that the poor are usually made up of people who are no longer productive due to old age and/or widows, as depicted by the following statement, "They are mostly elderly widows or elderly people who can no longer work" (Community Representatives' FGD, 39, Kabupaten Ngawi, 22 April 2010). It also holds true in Dusun Bakung, Kulon, Gresik, that the poor consists of the elderly widows. In this *dusun*, from the 25 households, 9 are headed by elderly widows and all are poor.

In the past eight or three years, the indicators of poverty have slightly changed. One of the changes recorded in this study is that the poor now have a higher awareness in sending their children to school, at least up to junior high school level. This is brought about by the implementation of the Nine-Year Compulsory Education and BOS (School Operational Assistance) programs which made it possible for elementary and junior high schools to be tuition free. Free schools give the poor a better access to education than ever before. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the schools are completely cost-free. Some respondents said, "Education is expensive. It is free on TV only; in reality, it is not" (interview, male, 49, poor citizen, Kabupaten Gresik, 22 April 2010). Some respondents even see education as the factor that causes poverty, as seen from the following statement, "At first, we owned things [we were not poor], but because we wanted our children to get an education, we sold our assets to cover the expenses [and thus we became poor]" (Poor Women's FGD, 53, Kabupaten Gresik, 24 April 2010).

As another change in the poverty indicator, in sample villages in East Java, specifically, having a motorcycle is no longer an important differentiating factor between welfare levels. Many of the poor have motorcycles now even though they obtained them through credits. The poor's housing condition has improved as well. Dirt floor is no longer a significant differentiating characteristic because many of the poor's houses have cemented or tile floor, especially in the parlor.

4.1.2 The Causes of Poverty

Poverty is a multidimensional problem; therefore, the factors causing it are also multidimensional. In the sample villages, the factors causing poverty are varied, but no apparent differentiating factors exist between all sample villages. Poverty is generally caused by a combination of the following factors.

a) Having limited land or no land at all

In all sample areas which economically rely on agriculture, an important factor causing poverty is not having any land or having limited land. This makes poor community members who do not have land and lack other skills become seasonal farm hands. Previous quotations state that the income generated by farm hands is not enough to fulfill basic needs. Combined with the lack of any other job opportunity outside the agricultural sector, the farm hands will likely stay poor.

b) Limited job opportunities

The limited number of job opportunities is a dominant factor in all sample areas causing the community members difficulty in freeing themselves from poverty. This in turn makes the poor who work as daily laborers (mostly farm hands) have no other job alternatives that pay better.

c) Low education level

The low formal education level, most only being elementary school graduates or dropouts, coupled with the lack of other skills besides agricultural skills, is one of the factors causing poverty in almost all sample areas. Statements such as, "The people are unintelligent, uneducated, so it is difficult for them to find a livelihood" (Poor Women's FGD, 40, Kabupaten Gresik, 23 April 2010), or, "Low education level, so they can't work in factories" (Poor Women's FGD, 42, Kabupaten Gresik, 24 April 2010), are depictions of the educational characteristics of the poor who face difficulty to find any livelihood opportunity outside the agricultural sector.

d) Limited capital

In all sample areas, almost all the FGD participants and in-depth interviewees mentioned the lack of both fixed capital (rice fields, plantations, boats, etc.) and liquid capital (funds) as important factors that hamper the poor from escaping poverty.

Besides the general factors above, some sample villages have special factors that cause poverty and/or make it difficult to overcome poverty. FGD participants in Desa Ndoyong, Ngawi, mentioned high transportation costs as the result of bad road infrastructure as one of the important obstacles in their efforts to raise their income. The nonfunctional irrigation channels also hinder the agricultural productivity of this village. The intermediary traders' domination in the trade system causes the farmers to receive lower prices for their produce. In addition, the hilly terrain and the lack of irrigation in Nagari Bukik Barisan, Solok, are the causes of the low agricultural productivity which makes the farmers' income lower and in turn makes them poor.

4.2 Factors That Influence the Dynamics of Community Welfare

Except in Wetan and Ndojong, all the sample villages show a trend of decreasing numbers of poor people, either in a massive or small scale, though not permanent, but dynamic according to the development of factors that cause poverty. Actually, several very important factors that influence the decrease in the number of poor people and/or the level of poverty in sample villages do not differ significantly. The following factors have a role in decreasing the level of poverty in the sample areas.

a) The presence of new job opportunities and/or expansion of existing job opportunities

The following cases reflect the expanding job opportunities which enable the poor to participate.

- (1) **Exploitation of a gold mine by the people of Kabupaten Bombana, Southeast Sulawesi.** For the people around the mine, including in Kenanga and Melati, the presence of the gold mine did not only create job opportunities as miners, but also created other job opportunities such as traders and *ojek* (motorcycle taxi) drivers. The booming job opportunities happened in 2008 and 2009. In Kenanga, which is approximately 10 km away from the mining site, the gold mine was the sole source of alternative jobs aside from the agricultural jobs. According to a participant of the Village Representatives' FGD in Kabupaten Bombana (39, 4 June 2010), between 2007 and 2009, the number of poor people in Kenanga had decreased from 78% to 68%. At the moment, gold mining has lessened due to the government regulation that forbids community mining. Without the alternative jobs, there is a possibility that the poverty level will stop decreasing or even increase again.
- (2) **The chance of becoming migrant workers in urban areas, either in cities close to or far from the village.** In Desa Kulon, for example, many of the people become construction workers in Surabaya. Besides becoming domestic migrant workers, some village citizens also work abroad as migrant workers to obtain a better income.
- (3) **Regional segregation (*pemekaran wilayah*) which creates new economic growth centers (the Dharmasraya case).** This gives a chance to the local people, including the poor, to obtain new jobs aside from getting better prices for their agricultural commodities.
- (4) **The opening of new factories/plantations in the sample communities' surroundings.** Some (oil palm) plantation investors in Southeast Sulawesi opened some plantations around the sample villages so that new job opportunities were available for the poor. Besides that, in Desa Kulon, since 2004, many farm hands have earned extra income from moonlighting as waste collectors thanks to the opening of some plants that receive wastes to recycle in that area.

b) The increase in agricultural commodity prices

The increase in the prices of plantation commodities (rubber, oil palm, and cocoa) and marine catch, especially in West Sumatra and Southeast Sulawesi, give a large contribution to the locals' income increase. This specifically started in the second semester of 2009 after the commodities' prices fell previously due to the global financial crisis. At the time of the crisis, the price of rubber in Nagari Gantuang, West Sumatra, for example, was only Rp1,500/kg, but now it has reached Rp11,500/kg (Poor Women's FGD, 33, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 13 May 2010). A similar thing happened to the price of *pokea* (a sea mussel) in Kamboja, Konawe

Utara, Southeast Sulawesi. The price of *pokea* is now Rp7,000/can, quadruple the previous price, Rp1,500/can (Poor Women's FGD, 45, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, 5 June 2010).

Box 4

Community Mine and the Decrease in Poverty Levels in Southeast Sulawesi

Desa Cempaka is one of the nine villages in Kecamatan Ranomeeto Barat, Kabupaten Konawe Selatan. Cempaka is a transmigration village for people from Ciamis and Tasikmalaya. At the moment, Cempaka is one of the two most prosperous villages in this *kecamatan*. The development in this village is mostly supported by development programs such as the ADD, PNPM, Raskin, BLT, livestock assistance, integrated village stimulating funds, and savings and loans assistance projects or revolving funds.

In economic activities, the people of Cempaka have tough trading spirits. The people's economic condition further improved when in 2007 a gold mine was discovered in Kabupaten Bombana. Many people from this village and other villages from almost all over Southeast Sulawesi came to this mine to try their luck as miners or as sellers fulfilling the miners' needs. The people of Cempaka became the pioneers in economic activities in the Bombana gold mine. They leave their homes in the middle of the night and sell their goods at the mines in the morning. Some use a motorcycle, while others use pick-up trucks. They generally sell together with their spouse. Between 2007 and 2010, the economic condition of the people of Desa Cempaka had improved greatly.

As a result of the economy of Desa Cempaka that improved, a new group of wealthy people has emerged in this village. The Adult Men's FGD showed that in 2007, there were only two community groups, the middle-class and poor groups, and now, there is the third group, the wealthy. This group consists of traders and civil servants (teachers) who have experienced an increase in profit/salary in the last three years. The group's members started buying vehicles (motorcycle or car) to support their business.

Since 2009, the mining companies have started to discipline the traders, forcing traders from Desa Cempaka to become peddlers who sell their goods in neighboring villages. With the presence of PNPM, the activities of which include creating JUT (*Jalan Usaha Tani*, or farm roads), bridges, and *deker* (small bridges), and giving SPP (capital assistance for women), economic activities in Cempaka community are able to survive; some even grow. Their mobility is easier and unobstructed. Besides easing the community when going to their rice field, the JUT also becomes their shortcut to the *kecamatan* office and *puskesmas*. The gold mine increased their economy temporarily, while the PNPM does it permanently.

c) Infrastructural improvements

In some sample locations, there have been village road improvements, this condition has improved trade efficiency and eased access to the market. Transportation costs have decreased and the prices received by the farmers have increased. The improvement of welfare due to improvements in road infrastructure has happened in sample villages which previously had terrible roads. In Nagari Tanah Tinggi, West Sumatra, a respondent said, "... the factor that has an influence on the change in the community's welfare level is transportation. With the transportation running smoothly, the people can reduce the cost of transporting their produce from the rice field to the market" (Village Representatives' FGD, 54, Kabupaten Agam, 11 May 2010). The increase in the quality and quantity of the rural economic infrastructure is a direct result of the programs/projects/assistance provided by the government. Specifically for the rural road infrastructure, some programs that have given a large contribution are the PNPM, JPD (Village Axis Road) program, stimulant funds, etc.

d) Increase in agricultural productivity

The agricultural productivity of some sample villages has increased due to the construction of irrigation infrastructure and the success of agricultural counseling. For example, in Nagari

Gantuang, Dharmasraya, West Sumatra, in 2007, the central government had built a technical irrigation network capable of irrigating 18,000 hectares of rice fields in West Sumatra and Jambi. The construction of these irrigation channels has increased the rice planting frequency from two harvests a year to three to four harvests a year. In Nagari Tanah Tinggi, Agam, a Community Representatives' FGD participant (32, 11 May 2010) stated, "The welfare betterment was supported by the change in planting patterns which happened in 1999 and by the smooth marketing. In the past, the people of Tanah Tinggi only planted carrots, but after the training held by the Agriculture Office, they have started to plant tomatoes and corn."

Besides the positive factors, in some sample villages, there have been factors that negatively influence the welfare level. In Desa Wetan, Gresik, the number of poor people has increased due to the pollution of the fish farms by the waste of factories that operate in the areas surrounding the village. The fishers' catch has also decreased due to the policy of Kabupaten Gresik government that bans the use of trawls, while in fact fishers from other *kabupaten* still use trawls in the Gresik waters. Thus, the fishers from Desa Wetan lose in the fish-catching competition and their income has drastically decreased.

For Desa Ndayong, Lumajang, one of the causes of the increasing number of poor people is the policy of agricultural mechanization in the Jatiroto Sugar Plant. The possibility for the locals to become seasonal workers in the plant has vanished. The local work force has also been marginalized from work opportunities because the rice wholesalers bring their own workers, shunning the use of locals.

4.2.1 Government Programs/Assistance

In the last eight years, both the central and regional governments have implemented various development programs that have a significant role in reducing poverty, or at least preventing the poor from becoming poorer. These programs can be grouped into two categories according to their targets: First, programs that are narrowly targeted such as Raskin, BLT, various credit assistance schemes, Gardu Taskin (Integrated Movements in Poverty Reduction), BOS, and Jamkesmas (Health Insurance for the Poor); and second, programs that are broadly targeted such as PNPM, JPD, ADD, stimulant funds, fertilizer subsidy, etc. All these programs aim to help make provision for the people and provide a wider space for them to enhance their economic activities.

Every sample village has a high level of variance, not only in the number and kind of programs but also in the effectiveness. Nagari Gantuang, Dharmasraya, for example, has received 16 kinds of programs within the duration of 2007–2010. On the contrary, Desa Kenanga, Bombana, has just received five kinds of programs within the same duration. The difference in the number of programs received will of course give different impacts on the village people's welfare improvement.

Besides the number and kind of programs received, the effectiveness of a similar program's implementation in every village is also different. Generally, the difference in a program's effectiveness is a result of the difference in the implementation of the program. Because this study does not deal directly with assessing the efficacy or usefulness of programs, but only assessing them indirectly through informants' perceptions, there is a large possibility of a biased judgment. Based upon this fact, the whole explanation on the effect of government programs in this study is not exclusive.

As an example, the Raskin program in Nagari Gantuang is not very effective because the majority of the recipients are not poor. This happens either because the poor are not included in the target group or because they cannot afford the rice.

In Jorong Padang Bintungan, there has been no Raskin assistance even though the program was initiated six years ago. The Raskin rice is [supposed to be] for the poor, while in fact the people who receive it are not the poor, but the middle-class people and the rich. (Poor Men's FGD, 63, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 13 May 2010)

I have never received Raskin rice because I don't have enough money to buy it. Today, I only have Rp1,000, and even that was used by my child to buy snacks already. How can I afford Raskin rice? The wealthy people can buy lots of it, up to five sacks. (Interview, female, 38, poor citizen, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 12 May 2010)

One of the causes is because the targeting mechanism is the domain of the village arbiters or the village elite as described in the statement, "The head of the *jorong* decides who gets the assistance. We are not consulted" (Poor Men's FGD 52, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 13 May 2010). The Raskin program's low effectiveness due to the mistargeting also happened in Nagari Darek, Solok, as described in the following statement, "There are still poor people who have not received assistance, while some people who don't deserve it get it" (Poor People's FGD, 50, Kabupaten Solok, 14 May 2010).

The implementation of the Jamkesmas program in Nagari Gantuang has also failed to reach its goals. This is depicted by a respondent, "My child died because of it, Sir. My child was dying and they told me to deal with all sorts of bureaucracy. So, my child could not make it, Sir" (Poor Women's FGD, 33, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 13 May 2010). The ineffective implementation of Jamkesmas also occurred in Desa Lor, Lumajang, which is seen from the statement, "Even though we use Jamkesmas, a family member is still asked to vouch for us. If not, they won't help you" (Middle-class Men's FGD, 42, 27 April 2010).

In some other sample villages, the two programs turned out to be highly effective. In Jorong Koto Tengah, Agam, for example, from the eight existing programs, the local people ranked Raskin as the most effective program in helping the poor. In Nagari Darek, Solok, and Kulon, Gresik, the free health programs, both Jamkesmas and the local government's health program, were highly appreciated by the locals. The appreciation can be seen, among others, from the statement, "... free health insurance, so the people's awareness to seek medical assistance is quite high compared to that of 2007. ... Now that the people are healthier, the harvests are also higher" (Community Representatives' FGD, male, 35, Kabupaten Solok, 12 May 2010).

The same thing goes for BLT. Some sample villages regard it as an effective program because it gives assistance in the form of cash so that the utilization is very flexible, in line with the needs of the recipient's family. In Desa Kidul, Lumajang, BLT is the most effective program compared to the others (Poor Women's FGD, 40, 26 April 2010). But on the contrary, the Middle-class Women's FGD results in Desa Lor, Lumajang, Middle-class Male FGD in Desa Ndoyong, Ngawi, and the interview results with the head of Desa Anggrek, Konawe Selatan, for example, state that BLT is not effective. In general, the reason is because BLT's benefits are short-lived (only to fulfill temporary consumptive needs) and do not help the people improve their economic condition.

Based upon that, especially the poor give different responses towards different poverty reductions programs because they are basically heterogeneous. The chronically and persistently poor probably need social assistance more, while the transient poor will perhaps

respond better to empowerment programs and opportunity openings, but at the same time need protection from shocks.

The perception of the effectiveness of a certain program does not only differ between sample villages. Even in the same village, there are always different perceptions. In Desa Kulon, Gresik, the Poor Men's FGD came up with a conclusion that the three most useful programs for the people are (i) JPD, (ii) dam dredging, and (iii) Raskin, whereas the Poor Women's FGD chose (i) Raskin, (ii) road construction, and (iii) BOS. The Middle-class Women's FGD voted for (i) fertilizer subsidy, (ii) JPD, and (iii) Raskin, while the Middle-class Men's FGD concurred on (i) Jamkesmas, (ii) PNPM, and (iii) ADD.

Once again, this phenomenon indicates that the people's judgment on the effectiveness of a certain program does not follow any pattern. The level of subjectivity is very prominent. This subjectivity level can occur because of personal experiences that may be very different from one another, but may also be caused by the interests of the concerned community groups.

4.2.2 Other Activities/Village People's Initiatives

Poverty is the problem of the entire nation. The country, *casu quo* the government, in accordance to its mandate, does have an obligation to reduce poverty and becomes the main actor. Nevertheless, government poverty reduction programs will be more optimal if they are supported by all the community elements, the private sector, NGOs, and other parties that care about poverty reduction.

In all sample villages, unfortunately, all poverty reduction programs, both the direct and indirect ones, only come from the central and regional governments. For the last eight or three years, there has never been any institution outside the government that takes part in reducing poverty. The nonpoor local community does not have any institution purposely established to contribute to reducing poverty systematically.

However, from a different perspective, the nonpoor local community has actually taken part in reducing poverty. This is at least reflected in the statement of a respondent that says that the haves have employed the poor as farm hands all this time. Without the works provided by the haves, the poor will get poorer (interview, male, 40, village head, Kabupaten Gresik, 23 April 2010). Outside this employer-worker relationship, the community's concern towards the poor is still present in some sample villages. In Desa Jejeg, Ngawi, for example, a poor citizen whose house was destroyed in a fire received a new house as the result of the other village citizens' mutual cooperation.

Furthermore, the various community groups that exist in the village have no special agenda that targets to reduce poverty. There is only one village or two that have community groups having special activities that touch the life of the poor. In Tanah Tinggi, Agam, there is the Bamus group whose activities, among others, include raising social funds in order to, among others, give financial assistance to orphans.

The role of the local community that is very minimal in helping the poor is at least caused by two things. Firstly, the presence of the poor in the village neighborhood is considered as a natural phenomenon and not a social problem that needs to be solved together. Based on this, generally, the local community only feels sympathy towards them without making any real effort to solve the problem. Secondly, almost all informants in the sample villages, both the government officials and

the poor, share the same opinion that the effort to reduce poverty is the responsibility of the government. For them, the government's responsibility is in the form of assistance programs.

The stance of the people is probably the result of the old paradigm of poverty reduction programs. Most of the poverty reduction programs in the past used to be top-down in nature without including the community's participation. The government placed the community as the party that requires assistance and, on the other hand, it positioned itself as a Santa Claus who gives away charity. In other words, development programs that were aimed at the poor were more like a charity rather than an improvement to the capacity and/or independence of the poor. A development paradigm such as this in practice will create dependence which eventually makes the community suffer even more.

4.2.3 Impact of PNPM on Poverty Reduction

To change anew a development mechanism having a top-down nature, the government implemented PNPM that is participatory. Through this program, the community is given space to formulate development activities that suit its needs. Conceptually, this kind of development approach is expected to bring about greater positive impacts. In sample areas, in the broad sense, PNPM-Rural is divided into two, namely the physical infrastructure development program and capital assistance program in the form of SPP. In line with the form of the programs, the impact of both programs on poverty reduction also has different characters. In this context, development programs in general and assistance programs in particular, no matter how small, certainly benefit the community. What becomes the question is then how much does PNPM affect poverty reduction.

a) Rural Infrastructure Development Program

The open menu programs of PNPM Mandiri-Rural have so far been focused more on physical infrastructure developments. Consequently, in all sample areas,¹⁰ PNPM activities are usually around the building and/or rehabilitation of roads, bridges, PAUD buildings, TK buildings, and clean water facilities. Overall, these infrastructure developments are certainly advantageous for the local community. Even some informants in many sample villages place PNPM as one of the three programs that greatly benefit the community.

The explanation in the previous part showed that the prime causes of poverty in sample areas are related to the scarce capital goods and financial capital, scarce job opportunities, and low-quality human resources. Related to this, Chapter VI (Villagers' Primary Needs and Their Fulfillment) also explains that the villagers' primary needs in all sample locations generally revolve around the needs of capital, alternative job opportunities, skills training, free education, and excellent health services that are free. In this context, the various physical infrastructure developments of PNPM-Rural are not the kinds of developments that can directly solve the root of the poverty problem and/or fulfill the villagers' primary needs.

Referring to the above facts, it can be said that the role of PNPM-Rural in reducing poverty is not centralized or dominant, but only peripheral. Direct indications regarding this matter are particularly reflected in FGD results and also in in-depth interviews with the poor group. When answering the question about the three kinds of programs that are most beneficial (effective) in improving the welfare of the poor group, the respondents' answers were

¹⁰Exception occurred only in Jorong Taruko, Dharmasraya, West Sumatra. In 2009, the PNPM activity was conducted in the form of baking skills training for women.

generally around Raskin program, BLT, and other programs that were quite diverse. In many sample villages, PNPM did not make one of the three programs that were considered to have positive impact on the increase in the poor's welfare. In some sample villages, for example in Desa Kidul, Lumajang, the FGD participants even did not mention PNPM as a program that were running in their village because they did not know whether PNPM was eventually implemented or not. According to the FGD participants, they were once invited to formulate their village's primary needs and to decide the people to manage them in the initial stage of the PNPM implementation, but they had never been informed about the realization of the program. In this context, an FGD participant (male, 36, 26 April 2010) said, "... The poor are only needed in the program proposal stage only, while for the program's realization, they have never been consulted again." This shows that PNPM's existence is unfamiliar to the local poor community, let alone its benefits for them.

For the village community in general and some of the poor in particular, the peripheral role of PNPM in improving the community's welfare takes place during the process of physical infrastructure development. This is reflected in the following statement, "The poor community gets work opportunities even though they're only incidental. The community in general enjoys the better road condition" (interview, male, 40, village head, Kabupaten Gresik, 23 April 2010). However, the poor actually expect to get alternative permanent jobs, not the temporary ones as such in the PNPM.

In addition to providing temporary job opportunities, the road construction in rural areas by PNPM also has had an impact on the decrease in marketing transportation costs as reflected in the statement, "... In the past, the cost to carry the produce from the farm to the road was around Rp5,000, plus the transport cost to the market for Rp3,000. Now, with only Rp2,500, the produce can reach the market" (Middle-class Men's FGD, 59, Kabupaten Agam, 14 May 2010). For the poor who own an arable land, this decrease in transportation cost can more or less improve their income. But, for the poor whose profession is only a farm hand, this decrease has had little effect on their income. Therefore, PNPM infrastructure development has no direct impact on reducing the population of the poor. Out of the 90 FGDs and around 216 in-depth interviews, information regarding the role of PNPM in poverty reduction only revolves around this aspect.

b) SPP Program

In sample villages, there are generally three kinds of understanding concerning SPP. First, SPP is considered a mandatory program or a prerequisite for the village to obtain a PNPM physical infrastructure project. Second, SPP repayment performance will determine whether in the following year the respective village will get an infrastructure project or not. Third, SPP is not a program exclusively designed for the poor. Based on these perspectives, SPP implementation emphasizes more on the smoothness of credit return rather than the empowerment aspect. As a result, this program is a bias in favor of the middle-class and wealthy groups. These groups are the ones that have the potency to return the credit smoothly, unlike the poor group. Besides, in some villages, there is a tendency that SPP implementation is only a formality to obtain a PNPM physical project.

Based on these phenomena, the realities in the field show that SPP is not a program that aims at reducing poverty. In Desa Ndoyong, Ngawi, for example, the number of villagers that became SPP recipients was 21 groups, each group having approximately 10 members. Even though the number of SPP recipients is quite big, it turns out that most of them do not belong to the poor community. In this matter, all respondents, both from the community and village

officials, as well as program implementers stated that program recipients targeting was merely based on the smoothness of the loan return aspect, and was not based on the aspect of economic empowerment of the poor. Statements such as "I just feel sorry for the poor. If they borrow money, but later cannot return it, they will be burdened with debts" (Poor Women's FGD, 32, 22 April 2010) are indications of which community groups are actually the targets of SPP. The same thing was also stated by some village officials,

Those who are supposed to receive SPP are the poor, but in practice, it is difficult to do because if one is poor and we give him/her money and he/she does not have any business [open a stall or trade], it will surely be a burden for them to return the money. (Interview, female, 48, village apparatus, Kabupaten Ngawi, 22 April 2010)

In this village, anyone can borrow SPP as long as they have a business and have the ability to return the loan. So, there is no stipulation stating that only the poor can get the loan. That's why, for SPP, we announce it in the village that whoever wants to get a loan is welcome. So, there is no appointment because if there is one and something goes wrong later on, we would be blamed. (Interview, male, 31, *dusun* head, Kabupaten Gresik, 24 April 2010)

The design of the SPP program implementation that is not aimed at the poor is also reflected in the fact that in Desa Jejeg, Ngawi, for example, the local UPK requires a motorcycle's BPKB (ownership certificate) as an assurance for the poor who want to borrow SPP. The requirement is obviously peculiar because even to fulfill the daily needs, the poor have difficulties, let alone owning a motorcycle. In other words, this requirement is only a way to prevent the poor from borrowing SPP because they are doubted to be able to return the loan.

Another fact in Desa Kidul, Lumajang, showed that out of the nine Poor Women's FGD participants, only one participant was aware that there was an SPP program in their village. In Desa Lor, Lumajang, the poor do not have the courage to borrow SPP because they fear that they cannot return it; they do not have fixed monthly income. Related to this, there are some issues that cause the ineffectiveness of SPP in providing capital for the poor community. First, SPP's monthly instalment scheme does not suit the income pattern of the community who are generally farmers. Their work as farmers usually can only give them earnings every harvest time, that is, once every four months. Second, the *kecamatan* facilitators (FK) and village cadres (KPMD), who are supposed to raise awareness (conduct empowerment) so that the people will want to make use of the loan and then to guide them in running their business, have not done their job well. Third, it seems that the FK/KPMD who are expected to carry out the empowerment function do not have the required time and skills to guide the creditors so that they can make use of the loan productively.

Based on that, all the while, SPP has appeared only as a program to give away funds to the community without accompanied by the aspect of economic guidance or empowerment for the people who receive the loan. For the poor who happen to get the SPP loan, the impression is that the program has instead deceived them into becoming powerless and this surely is against the spirit of PNPM itself that is based on the empowerment aspect. SPP's powerlessness, seen both from its entity and recipients, is depicted by the following quotations.

What happened was different from the motto. The motto is poverty reduction. Those who should be given the loan are the poor, but the evidence showed the opposite. The assistance is supposed to empower the poor, but the poor were not given the PNPM loan instead (Poor Men's FGD, 46, Kabupaten Ngawi, 24 April 2010)

In PNPM [SPP], we have to be good at lying, so we can get the assistance, meaning that when we are asked about our monthly income to see whether we can return the loan or not, we have to lie by saying that our income is high, so we are considered able to pay the

instalment (of SPP). In fact, our income is not high. This has been proven; there are many members [of SPP] who got a two-million-rupiah loan because they lied about their income. And I know that their income is not that much. As a result, this village had a payment due up to 15 million rupiah so that Desa Mawar got sanctioned in that it cannot propose a physical development project. The *kecamatan* head lent his hand in an effort to return the loan. (Interview, male 24, middle-class citizen, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, 7 June 2010)

I got Rp500,000. I belonged to the vegetable trading group, but I did not think it was enough for capital. Therefore, I used it to buy rice. ... So, I quit selling vegetables. To return the loan, I looked for a side job as a log carrier. I was paid Rp40,000 per day. I used this money to pay for the PNPM instalment. (Interview, male, 48, RT head, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, 4 June 2010)

I had to buy clothes and school equipment for the children. That's why, I was allowed to borrow money from SPP. (Poor Men's FGD, 31, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 12 May 2010)

That's the way it is. My wife became a member, but I was the one who managed the capital. My wife could not sell vegetables. (Interview, male, 48, RT head, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, 4 June 2010)

Various explanations and quotations above state that SPP program's implementation has been so far unable to reach its objective in supporting the economic activities of poor women and the poor group in general. Yet, the Technical Guidelines for the Operation (PTO) of PNPM Mandiri-Rural state that the visions as well as the objectives of the program—which clearly includes SPP—are to improve the welfare and job opportunities of the rural poor community. What makes it worse is that because the implementation of SPP is a bias in favor of the middle-class and wealthy groups and it puts forward the smooth flowing of instalment payments as the criteria of success of the program, the existence of the poor is in fact exploited by certain parties for their personal gains. This is proven by the following statement, "So, it happened that there was an individual from this village who borrowed money on behalf of several people up to around 10 million rupiah. Then, he ran away. The village office was forced to pay for his debt" (interview, male, 31, *dusun* head, Kabupaten Gresik, 24 April 2010).

V. ACCESS TO AND QUALITY OF PUBLIC FACILITIES IN THE VILLAGE

The availability of and access to public service facilities in the study areas are not equal. Out of the three provinces that became the study areas, the Province of Southeast Sulawesi has relatively limited infrastructure, while the infrastructure in the Province of East Java and West Sumatra is adequate even though its quality still needs improvement. This chapter will discuss the access to and quality of various public services in the study areas that cover the infrastructure of market, road, education and health services, clean water, and population administration service.

5.1 Access to Market

Even though they are part of the rural areas, no sample villages can still be categorized as a subsistent village. This means that the villagers surely need the market, both as a physical medium where trade occurs and an institution that mediates exchange, to trade goods and services to fulfill needs. Generally the communities in the sample villages do not experience any major difficulties in accessing the market in order to buy their daily provisions because market facilities are already provided in their local area. The difference is that there are some villages that are closer to the market and there are those that are more distant to the market. Besides, communities that are closer to the city, either the *kecamatan* or the *kabupaten*, have more advantages in that they are closer to the markets that are open daily from morning to afternoon. Communities who live in the villages that are relatively distant from city centers can only access the market on market days, which are once to thrice a week, with restricted operating hours.

The past eight or three years have shown that there has been a tendency of an easier access for the community to the available markets. The impact of this change is that the community can gain advantage since they can save up their transportation funds, and get a higher sale price for their agricultural produce and a lower buying price for consumer goods. Some comments from the community reflect this tendency.

In the last eight or three years, access to the market is really easy because the road facilities are already good and this is supported by the peddlers who sell people's daily needs. (Interview, male, 46, community figure, Kabupaten Gresik, 22 April 2010)

It's close, 1 km. Two kilometers is the farthest, from Wawoluri, that is. We usually go on foot together or ride along a neighbor's motorcycle that is going the same direction. We go to the market twice a week on market days, Thursday in the *kelurahan*, Tuesday in Wawoluri. Usually, I just shop for daily needs in the market because I sell my vegetables directly from the garden. My friends come to buy my vegetables and sell them at the market. This year, it's getting better because there is another market on Saturday in Desa Lembo. So, I can sell vegetables thrice a week at the garden. (Interview, female, 28, middle-class citizen, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, 6 June 2010)

I use the car [*cigak baruk*]. It costs Rp4,000 to Rp6,000, depending on the driver. Some will accept Rp4,000, but there are others who ask for more up to Rp6,000. Now, I ride a motorcycle more often because I have bought one. (Interview, male, 44, RTSM, Kabupaten Solok, 16 May 2010)

The community has no problem with the access to the market because there are several markets that can be accessed by the community in this *kecamatan*. There was even a PNPM

implementation whose activity was to rehabilitate the market like the one in Desa Kweni. It opens every market day. Looking at it, for the past three years, the access has in fact been getting better because there are markets that are expanded and organized. (Interview, male, 29, FK, Kabupaten Gresik, 21 April 2010)

Based on the above comments, there are at least four factors that support easier access to the market. Firstly, the numerous programs of road/bridge infrastructure developments, some of which are PNPM projects, help people from having to go through wet, rock-strewn, and potholed roads in order to reach the market. Secondly, the community has been able to own a means of transportation, such as a motorcycle, more easily (through the lenient requirement to motorcycle ownership credit), which has an effect on the much faster and smoother access to the market. Thirdly, not only can the community access the market easily, but the "market" can also easily come to the community. This is seen from the increasing number of peddlers who are using motorcycles or cars more often to come to the villages to sell various kinds of consumer goods. Fourthly, the number and frequency of market activities, as well as their quality, are increasing. In the past, markets in some villages were only open once a week, but in the last eight or three years, there have been some that are open twice a week or more, just like what occurs in Kabupaten Agam and Konawe Utara. Besides, the market buildings have been improved and there have even been developments of new markets like what happened in Konawe Selatan, Gresik, and Lumajang.

The improving community access to the market in some sample villages is attributed to the role of PNPM that has improved the quality of the market buildings, eased access to the market, and smoothed market penetration to the community or even created a market in the village as described in the following.

- a) The quality of market is improving because in some regions, PNPM has built new markets and renovate or expand the existing markets such as what happened in study villages in Ngawi, Gresik, Konawe Utara, and Konawe Selatan.
- b) Community's access to the market to sell agricultural produce or buy consumer goods is getting easier because PNPM has repaired the roads in the village and the roads included in JUT and constructed or fixed bridges connecting the village to the market. This condition occurs in almost all the study villages.
- c) Market penetration is getting smoother because with the road and bridge repairs, intermediary traders and distributors of consumer goods can directly visit the village to buy the community's agricultural and plantation products or distribute the community's consumer goods directly to the stalls in village.
- d) PNPM through the SPP program has also contributed to encouraging some villagers who accepted the loans to change or add professions, mostly, to become traders. This is because the "business" that one must own, as a prerequisite to get SPP, is always understood as a new business, which is different from what they have been doing all this time, namely farming.

5.2 Road Infrastructure and Transportation

The condition of road infrastructure in the study locations is generally quite good at present, especially in East Java and West Sumatra. In East Java, the village roads and even the *dusun* roads are generally already asphalted. In some villages, such as in Lor, the pathways have used paving blocks. Although not as good as the roads in East Java, the roads in West Sumatra are adequate. The main road in the villages and several strategic roads in the *dusun* are already

asphalted or at least hardened. In Southeast Sulawesi, except in Konawe Selatan, many of the village and *dusun* roads have not been asphalted, are damaged, have only been hardened, and, in Kabupaten Bombana, are only dirt roads. Almost along the 100-kilometer road that connects Kota Kendari and Kabupaten Bombana is full with big potholes. What an irony; Southeast Sulawesi, as the biggest producer of asphalt in Indonesia, has many roads that have not been asphalted.

In some sample areas were found damaged intervillage roads and they are seemed abandoned. In Lor, Lumajang; Melati, Bombana; and Kamboja, Konawe Utara, some of the intervillage connecting roads are slightly damaged and some others are heavily damaged. According to informants, the reason why most intervillage roads are relatively neglected is because there is no attention from the government being responsible for the roads, both the regional government (for *kecamatan*, *kabupaten*, and provincial roads) and the central government (for national roads). A number of road repair and improvement budgets that has come into the village such as PNPM, JPD, ADD, etc. are usually allocated to fixing or building roads that are strategic for the villagers, namely the village axis road. PNPM funds, according to informants at the *kecamatan* level, can only be allocated to building roads within the village and cannot be used to construct intervillage roads. Another reason why the intervillage roads were neglected is because every village assumes that the road is not their responsibility and thus they feel reluctant to allocate their development budget for it.

For villages that have good road infrastructure, it does not necessarily mean that transportation is no longer an obstacle because in these villages, for example, in Lor, Lumajang; Wetan, Gresik; and Anggrek, Konawe Selatan, there is no public transportation that passes the village. This condition heavily burdens the people who do not own any private vehicle such as motorcycles or cars. However, this condition opens up a job opportunity for other community groups, such as *ojek* and *becak* (pedicab) drivers, who provide alternative transportation facilities for people who do not own private means of transportation.

However, compared to the condition eight or three years ago, the present condition of the roads as well as the transportation in the sample villages has experienced a rapid progress. Most of the repairs of the roads within the villages in the sample villages occurred in the past eight or three years. PNPM's contribution towards the improvement of road infrastructure is mainly related to the construction of inter-*dusun* roads and farm roads, some of which are also inter-*dusun* roads, while the main road in the village is usually constructed by using other source of funding, such as the JPD program. The following are comments from the informants regarding the changes.

At present, there has just been a road repair because this road is included in the provincial roads that will still be widened. In this village, there is one village road and one farm road. The village road is mud-spattered when it's raining. The farm road is still in good condition; the road was hardened once in 2000s. I forgot the year. The transportation that is usually used is car or *ojek*. Sometimes people go on foot. *Ojek* costs Rp5,000 to go to the market. To Kasipute, the *ojek* rent is Rp20,000 for a round trip. (Interview, male, 44, TPK, Kabupaten Bombana, 5 June 2010)

The road in this village is heavily damaged. Since the segregation of Kabupaten Bombana, the road in this village has never been repaired. The current village road is the result of a project when Bombana was still part of Kabupaten Buton (Interview, male, 51, RTSM, Kabupaten Bombana, 5 June 2010)

There are still dirt roads; for example, the road to Siaro-aro is still full of dirt. (Interview, male, 43, *orong* head, Kabupaten Solok, 14 May 2010)

In terms of roads, there have been many improvements. Now, they are quite satisfactory. What lacks is the means of transportation. The impact on the economy is the smooth selling of consumer goods. (Interview, male, 28, RT head, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, 5 June 2010)

The roads to this market from the villages around Lor are already good, except for some roads, such as the road coming from Pronojiwo [towards the direction of Kecamatan Tempursari]. The problem is that there is no public transportation from the village to the market because what is available is only *ojek*. The inter-*kecamatan* access is awful, both for the roads to Pronojiwo [heading to Malang or returning to Lumajang] and to Pasitian heading towards Lumajang. However, PNPM cannot build this road because it is a *kabupaten* road. (Interview, male, 42, FK, Kabupaten Lumajang, 22 April 2010)

5.3 Education Services

For the informants, the availability of basic education facilities from elementary schools (SD) to junior high schools (SMP) in sample villages is quite satisfactory. Compared to eight or three years ago, the condition has experienced an improvement. Of all the sample villages, there is only one village in Konawe Utara that does not have an SD in the village. Aside from that, all villages even have more than one SD. SMP is usually not available in the villages, but available only in the villages that are the centers of the *kecamatan*. The senior high school (SMA) is even fewer in number. Usually, there is only one in every *kecamatan* or there is even none, so students from the village have to go to the *kabupaten* city. Some villages, such as Anggrek, Konawe Selatan, which are located quite far from the closest SMP had made a breakthrough by building an SD-SMP *Satu Atap*. The SD and SMP are integrated in the same school, so after the SD students graduate, they can go directly to the SMP in the same school.

For SD, there has been one since years ago, but SMP was just opened in 2008. It is still called SMP *Satu Atap*. Facilities for the SMP are still very much inadequate, both in terms of human resources [teachers] and computers that are lacking. For SMA, up to the present time, there has been none in Cempaka. Students are very active to go to school. (Interview, female, 42, community figure, Kabupaten Konawe Selatan, 7 June 2010)

Public facilities such as the road and bridge infrastructure, and means of transportation that have been getting better for the past three years have uplifted the enthusiasm of the students to attend school. (Interview, female, community figure, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 14 May 2010)

The education facilities from year to year have been improving because if it is seen from the physical condition of the school at present, it is much better and tidier. (Interview, male, 75, community figure, Kabupaten Agam, 16 May 2010)

Today, it's embarrassing to only graduate from SD. It will be difficult to get a job. It's different from the past. Back then, an SD graduate can be an SD teacher. (Interview, male, 52, middle-class citizen, Kabupaten Ngawi, 26 April 2010)

The community's interest in pre-SD education, namely TK and PAUD, today is high. In almost all study villages, there is one or at least a plan to build a pre-SD school. Quite many PNPM/PPK projects have been allocated to the building of pre-SD schools. As seen in Appendix 1, there are 12 open menu projects in 8 villages out of the 18 study villages that build/renovate education facilities for these pre-SD schools.¹¹ The great interest of the community in pre-SD education is partly caused by the community's awareness that children at a very early age need a medium for education as well as playing. In addition, it is also

¹¹This includes constructing/renovating TK buildings as many as eight projects, constructing/renovating PAUD buildings as many as three projects, and the building of *raudatul afal* (RA), or Islamic TK, as many as one project.

because it has become the latest trend to enroll children at a very early age; even though this kind of awareness is mostly present among the middle and upper classes. An informant in Konawe Selatan stated,

In the past, Sir, children went to school on foot. Now, almost all go to school by motorcycle, wear clean clothes, and wear shoes that are not splattered by mud. ... It seems that children are more diligent to go to school. What's most evident is actually the impact of the existence of TK. So, children do not have to start from scratch in SD. Well ... that TK which was built by PNPM. (Interview, male, 58, community figure, Kabupaten Konawe Selatan, 5 June 2010)

In villages categorized as poor with a relatively small number of population, there is usually only one SD or two such as in Tanah Tinggi, Kabupaten Agam; Anggrek, Kabupaten Konawe Selatan; and Bukik Barisan, Kabupaten Solok. Villages that are categorized as wealthy can have more than two or three schools for every education level. Desa Lor in Lumajang, for example, has three PAUD, six TK, and five SD, one of which is MIN (public Islamic elementary school) and one Christian SD. For the SMP level, there is one SMPK, one MTsN (public Islamic junior high school) and one MTsS (private Islamic junior high school). For the SMA level, there is one Christian SMA and SMA Mataram (public SMA). In addition, in this village, there have been several extension campuses of some universities, namely Unkris (Christian University) which stopped operating in 1999, Unida Malang which had operated until 2009, and STIT which is still operating up to today with lecture days on Saturdays and Sundays.

The people in villages that only have one or two schools usually send their children to the nearby schools, while the community members in villages that are relatively close to the urban areas which provide more alternatives of schools are inclined to send their children to schools in the cities considered to have better quality. This tendency appears to occur among the middle to upper class societies who have more aspiration towards the quality, aside from being able to support the extra education costs. An informant depicted,

Seen from the physical development, the education facilities in this *orong* are getting better, but the number of students is getting smaller because the community prefers sending their children to the cities to their own villages. (Interview, female, 29, middle-class citizen, Kabupaten Agam, 17 May 2010)

On the other hand, the enrollment rate of school-age children is getting higher. Particularly for the basic education level, all informants acknowledged that there are almost no children who do not attend school. Male and female discrimination has already been discarded by the community. In addition to the higher awareness of the parents and the more accessible schools are, this high level of enrollment rate is also affected by the existence of the BOS program that helps ease the burden of parents. If there are village people who complain about the cost of education, this is usually related to the fulfillment of school supporting needs, such as uniforms, books, pocket money, and also transportation costs, that are not covered by BOS. Ten out of the 18 study villages expressed that among the village primary needs is scholarship for poor students. For the SMA level, the enrollment rate, especially, of children from poor households is relatively low. This is due to the high education cost at the SMA level and the lack of support of programs like BOS. The following are depictions of education access at the study locations.

For SD and SMP, all boys and girls get equal chance to schooling, depending on the children, whether they really want to go to school or not. While for SMA, not all can attend school because the main obstacle is the tuition fee. That's why most boys are unenthusiastic to go to school. (Interview, female, 29, middle-class citizen, Kabupaten Solok, 16 May 2010)

The enrollment rates for the last three years, both for boys and girls, in SD and SMP have been improving due to the available facilities of SD and SMP buildings in Desa B, besides the support of the BOS program that helps students from poor households with free tuition fee and school equipment [uniform, shoes, bag, stationery] assistance. (Interview, male, 45, village head, Kabupaten Lumajang, 21 April 2010)

The direct role of PNPM in improving the access to and quality of education services is by assisting in the building/renovation of school buildings. However, as described above, PNPM projects that are related to education are all allocated for education development at the pre-SD level, such as PAUD and TK/RA. Only one village in Konawe Utara does not have an SD in its area and is planning to build one, although the fact is that it has not been realized yet. The tendency as such is because the primary basic education facilities for the community, namely SD and SMP, are already available in the village or at least easily accessible. The indirect role of PNPM-Rural is by creating a smoother access for students to school through road improvement. As depicted in the above quotations, the community believes that the betterment of roads passing through the schools has increased students' motivation to diligently go to school.

5.4 Health Services

The availability of health services in the study villages is considered quite adequate by the informants, except in some villages in Southeast Sulawesi. In Desa Melati and Kenanga, Kabupaten Bombana; and Desa Mawar, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, health facilities such as village maternity posts (*polindes*) along with their midwives are not available. Community's access to the *puskesmas* is also difficult because of its relatively distant location. In general, health facilities that are usually available in every village is *polindes* or *nagari* health center (*puskesmasri*), such as those in the *nagari* in West Sumatra, along with its midwife, while the *posyandu* is available in every *dusun*. Some villages that are distant from *kecamatan* centers and *puskesmas*, such as Desa Kamboja, Konawe Utara, have a secondary *puskesmas* (*pustu*). Only one *puskesmas* is usually available for one *kecamatan* and it is located in the village where the *kecamatan* center is. In addition to the government's health services, in developed villages, such as Lor, Cempaka, Darek, there are usually nongovernment health services, such as the private practices of doctors and midwives (not the village midwives), pharmacies, and maternity homes.

Related to these health facilities, the people in almost half of the study villages have several complaints, both those that are related to infrastructure availability and health service quality. In the matter of infrastructure availability, not all villages have a permanent building for *polindes*, let alone *posyandu*, as in the case of Desa Kamboja and Mawar. Villages that do not own a *polindes* usually do not have midwives and so the community has to go to the *puskesmas*. Villages that do not have a building for *posyandu* activities usually hold the activities in a resident's house or in the village office. This means that villagers who live far from the village office have to travel a relatively great distance. However, in the past three years, some villages have received assistance to build *polindes*, both from the regional budget and through program assistance such as PNPM. These villages include Anggrek, Bukik Barisan, and Mawar.

In villages such as Bukik Barisan, Kamboja, Kenanga, and Melati, informants also complained about the unavailable village/*nagari* midwife. Even if there is one, the midwife does not live in the village/*nagari*, so the villagers cannot get her service outside work hours. The community also felt that the services received by Jamkesmas card holders are not as good as those given to patients who pay cash. The services referred to are such as giving low quality medicine,

prioritizing other patients even though the Jamkesmas holders have come first, or even rejecting patients from getting services at the hospital just like what happened to the residents of a village in Lumajang. “Those who use Jamkesmas are treated later. ... But [that happens] in the hospital. But not here in the *puskesmas*” (interview, male, 35, RT head, Kabupaten Lumajang, 26 April 2010).

Another complaint is the midwife’s reluctance to give free services outside her work hours. In some villages, there is even a tendency that during work hours, the midwife prefers to refer patients who come to her for medication to the *puskesmas*, let alone outside work hours. According to the villagers, this tendency occurs because the midwife does not want to work too hard.

Even though some informants complained about some health service aspects, in general, they think that compared to eight or three years ago, the health service condition at present is relatively better. In the past three years, some study villages have received many health infrastructure construction as well as renovation assistance such as those received by Desa Anggrek, Bukik Barisan, and Mawar. The following quotation depicts these changes.

If it’s about health, today the condition is better than it was a few years back because there is a midwife in each *orong*; there is Jamkesmas for the poor community. *Posyandu* is held routinely once in two weeks. This health facility improvement has the same impact on men and women because the *orong*’s midwife does not only provide maternity services, but also serves people who ask for fever medicine. (Interview, male, RTM, Kabupaten Solok, 15 May 2010)

What is actually not peculiar is the fact that although health services are already available throughout the villages, the existence of traditional healers still persists.¹² Some community members often still ask for medicine from the traditional healer rather than from a midwife or a doctor. The reasons why there are still people who use the traditional healer’s services are not only because their awareness of and knowledge about modern health is limited, but also because of the cost factor. Even though there is no further information about who use the services of the traditional healer, the probability is that these people are the villagers who do not have a Jamkesmas card or those who have it but are hindered to access the available health facilities. An informant elaborated, “If it’s just a common illness, then I go to the traditional healer. If it’s a disease that cannot be cured by ‘the puffing’ of the traditional healer, then I go to the *puskesmas*” (interview, male, 38, village secretary, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, 6 June 2010).

The direct contribution of PNPM in the health sector in the study areas is the construction of building facilities for the *polindes* and *posyandu*. Three out of the 18 sample villages have received projects related to health infrastructure. The indirect contribution of PNPM is the construction of roads that pass through health facilities and thus community access to health facilities can be smoother and faster.

¹²Various studies show that even though the existence and the use of the traditional healer’s services are inclined to decrease from year to year, some people still access it up to the present time. See Rahayu, 2008.

5.5 Clean Water Facilities

Community's access to clean water is one of the complicated problems in the sample villages. This complication occurs because the problem is experienced only by a small number of people who live in a certain part of the villages that does not have any access to clean water, both the clean water that is provided by the government through the PDAM and the clean water that can be provided by the people themselves such as the traditional well. This access is not available sometimes because it cannot be reached by the PDAM pipe network and/or the area does not have any water content that is passable or fit to consume. In Desa Lor, for example, there are two or three RW that cannot be accessed by the PDAM pipe network, while not all the locals who tried to dig up a well could find water and so they had to share the neighbor's well. Desa Mawar in Konawe Utara, Desa Melati in Bombana, Desa Tanah Tinggi in Agam, and Jorong Taruko in Dharmasraya actually have an abundant water supply, but the water is of bad quality because it is salty and muddy, and contains so much iron that it cannot be consumed. The following quotations provide descriptions about this problem.

Since the past, the clean water problem has been a problem that cannot be solved in this village. There is no clean water network in this village. The community can only count on the water from the wells in the people's houses. It's just that the well water tastes salty because this village is near the sea. (Interview, male, 55, community figure, Kabupaten Bombana, 6 June 2010)

For clean water, the people here could hardly get it. All this time, we get water from the river or a well. (Interview, male, 33, RTM, Kabupaten Bombana, 6 June 2010)

[We get] quite good service. Only in some points, it is not, such as in Jorong Sipadan and Jorong Pakan Baru. But, for Jorong Pakan Baru, it has just got access and has got the Pansimas¹³ project. (Interview, male, 60, *wali nagari*, Kabupaten Agam, 9 May 2010)

The community members here use their own personal well at their own house, but the water is not really clean because the region is a swamp area. So, 65% of the water is not clean. (Interview, male, 30, RTSM, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 14 May 2010)

There hasn't been any clean water. In this house, there is no motorcycle. So, it's difficult to go to get water from Sawa [Kelurahan Sawa] since it's far away. (Interview, female, 48, community figure, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, 9 June 2010)

The PDAM's clean water has been felt inadequate since years ago. The PDAM pipes stopped at RT 7 and they are not continued to RT 8 because of the lack of funds/program from the top. Digging up a well for RT 7 does not seem effective because you have to dig a really deep well to find water. Today, what the community members in RT 8 have been doing is making a simple waterway to channel water from the closest water source from their area to fulfill the community's needs for water. (Interview, male, RT head, Kabupaten Ngawi, 21 April 2010)

Some villages that are at present experiencing lack of clean water had once received assistance in the form of clean water pipelining such as Mawar that received assistance from Yayasan Insani in 2001, but then the pipes were damaged. Desa Anggrek also received clean water assistance from CRD¹⁴, but it did not work because the water source was salty. This village also once received water pumping assistance, but, according to some informants, the pumps were controlled by some of the village elite members. Some other villages have received assistance recently, such as Desa Tanah Tinggi which has received the Pansimas program; the program is underway at present. There are also villages that are making efforts to improve the clean water access through ADD, such as the case in Kidul, Lumajang.

¹³Community-based Clean Water and Sanitation Supply.

¹⁴The name of this organization is obtained from a respondent, but, unfortunately, the accuracy of the writing cannot be confirmed.

Only Desa Kamboja already received clean water pipelining assistance in 2004 when PNPM was still called PPK. Desa Melati and Kenanga in Bombana had already made a proposal as well, but until now, they have not been granted the budget for its construction. Actually, some people from other villages that have a clean water supply problem have proposed to make clean water access improvement as PNPM's priority. However, some of the proposals did not make it because of a number of reasons. First, after the costs had been estimated, the proposed project required a lot of funds. For example, the project budget proposed by one of the sample villages amounted to Rp700 million so that it was rejected in the MAD. If this project had been passed, this one project alone would have taken up most of the PNPM budget in the respective *kecamatan*. Secondly, the urgency of the clean water supply was only felt by some people in a certain part of the village, so during the process to determine the ranks of the proposed projects, they lost.

5.6 Administration

The people in the sample villages can attend to the administration affairs quite easily and fast. The matters regarding administration that are often accessed by the community are those related to the arrangement of KTP (ID card), KK (family card), and notification letters (letters to notice poverty, buying and selling transactions, and death). The needs for good and fast administration services have been greatly felt by the community lately. This occurred as a result of several factors such as the direct election process that required KTP ownership, government as well as private assistance that also required complete population administration papers, and the more stringent policy of population administration regulation in general. The following is the elaboration of an informant.

For KK, the villagers have only started to make one after the LPG tube [assistance] had started, more or less in the past one or two years. This is because to get the LPG tube, one must have a KK. That's why, this encouraged people to make one. Aside from that, the administrative arrangement of KTP today also requires KK ownership as a prerequisite. This requirement had been more effectively applied since 2009. (Interview, male, RT head, Kabupaten Ngawi, 21 April 2010)

Some of the administration affairs can be taken care of in the village office, while some others have to be dealt with in the *kecamatan* office, such as the arrangement of KTP. Some affairs even have to be taken to the *kabupaten* office, such as the arrangement of KK. If only for the administration services, the expense that is borne by the community is only around Rp5,000–Rp10,000. However, if it includes “cigarette money” and transportation costs, especially if they have to take care of the matter at the *kabupaten* office, the people living far from the capital of the *kabupaten*, such as Tanah Tinggi in Agam, Lor in Lumajang, or Anggrek in Konawe Selatan, have to spend more than Rp100,000. Nevertheless, in general, most informants admitted that compared to eight or three years ago, the present condition is much better, in the sense that it is faster now, although there are a number of problems, such as the presence of officials who asked for “cigarette money”, lack of discipline in terms of time among the officials, and for KK, the requirement to deal with the matter at the distant *kabupaten* office. The following statements from the informants from various villages depict their opinions.

It's easy because there is a high commitment from the village officials to provide services to the maximum quality. Now, making a KTP is easy without having to wait long. If the community wants to make a KTP, they can ask a village official to take care of it without giving any cigarette money. (Interview, female, 58, RTM, Kabupaten Gresik, 26 April 2010)

Arrangement of population administration is handled quickly. Only when the official is not present, the arrangement takes up some time. But now, for the arrangement of KTP, you have to go to the *kabupaten* and this is burdensome because it is far. (Interview, male, 42, FK, Kabupaten Lumajang, 22 April 2010)

I think that administration matters are not difficult anymore because people just need to go to the village head's house and take care of the papers and they can be finished on the very same day. (Interview, female, 54, RTM, Kabupaten Konawe Selatan, 6 June 2010)

It's getting easier now because you used to have to go to Unaha [the capital of Kabupaten Konawe]. After the *kabupaten* was segregated, it is closer now, that is, in Wanggudu. The cost to make a KTP is around Rp30,000–Rp50,000. The cost for KK arrangement is also the same. In the village and *kecamatan*, you give only as much as you wish. If you don't give any, it's okay. (Interview, male, 28, RT head, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, 5 June 2010)

The *nagari* administration has made improvements such as the services that are getting better. In addition, the officials' working hours have also started to follow the schedule. Three years ago, there were still *nagari* administration officials who asked for "cigarette money" to the people for any service. (Interview, male, 34, community figure, Kabupaten Agam, 15 May 2010)

In the village, the administration process is simple, but in the *kecamatan*, such as when taking care of a KTP, it is difficult. It takes up a lot of time. (Interview, male, 40, RTM, Kabupaten Ngawi, 25 April 2010)

Well, service of this kind [administration arrangement in the village requiring cigarette money] remains the same. (Interview, male, 49, RTM, Kabupaten Gresik, 26 April 2010)

The more improved administration services in various study villages are, among others, because the office is more equipped, the village/*nagari* officials are more skilled, and the welfare level of the officials is higher. A summary of an interesting comment from a community figure in Lumajang depicts this matter.

Improvement of administration services at the village level can be felt by all the village people without exception for the last eight years. This change is caused by several factors, namely (i) tools/equipment that are becoming more adequate with a computerized system; (ii) officials that are more competent; previously, village officials were appointed, but now they go through a selection process; (iii) the *kabupaten* officials giving training on village administration. This condition speeds up all villagers' administration affairs. For example, in the past, it took days to get a KTP finished, but now it can be finished in only one day. (Interview, male, 56, community figure, Kabupaten Lumajang, 23 April 2010)

Besides the factors mentioned by the informant above, there is also the factor of the officials' salary raise, such as what happened in Tanah Tinggi Kabupaten Agam. According to its *wali nagari*, originally, the *nagari* officials were paid Rp300,000–Rp500,000 a month. At present, their salary is on average more than Rp700,000 a month so that their commitment towards their job and their discipline in terms of time are improving.

There is a little change in the services, but it is hard to make a self-judgement at the moment because the present administration has just been working for less than a month, but from the administration side, there has been an effort to improve services through the improvement of the *nagari* officials' welfare. There has been a salary increase of around 50% from Rp500,000 to Rp750,000. (Interview, male, 60, *wali nagari*, Kabupaten Agam, 9 May 2010)

However, the condition as explained by the informants above does not apply in all villages. Villages whose office has been equipped by computers are only found in East Java and West Sumatra. In Southeast Sulawesi, there are a number of sample villages that do not even have an

office such as in Melati, Bombana, and thus administration affairs are done at the village head's house. Most village heads in this province run government activities from their house, even if there is a village office. The village office in Desa Anggrek is even quite spacious and well equipped. In most of the villages, the village administration is run only by the village head. The other village officials only play a complementary role in the structure and almost lack any function.

The same thing also happened to the other factors such as competency, training, and salary increase. Not all *kabupaten* apply the same policy for their village administrations. This seems to be affected by the commitment and capacity of the *kabupaten* government in providing support for their village administrations. This happens because some things such as salary and training depend a lot on the policy and budgeting of the regional government.

If ranked, in general, East Java is the region that has the best village administration, followed by the *nagari* administration in West Sumatra and finally the village administration in Southeast Sulawesi. The relatively good village administration in East Java is very much related to the big budget commitment of the regional government to encourage improvement in the village administration by increasing the salary of the village officials and by giving honorarium to officials under the *dusun* administration (RW and RT heads).¹⁵ In addition, most village administrations in Java will also get extra income from the *tanah lungguh*¹⁶ which can be quite a lot. The village head of Lor, for example, receives an 8-hectare *tanah lungguh*, the village secretary 6 hectares, and the village affairs heads and the *dusun* heads 4 hectares each. Even though not all villages in Java have *tanah lungguh* as wide as the *tanah lungguh* in Desa Lor, the existence of extra incentive for village officials in the Java region in general, among others, explains why the election of village heads in the region is very competitive.

Outside Java, the position of a village head is not fought over as fiercely as it is in Java. Some village heads interviewed admitted that they became a village head after they were forced to. There is also a village head who can no longer provide for his family maximally because he became a village head, while the salary that he gets only amounts to no more than Rp600,000 per month which is sometimes not paid every month. In Desa Mawar, the salary of village officials is even only around Rp200,000–Rp300,000 for two/three months. This happens because of the big number of village officials. An informant described that almost all families in the village had a family member who became a village official. The different institutional capacities between village administrations explain why the administration services outside Java are not as good as those in Java. Therefore, the above quotations regarding the community's satisfaction over the village administration's services must be placed within the framework of this difference in capacity. The satisfaction as expressed by the informants in Java region has different quality nuances from those of the satisfaction expressed by communities outside Java.

¹⁵This policy is specifically applied in Kabupaten Lumajang. When the researchers conducted a field work in Desa Lor, the village administration was holding a socialization of a *kabupaten* government policy which provides honorarium for RT and RW heads as much as Rp100.000 per month. This kind of policy was not found in other regions.

¹⁶*Tanah lungguh* is the village land asset that is used specifically to pay for the salary expenditure of the village officials. Usually, the land is distributed to the village officials proportionally in accordance to their position. The higher their position, the more spacious the land. After his/her term of office, the official has to return the land to the village. The size of the land is varied between villages. Villages that have experienced segregation usually have less *tanah lungguh* because normally regional segregation is also followed by the division of *tanah lungguh*. Villages that have never undergone segregation will always have their *tanah lungguh* as spacious as the original size, unless there is a policy, for example, to sell the land.

VI. VILLAGE PRIMARY NEEDS AND THEIR FULFILLMENT

This part will discuss various village primary needs and their fulfillment. The assumption behind an empowerment program such as PNPM is that rural community empowerment can be observed if the villagers are able to formulate their needs and work independently to fulfill them, both individually and collectively. On the contrary, the inability of rural community to formulate their primary needs and independently fulfill them is evidence that the empowerment undertaken by several programs that claim to conduct “empowerment” has not succeeded. The various proofs described previously, and more specifically in this chapter, show that the empowerment has not succeeded. The last part of this chapter will give further explanation about the failure of the empowerment.

6.1 Priorities of Village Needs

In general, the primary needs of the poor community in every village are almost the same. There were only a few needs that were specifically suggested by one village only. Most of the needs appeared in four or more villages. The order of needs ranging from the most to the least needed by the village is capital, alternative job opportunities, skills training, free education, and free and excellent health services (for a more complete list on the order of needs based on their frequency of emergence, see Appendix 2).

Both the poor and middle-class groups equally need capital assistance as reflected in the results of FGD with poor and middle-class communities. The difference is that the middle-class group understands that capital assistance has an interest and must be returned. The kind of capital assistance that they seek is the one with low interest and flexible repayment. On the contrary, the poor citizens often perceive capital assistance as something that they do not have to return. It is understandable if there were only few poor citizens that tried to access capital credit assistance offered by such programs as Savings and Loan-Urban Economic Unit (UEP-SP) and SPP-PNPM because the capital must be returned along with the interest. Therefore, when they ask for capital assistance, what they mean is capital assistance that they do not have to return. An informant said,

What we need is real assistance. Not the one that requires us to borrow the money. If it is assistance, why do we have to borrow the money? *Ndadak ngembalikan* [Suddenly we have to return it]. The women said, “*Walah nek ono wong mbantu, sing gak nyaur*” [If there is assistance, why not assistance that does not need to be returned]. ... If we borrow money, some of the money must be spent on food. In the end, we can not pay it back. (Interview, female, 57, Kabupaten Ngawi, 26 April 2010)

The need for this kind of capital assistance emerges because of their fear of being unable to pay it back. This fear, or lack of courage, to take this kind of risk is natural, not only in Indonesia, but also in Southeast Asia in general, as shown by James C. Scott in his classic book *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (1977). The results of an FGD stated, “Because of lack of capital and fear of applying for a credit. I don’t have the courage to apply for a loan for fear of losses” (Middle-class Women’s FGD, 26, Kabupaten Bombana, 6 June 2010).

Generally, the poor community wants capital because they want to open a business. However, not all poor people know what kind of business they will open once they get the capital. Most of them see business as something similar to what they see in their surroundings, something

that is different from their work as a farmer, namely petty trading. Most of the people in the sample villages, such as the people in Mawar, Anggrek, and Lor, who had become SPP borrowers used their loan to open a kiosk/stall selling daily needs, a stall near school selling snacks for children, or an itinerant trading business. There were not many SPP borrowers, especially the poor ones, who used their funds to meet agricultural capital needs. This happened, among others, because they were not sure if investing in the agricultural sector would give more results than usual so that they could pay the SPP funds back. Besides, the repayment mechanism of the SPP loan in all villages that is once a month is burdensome to farmers. Agricultural enterprises are not monthly in nature, but seasonal. How can they pay every month if their yield is seasonal? Therefore, several village people suggested that the loan scheme be made seasonal, instead of monthly. The understanding of SPP-PNPM loan as mentioned above, on the one side, encourages job diversification in the rural area. However, on the other hand, this is counterproductive with the traits of PNPM-”Rural” that is supposed to encourage agriculture-based enterprises.

In relation with alternative job opportunities, what was meant by the informants was jobs other than agricultural jobs that have been undertaken by the poor people all this time. The emergence of needs for alternative jobs is driven by the disappointment of working in the agricultural sector all their life but it has never brought them welfare. Moreover, many of those who are involved in agricultural works are only farm hands with income that is far from enough, so aspiration to have a more decent job is increasing. Some other village people who do not have any other options but the agriculture sector need stable prices of agricultural produce. According to them, the prices of agricultural produce have never sided with the farmers. When the harvest season comes, the prices of almost all agricultural produce plummet and the government does nothing to help the farmers, when in fact, they become heavily burdened day by day with the rising expenses of seeds, fertilizer, and processing.

The types of alternative jobs that were revealed by the informants tended to refer to steady jobs that gave regular fixed income. What they imagined was a job in a factory or in a plantation. Aside from that, they also considered side jobs (not permanent) that could give extra income to their main job as a farmer, such as stock breeding or trading.

The next primary need is skills training. This need is apparently related to the high degree of community’s aspiration to alternative jobs. Alternative side jobs such as breeding livestock, selling homemade products, and others are things that are probably not familiar to them, so they need certain skills training. The kinds of training that were mostly mentioned by FGD participants were, among others, sewing, baking, beauty and cosmetology, handicraft, agriculture (for special plants), and animal husbandry skills.

These top three primary needs actually show a quite solid course of ideas about the desire to leave the current working condition that is not favorable. To start a new job, what they really need are financial capital and knowledge and skills capital.

Besides these three needs, two other needs with a high frequency of emergence are the needs for good and free education and health services. The high aspiration for both of these needs arises because the jargon frequently used by the government regarding free education and health services has not been felt by the poor community in reality. In relation with basic education, the village people still have to bear quite an amount of money for educational support needs, such as uniforms, books, transportation costs, and pocket money. For higher education levels, it is clear that all needs must be borne by each individual.

Some village people realize that it is impossible for the government to fulfill all their needs related to education. Such needs as pocket money must surely be the responsibility of the parents. However, there are actually costs that the people do not have to pay if the government improves the educational system. For example, in almost every region, whenever it is near the (national) final exam, there are additional learning activities from teachers to help students to prepare for the exam. For that, parents must spend money which is usually quite considerable. If the learning-teaching process ran effectively and efficiently, this kind of activity would not be needed and parents would not have to spend more money.

Related to the health aspect, not all villagers have received Jamkesmas and Regional Health Insurance for the Poor (Jamkesda) cards. Apart from that, especially for Jamkesmas/Jamkesda cardholders, the service that they receive is occasionally unsatisfactory. For example, they are treated as second-class patients, who are served after patients who pay for the service; given medicine which, according to the people, is not of good quality; and even rejected for treatment at the hospital.

Besides these five common needs, there are other needs that only few villages mentioned, such as the needs for *sembako* (nine staple foods) assistance, irrigation, roads, agricultural counseling, agricultural tools assistance, and seed assistance. Aside from these relatively common needs in each village, there are also needs that are specific to and contextual in certain villages. At least, there are three villages that have specific needs. The specific need of Desa Kamboja, Konawe Utara, is to have electricity during day time. This need arises because in this village, electricity is only available for six hours at night. Outside this period of time, if they need electricity, they have to use a *genset* (electricity generator) and only the rich people in the village have it. The people of Desa Anggrek, Konawe Selatan, specifically need water pumps to flow water to their rice fields. They need the water pumps because most of the rice fields are rain-fed rice fields. Although the village is passed by two major rivers, during the dry season, the river water is used up by the village located at a higher ground, namely Desa Margacinta. Therefore, the alternative solution to flow the rice fields with water is by pumping water from the wells that are plenty in their rice fields. The people of Desa Wetan in Kabupaten Gresik need a local government policy to prohibit fishers from using trawl nets. The use of trawl nets is unfavorable for traditional fishers because the trawl users can catch all fish and the traditional fishers with regular fish nets cannot catch any fish. They need the policy because the Local Government of Kabupaten Lamongan, their neighboring *kabupaten*, has forbidden the use of trawl in their area, making the trawl users move their operations to the waters around Desa Wetan.

6.2 Fulfillment of Primary Needs

The needs discussed above in general have never been formulated together at the village/*nagari* level. Before the PNPM-Rural (or PPK for areas that received it) existed, the formulation of village/*nagari* needs was usually conducted in a technocratic way, i.e., limitedly formulated by the elite circle consisting of village officials, BPD, and several community figures. The formulation of needs was usually conducted in the *musrenbangdes/nagari*. However, in several regions, such as the *nagari* in Sumatra Barat, there have been efforts to create a synergy between the need formulation model in *musrenbang* and the participatory need formulation model as implemented by PNPM.

Box 5

The Intregation of Need Formulation between PNPM and *Musrenbang*

In several study areas, there had been efforts to create synergy, and even to integrate, between need formulation in PNPM consultative meeting and *musrenbangdes*. This synergic effort, for instance, is conducted by implementing *musrenbangdes* after the PNPM consultative meeting. Various development aspirations from the people that do not pass as PNPM proposal priorities will then be discussed as people's proposals for *musrenbangdes*. The *musrenbangdes* itself is conducted according to its mechanism, that is, through a discussion attended by village/*nagari* officials (executive, legislative, and LPM) and community figures. This kind of model is found in Dharmasraya, West Sumatra. In Kabupaten Agam, the development planning is conducted during the consultative meeting that explores community aspirations in PNPM. Several aspirations of the people that are not included in the PNPM proposal priorities will automatically become the result of *musrenbang*. In this case, *musrenbang* is no longer held, which means PNPM consultative meeting is already considered as the medium for the *nagari musrenbang*.

Aside from the two regions, the effort to integrate both development planning models also occurred in other regions, such as in Kabupaten Ngawi. In Desa Ndoyong, the effort to integrate both models had been made, but it collided with the *musrenbang* stage that required proposals to be discussed up to the *kecamatan* level. According to village officials, the *kecamatan* government did not acknowledge the PNPM consultative meeting as *musrenbangdes*, so they still had to conduct *musrenbang* separately. However, in their Village Medium-term Development Plan (RPJMDes), the village government still included the result of the PNPM consultative meeting in the village as part of the result of *musrenbangdes*.

The fulfillment of various village needs discussed above has generally been or is being conducted. Several villages had accepted capital funds, for instance, through the SPP-PNPM, UEP-SP, Gardu Taskin, Female Cooperative (Kopwan) in East Java, *Baitul Maal wa Tamwil* (BMT, or Islamic microfinance institution) in West Sumatra, Cooperative Work Group (KUBE) and Bantesa (capital loan from the Sintesa NGO) in Southeast Sulawesi, etc. The need fulfillment of alternative job opportunities have only been conducted through labor-intensive programs that are usually only available for a limited time, just like in PNPM projects. Aside from that, residents acknowledged that there were no programs or assistance that aimed at making the people able to access alternative jobs. Besides that, the need for skills training is the least fulfilled need. In the research locations, there was only one *jorong*, namely Jorong Taruko in Kabupaten Dharmasraya, where its people received skills training, i.e., baking skills training.

Other basic needs, such as education and health, have generally been fulfilled in all villages. However, the people have not felt satisfied because there are still many burdens that they have to bear in order for the needs to be completely fulfilled. Some of the specific needs of each village had also been fulfilled, while others had not. The need for water pumps in Anggrek, for example, had been met through government assistance. However, according to the people, the water pumps are mostly controlled by the village elite, so the general community have not felt the benefits. The need of Desa Wetan, Gresik, for a policy that forbids the use of trawl net has been discussed with the Local Government of Gresik and the government has promised to act on it. However, until now, the people still find the use of trawl net in their sea. Besides that, the specific need that has not been fulfilled is the electricity need during the day in Desa Kamboja. The people of Desa Kamboja had already submitted the request to the authority, which is PLN in this case. However, due to limited electrical power supply, up to now, they can only enjoy six hours of electricity every night.

As described above, there are many parties involved in the fulfillment of village primary needs. According to most villagers, the fulfillment of village primary needs is firstly the responsibility of the government, followed by the individuals, and lastly community groups. Some villagers considered that the fulfillment of individual needs, such as jobs, basic needs, etc., is the

responsibility of the individuals, then the government, and finally third parties (community, NGOs, the rich people, etc.).

6.2.1 Role of the Government

The government's role is hugely accounted for in fulfilling the people's needs. In general, there are two models of government role, through routine budgets and through programs. The first model is carried out by providing ADD with 30% of it for village operational activities and 70% for community empowerment. However, in the study locations, there were only few programs making use of ADD budget to fulfill the above village primary needs. In fact, in many villages, the people questioned the use of ADD because the amount received and the allocation of the budget had never been announced.

In the second model, the government provides programs, both programs with specific recipients, such as BLT, PKH (Family of Hope Program), Raskin, and Jamkesmas, and general programs, such as PNPM, BOS, JPD, and other implemented programs. The village primary needs are apparently fulfilled more through this second mechanism. In the last eight or three years, all villages in the study areas have received plenty of programs (for more detailed information about programs received by the community, see Appendix 3).

6.2.2 Role of the Community

Community role refers to the efforts that have been made individually or collectively, but are not organized through certain institutions, to help fulfill village needs. The individual role of the people is very much related to their capacity, especially in terms of economy. According to the informants, the rich people in the village have a big role in giving assistance, both in the form of charity, such as donations, and giving help in a professional context, such as providing jobs for the poor. Some of them also provide fund assistance, but just like what happens in Ngawi, they apply a very high interest rate. Instead of helping people who need capital, they apply loan shark practices.

The collective role of the people is by working together, commonly known as *gotong royong* or mutual assistance, to do something in the interest of the village or certain people in the village. In Desa Wetan, for instance, recently the people worked together to build a house for the member of their community whose house was burnt down by fire. Both individual and collective roles of the people are usually unplanned and sporadic in nature. Related to various primary needs elaborated above, the community's role is only in the fulfillment of the needs of alternative jobs and capital.

6.2.3 Role of Social Groups

There are many and diverse social groups in the study villages. Some groups are very specific, while others can be found in almost all villages (for more detailed information on social groups in every village, see Appendix 4). There are three groups that are very common or can be found in all villages: Quran recitation group, farmers' group, and PKK. Besides that, there are also groups that become the vehicle for certain assistance recipients' groups, such as SPP female groups, Bantesa, etc. More specific groups are usually associated with the local culture. For example, in West Sumatra, there are clans (or *bubua arek*) that act as a means for villagers that come from the same clan to meet. Other than that, there is *Bundo Kanduang*, an instrument of *nagari* government structure that consists of female leaders. In Southeast Sulawesi, there are

mepotaka groups, which are similar to *arisan* groups that consist of only male members. There are *arisan* groups for various community groups in East Java, including those that are connected by a relationship of blood (*trah*, Javanese).

Generally, the informants put the Quran recitation group as the most important group to them. This is perhaps the reflection of a religious community. However, if it is associated with the village primary needs, the most important social group is the farmers' group because only the farmers' group that facilitates them to be able to get various agricultural needs, such as fertilizer, seed, and poison. However, the farmers' groups in several villages exist only to fulfill the requirement to obtain the above-mentioned assistance. In fact, these groups have no day-to-day activities. In addition, the informants stated that they were extremely helped by becoming a member of the *arisan* group because in this group, members can borrow some money when they are in dire need, besides benefitting from the group's revolving savings. In certain regions, there are also religious groups that not only conduct religious activities, but also give economic support to their members. There is a Quran recitation group in Lor that includes *arisan* and savings and loan in their activities. According to FGD participants, the fund that can be borrowed by the members of the group is quite big, as much as Rp5 millions. However, unfortunately, this group has stopped lending capital for the last two years.

Groups that are formed as the vehicle for borrowers of a program usually only function to consolidate borrowers in order that they can receive information easily, especially regarding the payment of instalment. This study does not find SPP borrowers' groups that conduct productive activities together. The group is actually designed for members to bear responsibility collectively in the case that a member cannot pay the installment, but the study did not find this in the study villages. In case of arrears, it is the village government that will pay for it, as happened in Wetan, Gresik, and a village in Kecamatan Moramo, Konawe Selatan. The village officials are willing to pay for it because they understand that if the SPP repayment in their village is in arrears, the village will not receive the physical programs.

6.2.4 Role of PNPM

In fulfilling the primary needs of the village, PNPM's role is very limited. As described at the beginning of this report, most of PNPM projects in the study areas are related to infrastructure development, while according to the people, the primary needs of villages are not infrastructure, but capital, alternative jobs, skills training, and education scholarship and quality health service. All the village primary needs are not directly in contact at all with PNPM activities in every village. Indirectly, PNPM infrastructure program did create job opportunities for some poor community, even though only with limited workdays and payment. The SPP program had also given several people access to capital. However, the poor people have not become the main target in these infrastructure and SPP programs. This is due to the fact that in the infrastructure program, the workers were not specifically recruited from the poor community in the study areas and, in most regions, their payment was deducted due to self-help reason. Other than that, in the SPP program, most of the recipients were not the poor people because the program executors were afraid that if the SPP funds had been given to the poor, they would not have been able to return the money.

The tendency to allocate PNPM projects to fulfill infrastructure needs happens everywhere. There are no discrepancies found between villages that have received the program for a long time and villages that are new to the program, or between advanced and poor villages. It means that the community in villages that have already received PNPM-Rural (PPK) since 2002 or have better welfare level has the same aspiration as that of the community that has just received the

program in 2009 or has a worse welfare level. In fact, it is only logical if the villages that have already received the program since 2002, or the K1 villages, are able to divert their development focus from infrastructure after several years of receiving this program. Moreover, the K1 category villages in this study are mostly villages with a high level of welfare. Main infrastructure availability in these villages with a high level of welfare is usually quite sufficient. What then encourages villages that have received PNPM for a long time and/or have a high level of welfare to keep allocating PNPM funds to the infrastructure sector?

In general, the tendency towards infrastructure and the similarity between old and new regions receiving PNPM funds can be explained by several things related to the objective condition of study villages as described next.

a) Minimal village infrastructure

Based on field observation, especially in poor villages outside Java, the main infrastructure (roads and irrigation) before there was PNPM-Rural was still limited. In fact, in several villages in Kabupaten Bombana and Konawe Utara in Southeast Sulawesi, there are still main roads or inter-*dusun* roads that are still not yet asphalted or are heavily damaged. The same thing happens to irrigation ducts. Most of the irrigation networks are still the primary ones, and are rarely the secondary, or even the tertiary, ones. When PNPM arrived, the community could easily achieve an agreement over its allocation to infrastructure development. A respondent in Kabupaten Bombana, Southeast Sulawesi, pointedly stated, "It fits perfectly. Do not terminate PNPM please. Every development activity carried out in this village, we owe it all to PNPM" (Middle-class Women's FGD, 26, Kabupaten Bombana, 6 June 2010).

b) PNPM is considered as a program for the general community

The community feels that PNPM-Rural is intended for the villagers in general without looking at their welfare status. To them, this program is different from such programs as BLT, PKH, Raskin, etc. that are specifically designed for poor people. From the 72 FGDs conducted with the poor and middle/rich communities, most of the participants stated that the target of this program was the village community in general. Only a few of them thought that the program was intended for unemployed labors or sellers with no capital. Because this program is meant for all villagers, it must be allocated for something that can be beneficial for all members of the community and that is the main infrastructure of the village. In fact, in several study villages, the PNPM infrastructure project did not hire workers that were specifically recruited from the poor, but any willing villagers. But, since the amount of wage given was the same for every worker and was usually according to or under the standard wage of labors in the local villages, there were almost no poor people who were willing to participate. Some of the following quotations illustrate the community's opinions.

For PNPM program, it is already right on target. All community members enjoy it, not only the poor people. (Poor Men's FGD, 50, Kabupaten Agam, 13 May 2010)

The whole community, but they should ask whether the people want to borrow the fund [SPP] or not. (Middle-class Women's FGD, 50, Kabupaten Bombana, 6 June 2010)

All members of the community. (Middle-class Men's FGD, 30, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, 5 June 2010)

In PNPM, there is *Jalan Usaba Tani* (farm roads), so everyone will take benefit from it. (Poor Men's FGD, 40, Kabupaten Konawe Utara, 4 June 2010)

The most effective is PNPM because in a broader sense, it can be felt by the community, the poor get jobs and payment even though only incidental, and the community in general enjoys the improvement of the road. (Interview, male, 40, village head, Kabupaten Gresik, 22 April 2010)

In my opinion, in terms of regulation, PNPM is the best. PNPM is a direct program. From the beginning, its purpose is to cover all the community. Other programs are only limited to certain groups. (Interview, male, 45, village head, Kabupaten Lumajang, 22 April 2010)

c) To avoid conflicts caused by segmented programs (such as BLT, Raskin, etc.)

Before PNPM became a mass program, the community had received programs in which the recipients were segmented, especially to the poor, such as BLT, Askeskin (now Jamkesmas), and Raskin. In most of the study areas, these programs had generated problems, such as jealousy or even conflict between community groups. These problems occurred mostly due to the household targeting mechanism that was considered dissatisfactory, where people that should have been given the right to assistance did not receive it, and vice versa. When PNPM was launched and inexplicitly targeted the poor group (*community targeting*), the village community was inclined to guide it towards something that can be enjoyed by all community in order to avoid protests from those who did not receive it. The following citations illustrate this tendency.

In my village, from the time PNPM was launched in Kecamatan Tempursari, we decided in every village consultation meeting that it must be used for infrastructure development, roads, and bridges. (Interview, male, 45, village head, Kabupaten Lumajang, 22 April 2010)

For data census, it is better if the RT does it. There was once someone from the *kecamatan* that did the census, but it wasn't relevant. The data was not completely compiled. Many people protested. The enumerator ran away. The RT was skipped. (Middle-class Men's FGD, 35, Kabupaten Gresik, 24 April 2010)

Sometimes the census was conducted based on kinship. (Middle-class Men's FGD, 30, Kabupaten Gresik, 24 April 2010)

There was once a conflict in the village hall due to social jealousy in the disproportion of PKH reception. At that time, one of the citizens threw a chair above which broke that ceiling [pointing the ceiling]. (Poor Men's FGD, 37, Kabupaten Gresik, 23 April 2010)

d) Bias of the elite and nonpoor villagers

The role of the elite is very significant in determining program types in the village. This can be seen from the proposed program types and FGD result about who has the most influence in decision-making process in the village. However, not all of the significant role of the elite can be categorized as elite capture because in several regions, the participation of the elite is directly needed to silence the conflict resulted by the acutely different aspirations concerning development project proposal. The elite mainly consists of officials at the village, *dusun*, and even RT levels, and community leaders. In the study areas, their significant role can be found in several stages of the program, which are in

- (1) the selection process of facilitators: In one of the provinces, there is information from a *kecamatan* facilitator that most of the *kecamatan* facilitators in that province came from the same region as the head of provincial *satker* (work unit);
- (2) socialization activities: In all regions, those that were invited to receive the early socialization of the program were the village elites, such as the village officials cum BPD and community leaders, who were all appointed by the village head;

- (3) the proposal selection process at the village/*nagari* level: In several *nagari* in West Sumatra, nine people from the village elite have a huge role in deciding which program will be taken to the inter-*nagari* consultative meeting (MAN); and
- (4) the proposal selection process at the *kecamatan* level: In several *kecamatan* in all provinces, there is an indication that the MAD/MAN is just a formality; the lobby between village heads highly determines the project that will be approved.

The bias of the nonpoor group can be observed from the selection of proposed projects. The infrastructure projects, such as road, irrigation, and TK/PAUD building projects, are utilized and enjoyed more by the nonpoor group. In the proposal formulation process in the *musdes* (*dusun* consultative meeting) or *musdes*, in most regions, most of the people attending it were the middle up to the rich groups. Poor workers were also not favored in the implementation of the project; more than often their pay was deducted from the given standard due to self-help reason.

For the moment, the existing program is inclined to be an infrastructure one, right. So, the nonphysical programs are abandoned, or lacking. ... For poor community, the good program is fund aid program from UEP-SP. That is for poor people. As for the middle-rich, they pay attention to physical sector. (Interview, male, 45, village head, Kabupaten Lumajang, 22 April 2010)

Road is only for those who can trade. We can't do that. So, the only good thing is that the road is no longer wet. (Poor Women's FGD, 39, Kabupaten Lumajang, 24 April 2010)

6.3 PNPM Empowerment Is Not Fully Effective

There is only a little difference in welfare between villages having received PNPM since 2002 and those having just received the program in 2007 or 2009 shows that PNPM empowerment is not fully effective. The failure of PNPM to empower these villages have caused them to be unable to fulfill their primary needs and has had little impact on the management of the village administrations as well as programs other than PNPM. Besides the various problems previously discussed in the preceding chapters, there are another two problems that are considered to have caused the ineffective PNPM empowerment, both being conceptual and technical in nature.

6.3.1 Empowerment as a Very Mechanistic Concept

In general, PNPM conceptualisation of empowerment is as, "... the effort to create/enhance community capacity, both individually and collectively, in solving various problems related to efforts to improve quality of life, independence, and welfare" (Buku Pedoman Umum PNPM Mandiri (General Guidelines for PNPM Mandiri): 20).

Technically, the understanding of "empowerment" as the effort to "enhance community capacity" is then embodied into a series of "community development" activities that are believed to be able to create a prosperous and independent community. These activities are

Community development components [that] cover a series of activities to build critical awareness and independence of the community that consist of the mapping of potentials, community problems and needs, participatory planning, organizing, resource utilization, monitoring, and maintenance of achieved results. (Buku Pedoman Umum PNPM Mandiri (General Guidelines for PNPM Mandiri): 29)

The series of activities above is then formulated in PNPM implementation stages as described in Chapter II above. Hence, technically, what is meant as “empowerment” by PNPM is conducting a series of activities in PNPM implementation stages. The assumption is clear; by carefully implementing the program stages, the output of the empowerment process will certainly be created, i.e., a prosperous and independent community. Clearly, PNPM empowerment concept displays a mechanistic view of change, that is, the community will change according to the given stimulus. PNPM expects the community to be participative, transparent, and accountable. For that, they will get an amount of fund that can be used in the development of their village. In the context of a homogeneous society and that there is no interest group threatened by changes, this kind of program might work. However, in a more complex situation where many actors are involved and have interest in these various changes, programs that attempt to change the existing paradigm of village development and empowerment, such as PNPM, will encounter many challenges.

What is not adequately anticipated by the program is the very complex social reality in the village. The low level of participation, transparency, and accountability; the poor quality of village governance; the difficulty of welfare improvement; and the low level of villagers’ independence are not simple problems that can be solved in a year or two by a program such as PNPM. There are still many aspects of social relationships that remain untouchable by PNPM, such as the dominance of village elites, the strong patron-client relationship, the established familial relationship, and the lack of the poor’s courage and confidence. These relationships have been created in the living process of the community for hundreds of years and have become the foundation of established social interactions. Poor farmers can survive because of, among others, the moral support, and social and fund assistances from the elite, which then becomes their patron. In many cases, they also depend on their family and relatives.

Conversely, the elite receives something in return from the poor in the form of legitimacy, trust, and absolute obedience. This kind of relationship is stable because both give and take. This relationship model becomes the pattern that defines the roles and responsibilities of each party and various social institutions are created later on to strengthen and eternalize it. In East Java, for example, there is *abot sawangane* that socially, culturally, and economically becomes the patron of the general community, especially the poor. In West Sumatra, the role of *ninik mamak* (tribe chief), even though already having shifted, cannot be suppressed by the change of era. In Southeast Sulawesi, the elders and the rich in the village are the ones that decide on every matter related to public interests.

In this context, PNPM’s idea about a participation model that encourages an individual to be directly responsible for all decisions in the village related to their own interests, on the one side, means the elimination of the elite’s dominance; however, on the other hand, this idea also gives more responsibility to the poor because due to the loss of domination of the elite, the incentive from them as the patron of the poor is also eliminated. When the poor are in desperate condition, both economically and socially, the elite has no more obligations to help. Various quotations in the participation part in Chapter III suggest this fear of the poor.

Furthermore, PNPM’s idea about transparency and accountability will also mean the loss of privilege of certain groups to the village’s resources. By all accounts, the lack of transparency in the decision-making in the village is, to a certain degree, beneficial to certain parties, be it the village officials or people who receive benefits from it. The notion of accountability, especially related to village finance, is even riskier. Demanding transparency and accountability not only deals with government administration and management aspects, but also moral aspects. Demanding transparency and accountability means accusing concerned parties to have been

hiding and even swindling certain resources and that is a morally serious accusation in the rural area. This will also bring a very serious implication because, no matter what, the elite's legitimacy in the rural area is mostly built upon moral aspect, rather than formal aspect (legislation).

Based on the above explanation, it is clear that implementation of participatory programs like (but not only) PNPM can create negative consequences to social relationship stability, even though it will not cause chaos. Therefore, resistance will come from both the elite and the poor, because PNPM's ideas endanger not only the position of the elite but also the poor. As described by James C. Scott (1985), resistance occur not only in offensive actions but also in defensive actions by way of silence. "Silent resistance" has been observed in the field, namely the low level of poor people's participation in various activities other than PNPM. The fact that the poor are relatively participative in PNPM is because the program requires them to be so and their participation is mobilized by the elite and is not entirely on their own accord.

6.3.2 In Contradiction with Local Specialties

Another issue that is considered related to the ineffectiveness of PNPM empowerment is that because, to a certain degree, the concept of PNPM empowerment is not suitable for or even against the local features. The most apparent evidence regarding this is the difference between the participation concept of PNPM and that in the Minangkabau custom in West Sumatra. Like mentioned above, PNPM encourages the creation of a participation model, in which every individual has to represent himself/herself in any activity that is related to his/her personal interest. A representation system is seen as only strengthening the dominance of the elite.

Conversely, West Sumatra, which since the start of the reform era has enthusiastically revitalized their old customs, possesses a different participation concept. With the spirit of "going back to the *nagari* (concept)", they have developed a participation pattern that can be described as communitarian participation. In this communitarian participation, the community, and not the individual, is thrust forward. In practice, in various decision-making processes related to public interest, the ones involved are the communities or tribes where individuals become the members. In this model, the tribe chief automatically becomes the personification of the tribe. This is different from the representation concept in which the representative is just a person who is "appointed" to "represent the interest of individuals" through an election process. According to a *wali nagari* in Kabupaten Agam, the revitalization of the communitarian concept is part of their effort to bring back the traditional values existing in the old *nagari* governance that they consider ideal.

In the *nagari* in West Sumatra, this communitarian concept is institutionalized into the decision-making process in *nagari*. For example, in a *nagari* in, Kabupaten Agam, the formulation of *nagari* regulations involves all tribes which consist of 58 tribes. The implementation technique is as follow. First, the *nagari* government designs a *nagari* regulation together with the *Nagari* House of Representatives (BPRN). The temporary draft is then distributed to each tribe through its tribe chief. The draft regulation is then deliberated by each tribe, the result of which is to state their agreement/disagreement over the design. After all tribes concur, the regulation is then taken to the *nagari* plenary meeting which is attended by *nagari* officials, BPRN, and the representatives of all tribes in the *nagari*.

The coming of PNPM that brings along the individual participation concept to a certain level challenges the communitarian concept that is in the process of being established in West Sumatra. Even though the two are against one another, both can still run on their own. The

individual participation takes place during the PNPM activities, while communitarian participation goes on outside PNPM. However, if PNPM continues to encourage individual participation and is hoping that the mechanism will be adopted as a public practice for all decision-making processes, this may lead to a collision. The incompatibility between participation concept that is promoted by PNPM and participation concept that is being established in this region explains why the PNPM version of individual participation cannot infect other decision-making processes in the *nagari*.

6.3.3 Facilitators and Facilitating Problems

The facilitator is the spearhead of PNPM empowerment. It is the facilitator who ensures that the stages in the program that are the instruments in the empowerment are properly applied in the field. However, as depicted in Chapter II, there is a difference in the capacity of facilitators from different regions which affect the success of program implementation. There are quite a number of facilitators that have no experience and some of them are even fresh graduates. In fact, facilitating which is mostly related to the efforts to invite, persuade, and motivate requires special skills that mostly develop from one's long experience. In addition, there is also an issue that in a certain province, some facilitators are originally from the same *kabupaten* as the *satker* officer. This means a high nepotism level in the facilitator recruitment. In such a situation, it is understandable if the quality of the facilitators is neglected.

In the sample areas, facilitators' activities are mostly occupied by technical and administrative matters, that is, facilitating various community meetings as well as making numerous reports about the implementation of PNPM in the field. The more villages they have under their responsibility, the more time is used up for technical and administrative matters. There has not been any case where a facilitator does extra work to strengthen the existing social organizations or to assist SPP recipient groups. As mentioned in Chapter II, these facilitators admit that they run out of time to finish various technical and administrative matters of the program.

Besides the problem of quality and the heavy load of technical/administrative work, there is another problem, that is, the frequent rotation of facilitator from one region to another. On the one hand, this rotation policy probably has some advantages, for example, to anticipate community's dependence on the facilitator and to give new atmosphere and experience to the facilitator. However, on the other hand, this policy becomes a problem because facilitation efficacy is also affected by how deep a facilitator understands the area where he works. In fact, there is a *kecamatan* in the study area that does not have any facilitator at all because its facilitator has been transferred to another *kecamatan* and there has not been a replacement yet.

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Conclusions

- a) In general, the PNPM-Rural has been implemented quite well, except in the followings.
 - (1) Socialization activities were not effectively undertaken resulting in various understandings over PNPM. For example, PNPM was considered as a general program, not as a poverty reduction program, so the poor did not have to be prioritized.
 - (2) The competition to win a PNPM project at the *kecamatan* level tends to result in deviation. In many villages, the competition was manoeuvred resulting in the decision to split the projects evenly.
 - (3) The facilitators had different understandings about the program causing diversity in program implementation.
 - (4) Many facilitators considered that their workload was too excessive due to the large number of villages/*jorong* that became their responsibility.
- b) Due to the lack of understanding of some PNPM program implementers regarding the PNPM guidelines, some aspects in program implementation in the field were very much in contrast to the spirit of poverty reduction. These aspects are as follows:
 - (1) not specifically determining that the workers in the PNPM infrastructure project had to come from the poor community,
 - (2) deducting the workers' wage in the PNPM infrastructure project due to self-reliance reasons or others,
 - (3) limiting the poor people's access to obtaining SPP loan by applying requirements that they could never meet,
 - (4) making SPP realization in the village as a prerequisite to get an open menu program, and
 - (5) making the realization of 25% *cost sharing* funds from the *kabupaten* as a provision to attain the program fund from the central government.
- c) PNPM-Rural was considered beneficial by the community, especially in providing infrastructure in rural areas. Almost all of PNPM-Rural open menu programs were in the form of infrastructure projects. There were only few projects in the form of activities such as skills training for the community.
- d) As a mechanism for the distribution of development fund from the central government to the village, this program is very effective and efficient. In study areas, there was almost no deviation found in the use of PNPM budget. However, as a community empowerment instrument or as a poverty reduction program, the program has not been able to accomplish many things due to the following reasons.
 - (1) The program's design does not fully support empowerment.
 - (2) The human resources (facilitators) for empowerment are lacking.
 - (3) There are many disparities in program implementation.
 - (4) There are sociocultural obstacles, such as
 - (a) the dominance of village elite's role,
 - (b) the strong familial system or relationship, and
 - (c) the presence of patronage relationship between the village elite and the poor.

- e) There is a decrease in poverty level in almost all of study villages, except in two villages. However, the role of PNPM-Rural in decreasing poverty in the sample villages was not considered significant by the people. PNPM-Rural is considered to participate more indirectly in poverty reduction by repairing community's access to various public services.
- f) The creation of job opportunities in PNPM-Rural infrastructure projects is not enough to help the poor. The reason, apart from the very limited days and the fact the workers were not obligated to come from the poor community, is the deduction of wage that was regarded as the form of community participation in the program. SPP is believed to be highly beneficial to expand community's business, but the poor had difficulties in accessing it since the program implementers required the presence of productive business ownership. Almost all poor people do not have it. In addition, the community was also afraid to utilize SPP because their economic capacity could not give them a guarantee that they could return the loan within the determined schedule.
- g) The participation of the community, both males and females, in the PNPM-Rural stages tends to increase. However, the participation was seemingly performed only to fulfill program's requirements. In various decision-making forums in the village, or in programs other than PNPM that did not require people's participation, the village elites were still very dominant, whereas the community, especially the poor, was almost not involved.
- h) Numerous PNPM-Rural projects were not suitable with the needs of the village's poor people. PNPM-Rural projects were dominantly in the form of infrastructure projects, while the three main needs of the poor people in the village are skills training, alternative job opportunities, and capital assistance. PNPM actually had the opportunity to fulfill these needs through the open menu program and SPP. However, in reality, it did not happen because
 - (1) the open menu programs were almost always physical and there were almost no skills training activities,
 - (2) in the infrastructure projects, the workers did not always come from the poor community and there was wage deduction as a form of self-reliance, and
 - (3) SPP could not be accessed by the poor because there are burdensome requirements or because the poor themselves are afraid of applying for the loan.

7.2 Recommendations

- a) It is necessary to consider avoiding uniformity of design and/or program implementation for all regions. There are inharmonious indications between the program's general character that puts forward individual participation (direct participation) and local cultural pattern that leans towards communitarian trait (representative participation).
- b) It is necessary to expand and intensify the socialization of the program and its mechanism in general and, specifically, open menu option, SPP requirements and mechanism, and the position of poor people as the target group in the program. For that, it is essential to maximize the facilitators' role in facilitation activities at every stage of the PNPM implementation, especially during the formulation of needs and program implementation. In order to achieve this, more facilitators are needed.

- c) It is necessary to encourage the integration of development planning through PNPM with development planning through *musrenbangdes*. From various practices in the field, the best model is implementing both in one deliberation to formulate village needs. This integration will encourage *musrenbangdes* to be more participative, aspirational, and open.
- d) It is highly necessary to re-formulate the mechanism for and amount of SPP funds return that can ease the burden of the poor people, and it is necessary to have more systematic and intensive efforts to make the people realize the benefits of SPP as well as to eliminate their fear of applying for the loan.
- e) It is extremely necessary to formulate a mechanism/institution that is credible and forceful to ensure that program regulations are implemented according to plan.
- f) It is necessary to review the proportionality of the number of facilitators to their workload, reduce the technical administrative workload of facilitators, and increase their social empowerment work portion through their intensive involvement in various group activities in the village.
- g) Although PNPM-Rural is not aimed at developing the agricultural sector, it is necessary to consider improving the program design so that it can touch agricultural issues more profoundly. This is based on the consideration that to achieve one of PNPM's goal, that is, to increase sustainable community welfare, the program will be more effective if it is directed towards developing work that is in line with what community members do and their expertise. This will, at the same time, develop local potentials. In the context of rural areas, these vocations would mainly fall under the agricultural sector. This is supported by the study's findings that most businesses initiated by SPP recipients—who in general are opening a sundries stall—tend to be unsustainable. This is mainly due to lack of experience and skill in that area, as well as guidance for running a different kind of enterprise.
- h) It is necessary to conduct continuous assessment and development to find various community empowerment models that are suitable for all communities with diverse social conditions. In particular, it is also necessary to develop an empowerment instrument for the chronic poor by treating them as an inseparable part of their community.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

Table A1. Community Needs and PNPM Projects in Study Areas

Village/ <i>Nagari</i> / <i>Kelurahan</i>	PNPM Categories	Welfare Categories	Open Menu Activities	Needs
Jorong Taruko	K1	Middle	TK building; <i>posyandu</i> ; PAUD building; baking training	Arable land; Skills education; Capital; Manure subsidy.
Bukik Barisan	K1	Poor	JUT, many times/in stages; water channel construction (tertiary irrigation), 2008; PAUD building, 2010	Primary Irrigation; Skills Education; Job opportunity; Capital.
Lor	K1	Middle	Bridge and irrigation, 2004; inter- <i>dusun</i> /RW road; <i>posyandu</i> building	Capital; Job opportunity; Road; Good and inexpensive health services; Skills training; Irrigation; Stable prices of agricultural produce; <i>Sembako</i> .
Kamboja	K1	Middle	Clean water pipe lines, 2004; JUT; TK building, 2010.	Job opportunity; Agricultural tools and machines; Business capital; <i>Sembako</i> ; Irrigation; Day electricity; Drainage.
Kulon	K1	Middle	Macadam road, 2004; TK building, 2005; RA building, 2006; intervillage road, 2007; bridge, 2009; <i>paving block</i> road, 2010; in 2008 got sanctioned because of road construction manipulation (below standard road)	Health; Road; House renovation; Free education; <i>Sembako</i> ; Manure.
Anggrek	K2	Poor	TK building and irrigation, 2008; irrigation, 2009	Job opportunity; Capital; Irrigation; Agricultural tools and machines; Farm animal assistance; Housing assistance; Land provision; Agricultural counseling; Stable prices.

Village/ <i>Nagari/ Kelurahan</i>	PNPM Categories	Welfare Categories	Open Menu Activities	Needs
Mawar	K2	Poor	Just SPP, 2008; in 2009 got sanctioned	Housing; Food assistance; Scholarship; Debt relief assistance; Agricultural productivity improvement; Job opportunity; Capital.
Ndoyong	K2	Middle	Macadam road in 2 <i>dusun</i> , 2008; TK building, 2009 (postponed because phase three assistance could not be disbursed; in the end, it was funded by the <i>kabupaten</i> government)	Irrigation and pumps; <i>Sembako</i> ; Skills; Capital; Job opportunity; Access Road.
Tanah Tinggi	K2	Poor	JUT in 1 <i>dusun</i> ; JUT in 2 <i>dusun</i> ; in 2010 1 <i>orong</i> received sanction	Capital; Land; Education scholarship; Health services; Road; Agricultural training; Skills training.
Wetan	K2	Poor	TK building, 2008	Trawl restriction; Education scholarship; Health assistance; Pollution management; Capital assistance; Stable prices of catch; Stable prices of necessities.
Gantuang	K2	Poor	TK building, 2007; PAUD building, 2010; in 2008 received the assistance but was separated to become a different <i>orong</i>	Job opportunity; Farm animal capital; School scholarship; Rubber/palm seeds; Agricultural counseling.
Melati	K2	Middle	The building of public toilet, 2008; water channel, 2008; road hardening, 2008; pump provision, 2009	Skills; Agricultural counseling; Agricultural tools and machines; Road; Scholarship for dropouts.
Koto Tengah	K2	Middle	Intervillage road, 2007 dan 2008; 2009 received sanction	-
Darek	K3	Middle	Irrigation channel; sewer in <i>orong</i>	Job opportunity; Free medicine; Free education; Business capital; Agricultural counseling.

Village/Nagari/ Kelurahan	PNPM Categories	Welfare Categories	Open Menu Activities	Needs
Jejeg	K3	Poor	<i>Polindes</i> building, 2009	Business capital assistance without interest; Job opportunity; Marketing of woven products; Education scholarship; Nutrition assistance; Senior high school scholarship.
Kidul	K3	Middle	TK building, 2009; slipway (breakwater), 2009	Business capital; Free schooling; Free medication; Job opportunity; Training and business facilitation.
Kenanga	K3	Poor	Clean water pipe proposal for 2010	Social assistance (Raskin, BLT); Land expansion and intensification; Clean water; Business capital.
Cempaka	K3	Middle	JUT; bridge + decker	Job opportunity; Primary irrigation (check dam); Awareness building training; Capital assistance; Free education; Rice seeds assistance; Skills training; Water pumps; Free medicine.

Source: FGD results.

Note: K1 = Village receiving PPK since 2002 and PNPM since 2007.

K2 = Village not receiving PPK since 2002, but receiving PNPM since 2007.

K3 = Village receiving neither PPK since 2002 nor PNPM since 2007, but just receiving PNPM since 2009.

APPENDIX 2

Table A2. Frequency of Needs in Study Villages

No.	Needs	Frequency
1.	Capital	17 villages
2.	Job opportunity	10 villages
3.	Skills Training	9 villages
	Education	9 villages
4.	Health	7 villages
5.	<i>Sembako</i> ^a	5 villages
	Irrigation	5 villages
6.	Land provision	4 villages
	Stable prices of products	4 villages
	Road	4 villages
	Agricultural Counseling	4 villages
7.	Agricultural tools and machines	3 villages
8.	Seeds	2 villages
9.	Water pumps	1 village
	Trawl restriction	1 village
	Day electricity	1 village

Source: FGD results.

^aNine basic commodities.

APPENDIX 3

Table A3. Poverty Dynamics in Study Villages

Village/Nagaril Kelurahan	Program and Economic Categories		VP (%)		P (%)		M (%)		R (%)		VR (%)	
			2007	2010	2007	2010	2007	2010	2007	2010	2007	2010
Jorong Taruko	K1	Middle			30	20	67	75	3	5		
Bukik Barisan	K1	Poor	34	24	38	35	21	31	7	10		
Lor	K1	Middle	13	6	23	22	41	40	19	28	4	4
Kamboja	K1	Middle	60	32	26	46	14	22				
Kulon	K1	Middle			30	15	67	80	3	5		
Anggrek	K2	Poor			64	35	29	56	7	9		
Mawar	K2	Poor	94	94	5	5	1	1				
Ndoyong	K2	Middle	23	14	47	50	20	21	10	15		
Tanah Tinggi	K2	Poor	13	5	45	24	33	56	9	15		
Wetan	K2	Poor	27	14	26	48	41	32	6	6		
Gantuang	K2	Poor			45	30	40	50	15	20		
Melati	K2	Middle				40		50		10		
Jorong Koto Tengah	K2	Middle			34	23	54	65	12	12		
Darek	K3	Middle	18	19	49	48	25	24	9	9		
Jejeg	K3	Poor	23	20	55	52	14	17	8	11		
Kidul	K3	Middle			58	58	27	27	14	14		
Kenanga	K3	Poor			78	68	17	22	5	10		
Cempaka	K3	Middle			38	15	62	82	-	2		

Source: FGD results.

Note:

- K1 = Village receiving PPK since 2002 and PNPM since 2007.
- K2 = Village not receiving PPK since 2002, but receiving PNPM since 2007.
- K3 = Village receiving neither PPK since 2002 nor PNPM since 2007, but just receiving PNPM since 2009.
- VP = Very Poor.
- P = Poor.
- M = Middle.
- R = Rich.
- VR = Very Rich.

APPENDIX 4

Table A4. Various Organizations/Groups in Study Villages

Province/ <i>Kabupaten</i>	Village	Organization/Group
East Java		
Gresik	Kulon	Farmers' groups, PKK, <i>tahlilan</i> groups
	Wetan	PKK, <i>tahlilan</i> groups, fishers' groups
Lumajang	Lor	PKK, Quran recitation groups, farmers' groups, SPP, religious groups
	Kidul	Quran recitation groups, PKK, SPP, <i>dasawisma</i>
Ngawi	Ndoyong	<i>Dasawisma</i> , <i>yasinan</i> groups, RT <i>arisan</i> , PKK, farmers' groups, Karang Taruna
	Jejeg	<i>Arisan</i> groups, Quran recitation groups, UPK, farmers' groups, stockbreeders' groups
West Sumatra		
Agam	Tanah Tinggi	Farmers' groups, <i>adat</i> groups, religious groups
	Koto Tengah	<i>Buhua arek</i> groups, religious groups, <i>Bundo Kandung</i> , farmers' groups, PKK
Solok	Darek	<i>Arisan</i> groups, farmers' groups, loan and savings cooperatives, youths' groups
	Bukik Barisan	Farmers' groups, KUBE groups, SPP groups
Dharmasraya	Taruko	<i>Majelis taklim</i> (groups focusing on Islamic studies), farmers' groups
	Gantuang	Farmers' groups, <i>yasinan</i> groups, SPP groups, <i>arisan</i> groups, <i>dasawisma</i> , <i>qosidahan</i> (singing Islamic songs) groups
Southeast Sulawesi		
Konawe Selatan	Cempaka	Farmers' groups, <i>arisan</i> groups, <i>majelis taklim</i>
	Anggrek	Bantesa groups, SPP groups, farmers' groups (males & females), males' <i>arisan</i> groups (<i>mepotaka</i>)
Konawe Utara	Mawar	<i>Arisan</i> groups, SPP groups, <i>majelis taklim</i> , farmers' groups, stockbreeders' groups
	Kamboja	<i>Arisan</i> groups, SPP groups, PKK, <i>majelis taklim</i> , farmers' groups, <i>adat</i> /brotherhood groups
Bombana	Melati	<i>Arisan groups</i> , art groups
	Kenanga	Farmers' groups, <i>arisan</i> groups, mosque youths' organizations

APPENDIX 5

Table A5. Decision-making in Study Villages

Province/ <i>Kabupaten</i>	Village	Those Involved	Those Making the Decisions
East Java			
Gresik	Kulon	Village officials (BPD, LKMD ^a , <i>kadus</i> , RT/RW), community figures	Through consultation/BPD, the village head is dominant
	Wetan	Village head, village apparatus, RT, RW, community figures, youth figures	Village elite in a consultative meeting/village head is dominant
Lumajang	Lor	Village officials, BPD, LKMD, community figures	Village elite in a consultative meeting/village head is dominant
	Kidul	Village officials, sometimes villagers are gathered to participate	Village elite in a consultative meeting
Ngawi	Ndoyong	Village officials (BPD, LKMD, <i>kadus</i> , RT/RW), sometimes PKK managers and community figures are present	Village elite in a consultative meeting
	Jejeg	Village officials (BPD, LKMD, <i>kadus</i> , RT/RW) sometimes PKK managers and community figures are present	Village elite in a consultative meeting/village head is dominant
West Sumatra			
Agam	Tanah Tinggi	<i>Nagari</i> officials and <i>ninik mamak</i> , concerned villagers ^b	<i>Nagari</i> elite in a consultative meeting, representatives of the tribes are dominant
	Koto Tengah	<i>Nagari</i> officials and community leaders	<i>Nagari</i> elite in a consultative meeting
Solok	Darek	<i>Nagari</i> officials, <i>ninik mamak</i> , religious scholars	<i>Nagari</i> elite in a consultative meeting
	Bukik Barisan	<i>Nagari</i> apparatus, <i>ninik mamak</i> , community figures, BMN ^c , <i>jong</i> head, KAN ^d , <i>Bundo Kandung</i>	<i>Nagari</i> elite in a consultative meeting
Dharmasraya	Taruko	Village officials and community figures	Village elite in a consultative meeting
	Gantuang	Community figures	Village elite in a consultative meeting
Southeast Sulawesi			
Konawe Selatan	Cempaka	Village officials and villagers	Villagers in a consultative meeting
	Anggrek	Village officials and villagers	Villagers in a consultative meeting ^e
Konawe Utara	Mawar	Village officials and villagers	Villagers in a consultative meeting ^e
	Kamboja	Village officials and villagers, but villagers are usually passive participants	Village elite in a consultative meeting
Bombana	Melati	Village officials, BPD, community figures, and <i>dusun</i> head	Village elite in a consultative meeting
	Kenanga	Village officials, representatives of the villagers	Village elite in a consultative meeting

^aLKMD, or Village Community Resilience Institution, is a government institution established to increase the village community's participation in development programs.

^bIf these villagers become victims of a construction project, such as a road widening project.

^c*Nagari* Consultative Council.

^d*Nagari* Customary Council.

^eThis refers to the process of PNPM only and does not normally happen.

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ISBN: 978-979-3872-890-2