Scores, Camera, Action? Incentivizing Teachers in Remote Areas

Policy Research

Poor teacher accountability leads to poor education quality, especially in remotely-located schools that are costly to supervise. This paper reports the impacts of three interventions that linked community-based monitoring to a government allowance for teachers working in remote areas in Indonesia. In all treatments, the project helped communities to formulate a joint commitment between schools and community members to improve education.

Teacher-specific scorecards were developed based on this commitment and performance was evaluated and disseminated by a newly-formed user committee. Treatments 2 and 3 added a pay for performance scheme that relied on the community reports. In Treatment 2 (SAM+Cam), the remote area allowance was made dependent on teacher presence, which was monitored with a camera with a time stamp. In Treatment 3 (SAM+Score), the overall score on the scorecard determined the allowance. We find improvements in learning outcomes across all treatments; however, the strongest impacts of between 0.17-0.20 standard deviations were observed for SAM+Cam.

In this treatment, teachers increased teaching hours and parents increased investments in their children’s education. We show evidence that bargaining and the community’s propensity to punish free-riders may have a role in affecting treatment effectiveness.

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This is one of a series of working papers from RISE—the large-scale education systems research programme supported by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

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Author 
Menno Pradhan
Arya Gaduh
Jan Priebe
Dewi Susanti
Author(s)
Menno Pradhan
Arya Gaduh
Jan Priebe
Dewi Susanti
Editor(s) 
Translator(s) 
Research Area 
West Kalimantan
Papua
West Papua
Research Topic 
Keywords 
Teacher incentives
community-based monitoring
performance pay
remote-area policy
Publication Type 
Working Paper